State v. Wynn

2025 Ohio 2016

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 5, 2025
• Docket: 24 CAA 09 0058
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Wynn, 2025-Ohio-2016.]

COURT OF APPEALS DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO, : JUDGES: : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, P.J. Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. : Hon. Andrew J. King, J. -vs- : : DARIUS D. WYNN, : Case No. 24 CAA 09 0058 : Defendant - Appellant : OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 23 CRI 12 0746

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT: June 5, 2025

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant

MELISSA A. SCHIFFEL WILLIAM T. CRAMER Prosecuting Attorney 1554 Polaris Parkway, Suite 325 Delaware County, Ohio Columbus, Ohio 43240

By: KATHERYN L. MUNGER Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Delaware County Prosecutor’s Office 154 North Union Street, 3rd Floor Delaware, Ohio 43015 Baldwin, P.J.

{¶1} The appellant, Darius D. Wynn, appeals his July 18, 2024, conviction and

sentence from the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, Ohio. The appellee is

the State of Ohio.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE CASE

{¶2} On December 21, 2023, the appellant was indicted on one count of

Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity in violation of R.C. 2923.32(A)(1), one count of

Aggravated Murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(B) with a three-year firearm specification

pursuant to R.C. 2941.141, one count of Felony Murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B)

with a three-year firearm specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.141, two counts of

Aggravated Robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) with a three-year firearm

specification, one count of Felonious Assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) with a

three-year firearm specification, and one count of Attempted Murder in violation of R.C.

2903.02(A) with a three-year firearm specification. All charges except Engaging in a

Pattern of Corrupt Activity included a three-year firearm specification pursuant to R.C.

2941.145.

{¶3} On July 18, 2024, the trial court held a change of plea hearing, the following

exchange took place at the appellant’s change of plea hearing:

THE COURT: Did you need any more time to speak with your lawyer now?

THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Have you had enough time to think about the important

decision that you’re making?

THE DEFENDANT: I don’t think so, but it’s fine. THE COURT: Did you need any more time today or any other day?

THE DEFENDANT: No. It’s good.

THE COURT: I see. And you’re certain this is what you want to do.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

{¶4} Ultimately, the appellant entered a plea of guilty to one count of Engaging

in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity in violation of R.C. 2923.32(A)(1), one count of Felony

Murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B) with a one-year firearm specification, and one

count of Aggravated Robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) with a three-year firearm

specification, and Felonious Assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A).

{¶5} On August 28, 2024, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. At the

hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to a mandatory sentence of fifteen-years-

to-life for felony murder along with a mandatory consecutive term of one year for the

associated firearm specification, eleven to sixteen-and-a-half years for corrupt activity,

and ten years for aggravated robbery along with a mandatory consecutive term of three

years for the associated firearm specification. The trial court imposed the prison terms

consecutively for an aggregate term of forty-years-to-life. The trial court also imposed a

mandatory term of post-release control of two to five years for corrupt activity and

aggravated robbery.

{¶6} The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and raises the following two

assignments of error:

{¶7} “I. APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEAS WERE NOT KNOWING, INTELLIGENT,

OR VOLUNTARY BECAUSE APPELLANT INDICATED THAT HE NEEDED MORE TIME

TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE.” {¶8} “II. BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THE RECORD DOES NOT

SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT’S CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES FINDINGS UNDER

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).”

I.

{¶9} In the appellant’s first assignment of error, the appellant argues his guilty

pleas were not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. We disagree.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶10} A determination of whether a plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary is

based upon a review of the record. State v. Spates, 64 Ohio St.3d 269, 272 (1992). If a

criminal defendant claims that his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently

made, the reviewing court must review the totality of the circumstances in order to

determine whether or not the defendant’s claim has merit. State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d

106, 108 (1990).

ANALYSIS

{¶11} The appellant argues his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, or

voluntary because the appellant indicated he may need more time to consider the plea.

We disagree.

{¶12} Due process mandates that a guilty plea must be knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); State

v. Clark, 2008-Ohio-3748, ¶25.

{¶13} At the change of plea hearing, the trial court inquired whether the appellant

had sufficient time to consider his decision. The appellant indicated he did not think so.

The trial court then followed up by asking if he needed any more time that day or on any other day. The appellant replied that he did not need any more time. The trial court then

asked the appellant if he was certain he wanted to change his plea. The appellant

indicated that he did.

