This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date.
1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
2 STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
3 Plaintiff-Appellee,
4 v. No. A-1-CA-36358
5 TABITHA L. WOLF,
6 Defendant-Appellant,
7 and
8 STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
9 Plaintiff-Appellee,
10 v. No. A-1-CA-36359
11 TABITHA L. WOLF,
12 Defendant-Appellant.
13 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CURRY COUNTY 14 Matthew E. Chandler, District Judge
15 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 16 Santa Fe, NM
17 for Appellee 1 Tabitha L. Wolf 2 Elida, NM
3 Pro Se Appellant
4 MEMORANDUM OPINION
5 SUTIN, Judge.
6 {1} Defendant, a self-represented litigant, appeals from the district court’s order
7 dismissing her appeal and remanding to the magistrate court for enforcement of its
8 judgment. We issued a notice of proposed summary disposition, proposing to affirm
9 the district court’s dismissal of Defendant’s appeal from magistrate court, but not on
10 the grounds relied upon by the district court. Defendant has filed a response to our
11 notice that we have duly considered. We are not persuaded by Defendant’s arguments,
12 and therefore, we affirm.
13 {2} The district court dismissed Defendant’s appeal, ruling that because she entered
14 a valid, unconditional plea of no contest in magistrate court, she is not an aggrieved
15 party for the purpose of appeal to the district court. [RP 19-20, 24-25] Our notice
16 pointed out that Defendant appealed on grounds that the magistrate court lacked
17 subject matter jurisdiction. [RP 7-10, 28-31] We stated that “[b]ecause a challenge to
18 subject matter jurisdiction calls into question the power of the . . . court to hear and
19 decide the case before it, it is now well-settled that a lack of subject matter jurisdiction
20 cannot be waived or cured by the consent of the parties.” El Castillo Retirement
2 1 Residences v. Martinez, 2015-NMCA-041, ¶ 14, 346 P.3d 1164. “A judgment entered
2 by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction has no legal effect.” Allred v. N.M. Dep’t
3 of Transp., 2017-NMCA-019, ¶ 20, 388 P.3d 998. Not only can a lack of subject
4 matter jurisdiction not be waived by plea agreement, it “may be raised at any time,
5 including on appeal to this Court.” Id. Observing that a party surely would be
6 aggrieved by entry of a judgment that had no legal effect because it was entered by a
7 court without subject matter jurisdiction, we proposed to hold that the district court
8 erred by refusing to examine Defendant’s challenge to the magistrate court’s subject
9 matter jurisdiction in order to ascertain whether Defendant was an aggrieved party
10 entitled to appeal. Cf. State v. Gallegos, 2007-NMCA-112, ¶ 1, 142 N.M. 447, 166
11 P.3d 1101 (explaining that to determine whether the defendant, who entered a no
12 contest plea in magistrate court, was an aggrieved party and whether the district court
13 had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, the district court had to consider the defendant’s
14 claim de novo that his plea in magistrate court was invalid). We continue to believe
15 that the district court erred and proceed to address the merits of Defendant’s challenge
16 to the magistrate court’s subject matter jurisdiction even in the absence of a ruling
17 from the district court. See Allred, 2017-NMCA-019, ¶ 20.
18 {3} As we understand Defendant’s contentions on appeal, she believes that the
19 adjudication of traffic citations is not a criminal matter, but an administrative matter
3 1 for the Taxation and Revenue Department. [DS 8; MIO 2, 4-6] Defendant’s belief
2 seems to stem, at least in part, from statutory language in the Administrative Hearings
3 Office Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 7-1B-1 to -9 (2015), and in the Motor Vehicle Code,
4 NMSA 1978, § 66-2-3 (2007). Defendant’s understanding is misguided.
5 {4} With regard to the Administrative Hearings Office Act, as its title suggests, this
6 Act applies to administrative proceedings, not to criminal proceedings. See, e.g, § 7-
7 1B-9(F) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize a criminal
8 proceeding[.]”); § 7-1B-8(E) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize
9 a criminal proceeding[.]”). Also, contrary to Defendant’s understanding, Section 7-
10 1B-6(C)(4), which vests authority in the administrative hearing office to “conduct all
11 adjudicatory hearings pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Code[,]” does not refer to
12 adjudicatory hearings in the prosecution of crimes under the Motor Vehicle Code. The
13 adjudicatory hearings to which Section 7-1B-6(C)(4) refers are administrative
14 adjudications as opposed to administrative rule-making hearings.
