State v. Wilson-Jones

2025 Ohio 2903

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 15, 2025
• Docket: C-240548
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Wilson-Jones, 2025-Ohio-2903.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240548 TRIAL NO. B-1107417 Plaintiff-Appellee, :

vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY JUSTIN WILSON-JONES, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, the briefs, and arguments. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed for the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date. Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs are taxed under App.R. 24. The court further orders that 1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and 2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.

To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 8/15/2025 per order of the court.

By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as State v. Wilson-Jones, 2025-Ohio-2903.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240548 TRIAL NO. B-1107417 Plaintiff-Appellee, :

vs. : OPINION JUSTIN WILSON-JONES :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 15, 2025

Connie M. Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and John D. Hill, Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Joshua A. Thompson, Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BOCK, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Justin Wilson-Jones applied to seal a 2012

conviction for trafficking in heroin. The State opposed the application based on

Wilson-Jones acquiring additional drug-trafficking convictions after his 2012

conviction and Wilson-Jones having been released from prison only two years earlier,

thus demonstrating that he had not shown he was adequately rehabilitated. The trial

court denied the application. Wilson-Jones has appealed, arguing that the trial court

abused its discretion in considering the number of his convictions when denying the

application.

{¶2} We hold that in cases where a defendant seeks to seal a conviction, the

trial court, when determining whether the defendant is adequately rehabilitated, may

consider the defendant’s criminal convictions incurred after the last offense the

defendant seeks to seal.

{¶3} The trial court did not abuse its discretion. We overrule the assignment

of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I. Factual and Procedural History

{¶4} In 2012, after he pled guilty, the trial court convicted Wilson-Jones of

fourth-degree felony trafficking in heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and

sentenced him to three years of community control (“2012 conviction”). The trial court

terminated Wilson-Jones’s community control in September 2013.

{¶5} In 2014, Wilson-Jones was convicted of first-degree misdemeanor

attempted trafficking of cocaine. In 2017, he was convicted of fourth-degree felony

aggravated trafficking. Finally, in 2021, Wilson-Jones was convicted of two counts of

third-degree trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound, for which he was sentenced

to 18 months in prison. He was released in 2022.

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{¶6} In June 2024, Wilson-Jones applied to seal his 2012 conviction. The

State objected to Wilson-Jones’s application, arguing that while Wilson-Jones’s 2012

conviction was eligible for sealing, he was not rehabilitated as required by R.C.

2953.32(D)(1)(c). The State pointed to Wilson-Jones’s “extensive criminal history,”

including multiple convictions after his 2012 conviction.

{¶7} Wilson-Jones’s reply to the State’s objection included an affidavit in

which he took “full responsibility for his actions.” Wilson-Jones noted that after his

release from prison in 2022, he had been working and attending a truck-driving school

to improve his financial prospects. He explained that he wanted his 2012 conviction

sealed to obtain better housing, which might allow him to have overnight visits with

his daughter.

{¶8} At an August 2024 hearing on Wilson-Jones’s application, the State

reasserted its objection. It argued that Wilson-Jones had failed to show that he was

adequately rehabilitated as, in light of his “extensive criminal history . . . it’s a lot

harder to make the case of rehabilitation over such a short period of time.”

{¶9} The trial court denied the application:

Expungements, I think it is great. And it is good that you are staying out

of trouble for the last two years. That’s good. Keep working hard and

maybe you will get these expunged later. But right now I just can’t see

expunging them. You have too many convictions. And it hasn’t been that

long of a time since you got out of prison for your last one.

{¶10} Wilson-Jones has appealed.

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II. Analysis

{¶11} In his sole assignment of error, Wilson-Jones argues that the trial court

abused its discretion in denying his application to seal his 2012 conviction.

a. Standard of review

{¶12} An appellate court reviews a trial court’s denial of an application to seal

a conviction for an abuse of discretion. State v. G.H., 2023-Ohio-3269, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.).

A trial court abuses its discretion when it “‘exercises its judgment, in an unwarranted

way, in regard to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.’” (Cleaned up.)

State v. Austin, 2021-Ohio-3608, ¶ 5 (1st Dist.), quoting Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-

Ohio-3304, ¶ 35. A trial court has no discretion to make an error of law. Id., quoting

Johnson at ¶ 39.

b. Application for sealing

{¶13} R.C. 2953.32 establishes a mechanism where eligible criminal

convictions may be sealed from the public’s view. “In Ohio, sealing an individual’s

criminal record is an act of grace.” State v. R.S., 2022-Ohio-1108, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.). But,

as R.C. 2953.23 is “a remedial statute,” it “is liberally construed.” Id.

