State v. Yeigh

2024 Ohio 2348

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 17, 2024
• Docket: 2023 CA 0054
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Yeigh, 2024-Ohio-2348.]

COURT OF APPEALS RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO, : JUDGES: : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J. Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. -vs- : : TIMOTHY YEIGH, : Case No. 2023 CA 0054 : Defendant - Appellant : OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2021-CR-0022

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT: June 17, 2024

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant

JODIE SCHUMACHER TODD W. BARSTOW Prosecuting Attorney 261 West Johnstown Road Suite 204 Richland County, Ohio Columbus, Ohio 43230

By: OLIVIA A. BOYER Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 38 South Park Street Mansfield, Ohio 44902 Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0054 2

Baldwin, J.

{¶1} The appellant, Timothy Yeigh, appeals the trial court’s judgment entry

denying the appellant’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment. The appellee is the State of

Ohio. The relevant facts leading to the appeal are as follows.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE CASE

{¶2} On January 7, 2022, the Richland County Grand Jury indicted the appellant

with one count of Failure to Provide Notice of Change of Address in violation of R.C.

§2950.05(F)(1) and one count of Escape in violation of R.C. §2921.34(A)(3).

{¶3} On April 26, 2022, the appellant filed a Motion of Availability with the clerk

of courts.

{¶4} On August 18, 2022, the appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss.

{¶5} On September 27, 2022, the State filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus ad

Prosequendrum, requesting the appellant be brought from the Northeast Ohio Correction

Center to Richland County.

{¶6} On October 4, 2022, the State filed its objections to the appellant’s Motion

to Dismiss.

{¶7} On December 30, 2022, the trial court overruled the appellant’s Motion to

Dismiss.

{¶8} On February 14, 2023, the State filed a second Writ of Habeas Corpus ad

Prosequendrum.

{¶9} On March 3, 2023, the appellant was arraigned, and the trial court appointed

counsel. Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0054 3

{¶10} On August 30, 2023, pursuant to a plea deal, the appellant entered a plea

of no contest to the Failure to Provide Notice of Change of Address. The State dismissed

the Escape charge. The trial court imposed a sentence of three years consecutive to any

sentence the appellant was currently serving.

{¶11} The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and raised the following

Assignment of Error:

{¶12} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT BY

OVERRULING HIS MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT.”

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶13} In reviewing the denial of the appellant’s motion to dismiss, we are required

to determine whether, as a matter of law, “ ‘the trial court erred in applying the substantive

law to the facts of the case.’ ” State v. Gill, 8th Dist. No. 82742, 2004-Ohio-1245, ¶8,

quoting State v. Williams, 94 Ohio App.3d 538, 641 N.E.2d 239 (8th Dist.1994).

ANALYSIS

{¶14} The appellant alleges the trial court erred in denying the appellant’s Motion

to Dismiss. We disagree.

{¶15} As a preliminary matter, we note R.C. §2941.401 applies when a person

has “entered upon a term of imprisonment in a correctional institution of this state[.]” R.C.

§2963.30, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”), applies when a person has

“entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state.”

{¶16} The appellant entered upon a term of imprisonment through the federal

government at the Bureau of Prisons Federal Correctional Institution in Terre Haute,

Indiana. The U.S. Marshals Service temporarily moved the appellant to the Northeast Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0054 4

Ohio Correctional Center in Youngstown, Ohio. The U.S. Marshals Service maintained

custody and control of the appellant the entire time. Therefore, R.C. §2963.30 “governs

the procedures by which a criminal defendant incarcerated in another jurisdiction must be

brought to trial on outstanding charges in a party state.” State v. Harvey, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 98906, 2013-Ohio-2332, ¶9.

{¶17} In the case sub judice, the appellant argues that if R.C. §2941.401 does not

apply, then the State failed to file a detainer required by R.C. §2963.30. In addition, if we

find that the State filed a detainer, then the appellant substantially complied with the

requirements of R.C. §2963.30, Article III(a) and (b). We disagree.

{¶18} “IAD outlines two procedures by which a prisoner against whom a detainer

has been lodged may be transferred to the temporary custody of another state for

disposition of charges pending there.” State v. Black, 142 Ohio St.3d 332, 2015-Ohio-

513, ¶8. “ ‘One of these procedures may be invoked by the prisoner; the other by the

prosecuting attorney of the receiving State.’ ” Id., quoting Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433,

444, 101 S.Ct. 703 (1981). In the case sub judice, the appellant initiated the procedure.

{¶19} Therefore, “a federal prisoner must be brought to trial within 180 days

following the delivery of written notice to the appropriate trial court and prosecutor’s office

accompanied by” documentation outlined in Article III(A) of R.C. §2963.30. State v.

Barrett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94434, 2010-Ohio-5139, ¶10, citing R.C. §2963.30, Article

III(a). Specifically, “Article III(b) requires the prisoner to send written notice requesting

final disposition to the ‘warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having

custody of him.’ ” Id. quoting R.C. §2963.30, Article III(b). The prisoner’s request must be

accompanied by a certificate from the official who has custody of the prisoner. The Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0054 5

certificate must state “the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the

time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good

time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state

parole agency relating to the prisoner.” R.C. §2963.30, Article III(a). The appropriate

official is then required to forward the written notice and the accompanying documentation

“to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return

receipt requested.” R.C. §2963.30, Article III(b).

