[Cite as State v. Yang, 2025-Ohio-691.]
COURT OF APPEALS DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: : Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Jason P. Smith, J. : Hon. Michael D. Hess, J. -vs- : : Judges Smith and Hess JING YANG : Sitting by Assignment by the : Supreme Court of Ohio Defendant-Appellant : : Case No. 24 CAC 05 0029 : : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Municipal Court, Case No. 24 TRC 00148
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: February 28, 2025
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
TYLER A. SANDERS WILLIAM T. CRAMER 70 North Union Street 1554 Polaris Parkway, Suite 325 Delaware, OH 43015 Columbus, OH 43240 Smith, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant, Jing Yang, appeals his July 19, 2023 sentence from
the Municipal Court of Delaware County, Ohio, challenging the order of restitution.
Plaintiff-Appellee is the State of Ohio. We affirm the trial court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} On January 5, 2024, Yang crashed into the rear of an Ohio State Highway
Patrol cruiser while the trooper was stopped on the side of the road helping another
motorist. Yang exhibited an odor of alcohol and bloodshot, glassy eyes; he appeared to
have urinated on himself. Despite a language barrier, Yang agreed to submit to a breath
test which produced a blood alcohol level of .16.
{¶ 3} Yang was charged with five offenses and on April 3, 2024, pled no contest
to driving while under the influence of alcohol in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a); the
trial court found Yang guilty. The remaining charges were dismissed. The state
requested a restitution order in the amount of $16,874.60 payable to the Ohio Treasurer
of State for damages to the cruiser, the amount remaining after Yang's insurance paid his
policy limit of $10,000. Yang requested a hearing on the issue of restitution and the trial
court ordered briefs on the issue of capping restitution under Marsy's Law; each side filed
memorandums. A joint restitution and sentencing hearing was held on April 19, 2024.
The trial court acknowledged the issue of restitution under Marsy's Law was "somewhat
of a gray area," but found under the facts of the case, the state was a victim and entitled
to full restitution. April 19, 2024 T. at 10-11. By final judgment entry filed on the same
date, the trial court sentenced Yang to 180 days in jail, 177 days suspended and the remaining three days suspended in lieu of completing the Driver Intervention Program,
and ordered him to pay restitution in the amount of $16,874.60 to the State of Ohio.
{¶ 4} Yang filed an appeal with the following assignment of error:
I
{¶ 5} "THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED R.C. 4511.19(G)(7) BY REQUIRING
APPELLANT TO PAY MORE THAN $5,000 IN RESTITUTION."
{¶ 6} In his sole assignment of error, Yang claims the trial court violated R.C.
4511.19(G)(7) in ordering him to pay more than $5,000 in restitution. We disagree.
{¶ 7} The issue of who constitutes a "victim" under R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) and
likewise R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) or to whom restitution may appropriately be awarded under
the statutes is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-81,
¶ 6 (1st Dist.), citing State v. Cartwright, 2017-Ohio-7212, ¶ 11 (12th Dist.); see also,
State v. Shifflet, 2015-Ohio-4250, ¶ 54 (4th Dist.).
{¶ 8} R.C. 4511.19 governs the offense of driving while under the influence.
Subsection (G)(7) states the following:
In all cases in which an offender is sentenced under division (G) of
this section, the offender shall provide the court with proof of financial
responsibility as defined in section 4509.01 of the Revised Code. If the
offender fails to provide that proof of financial responsibility, the court, in
addition to any other penalties provided by law, may order restitution
pursuant to section 2929.18 or 2929.28 of the Revised Code in an amount not exceeding five thousand dollars for any economic loss arising from an
accident or collision that was the direct and proximate result of the
offender's operation of the vehicle before, during, or after committing the
offense for which the offender is sentenced under division (G) of this
section.
{¶ 9} In his April 18, 2024 memorandum on issue of restitution, Yang did not
dispute the amount of estimated damages, but argued he was not legally obligated to pay
any additional restitution because his insurance carrier paid his policy limit of $10,000.
He argued because he was insured, albeit underinsured, subsection (G)(7) does not
apply in his case. Further, the State of Ohio has already been paid an amount exceeding
the $5,000 restitution cap mandated in the subsection. Yang acknowledged that Marsy's
Law states a crime victim has the right to "full and timely restitution from the person that
committed the criminal offense." Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a(A)(7). The law defines a victim
as "a person against whom the criminal offense or delinquent act is committed or who is
directly and proximately harmed by the commission of the offense or act." Id. at § 10a(D).