15 {5} To the extent that Defendant believes that traffic laws are enforced
16 administratively and that she is not subject to the Motor Vehicle Code because she is
17 not a member of the administration [DS 8], this, too, is misguided. NMSA 1978,
18 Section 66-7-5(A) (1978), states:
19 The provisions of Article 7, Chapter 66 NMSA 1978, [the traffic laws] 20 applicable to the drivers of vehicles upon the highways, shall apply to
4 1 the drivers of all vehicles owned or operated by the United States, this 2 state or any county, city, town, district or any other political subdivision 3 of the state, except as provided in this section and subject to such 4 specific exceptions as are set forth in Article 7, Chapter 66 NMSA 1978 5 with reference to authorized emergency vehicles.
6 {6} To the extent that Defendant relies on language in the Motor Vehicle Code,
7 Section 66-2-3(A), that provision indicates that the observance, administration, and
8 enforcement of the Motor Vehicle Code are duties that the Department of Taxation
9 and Revenue shares “in cooperation with state and local agencies as provided by
10 law[.]” NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-3 (1978), entitled “Required obedience to traffic
11 laws,” states: “It is unlawful and, unless otherwise declared in the Motor Vehicle Code
12 . . . with respect to particular offenses, it is a misdemeanor for any person to do any
13 act forbidden or fail to perform any act required in Article 7 of Chapter 66 . . . [the
14 traffic laws].” Also, NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-7(A) (1989), states: “It is a
15 misdemeanor for any person to violate any provision of the Motor Vehicle Code . . .
16 unless the violation is declared a felony.” See also NMSA 1978, § 66-8-131 (1990)
17 (providing that “uniform traffic citation[s] used as a notice to appear [constitute] a
18 valid complaint”). Thus, generally, New Mexico traffic laws are universally applicable
19 to drivers on public roads in New Mexico; and generally, violations of the traffic laws
20 are criminal acts punishable as misdemeanors.
5 1 {7} “Magistrates have jurisdiction in all cases of misdemeanors and petty
2 misdemeanors[.]” NMSA 1978, § 35-3-4(A) (1985) (emphasis added); State v. Anaya,
3 1997-NMSC-010, ¶ 22, 123 N.M. 14, 933 P.2d 223 (explaining that magistrate courts
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This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date.
1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
2 STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
3 Plaintiff-Appellee,
4 v. No. A-1-CA-36358
5 TABITHA L. WOLF,
6 Defendant-Appellant,
7 and
8 STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
9 Plaintiff-Appellee,
10 v. No. A-1-CA-36359
11 TABITHA L. WOLF,
12 Defendant-Appellant.
13 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CURRY COUNTY 14 Matthew E. Chandler, District Judge
15 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 16 Santa Fe, NM
17 for Appellee 1 Tabitha L. Wolf 2 Elida, NM
3 Pro Se Appellant
4 MEMORANDUM OPINION
5 SUTIN, Judge.
6 {1} Defendant, a self-represented litigant, appeals from the district court’s order
7 dismissing her appeal and remanding to the magistrate court for enforcement of its
8 judgment. We issued a notice of proposed summary disposition, proposing to affirm
9 the district court’s dismissal of Defendant’s appeal from magistrate court, but not on
10 the grounds relied upon by the district court. Defendant has filed a response to our
11 notice that we have duly considered. We are not persuaded by Defendant’s arguments,
12 and therefore, we affirm.
13 {2} The district court dismissed Defendant’s appeal, ruling that because she entered
14 a valid, unconditional plea of no contest in magistrate court, she is not an aggrieved
15 party for the purpose of appeal to the district court. [RP 19-20, 24-25] Our notice
16 pointed out that Defendant appealed on grounds that the magistrate court lacked
17 subject matter jurisdiction. [RP 7-10, 28-31] We stated that “[b]ecause a challenge to
18 subject matter jurisdiction calls into question the power of the . . . court to hear and
19 decide the case before it, it is now well-settled that a lack of subject matter jurisdiction
20 cannot be waived or cured by the consent of the parties.” El Castillo Retirement
2 1 Residences v. Martinez, 2015-NMCA-041, ¶ 14, 346 P.3d 1164. “A judgment entered
2 by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction has no legal effect.” Allred v. N.M. Dep’t
3 of Transp., 2017-NMCA-019, ¶ 20, 388 P.3d 998. Not only can a lack of subject
4 matter jurisdiction not be waived by plea agreement, it “may be raised at any time,
5 including on appeal to this Court.” Id. Observing that a party surely would be
6 aggrieved by entry of a judgment that had no legal effect because it was entered by a
7 court without subject matter jurisdiction, we proposed to hold that the district court
8 erred by refusing to examine Defendant’s challenge to the magistrate court’s subject
9 matter jurisdiction in order to ascertain whether Defendant was an aggrieved party
10 entitled to appeal. Cf. State v. Gallegos, 2007-NMCA-112, ¶ 1, 142 N.M. 447, 166
11 P.3d 1101 (explaining that to determine whether the defendant, who entered a no
12 contest plea in magistrate court, was an aggrieved party and whether the district court
13 had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, the district court had to consider the defendant’s
14 claim de novo that his plea in magistrate court was invalid). We continue to believe
15 that the district court erred and proceed to address the merits of Defendant’s challenge
16 to the magistrate court’s subject matter jurisdiction even in the absence of a ruling
17 from the district court. See Allred, 2017-NMCA-019, ¶ 20.
