State v. Yell

Supreme Court of New Hampshire

State v. Yell

178 A.2d 289, 104 N.H. 87, 1962 N.H. LEXIS 22

CourtSupreme Court of New Hampshire

DecidedMarch 6, 1962

Docket5020

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 178 A.2d 289 (State v. Yell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Yell, 178 A.2d 289, 104 N.H. 87, 1962 N.H. LEXIS 22 (N.H. 1962).

Pincite

Opinion

Wheeler, J.

The principal contention of the defendant is that the indictment fails to allege that the embezzlement was committed with criminal intent and that the words “fraudulently convert” are not sufficient. In indictments for offenses created by statute it is generally sufficient to describe the events in the words of the statute. State v. Goodwin, 101 N. H. 252, 253. The exception to the general rule is where the capacity in which the defendant acted is alleged in too general terms and those too vague to enable the defendant to prepare for trial in the absence of additional specifications. State v. Goodwin, supra.

The word “fraudulent” in an indictment charging embezzlement includes an “intent” to do the act and is descriptive of the motive. See 17A Words & Phrases, “Fraudulently,” intent (p. 164); People v. Swenson, 127 Cal. App. 2d 658.

The defendant here was charged with fraudulently converting to his own use $16,000 of funds belonging to the Raymond E. Walton Post, No. 70, American Legion of Seabrook, which had been entrusted to him in his official capacity as finance officer. The indictment follows the wording of the statute and the capacity in *89 which the defendant acted is described with sufficient definiteness and fully states all the essential elements of the offense charged. State v. Farwell, 102 N. H. 3, and cases cited.

Exceptions overruled.

All concurred.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Wheeler, J.

The principal contention of the defendant is that the indictment fails to allege that the embezzlement was committed with criminal intent and that the words “fraudulently convert” are not sufficient. In indictments for offenses created by statute it is generally sufficient to describe the events in the words of the statute. State v. Goodwin, 101 N. H. 252, 253. The exception to the general rule is where the capacity in which the defendant acted is alleged in too general terms and those too vague to enable the defendant to prepare for trial in the absence of additional specifications. State v. Goodwin, supra.

The word “fraudulent” in an indictment charging embezzlement includes an “intent” to do the act and is descriptive of the motive. See 17A Words & Phrases, “Fraudulently,” intent (p. 164); People v. Swenson, 127 Cal. App. 2d 658.

The defendant here was charged with fraudulently converting to his own use $16,000 of funds belonging to the Raymond E. Walton Post, No. 70, American Legion of Seabrook, which had been entrusted to him in his official capacity as finance officer. The indictment follows the wording of the statute and the capacity in *89 which the defendant acted is described with sufficient definiteness and fully states all the essential elements of the offense charged. State v. Farwell, 102 N. H. 3, and cases cited.

Exceptions overruled.

All concurred.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

178 A.2d 289, 104 N.H. 87, 1962 N.H. LEXIS 22, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-yell-nh-1962.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack