State v. Woofter

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 27, 2026
• Docket: 2025-G-0025
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Woofter, 2026-Ohio-1506.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT GEAUGA COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2025-G-0025

Plaintiff-Appellee, Criminal Appeal from the - vs - Chardon Municipal Court

BRIAN K. WOOFTER, Trial Court No. 2025 CRB 00251 Defendant-Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Decided: April 27, 2026 Judgment: Appeal dismissed

John W. Bosco, Assistant Prosecutor, Chardon Municipal Court, 231 Main Street, Third Floor, Chardon, OH 44024 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Brian K. Woofter, pro se, NEOCAP, 411 Pine Avenue S.E., Warren, OH 44483 (Defendant-Appellant).

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.

{¶1} Appellant, Brian K. Woofter, appeals the judgment denying his motion for

release of evidence. We dismiss the appeal for lack of a final, appealable order.

{¶2} In 2025, Woofter was charged with purchasing and selling alcohol to minors.

Woofter pleaded not guilty, and, thereafter, the charge was dismissed.

{¶3} On June 2, 2025, Woofter filed a motion requesting the court to order the

sheriff’s department to release to his friend six cases of alcohol that it had confiscated

relative to the dismissed charge.

{¶4} On June 12, 2025, the trial court denied the motion in an entry stating: This matter came on for consideration on June 12, 2025 upon defendant’s Motion for RELEASE OF EVIDENCE.

Upon due consideration, the Court finds said Motion not well- taken.

IT IS THEREFORE THE ORDER OF THIS COURT that said motion is hereby denied.

The Motion may be reconsidered with proof of purchase.

{¶5} Woofter noticed an appeal from the June 12, 2025 entry. In his appellant’s

brief, he maintains that he should not be required to present proof of purchase to regain

possession of his property. In the State’s appellee’s brief, it maintains, in part, that the

June 12, 2025 entry is not a final, appealable order. We agree with the State.

{¶6} This court’s appellate jurisdiction is set forth in Ohio Const., art. IV, §

3(B)(2), which provides that “[c]ourts of appeals shall have such jurisdiction as may be

provided by law to review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the

courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district . . . .”

{¶7} R.C. 2505.02(B) defines various categories of final orders. Such categories

include:

(1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment;

(2) An order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judgment;

...

(4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and to which both of the following apply:

(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action

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Case No. 2025-G-0025 in favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy.

(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action.

{¶8} To “affect” a substantial right, an appellant “must demonstrate that in the

absence of immediate review of the order [he] will be denied effective relief in the future.”

Bell v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 67 Ohio St.3d 60, 63 (1993); see also Wilhelm-Kissinger v.

Kissinger, 2011-Ohio-2317, ¶ 7.

{¶9} We review the substance of the appealed order to determine its finality

under R.C. 2505.02(B). Harkai v. Scherba Industries, Inc., 136 Ohio App.3d 211, 220 (9th

Dist. 2000); see also Rymers v. Rymers, 2010-Ohio-2684, ¶ 20 (11th Dist.) (“The principal

function of a final, appealable order is the termination of a case or controversy.”).

{¶10} Here, the appealed order specifically anticipates further action—receipt of

Woofter’s proof of purchase—prior to declaring a final ruling on the motion for return of

property. Thus, the order does not foreclose effective relief in the future. Accordingly, the

order does not “affect” a substantial right and is not final under R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) or

(B)(2). Likewise, because the order does not prevent a judgment with respect to Woofter’s

motion, it is not final under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4). As the order fails these prongs of a “final

order” under subdivisions R.C. 2505.02(B)(1), (B)(2), and (B)(4), we need not consider

whether the order meets the remaining elements of a “final order” as set forth in these

subdivisions. The remaining subdivisions of R.C. 2505.02(B) are clearly inapplicable to

the present case.

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Case No. 2025-G-0025 {¶11} Accordingly, the June 12, 2025 entry is not a final order, and we have no

jurisdiction to address the merits of the appeal.

{¶12} Appeal dismissed.

MATT LYNCH, P.J.,

SCOTT LYNCH, J.,

concur.

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Case No. 2025-G-0025 JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the memorandum opinion of this court, it is ordered that

the appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Costs to be taxed against appellant.

JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI

PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH, concurs

JUDGE SCOTT LYNCH, concurs

THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.

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Case No. 2025-G-0025