18 {3} As we understand Defendant’s contentions on appeal, she believes that the
19 adjudication of traffic citations is not a criminal matter, but an administrative matter
3 1 for the Taxation and Revenue Department. [DS 8; MIO 2, 4-6] Defendant’s belief
2 seems to stem, at least in part, from statutory language in the Administrative Hearings
3 Office Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 7-1B-1 to -9 (2015), and in the Motor Vehicle Code,
4 NMSA 1978, § 66-2-3 (2007). Defendant’s understanding is misguided.
5 {4} With regard to the Administrative Hearings Office Act, as its title suggests, this
6 Act applies to administrative proceedings, not to criminal proceedings. See, e.g, § 7-
7 1B-9(F) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize a criminal
8 proceeding[.]”); § 7-1B-8(E) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize
9 a criminal proceeding[.]”). Also, contrary to Defendant’s understanding, Section 7-
10 1B-6(C)(4), which vests authority in the administrative hearing office to “conduct all
11 adjudicatory hearings pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Code[,]” does not refer to
12 adjudicatory hearings in the prosecution of crimes under the Motor Vehicle Code. The
13 adjudicatory hearings to which Section 7-1B-6(C)(4) refers are administrative
14 adjudications as opposed to administrative rule-making hearings.
15 {5} To the extent that Defendant believes that traffic laws are enforced
16 administratively and that she is not subject to the Motor Vehicle Code because she is
17 not a member of the administration [DS 8], this, too, is misguided. NMSA 1978,
18 Section 66-7-5(A) (1978), states:
19 The provisions of Article 7, Chapter 66 NMSA 1978, [the traffic laws] 20 applicable to the drivers of vehicles upon the highways, shall apply to
4 1 the drivers of all vehicles owned or operated by the United States, this 2 state or any county, city, town, district or any other political subdivision 3 of the state, except as provided in this section and subject to such 4 specific exceptions as are set forth in Article 7, Chapter 66 NMSA 1978 5 with reference to authorized emergency vehicles.
6 {6} To the extent that Defendant relies on language in the Motor Vehicle Code,
7 Section 66-2-3(A), that provision indicates that the observance, administration, and
8 enforcement of the Motor Vehicle Code are duties that the Department of Taxation
9 and Revenue shares “in cooperation with state and local agencies as provided by
10 law[.]” NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-3 (1978), entitled “Required obedience to traffic
11 laws,” states: “It is unlawful and, unless otherwise declared in the Motor Vehicle Code
12 . . . with respect to particular offenses, it is a misdemeanor for any person to do any
13 act forbidden or fail to perform any act required in Article 7 of Chapter 66 . . . [the
14 traffic laws].” Also, NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-7(A) (1989), states: “It is a
15 misdemeanor for any person to violate any provision of the Motor Vehicle Code . . .
16 unless the violation is declared a felony.” See also NMSA 1978, § 66-8-131 (1990)
17 (providing that “uniform traffic citation[s] used as a notice to appear [constitute] a
18 valid complaint”). Thus, generally, New Mexico traffic laws are universally applicable
19 to drivers on public roads in New Mexico; and generally, violations of the traffic laws
20 are criminal acts punishable as misdemeanors.
5 1 {7} “Magistrates have jurisdiction in all cases of misdemeanors and petty
2 misdemeanors[.]” NMSA 1978, § 35-3-4(A) (1985) (emphasis added); State v. Anaya,
3 1997-NMSC-010, ¶ 22, 123 N.M. 14, 933 P.2d 223 (explaining that magistrate courts
4 have jurisdiction over all misdemeanors and petty misdemeanors and any other
5 criminal action where jurisdiction is granted by law, and they have concurrent
6 jurisdiction with district courts to try offenders for misdemeanor DWI under the
7 Motor Vehicle Code).
8 {8} In the current case, Defendant was issued traffic citations for speeding, in
9 violation of NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-301 (2015) [RP 4 (No. 36,359)], and driving
10 with expired registration of a vehicle, in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 66-3-19
11 (1995). [RP 4 (No. 36,358)] These are criminal acts punishable as misdemeanors,
12 enforceable by state and local police, and can be prosecuted in magistrate court.