{¶14} The appellant points to State v. Sellman, 2019-Ohio-4185 (2nd Dist.), where

the appellant expressed confusion during the plea hearing and was permitted to consult

with counsel before proceeding. In the case at bar, the appellant contends that the trial

court should have allowed the appellant time to consult with counsel before proceeding

with the hearing. The record shows a more extensive interaction between the trial court

and the appellant. The trial court asked the appellant if he had enough time to consult

with counsel. The appellant said yes. The appellant indicated his attorney answered all

of his questions. The trial court also asked the appellant if he wanted more time that day

or any other day. The appellant said no. The trial court also asked the appellant if he

needed any more time to speak with his lawyer before proceeding. The appellant also

answered no.

{¶15} The appellant’s responses at the plea hearing do not indicate any confusion

on the appellant’s part. The trial court provided the appellant more time to consider or

speak further with counsel. The appellant declined. We do not find any merit that the

appellant’s plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary.

{¶16} Accordingly, the appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.

II.

{¶17} In the appellant’s second assignment of error, the appellant argues the

record fails to support the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences by clear and

convincing evidence. We disagree. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶18} Generally, felony sentences are reviewed under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State

v. Goings, 2014-Ohio-2322, ¶20 (6th Dist.). An appellate court may increase, modify, or

vacate and remand a judgment only if it clearly and convincingly finds either “(a) the

record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under division (B) or (D) of section

2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20

of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant” or “(b) the sentence is otherwise

contrary to law.” State v. Yeager, 2016-Ohio-4759, ¶7 (6th Dist.); citing R.C.

2953.08(G)(2).

{¶19} However, as discussed by this Court recently in State v. Bright, 2025-Ohio-

725 (5th Dist.), the appellant’s failure to object to his sentence while before the trial court

“leaves him with little recourse.” Id. at ¶6. The Bright Court stated:

Bright did not, however, object to the community-control conditions

that were imposed at her sentencing hearing. An error “that was not called

to the attention of the trial court at a time when the error could have been

avoided or corrected by the trial court” is deemed forfeited absent plain

error.

To be sure, had the trial judge announced the sentence and then

abruptly left the courtroom without giving the parties a chance to raise

objections to the judge’s ruling, Bright could not be faulted now for having

stayed silent then. See, e.g., United States v. Ralston, 110 F.4th 909, 919

(6th Cir.2024) (noting that federal district courts “are required to ask the

parties during the sentencing hearing whether they have any objections to the sentence that has been imposed.”); U.S. v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872

(6th Cir.2004) (where a trial court fails to provide the parties with an

opportunity to object to the sentence, the parties “will not have forfeited their

objections and thus will not be required to demonstrate plain error on

appeal[ ]”).

Here, the trial judge – by asking the parties, after the sentence was

announced if they had “[a]nything further” to say – gave Bright a meaningful

opportunity to express the concerns that Bright now raises here. Neither

Bright’s trial counsel nor Bright herself objected to the sentence. We,

therefore, review Bright’s community-control sentence for plain error.

{¶20} In the case sub judice, the appellant failed to object to the sentence imposed

by the trial court at the time of sentencing, even when given the opportunity. The appellant

had a meaningful opportunity to address his sentence at that time and failed to do so. As

such, we review for plain error only.

{¶21} The Court’s decision in Bright concisely addressed plain error:

To constitute plain error, an error “must be on the record, palpable,

and fundamental, so that it should have been apparent to the trial court

without objection.” State v. Dunlap, 2004-Ohio-6652, ¶34 (8th Dist.). “Notice

of plain error under Crim.R. 52(B) is to be taken with the utmost caution,

under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest

miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph

three of the syllabus. Id. at ¶¶10-11. According to the record, the appellant planned all the crimes, continued

the plan after somebody was killed, and only entered a plea of guilty because a

codefendant changed his plea to guilty. The court noted his past record of multiple

offenses involving firearms. Furthermore, the appellant was sentenced in conformity with

statutory guidelines and made all the appropriate findings on the record. The court has

broad discretion in this regard and did not commit plain error when it sentenced the

appellant.

{¶22} Therefore, the appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.

CONCLUSION

{¶23} Based upon the foregoing, the decision of the Delaware County Court of

Common Pleas is hereby affirmed.

By: Baldwin, P.J.

King, J. concur.

Hoffman, J. concurs separately. Hoffman, J., concurring

{¶24} I concur in the majority’s analysis and disposition of Appellant’s first

assignment of error.

{¶25} I further concur in the majority’s disposition of Appellant’s second

assignment of error. However, I disagree with the standard of review it applies.

{¶26} The majority analyzes the second assignment of error under a plain error

standard of review. I disagree. I believe the proper standard of review is set forth by the

Ohio Supreme Court in its recent opinion in State v. Glover, 2024-Ohio-5195, ¶¶ 43-46.

When applying that standard, I concur in the majority’s decision to also overrule

Appellant’s second assignment of error. [Cite as State v. Wynn, 2025-Ohio-2016.]