{¶20} “[T]he one-hundred-eighty-day time period set forth in R.C. 2963.30 * * *

begins to run when a prisoner substantially complies with the requirements of the statute

set forth in Article III(a) and (b) thereof.” State v. Mourey, 64 Ohio St.3d 482, 485 (1992).

“ ‘ “Substantial compliance” requires the defendant to do “everything that could be

reasonably expected.’ ” Barrett, 2010-Ohio-5139, at ¶11, quoting State v. Quinones, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86959, 2006-Ohio-4096, ¶17, quoting State v. Ferguson, 41 Ohio

App.3d 306, 311 (10th Dist.1987).

{¶21} To determine whether Article III of R.C. §2963.30 is applicable to Yeigh’s

case, we must first determine whether the State lodged a detainer against Yeigh. See

State v. Hornsby, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28322, 2020-Ohio-1526, ¶11. “Although the

term ‘detainer’ is not defined in the IAD, the agreement, by its terms, makes the existence

of a detainer a prerequisite to its applicability.” State v. Wells, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 93AP-

1039, 94 Ohio App.3d 48, citing United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 347-351, 98 S.Ct.

1834 (1978).

{¶22} Given the means employed in Article III to achieve the IAD’s purpose, the

detainer requirement of the IAD is simply to ensure that prison officials in a “sending state” Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0054 6

have in fact received official notice of criminal charges pending in another state against

an inmate; it is not intended to impose technical requirements regarding the form of that

notice, as such technical requirements would frustrate the very purpose of the agreement

by rendering it inapplicable in many cases where prison officials have in fact been notified

that charges are pending in another state against one of their inmates.

Wells at 53.

{¶23} “Further, the history of IAD reveals that both the drafters of the agreement

and the United States Congress had broad and general understandings of what

constituted a ‘detainer’ for purposes of IAD.” Id. “[A] detainer is ‘a request filed by a

criminal justice agency with the institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking the

institution either to hold the prisoner for the agency or to notify the agency when [the]

release of the prisoner is imminent.’ ” State v. Sanchez, 110 Ohio St.3d 274, 2006-Ohio-

4478, ¶19, quoting Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 87 L.Ed.2d 516

(1985). Additionally, in Carchman, the United States Supreme Court explained the

legislative history of the IAD. The drafters of the IAD, the Council of State Governments,

explained detainers as follows: “ ‘[a] detainer may be defined as a warrant filed against a

person already in custody with the purpose of insuring that he will be available to the

authority which has placed the detainer.’ ” Carchman at 726-727, 105 S.Ct. 3401, quoting

Suggested State Legislation, Program for 1957, 74 (1956). However, “[a] writ of habeas

corpus ad prosequendum issued by a federal court to state authorities … is not a detainer

within the meaning of the [IAD].” United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 341, 98 S.Ct.1834,

1837, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978). Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0054 7

{¶24} In the case sub judice, the State issued a warrant for the appellant’s arrest

upon the appellant’s indictment on January 7, 2022. The appellant filed a Motion of

Availability on April 26, 2022, citing the case number, and a Motion to Dismiss filed on

August 18, 2022, which Yeigh argues is a request for disposition. The State filed a writ of

habeas corpus ad prosequendum and argues that this operates as a detainer. However,

the United States Supreme Court found in Mauro that such a writ is not a detainer. Id.

The record is somewhat sparse as to the facts around how the detainer was lodged, but

the appellant’s filings show the officials having custody over Yeigh communicated that a

detainer was lodged against the appellant and that the appellant knew to request a final

disposition of the indictment. Therefore, in the facts of this case, the warrant was a

sufficient detainer as contemplated by R.C. §2963.30.

{¶25} Next, we must determine whether the appellant substantially complied with

the procedures of R.C. §2963.30. The appellant’s Motion of Availability states: “I Timothy

Andrew Yeigh on April 20, 2022 submits this handwritten motion to the respected court in

regards to the following case #2021CR0022R[.][sic]” Appellant’s Motion of Availability.

The appellant’s address and federal inmate number are listed after that paragraph. No

other information is included in the Motion of Availability. The appellant fails to follow the

procedure set forth in R.C. §2963.30. The record does not show the appellant provides

written notice and request for final disposition to the appropriate official having custody of

the appellant; the appellant fails to file a certificate from the appropriate official stating the

term of commitment under which the appellant is being held, the time already served, the

time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time

of parole eligibility of the appellant, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0054 8

to the appellant. The appellant also argues the August 18, 2022 Motion to Dismiss

functions as a request for final disposition. However, this too is filed directly with clerk of

courts and was not given to the appropriate official with custody over the appellant and

no certificate containing the information required by R.C. §2963.30, Article III(a) was

provided. Therefore, we find the appellant has not substantially complied with the

requirements of R.C. §2963.30, Article III(a) and (b).

{¶26} Accordingly, the appellant’s sole Assignment of Error is overruled.

CONCLUSION

{¶27} For the forgoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of

Richland County, Ohio, is hereby affirmed.

By: Baldwin, J.

Delaney, P.J. and

Hoffman, J. concur.