State v. Woodworth

2024 Ohio 2756

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 19, 2024
• Docket: WD-23-014
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Woodworth, 2024-Ohio-2756.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WOOD COUNTY

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. WD-23-014

Appellee Trial Court No. 2021CR0597

v.

Todd Jacob Woodworth DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: July 19, 2024

*****

Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and David T. Harold, Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Dan M. Weiss and Peter F. Field, for appellant.

***** ZMUDA, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Todd J. Woodworth, appeals the March 17, 2023

judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas, convicting him of aggravated

assault. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court judgment.

I. Background

{¶ 2} On December 16, 2021, Todd Woodworth was indicted on one count of

gross sexual imposition, a violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) and (C)(2), a third-degree

felony. After the trial court found the alleged child-victim competent to testify, the State and Woodworth reached an agreement that Woodworth would enter a plea of guilty to the

amended charge of aggravated assault, a violation of R.C. 2903.12(A)(1) and (B), a

fourth-degree felony. As part of the written plea agreement, the State agreed to

recommend that the court impose a sentence of community control, Woodworth agreed to

waive any defect relating to the amendment of the charge, and the parties stipulated that

there is a factual basis to support a finding of guilt as to the amended charge.

{¶ 3} At a hearing conducted on January 31, 2023, counsel for the State advised

the court of the terms of the plea agreement, including the agreement to stipulate that a

factual basis exists to support a finding of guilt as to the amended charge. Defense

counsel confirmed that he agreed with the information supplied by the State’s attorney

and represented that he believed that his client was entering the plea knowingly and

voluntarily.

{¶ 4} The trial court personally addressed Woodworth. Woodworth confirmed

that (1) he signed and initialed the written plea agreement; (2) he read the plea agreement

completely with his attorney present, any questions he had were answered, and he had no

further questions about the document; (3) he understood and agreed with the contents of

the document; (4) he understood the possible penalties that could be imposed; (5) no one

threatened him or made any promises to induce him to enter the plea; (6) he was satisfied

with the advice of his attorney; and (7) he understood that his attorney and counsel for the

State agreed that there were facts sufficient to find him guilty of the amended charge and

this was acceptable to him. The court also advised Woodworth of the constitutional

rights he was waiving, including the right to a jury or bench trial; the right to have the

2. State prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt; the right to confront,

cross-examine, call, and subpoena witnesses; and the right to testify or to not testify.

{¶ 5} The court accepted Woodworth’s plea, made a finding of guilt, ordered a

presentence investigation report, and continued the matter for sentencing. On March 14,

2023, the trial court sentenced Woodworth to a prison term of 17 months. Woodworth’s

sentence and conviction were memorialized in a judgment journalized on March 17,

2023.

{¶ 6} Woodworth appealed. He assigns the following errors for our review.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT FOUND

APPELLANT GUILTY WITHOUT A FACTUAL BASIS TO SUPPORT

THE CHARGE OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

WHEN IT FOUND THE ALLEGED VICTIM COMPETENT TO

TESTIFY AT APPELLANT’S TRIAL.

II. Law and Analysis

{¶ 7} Woodworth’s assignments of error challenge (1) the trial court’s finding of

guilt, and (2) its determination that the victim was competent to testify. We address each

of his assignments in turn.

A. The Trial Court’s Finding of Guilt

{¶ 8} In his first assignment of error, Woodworth argues that the trial court erred

in finding him guilty of aggravated assault without a factual basis to support the charge.

He acknowledges telling the court that he understood that his attorney and counsel for the

3. State stipulated that the facts were sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated

assault, but he argues that the State could not provide any facts to support the amended

charge of aggravated assault because no such facts existed. He also acknowledges that

the trial court was not required to explain to him the elements of the offense, but he

insists that his plea could not have been entered knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily

because he did not know the elements of aggravated assault. He asks that we vacate his

sentence and release him from custody.

{¶ 9} A “plea of guilty is a complete admission of the defendant’s guilt.” Crim.R.

11(B)(1). “[A] ‘guilty plea itself provides the necessary proof of the elements of the

crime, thus relieving the trial court of the obligation to determine whether a factual basis

exists to support the plea.’” State v. Norris, 2019-Ohio-1488, ¶ 10-11 (6th Dist.), quoting

State v. Duhart, 2017-Ohio-7983, ¶ 9 (6th Dist.). It also precludes the defendant from

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Id. See also State v. Ellis, 2016-Ohio-8086,

¶ 26 (6th Dist.) (explaining that plea agreement precluded appellant from challenging her

conviction for lack of a factual basis to support charge and finding that guilty plea was

complete admission of guilt).

{¶ 10} Here, Woodworth signed a written plea of guilty, explicitly acknowledging

“that there is a factual basis to support a finding of guilty for Amended Count One,”

aggravated assault. Woodworth’s attorney stipulated that a factual basis existed, and

Woodworth confirmed his understanding of this stipulation and told the court that this

was acceptable to him. As such, his plea of guilty was a complete admission to the

4. offense, and he is precluded from challenging the court’s finding of guilt or arguing that

the facts do not support a finding of guilt.

{¶ 11} While Woodworth’s assignment of error specifically challenges only the

court’s finding of guilt, he also argues that his plea could not have been entered

knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily because he did not know the elements of the

offense to which he pled. He insists that his protestations of innocence demonstrate that

he did not understand the elements of the offense.

{¶ 12} “A defendant’s plea must be entered knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily in order for the plea to be constitutional under the United States and Ohio

Constitutions.” State v. Montgomery, 2020-Ohio-5552, ¶ 10 (6th Dist.), citing State v.

Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527 (1996). “To ensure the finality of a proper guilty plea,

Crim.R. 11(C) provides a framework for informing a defendant of his or her

constitutional rights.” State v. Deselms, 2022-Ohio-3769, ¶ 11 (6th Dist.), citing State v.

Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 479 (1981). Under Crim.R. 11(C)(2), in felony cases, “the

court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty . . ., and shall not accept a plea of guilty . . .

without first addressing the defendant personally . . . and doing all of the following”:

(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily,

with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum

penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for

probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at the

sentencing hearing.

5. (b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant

understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court,

upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.

(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant

understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial,

to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for

obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to

prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the

defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself

The underlying purpose of Crim.R. 11(C) is to convey certain information to allow the

defendant to make a voluntary and intelligent decision whether to plead guilty. Deselms

at ¶ 11, citing Ballard at 479-480.

{¶ 13} Here, Woodworth does not raise any error as to the trial court’s explanation

of his constitutional rights under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). Rather, he argues, in essence, that

his plea was involuntary because he did not understand the nature of the charges to which

he was entering a plea.

{¶ 14} Crim.R. 11(C) does not require the trial court to explain the elements of the

offense before accepting a plea. In fact, the Supreme Court of Ohio has observed that

trial courts need not engage in a detailed recitation of the elements of a charge before

accepting a plea. State v. Fitzpatrick, 2004-Ohio-3167, ¶ 57. See also Duhart, 2017-

Ohio-7983, ¶ 10 (6th Dist.) (“[T]he trial court was not obligated to recite the elements or

explain the facts supporting each offense in order to render [defendant’s] plea ‘knowing’

6. and ‘voluntary.’”); State v. Vialva, 2017-Ohio-1279, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.) (“[C]ourts are not

required to explain the elements of each offense * * *.”); State v. Giovanni, 2009-Ohio-

3333, ¶ 19 (7th Dist.) (“[T]he trial court has no obligation to explain the elements of the

charge.”).

{¶ 15} Woodworth confirmed for the court that any questions he had about the

plea agreement were fully and completely answered by his attorney, that he had no

questions about the plea agreement, and that he read, understood, and agreed with what

was contained in the plea agreement. The code section of the offense was listed in the

written plea agreement and recited by the court at the hearing. Woodworth did not

indicate that he did not understand the elements of the offense and he expressly

represented to the court that he understood the contents of the plea agreement and had no

questions. We find no basis for concluding that Woodworth’s plea was not entered

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

{¶ 16} Woodworth also maintains that he asserted his innocence, suggesting that

this further evidences his lack of understanding of the offense and that the trial court

should not have accepted his plea or made a finding of guilt. He purports to cite the

transcript of the plea hearing as containing the following protestations of innocence:

“Like I said, I mean, you know, nothing ever happened what they were trying to say that

happened,” and “I mean the gist [o]f it, yes. I do think that I didn’t do anything . . . .” In

fact, these statements were made at the sentencing hearing, after he entered his plea, the

court accepted it, and the court found him guilty. Significantly, Woodworth never sought

to withdraw his plea.

7. {¶ 17} Ohio courts have recognized that a trial court is not required to measure a

claim of innocence against a willingness to waive trial—as may be required in accepting

a plea under North Carolina v. Alford—where protestations of innocence occur after the

court has accepted a plea and the defendant has not sought to withdraw his plea. State v.

Alvelo, 2017-Ohio-742, ¶ 22-27 (8th Dist.) (finding that court had no duty to inquire into

defendant’s reason for pleading guilty where protestations of innocence occurred at

sentencing and defendant did not move to withdraw his guilty plea); State v. Bartley,

2001 WL 604219, *5 (10th Dist. Jun. 5, 2001) (noting that it was only at sentencing that

defendant denied the requisite mental state for the offense, and commenting that he did

not ask to withdraw his guilty plea); State v. Millhouse, 2002-Ohio-2255, ¶ 17 (8th Dist. )

(observing that defendant never expressed desire to withdraw guilty pleas even though at

sentencing, he denied facts supporting conviction). Woodworth made no protestations of

innocence at the plea hearing that may have warranted additional scrutiny by the trial

court.

{¶ 18} Accordingly, because (1) Woodworth’s guilty plea precludes his challenge

to the factual basis for his conviction, (2) the court had no obligation to recite the

elements of the offense and it did, in fact, ensure that Woodworth understood the nature

of the offense and effect of his plea, and (3) Woodworth did not assert his innocence at

the plea hearing, the trial court did not err in finding him guilty of aggravated assault.

We find Woodworth’s first assignment of error not well-taken.

8. B. Competence Ruling

{¶ 19} In his second assignment of error, Woodworth argues that the trial court

abused its discretion when it found that the victim, who was 11 years old at the time she

was interviewed by the trial judge, was competent to testify at trial. He maintains that the

trial court failed to consider all required factors in determining competency and

incorrectly concluded that the victim was competent to testify.

{¶ 20} A defendant cannot contest a pretrial evidentiary ruling after entering a

guilty plea. State v. Jensen, 2020-Ohio-1411, ¶ 33 (5th Dist.). More specific to

Woodworth’s claim here, a guilty plea waives non-jurisdictional defects, including “any

alleged error in the trial court’s ruling on witness competency.” Id. See also State v.

Martin, 2020-Ohio-3216, ¶ 2 (4th Dist.) (“[Defendant’s] voluntary, knowing, and

intelligent guilty plea waives his right to challenge the trial court’s competency

determination concerning the child witness.”); State v. Suggett, 2021-Ohio-4641, ¶ 13

(7th Dist.) (“[A]ppellant waived the right to challenge the trial court’s competency ruling

by entering her guilty plea.”). Because Woodworth entered a guilty plea, he waived his

right to challenge the trial court’s determination of the victim’s competence to testify.

{¶ 21} We find Woodworth’s second assignment of error not well-taken.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 22} Woodworth’s plea of guilty to the amended charge of aggravated assault

precludes him from challenging his conviction based on a lack of factual basis to support

the charge. Additionally, the trial court engaged in a colloquy with Woodworth where

Woodworth confirmed that he read, understood, and agreed with what was contained in

9. the plea agreement and had no additional questions. The trial court’s failure to advise

him of the elements of the offense did not render his plea unknowing, unintelligent, or

involuntary. We find Woodworth’s first assignment of error not well-taken.

{¶ 23} By entering a plea of guilty, Woodworth waived his right to challenge the

trial court’s determination that the victim was competent to testify. We find

Woodworth’s second assignment of error not well-taken.

{¶ 24} We affirm the March 17, 2023 judgment of the Wood County Court of

Common Pleas. Woodworth is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal under App.R. 24.

Judgment affirmed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Gene A. Zmuda, J. ____________________________ JUDGE Myron C. Duhart, J. ____________________________ Charles E. Sulek, P.J. JUDGE CONCUR. ____________________________ JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

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