State v. Young

26 Iowa 122
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedDecember 10, 1868
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 26 Iowa 122 (State v. Young) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Young, 26 Iowa 122 (iowa 1868).

Opinion

Cole, J.

Criminal law: maliciously threatening to injure another. — The charging part of the indictment is as follows: “The said Charles Toung, at, etc., feloniously and maliciously did threaten to shoot one George W. Pressley, then and there being, with intent then and there thereby, by means of said threat, to compel the said George ~W. Pressley to submit to his person being searched,' the same being against the will of him, the said George W. Pressley, and contrary to the form of the statute, in such case made and provided.” The section of the statute under which the indictment was found, is as follows: “Sec. 4218 (2590). If any person, either verbally or by any written or printed communication, maliciously threaten to accuse another of a crime or offense, or to do any injury to the person or property of another, with intent thereby to extort any money or pecuniary advantage whatever, or to compel the person so threatened to do any act against his will, he shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not more than two years, or by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars.”

The only question presented for our decision, is as to the sufficiency of the indictment under the statute quoted. The appellant’s counsel claim that extortion or pecuniary advantage are the principal and necessary ingredients in the offense, and must be charged in the indictment, or it is bad.

The indictment is sufficient. The statute defines the crimes and prescribes the penalty for the doing of either one of two things: First, to maliciously' threaten, etc., with intent to extort money or pecuniary advantage; second, to maliciously threaten, etc., with intent to compel the person threatened to do an act against his will. This indictment charges the latter. For the purpose of showing the true interpretation of the statute and that the offense charged is within it, the section may be read [124]*124so as to omit tlie language applicable to tbe first offense above specified, as follows: If any person verbally * * maliciously threaten * * to do any injury to the person of another, with intent * * to compel the person so threatened to do any act against his will, he shall be punished, etc. That this is the correct construction of the statute we have no doubt.

. Affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

State v. Wilbourn
257 N.W. 571 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1934)
State v. Essex
250 N.W. 895 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1933)
State v. Browning
153 Iowa 37 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1911)
People v. Triscoli
21 N.Y. Crim. 1 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1907)
State v. Todd
82 N.W. 322 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1900)
People v. Whittemore
61 N.W. 13 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1894)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
26 Iowa 122, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-young-iowa-1868.