State v. Young

2024 Ohio 367

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 2, 2024
• Docket: 2023-CA-45
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Young, 2024-Ohio-367.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT GREENE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : Appellee : C.A. No. 2023-CA-45 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2023-CR-0234 : RODERICK K. YOUNG : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellant : :

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OPINION

Rendered on February 2, 2024

GLENDA A. SMITH, Attorney for Appellant

MEGAN A. HAMMOND, Attorney for Appellee

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HUFFMAN, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Roderick K. Young appeals from his conviction for

attempted aggravated assault following a guilty plea. For the reasons outlined below, we

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I. Factual and Procedural Background -2-

{¶ 2} In April 2023, Young was indicted on one count of strangulation and one

count of domestic violence. On June 20, 2023, Young pled guilty to an amended charge

of attempted aggravated assault in violation of R.C. 2923.02(A) and R.C. 2903.12(A)(1)

and domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A).

{¶ 3} At Young’s plea hearing, the State indicated that it would not oppose

community control sanctions at sentencing provided there was a mental health and

substance abuse evaluation of Young. However, the State also indicated that, if Young

failed to appear for the final disposition of the case, violated the terms of bond, or

committed a new offense before sentencing, the State would no longer be bound by its

recommendations and would be free to argue for any disposition it believed appropriate.

{¶ 4} One of the conditions of Young’s bond was that he would not consume any

form of illegal drugs, mood altering substances, or alcoholic beverages. As part of that

condition, Young was subject to drug testing, and before his disposition hearing, Young

tested positive for marijuana. On July 24, 2023, two days before Young’s disposition

hearing, a motion regarding a violation of bond due to Young’s positive marijuana test

was filed in the trial court.

{¶ 5} On July 26, 2023, at Young’s disposition hearing, the trial court summarily

found that Young’s attempted aggravated assault offense, a felony of the fifth degree,

was an offense of violence as defined in R.C. 2901.01 and that Young had violated the

terms and conditions of his bond by testing positive for marijuana. Based on these

circumstances, the trial court stated that it had discretion in imposing a prison sentence.

{¶ 6} The trial court sentenced Young to 12 months in prison on the attempted -3-

aggravated assault charge and to six months in jail on the domestic violence charge, to

be served concurrently, with 71 days jail time credit. Young timely appealed.

II. Assignment of Error

{¶ 7} Young asserts the following sole assignment of error:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT COMPLYING WITH THE

PURPOSES OF FELONY SENTENCING.

{¶ 8} Young contends that the trial court erred when it found that Young had

committed a violent offense with respect to the attempted aggravated assault charge and

then sentenced Young to one year in prison. More specifically, according to Young, the

trial court erred in imposing a prison term rather than community control sanctions

because there was no clear and convincing evidence of violence or serious physical harm

to another person.

{¶ 9} “When reviewing felony sentences, a court of appeals must apply the

standard of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G).” State v. Williams, 2d Dist. Greene No.

2021-CA-30, 2022-Ohio-2897, ¶ 18, citing State v. Farra, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.

28950, 2022-Ohio-1421, ¶ 73. Under that statute, an appellate court may increase,

reduce, or modify a sentence, or vacate it altogether and remand for resentencing, if it

“clearly and convincingly finds either (1) the record does not support certain specified

findings or (2) that the sentence imposed is contrary to law.” State v. Worthen, 2d Dist.

Montgomery No. 29043, 2021-Ohio-2788, ¶ 13.

{¶ 10} As we recently explained in State v. Bartley, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2022-

CA-28, 2023-Ohio-2325, ¶ 9, we may not independently “weigh the evidence in the record -4-

and substitute [our] judgment for that of the trial court concerning the sentence that best

reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242,

2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 42. “The inquiry is simply whether the sentence is

contrary to law.” Bartley at ¶ 9. “A sentence is contrary to law when it falls outside the

statutory range for the offense or if the sentencing court does not consider R.C. 2929.11

and 2929.12.” Id., citing State v. Dorsey, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28747, 2021-Ohio-76,

¶ 18.

{¶ 11} Under R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a), in general:

* * * “[I]f an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony of the fourth or fifth

degree that is not an offense of violence or that is a qualifying assault offense, the

court shall sentence the offender to a community control sanction or combination

of community control sanctions if all of the following apply:

(i) The offender previously has not been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a

felony offense.

(ii) The most serious charge against the offender at the time of sentencing

is a felony of the fourth or fifth degree.

(iii) The offender previously has not been convicted of or pleaded guilty to

a misdemeanor offense of violence that the offender committed within two

years prior to the offense for which sentence is being imposed.

(Emphasis added.)

{¶ 12} However, a trial court has discretion to impose a prison term upon an

offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony of the fourth or fifth degree that -5-

either is an offense of violence or that is not an offense of violence but is a qualifying

assault offense under certain circumstances, including when “[t]he offender violated a

term of the conditions of bond as set by the court.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2929.13

(B)(1)(b)(ii) and (iii).

{¶ 13} When a trial court has discretion to impose a prison term, “* * * in

determining whether to impose a prison term as a sanction for a felony of the fourth or

fifth degree, the sentencing court shall comply with the purposes and principles of

sentencing” under R.C. 2929.11 and with R.C. 2929.12. R.C. 2929.13(B)(2). “[N]either

R.C. 2929.11 nor 2929.12 requires a trial court to make any specific factual findings on

the record.” State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 20,

citing State v. Wilson, 129 Ohio St.3d 214, 2011-Ohio-2669, 951 N.E.2d 381, ¶ 31; State

v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215, 724 N.E.2d 793 (2000).