The law does not define "person." Yang argued the State of Ohio is not a victim for
expenses incurred while engaged in a governmental function and therefore the state was
not a victim in this case as contemplated by Marsy's Law.
{¶ 10} In support of his argument, Yang cited the Supreme Court of Ohio's opinion
in City of Centerville v. Knab, 2020-Ohio-5219. In Knab, Centerville police officers
responded to false 9-1-1 calls. Knab was convicted of making a false report to law
enforcement and improper use of the 9-1-1 emergency system. As part of his sentence, the trial court ordered Knab to pay Centerville $1,375.56 in restitution for the costs
incurred in responding to Knab's calls. On appeal, the Second District reviewed the
restitution order under R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) which governs financial sanctions. City of
Centerville v. Knab, 2019-Ohio-1903 (2d Dist.). Under the statute, trial courts may impose
a restitution order on misdemeanants for the benefit of the victim "in an amount based on
the victim's economic loss." The Second District analyzed various definitions of the word
"victim" including the definition included in Marsy's Law, and stated: "Although we agree
that Marsy's Law does expand the meaning of the term 'victim,' we do not find that it
expressly authorizes sentencing courts to characterize law enforcement agencies as
victims who are entitled to restitution due to their efforts in carrying out their official duties."
Id. at ¶ 31. The court concluded the Centerville Police Department was not a "victim"
under R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) and vacated the restitution order. Id.
{¶ 11} On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Second District, holding
"a municipality is not a victim and has no right to restitution under Marsy's Law." Knab,
2020-Ohio-5219, at ¶ 1. However, the Court acknowledged some courts "have suggested
that there may be some limited situations in which a governmental agency may be a victim
entitled to restitution" and cited the case of State v. Turner, 2018-Ohio-2860 (2d Dist.).
Id. at ¶ 20.
{¶ 12} In Turner, a case decided by the Second District ten months prior to its
decision in Knab, the court reviewed a restitution order imposed on an offender convicted
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[Cite as State v. Yang, 2025-Ohio-691.]
COURT OF APPEALS DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: : Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Jason P. Smith, J. : Hon. Michael D. Hess, J. -vs- : : Judges Smith and Hess JING YANG : Sitting by Assignment by the : Supreme Court of Ohio Defendant-Appellant : : Case No. 24 CAC 05 0029 : : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Municipal Court, Case No. 24 TRC 00148
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: February 28, 2025
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
TYLER A. SANDERS WILLIAM T. CRAMER 70 North Union Street 1554 Polaris Parkway, Suite 325 Delaware, OH 43015 Columbus, OH 43240 Smith, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant, Jing Yang, appeals his July 19, 2023 sentence from
the Municipal Court of Delaware County, Ohio, challenging the order of restitution.
Plaintiff-Appellee is the State of Ohio. We affirm the trial court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} On January 5, 2024, Yang crashed into the rear of an Ohio State Highway
Patrol cruiser while the trooper was stopped on the side of the road helping another
motorist. Yang exhibited an odor of alcohol and bloodshot, glassy eyes; he appeared to
have urinated on himself. Despite a language barrier, Yang agreed to submit to a breath
test which produced a blood alcohol level of .16.
{¶ 3} Yang was charged with five offenses and on April 3, 2024, pled no contest
to driving while under the influence of alcohol in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a); the
trial court found Yang guilty. The remaining charges were dismissed. The state
requested a restitution order in the amount of $16,874.60 payable to the Ohio Treasurer
of State for damages to the cruiser, the amount remaining after Yang's insurance paid his
policy limit of $10,000. Yang requested a hearing on the issue of restitution and the trial
court ordered briefs on the issue of capping restitution under Marsy's Law; each side filed
memorandums. A joint restitution and sentencing hearing was held on April 19, 2024.
The trial court acknowledged the issue of restitution under Marsy's Law was "somewhat
of a gray area," but found under the facts of the case, the state was a victim and entitled
to full restitution. April 19, 2024 T. at 10-11. By final judgment entry filed on the same
date, the trial court sentenced Yang to 180 days in jail, 177 days suspended and the remaining three days suspended in lieu of completing the Driver Intervention Program,
and ordered him to pay restitution in the amount of $16,874.60 to the State of Ohio.
{¶ 4} Yang filed an appeal with the following assignment of error:
I
{¶ 5} "THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED R.C. 4511.19(G)(7) BY REQUIRING
APPELLANT TO PAY MORE THAN $5,000 IN RESTITUTION."
{¶ 6} In his sole assignment of error, Yang claims the trial court violated R.C.
4511.19(G)(7) in ordering him to pay more than $5,000 in restitution. We disagree.
{¶ 7} The issue of who constitutes a "victim" under R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) and
likewise R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) or to whom restitution may appropriately be awarded under
the statutes is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-81,
¶ 6 (1st Dist.), citing State v. Cartwright, 2017-Ohio-7212, ¶ 11 (12th Dist.); see also,
State v. Shifflet, 2015-Ohio-4250, ¶ 54 (4th Dist.).
{¶ 8} R.C. 4511.19 governs the offense of driving while under the influence.
Subsection (G)(7) states the following:
In all cases in which an offender is sentenced under division (G) of
this section, the offender shall provide the court with proof of financial
responsibility as defined in section 4509.01 of the Revised Code. If the
offender fails to provide that proof of financial responsibility, the court, in
addition to any other penalties provided by law, may order restitution
pursuant to section 2929.18 or 2929.28 of the Revised Code in an amount not exceeding five thousand dollars for any economic loss arising from an
accident or collision that was the direct and proximate result of the
offender's operation of the vehicle before, during, or after committing the
offense for which the offender is sentenced under division (G) of this
section.
{¶ 9} In his April 18, 2024 memorandum on issue of restitution, Yang did not
dispute the amount of estimated damages, but argued he was not legally obligated to pay
any additional restitution because his insurance carrier paid his policy limit of $10,000.
He argued because he was insured, albeit underinsured, subsection (G)(7) does not
apply in his case. Further, the State of Ohio has already been paid an amount exceeding
the $5,000 restitution cap mandated in the subsection. Yang acknowledged that Marsy's
Law states a crime victim has the right to "full and timely restitution from the person that
committed the criminal offense." Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a(A)(7). The law defines a victim
as "a person against whom the criminal offense or delinquent act is committed or who is
directly and proximately harmed by the commission of the offense or act." Id. at § 10a(D).
The law does not define "person." Yang argued the State of Ohio is not a victim for
expenses incurred while engaged in a governmental function and therefore the state was
not a victim in this case as contemplated by Marsy's Law.
{¶ 10} In support of his argument, Yang cited the Supreme Court of Ohio's opinion
in City of Centerville v. Knab, 2020-Ohio-5219. In Knab, Centerville police officers
responded to false 9-1-1 calls. Knab was convicted of making a false report to law
enforcement and improper use of the 9-1-1 emergency system. As part of his sentence, the trial court ordered Knab to pay Centerville $1,375.56 in restitution for the costs
incurred in responding to Knab's calls. On appeal, the Second District reviewed the
restitution order under R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) which governs financial sanctions. City of
Centerville v. Knab, 2019-Ohio-1903 (2d Dist.). Under the statute, trial courts may impose
a restitution order on misdemeanants for the benefit of the victim "in an amount based on
the victim's economic loss." The Second District analyzed various definitions of the word
"victim" including the definition included in Marsy's Law, and stated: "Although we agree
that Marsy's Law does expand the meaning of the term 'victim,' we do not find that it
expressly authorizes sentencing courts to characterize law enforcement agencies as
victims who are entitled to restitution due to their efforts in carrying out their official duties."
Id. at ¶ 31. The court concluded the Centerville Police Department was not a "victim"
under R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) and vacated the restitution order. Id.
{¶ 11} On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Second District, holding
"a municipality is not a victim and has no right to restitution under Marsy's Law." Knab,
2020-Ohio-5219, at ¶ 1. However, the Court acknowledged some courts "have suggested
that there may be some limited situations in which a governmental agency may be a victim
entitled to restitution" and cited the case of State v. Turner, 2018-Ohio-2860 (2d Dist.).
Id. at ¶ 20.