13 Section 66-7-3; § 66-8-7(A); § 66-8-131; § 66-8-131; § 35-3-4(A). Thus, we hold that
14 the magistrate court properly exercised jurisdiction over Defendant’s traffic citations,
15 and therefore, could try her, accept her plea, and sentence her in accordance with law.
16 {9} Also in her response to our notice, Defendant now seems to contend that she
17 does not own a “vehicle” as defined by the Motor Vehicle Code. [MIO 2] Defendant
18 does not explain whether or how she preserved this issue in the magistrate and district
19 courts; and the record does not suggest that she did. “In order to preserve an issue for
6 1 appeal, a defendant must make a timely objection that specifically apprises the trial
2 court of the nature of the claimed error and invokes an intelligent ruling thereon.”
3 State v. Montoya, 2015-NMSC-010, ¶ 45, 345 P.3d 1056. “We generally do not
4 consider issues on appeal that are not preserved below.” State v. Leon,
5 2013-NMCA-011, ¶ 33, 292 P.3d 493 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
6 {10} We treat this new assertion as a motion to amend the docketing statement and
7 deny it as not preserved and not viable. See State v. Rael, 1983-NMCA-081, ¶¶ 7-8,
8 10-11, 14-17, 100 N.M. 193, 668 P.2d 309 (stating that in cases assigned to the
9 summary calendar, this Court will grant a motion to amend the docketing statement
10 to include additional issues if the motion (1) is timely, (2) states all facts material to
11 a consideration of the new issues sought to be raised, (3) explains how the issues were
12 properly preserved or why they may be raised for the first time on appeal, (4)
13 demonstrates just cause by explaining why the issues were not originally raised in the
14 docketing statement, and (5) complies in other respects with the Rules of Appellate
15 Procedure); see also State v. Moore, 1989-NMCA-073, ¶¶ 36-51, 109 N.M. 119, 782
16 P.2d 91 (providing that this Court will deny motions to amend that raise issues that
17 are not viable, even if they allege fundamental or jurisdictional error), superseded by
18 rule on other grounds as recognized in State v. Salgado, 1991-NMCA-044, 112 N.M.
19 537, 817 P.2d 730.
7 1 {11} Defendant does not provide us with any reference to evidence from which she
2 did or could demonstrate that she was driving something that was not governed by the
3 Motor Vehicle Code. To the extent Defendant’s argument seeks to draw a distinction
4 between automobiles and vehicles or motor vehicles [MIO 2], we are not persuaded.
5 The Motor Vehicle Code defines “motor vehicle” as “every vehicle that is
6 self-propelled and every vehicle that is propelled by electric power obtained from
7 batteries or from overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon rails[.]” NMSA 1978,
8 § 66-1-4.11(H) (2015). It defines “vehicle” as “every device in, upon or by which any
9 person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, including any
10 frame, chassis, body or unitized frame and body of any vehicle or motor vehicle,
11 except devices moved exclusively by human power or used exclusively upon
12 stationary rails or tracks[.]” NMSA 1978, § 66-1-4.19(B) (2017). Contrary to
13 Defendant’s belief, it is not the courts that have created a broad definition for
14 “vehicle” and “motor vehicle” [MIO 3]; these broad definitions were created and
15 intended by the Legislature.
16 {12} For the reasons stated earlier, we hold that the magistrate court properly
17 exercised jurisdiction to accept Defendant’s plea and that Defendant has not
18 established that she is an aggrieved party entitled to appeal to the district court. See
19 Gallegos, 2007-NMCA-112, ¶ 9 (“A defendant who enters a voluntary and knowing
8 1 plea of guilty or no contest in an inferior court is not an aggrieved party for the
2 purpose of appeal to district court.”). We affirm the district court’s order dismissing
3 Defendant’s appeal. See State v. Vargas, 2008-NMSC-019, ¶ 8, 143 N.M. 692, 181
4 P.3d 684 (“Under the right for any reason doctrine, we may affirm the district court’s
5 order on grounds not relied upon by the district court if those grounds do not require
6 us to look beyond the factual allegations that were raised and considered below.”
7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
8 {13} IT IS SO ORDERED.
9 ___________________________________ 10 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
11 WE CONCUR:
12 _______________________________ 13 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge
14 _______________________________ 15 STEPHEN G. FRENCH, Judge