State v. Wright

2025 Ohio 672

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 28, 2025
• Docket: C-240158
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Wright, 2025-Ohio-672.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240158 TRIAL NO. C/22/TRC/29971 Plaintiff-Appellee, :

vs. : OPINION CHRISTOPHER WRIGHT, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: February 28, 2025

Connie M. Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and John D. Hill, Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Frost Brown Todd LLP and Nathaniel L. Truitt, for Defendant-Appellant. KINSLEY, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Christopher Wright was convicted of OVI

following a bench trial in which the sole issue was whether Wright had operated his

vehicle while impaired. Wright’s OVI arrest stemmed from an encounter at a gas

station where police found Wright unconscious in the driver’s seat. His car was in

park, and he had drug paraphernalia in his hand. Because the State presented

sufficient evidence to support an inference that Wright was impaired when he drove

the vehicle to the gas station we affirm Wright’s OVI conviction.

I. Factual and Procedural History

{¶2} The State charged Wright with one count of OVI in violation of R.C.

4511.19(A)(1)(a). Prior to trial, Wright stipulated that when police found him at the

gas station, he was unconscious in the driver’s seat of a vehicle with his foot on the

brake, that he was impaired, and that the vehicle was running and in gear. Therefore,

the only issue remaining for trial was whether Wright had actually operated the vehicle

while impaired.

{¶3} The matter proceeded to a bench trial at which the State presented

testimony from Officer Evan Lewin of the Green Township Police Department. The

officer testified that at approximately 4:38 a.m. on December 18, 2022, emergency

personnel responded to the B.P. gas station at 5488 Old Rybolt Road in Hamilton

County, Ohio, for a possible overdose. Police found Wright unconscious in the driver’s

seat of a 2022 Nissan Rogue parked at a gas pump. Wright was holding what appeared

to be a “crack pipe.” Officer Lewin entered Wright’s unlocked car on the passenger

side, shifted the gear from drive into park, and turned off the ignition. Once Wright

became conscious, he told police that he had not taken any drugs; however, the officer

observed drugs and drug paraphernalia in Wright’s vehicle, which would be OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

consistent, in the officer’s opinion, with Wright using drugs in the vehicle. Police

placed Wright under arrest. At the police station, Wright told Officer Lewin that he

had driven from his parents’ home to the gas station approximately 20 minutes prior

to police contact.

{¶4} At trial, the State admitted, without objection, Wright’s postarrest

toxicology report, which showed multiple drugs in Wright’s system, including

marijuana, cocaine, amphetamines, clonazepam, alprazolam, and fentanyl-related

compounds. At the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief, Wright moved for an

acquittal under Crim.R. 29, which the trial court denied.

{¶5} Wright testified in his own defense at trial. According to Wright, on the

morning in question, he had been driving from his parents’ house to his home when

he stopped to fill his vehicle with gas at the gas station. Wright put gas in his car and

then sat in his car using his phone. Wright denied using any alcohol or drugs prior to

his arrival at the gas station, but he admitted to using an unspecified drug while sitting

in his vehicle parked at the gas pump. Wright testified that his vehicle contains a safety

feature, which automatically engages the parking brake when the car starts. He

explained that the parking brake must be manually disengaged before the car moves,

even if the driver shifts into drive, touches the gas pedal, or releases the brake pedal.

Wright presented a video exhibit where he demonstrated that the parking-brake light

remained on, even when Wright shifted the vehicle into drive, until Wright manually

released the parking-brake pedal. Wright admitted that he had lied to police initially

about his drug use, but he maintained that he did not drive while impaired.

{¶6} At the conclusion of the evidence, Wright renewed his Crim.R. 29

motion, which the trial court again denied.

{¶7} The trial court found Wright guilty of OVI, determining that Wright had

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operated the vehicle once he placed the gear shift in drive. The trial court sentenced

Wright to 180 days in jail, with 177 days suspended, as well as a $375 fine, court costs,

and a one-year license suspension, subject to driving privileges for work. The trial

court stayed Wright’s sentence pending this appeal.

II. Analysis

{¶8} In in his first assignment of error, Wright argues that the trial court

erred in denying his Crim.R. 29 motion for an acquittal because the State failed to

produce sufficient evidence to show that he actually operated his vehicle while

impaired. More specifically, Wright argues that sitting in his car with the gear in drive

and the parking-brake engaged did not constitute movement under the OVI statute.

{¶9} This court reviews the denial of a Crim.R. 29(A) motion for an acquittal

under the same standard as sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Evenson, 2023-Ohio-

4196, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.). In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, an

appellate court must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio

St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶10} R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) provides in relevant part that “[n]o person shall

operate any vehicle . . . if, at the time of the operation . . . [t]he person is under the

influence[.]” Operation in this context means “to cause or have caused movement of

a vehicle.” See R.C. 4511.01(HHH).