{¶ 12} In Turner, a case decided by the Second District ten months prior to its
decision in Knab, the court reviewed a restitution order imposed on an offender convicted
of failing to comply with an order to stop which resulted in the offender colliding with an
Ohio State Highway Patrol cruiser; the restitution order in the amount of $26,897.41 was
made payable to the state treasurer for damages sustained to the cruiser. The Second District reviewed the order under R.C. 2929.18(A)(1). Under the statute, like R.C.
2929.28(A)(1) but pertaining to felony offenses, trial courts may impose a restitution order
on felony offenders for the benefit of the victim "in an amount based on the victim's
economic loss." The Second District determined the restitution order fell squarely within
the exception to "the general rule that governmental agencies are not 'victims' of crimes
to which they respond in their official capacities, including, specifically, 'vandalism or
destruction of governmental property.'" Id. at ¶ 15, quoting State v. Christian, 2014-Ohio-
2672, ¶ 126 (2d Dist.), rev'd on other grounds, 2015-Ohio-3374.1 The court concluded:
"In sum, although law enforcement agencies generally are not entitled to receive
restitution for expenditures related to their investigation of or response to crimes, they are
'victims' entitled to restitution in situations such as this one, where OSHP property was
damaged by Turner's criminal conduct." Id. at ¶ 17. The court did not discuss Marsy's
Law although it was in effect at the time.2
{¶ 13} Here, the trial court found under the facts of the case, the state was a victim
and entitled to full restitution. April 19, 2024 T. at 11. We agree. Just like Turner, Yang's
criminal conduct in driving under the influence of alcohol caused damage to an Ohio State
Highway Patrol cruiser; a cruiser that was not dispatched in relation to him, but parked on
the side of the road helping another motorist. The state was not seeking restitution as a
"victim" carrying out its official duties; it was seeking restitution for its economic damages
1In Christian, the Second District reversed the restitution order after determining the state
agencies involved were not victims as they were responding to the crimes in their official capacities. Christian, 2014-Ohio-2672, at ¶ 128-129 (2d Dist.). 2Although the Second District upheld the restitution award to the state, it reversed the
amount of the restitution in light of the evidence presented and remanded the matter back to the trial court for further consideration of the actual amount of the state's economic loss. Turner, 2018-Ohio-2860, at ¶ 21-22, 27 (2d Dist.). incurred as a result of Yang's criminal conduct. As noted above, the Supreme Court
acknowledged "there may be some limited situations in which a governmental agency
may be a victim entitled to restitution." We agree this is such a case and the state qualifies
as a "victim" under Marsy's Law entitled to "full and timely restitution from the person that
committed the criminal offense." Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a(A)(7).
{¶ 14} As stated by the Supreme Court of Ohio: "It is elementary that a statute
must be sustained and enforced unless it is in clear and irreconcilable conflict with some
express provision of the Constitution; and, on the other hand, that if the constitutional
provision and the legislative enactment are so clearly in conflict that they cannot both
stand the statutory provision must of course fall." State ex rel. Price v. Huwe, 105 Ohio
St. 304, 306 (1922). Accordingly, Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10a(A)(7) prevails
over R.C. 4511.19(G)(7). See Cleveland v. Fuller, 2023-Ohio-1669, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.)
("Marsy's Law supersedes C.C.O. 433.01(h)(3)(B)(7) [identical to R.C. 4511.19(G)(7)] to
the extent the ordinance caps the availability of restitution to a victim"); see also Ohio
Constitution, Article I, Section 10a(E) ("All provisions of this section shall be self-
executing and severable, and shall supersede all conflicting state laws").
{¶ 15} The amount of the state's economic loss was not in dispute. Pursuant to
the express mandates of Marsy's Law, the trial court was required to award full restitution
even if the amount exceeded $5,000; therefore, the trial court did not err in ordering Yang
to pay restitution to the State of Ohio in the amount of $16,874.60.
{¶ 16} Upon review, given the facts of this case, we find the trial court did not
violate R.C. 4511.19(G)(7) in ordering Yang to pay more than $5,000 in restitution as
argued in the stated assignment of error. {¶ 17} The sole assignment of error is denied.
{¶ 18} The judgment of the Municipal Court of Delaware County, Ohio is hereby
affirmed.
By Smith J.
Hoffman, P.J. concur.
Hess, J. concurs in judgment only.