State v. Wisth

2009 WI App 53, 766 N.W.2d 781, 317 Wis. 2d 719, 2009 Wisc. App. LEXIS 224
CourtCourt of Appeals of Wisconsin
DecidedMarch 31, 2009
Docket2008AP1748-CR
StatusPublished

This text of 2009 WI App 53 (State v. Wisth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Wisth, 2009 WI App 53, 766 N.W.2d 781, 317 Wis. 2d 719, 2009 Wisc. App. LEXIS 224 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009).

Opinion

KESSLER, J.

¶ 1. William Allen Wisth appeals from a judgment of conviction for one felony count of issuing a worthless check, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 943.24(2) (2003-04). 1 Wisth raises a single issue on appeal: whether the trial court erroneously denied his request to substitute the assigned judge pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.20(5), where Wisth's request was made prior to sentencing after his probation was revoked. We conclude that § 971.20(5) allows for substitution only prior to the time the defendant is determined to be guilty or not guilty, whether by a factfinder or based on a guilty or no-contest plea.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2. Wisth pled guilty to one felony count of issuing a worthless check. The Honorable Jeffrey A. Conen accepted Wisth's plea and found him guilty. Due to court congestion, the Honorable Karen E. Christen-son conducted the sentencing hearing. The court withheld sentence and placed Wisth on probation for three years, ordering ten months of jail time as a condition of probation. About two years later, Wisth's probation was revoked and sentencing was scheduled before the Honorable Daniel L. Konkol, who was assigned the case pursuant to judicial rotation.

*722 ¶ 3. Wisth filed a request for substitution pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.20(5). 2 The trial court denied the request on grounds that § 971.20(5) provided a basis for substitution only prior to trial, and not for a sentencing after revocation. 3 This appeal follows.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 4. At issue is the interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 971.20(5). The interpretation of statutes is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. State ex rel. Steldt v, McCaughtry, 2000 WI App 176, ¶ 11, 238 Wis. 2d 393, 617 N.W.2d 201. Statutory interpretation " 'begins with the language of the statute.'" State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citation omitted). " 'If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry'" and apply that meaning. Id. (citation omitted). Relevant to a statute's plain meaning are the context in which a statute appears; the history of the statute revealed in both prior versions of *723 the statute and legislative amendments to the statute; and prior case law interpreting the statute. Berkos v. Shipwreck Bay Condo. Ass'n, 2008 WI App 122, ¶ 8, 313 Wis. 2d 609, 758 N.W.2d 215.

DISCUSSION

¶ 5. We begin our analysis with Wis. Stat. § 971.20(5), the substitution statute at issue in this case, which provides:

Substitution of trial judge subsequently assigned. If a new judge is assigned to the trial of an action and the defendant has not exercised the right to substitute an assigned judge, a written request for the substitution of the new judge may be filed with the clerk within 15 days of the clerk's giving actual notice or sending notice of the assignment to the defendant or the defendant's attorney. If the notification occurs within 20 days of the date set for trial, the request shall be filed within 48 hours of the clerk's giving actual notice or sending notice of the assignment. If the notification occurs within 48 hours of the trial or if there has been no notification, the defendant may make an oral or written request for substitution prior to the commencement of the proceedings.

The trial court held, and the State argues on appeal, that the language "[i]f a new judge is assigned to the trial of an action," see id. (emphasis added), limits substitution to those cases where substitution is sought prior to a trial in the case. The State explains that there are policy reasons why the legislature would allow substitution prior to trial, but not after trial:

After trial and conviction, the defendant is no longer presumed innocent. Therefore, the liberty interest of the defendant does not need as much protection. For reasons of judicial economy, the legislature may have chosen to grant more rights to a defendant still facing trial, rather than a defendant who had already been convicted.

*724 ¶ 6. In contrast, Wisth argues that the phrase "trial of an action" used in Wis. Stat. § 971.20(5) is not so limited. He explains that § 971.20(1) defines "action," as used in § 971.20, as "all proceedings before a court from the filing of a complaint to final disposition at the trial level." Wisth argues that at the time the new judge was assigned in his case, there was not yet a final disposition at the trial level, so he was entitled to seek substitution pursuant to § 971.20(5).

¶ 7. First, we give the word "trial" its plain meaning. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2439 (unabr. 1993) defines "trial" as "the formal examination of the matter in issue in a cause before a competent tribunal for the purpose of determining such issue" and "the mode of determining a question of fact in a court of law." Black's Law Dictionary 1543 (8th ed. 2004) defines "trial" as "[a] formal judicial examination of evidence and determination of legal claims in an adversary proceeding." These definitions describe the process by which a court presides over the determination of facts —whether the ultimate factfinder is the court or the jury — and applies the law to those facts. As applied to criminal proceedings, the "issue" or "legal claim" is whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. The trial court is the "competent tribunal" before which the "issue" or "legal claim" is examined. See Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 2439 (unabr. 1993); Black's Law Dictionary 1543 (8th ed. 2004). When the issue of guilt or lack of guilt is resolved, a criminal "trial" is complete.

¶ 8. Our interpretation of the word "trial" is consistent with the rule of statutory construction that " 'meaning should be given to every word, clause and sentence in the statute, and a construction which would make part of the statute superfluous should be avoided *725 wherever possible.'" See Hutson v. State Pers. Comm'n, 2003 WI 97, ¶ 49, 263 Wis. 2d 612, 665 N.W.2d 212 (citation omitted).

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Related

State v. Castillo
570 N.W.2d 44 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1997)
Hutson v. State Personnel Commission
2003 WI 97 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 2003)
State Ex Rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County
2004 WI 58 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 2004)
State v. Garner
194 N.W.2d 649 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1972)
State Ex Rel. Steldt v. McCaughtry
2000 WI App 176 (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 2000)
Berkos v. Shipwreck Bay Condominium Ass'n
2008 WI App 122 (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 2008)

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Bluebook (online)
2009 WI App 53, 766 N.W.2d 781, 317 Wis. 2d 719, 2009 Wisc. App. LEXIS 224, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-wisth-wisctapp-2009.