{¶11} Wright contends that he did not move the vehicle once he arrived at the

gas station. But he does not dispute that he drove his car to the gas station. And he

does not address whether he was under the influence during that period of time, as

opposed to when the police arrested him shortly after he passed out at the gas pump.

4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence supports an

inference that Wright indeed operated his vehicle while under the influence when he

drove to the gas station.

{¶12} As the evidence presented at trial revealed, police encountered an

unconscious Wright at 4:38 a.m. sitting in the driver’s seat of a running vehicle. He

was holding a “crack pipe,” but no other drug paraphernalia was found in the car. The

State, however, introduced a toxicology report that revealed the presence of multiple

drugs, not merely crack, in Wright’s system. This report supports the inference that

Wright had ingested other substances prior to arriving at the gas station.

{¶13} Wright also told police that he had driven from his parents’ home to the

gas station a mere 20 minutes prior to when police encountered him passed out in his

vehicle. This timeline further supports the inference that Wright had ingested

intoxicating substances prior to his arrival.

{¶14} Even though police never actually saw Wright’s vehicle moving, the trier

of fact could reasonably infer from the evidence presented that Wright had operated

his vehicle while impaired. We therefore determine that the State presented sufficient

evidence of OVI, and the trial court did not err in overruling Wright’s Crim.R. 29

motion.

{¶15} In urging this court to reverse his conviction, Wright relies on State v.

Anderson, 2017-Ohio-8641 (1st Dist.). In Anderson, officers found the defendant

unconscious sitting in the driver’s seat of a vehicle in the parking lot of a city

recreational facility. The driver’s side door of the defendant’s vehicle was open, and

the keys were in the ignition, but the engine was off. The State charged the defendant

with OVI, and the trial court found the defendant guilty. On appeal, the defendant

argued that the State had failed to provide any evidence that he operated the vehicle

5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

while impaired. The Anderson court agreed with defendant’s argument and

determined that the State did not provide sufficient evidence of operation. The

Anderson court reasoned that the State had failed to provide any direct or

circumstantial evidence of movement; for example, no one witnessed the defendant

driving the vehicle, and the vehicle was not found in or alongside the roadway, but

instead in a parking lot.

{¶16} But Wright’s case is different from Anderson, because Wright admitted

to driving his car from his parents’ home to the gas station and stipulated that he was

intoxicated when police found him there 20 minutes later. Given his admission of

movement and stipulation to intoxication, combined with the toxicology report

showing the presence of a number of chemical substances and the officer’s testimony

that Wright was completely unconscious, the trial court could reasonably infer that

Wright was under the influence when he drove to the gas station.

{¶17} We overrule Wright’s first assignment of error.

{¶18} In his second assignment of error, Wright argues that the trial court

erred in convicting him of OVI, because his conviction was not supported by sufficient

evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence. With regard to

sufficiency, Wright again argues that the State failed to adduce sufficient evidence of

operation to convict him of OVI. But as we determined in Wright’s first assignment of

error, Wright’s conviction was supported by sufficient evidence. See Jenks, 61 Ohio

St.3d at paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶19} With regard to manifest weight of the evidence, this court reviews the

entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, and considers the

credibility of the witnesses to determine whether the trier of fact clearly lost its way

such that a manifest miscarriage of justice occurred, that the conviction must be

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reversed, and a new trial ordered. State v. Thompkins, 1997-Ohio-52.

{¶20} Wright argues that his OVI conviction was against the manifest weight

of the evidence because the trial court disregarded his testimony that he did not use

drugs or alcohol prior to arriving at the gas station, only while parked at the gas station,

and that his testimony was corroborated by Lewin’s testimony that he saw drugs in the

vehicle. Wright also points out that Lewin did not sense any movement of the vehicle

when he placed the vehicle in park.

{¶21} In convicting Wright of OVI, the trial court, as the ultimate trier of fact,

was free to reject Wright’s testimony that he did not use drugs or alcohol prior to

arriving at the gas station. Police found Wright unconscious in the driver’s seat of his

idling vehicle with the gear shift in drive, holding a “crack pipe” in his hand. Police

observed drugs and drug paraphernalia in the car. Wright’s postarrest toxicology

screen showed multiple drugs in his system. Wright also admitted to officers that he

had started driving from his parents’ home to the gas station approximately 20

minutes before police found him. Therefore, we determine that this is not an

exceptional case that warrants reversal on manifest-weight grounds, and Wright’s OVI

conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶22} We overrule Wright’s second assignment of error.

III. Conclusion

{¶23} Having overruled Wright’s assignments of error, we affirm the trial

court’s judgment convicting Wright of OVI.

Judgment affirmed.

ZAYAS and BOCK, JJ., concur.

Please note:

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The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.