{¶ 14} The three overriding purposes of felony sentencing are “to protect the public

from future crime by the offender and others, to punish the offender, and to promote the

effective rehabilitation of the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court

determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state

or local government resources.” R.C. 2929.11(A). “To achieve those purposes, the

sentencing court shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the

offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution

to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.” Id. A sentence imposed for a felony shall

be reasonably calculated to achieve the three overriding purposes of felony sentencing,

“commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and -6-

its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes

committed by similar offenders.” R.C. 2929.11(B).

{¶ 15} R.C. 2929.12 addresses several factors to be considered by the trial court

when imposing a sentence under R.C. 2929.11, underscoring that a court imposing a

sentence upon an offender for a felony has discretion to determine the most effective way

to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11. R.C.

2929.12(A). R.C. 2929.12(B) through (F) then set out factors for the court to consider

relating to matters such as the seriousness of the offender’s conduct, the likelihood of the

offender’s recidivism, and the offender’s service in the armed forces of the United States.

The trial court may also “consider any other factors that are relevant to achieving those

purposes and principles of sentencing.” R.C. 2929.12(A).

{¶ 16} In this case, Young contends that his attempted aggravated assault offense

was not an offense of violence or a qualifying assault offense for prison sentencing

because there was no evidence of serious physical harm to another person. In so arguing,

Young contends that he should have only been sentenced to community control sanctions

and, thus, the trial court erred in exercising discretion to sentence him to prison. Young

also contends that the trial court erred in failing to consider the purposes of felony

sentencing; thus, his sentence was not supported by the record and was contrary to law.

We disagree.

{¶ 17} In sentencing Young, the trial court stated that it had discretion to impose a

prison sentence for Young’s attempted aggravated assault conviction and then read from

the statute the possible alternative reasons for which an offender like Young could be -7-

sentenced to prison, including pleading guilty to a fifth-degree felony offense of violence

or any offense for which a mandatory prison term was required, violating a condition of

his bond by testing positive for marijuana, committing a qualifying assault offense that

caused serious physical harm to another person while carrying out the offense, or not

committing a qualifying assault offense but still causing physical harm to another person

while executing the offense.

{¶ 18} With respect to Young’s first argument that the trial court did not have

discretion to sentence him to prison, we note that an offense of attempted aggravated

assault is an offense of violence. State v. Rybak, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2011-L-084, 2012-

Ohio-1791, ¶ 22; State v. D.G., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103861, 2016-Ohio-7609, ¶ 3;

State v. Roark, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2018-02-019, 2018-Ohio-3549, ¶ 16; State v.

C.D.D, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-130, 2019-Ohio-4754, ¶ 10. As a result, we agree

with the State and the trial court that the presumption of community control sanctions was

inapplicable in this case because Young had been convicted of an offense of violence

felony of the fifth degree. Although Young argues there was insufficient evidence in the

record that he had caused serious physical harm to another person while committing the

offense, we note that the trial court did not make specific factual findings regarding

whether Young’s actions caused serious physical harm to another, nor was the trial court

required to make those findings; Young had been convicted of an offense of violence,

which, by itself, afforded the trial court discretion in sentencing Young to prison. Moreover,

there was undisputed evidence that Young had violated the conditions of his bond by

testing positive for marijuana, which also afforded the trial court with discretion in -8-

sentencing Young to prison. Therefore, we agree that the trial court had discretion in

imposing a prison sentence for Young’s attempted aggravated assault conviction.

{¶ 19} Next, in determining whether to impose a prison term as a sanction for

Young’s offense of violence felony conviction, the trial court was required to comply with

the purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. We

conclude that it did.

{¶ 20} At Young’s disposition hearing, the trial court questioned Young about his

version of the events relevant to his convictions and allowed the victim to provide a victim

impact statement. The trial court expressed its concern that, even in his apology letter to

the victim, Young did not take responsibility for his actions against her. The trial court

explained that it had considered the record, oral statements, the presentence

investigation report, and the victim impact statement, and that it had also considered the

purposes of felony sentencing, had balanced the seriousness and recidivism factors, and

had contemplated the need for deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and restitution.

The trial court stated that it was guided by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing,

including protection of the public from future crime by Young, punishment of Young, and

promotion of effective rehabilitation of Young using the minimum sanction that the court

determined accomplished those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on

state or local government resources. The court then concluded that, after considering the

factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12, a prison term in this case was consistent with the

purposes of sentencing as set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and that Young was not amenable to

any available community control sanction. The court reasoned that community control -9-

sanctions would demean the seriousness of Young’s conduct and its impact on his victim

and, thus, a prison sentence was not only commensurate with the seriousness of his

conduct and the consequential victim impact but also would not pose an unnecessary

burden on government resources.

{¶ 21} Our inquiry is limited to whether Young’s sentence was contrary to law. In

making that determination, we are limited to considering only whether Young’s sentence

fell outside the statutory range for the offense or if the sentencing court did not consider

R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. There is no dispute that Young’s sentence was within the

statutory range for fifth-degree felonies. Additionally, while the trial court did not discuss

every factor set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 when sentencing Young, the court

considered the purposes of felony sentencing, balanced the seriousness and recidivism

factors, contemplated the need for deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and

restitution, and was guided by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing. R.C. 2929.11

and R.C. 2929.12 do not require a trial court to make any specific factual findings on the

record, and thus the trial court was not obligated to specifically provide every factor that

it considered in sentencing Young. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial

court complied with the purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and

R.C. 2929.12, and therefore we cannot say Young’s sentence was not supported by the

record and was contrary to law.

{¶ 22} Young’s sole assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 23} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. -10-

WELBAUM, J. and TUCKER, J., concur.