Wilson-Jones’s 2012 conviction was eligible for sealing

{¶14} R.C. 2953.32(A) enumerates specific offenses that are ineligible for

sealing. A defendant may apply to seal any conviction that is not an ineligible offense.

R.C. 2953.32(A); R.C. 2953.32(B)(1). The State concedes that Wilson-Jones’s 2012

conviction for fourth-degree felony trafficking in heroin is eligible for sealing. And

while Wilson-Jones’s post-2012 convictions previously would have rendered the 2012

conviction ineligible for sealing under former R.C. 2953.32, the legislature amended

that statute in 2023 such that Wilson-Jones’s subsequent convictions do not affect his

statutory eligibility for sealing his 2012 conviction.

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{¶15} R.C. 2953.32(B) provides specific periods following a conviction after

which an applicant may apply for sealing. Relevant here, an “eligible offender” may

apply for sealing “at the expiration of one year after the offender’s final discharge if

convicted of one or more felonies of the fourth or fifth degree or one or more

misdemeanors.” R.C. 2953.32(B)(1)(a)(ii). There is no dispute that Wilson-Jones

satisfied the one-year waiting period.

Wilson-Jones’s rehabilitation

{¶16} In addition to the technical eligibility requirements, R.C. 2953.32(D)(1)

directs the trial court to consider various criteria when determining whether to grant

an application for sealing. If the trial court finds that all the considerations under R.C.

2953.32(D)(1) apply, then the trial court “shall order all official records of the case that

pertain to the conviction . . . sealed.” R.C. 2953.32(D)(2).

{¶17} R.C. 2953.32(D)(1)(c) requires the trial court to consider “whether the

applicant has been rehabilitated to the satisfaction of the court.” An applicant bears

the burden of establishing rehabilitation. R.S., 2022-Ohio-1108, at ¶ 21 (1st Dist.).

“Rehabilitation can be demonstrated through ‘an admission of guilt and a promise to

never commit a similar offense in the future, or good nature or citizenship in the

community since the conviction.’” Id.

{¶18} In R.S., this court explained that trial courts may not deny an

application to seal a conviction based solely on “the nature of the offense” where the

General Assembly has deemed the conviction an eligible offense. Id. at ¶ 29, quoting

State v. M.H., 2018-Ohio-582, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.) (collecting cases).

{¶19} Further, because the General Assembly made the policy determination

to allow people to seal a “certain number of offenses . . . a court cannot deny an

application to seal based solely on the nature or number of offenses, if the records of

6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

those offenses are eligible for sealing under the law.” G.H., 2023-Ohio-3269, at ¶ 22

(1st Dist.).

{¶20} And in State v. J.B., 2024-Ohio-1879, ¶ 22 (1st Dist.), accepted for

review, 2024-Ohio-4501, the defendant applied in 2023 to seal seven misdemeanor

convictions that she had incurred from 2012 through 2016. Id. at ¶ 1. The trial court

denied the application because the defendant had not offered evidence demonstrating

rehabilitation, other than stating “that’s just not me anymore,” and referenced J.B.’s

convictions for subsequent similar misdemeanors in 2018 and 2019. Id. at ¶ 6, 18. This

court reversed, explaining that the applicant’s statement “demonstrated her

acknowledgement that she has changed since the cessation of her criminal activity,”

the applicant had applied for and received a certificate of qualification for

employment, and the applicant’s criminal activity had ceased four years before her

application for sealing. Id. at ¶ 20. The court held that “the focus of rehabilitation is

the applicant’s progress following the last offense, not simply the number of previous

offenses.” Id. at ¶ 22.

{¶21} Here, the trial court credited Wilson-Jones’s statements that he was

“staying out of trouble for the last two years,” was “working hard,” and was taking

truck-driving classes to obtain more lucrative employment. Wilson-Jones’s affidavit

also explained that he had attended Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholics Anonymous

meetings “on and off from 2011 to 2021,” and attended therapy on his own since his

discharge from prison in 2022. The trial court appears to have accepted that Wilson-

Jones was taking appropriate actions, not breaking the law, and otherwise “doing

good” since his 2022 release from prison. But the trial court determined that sealing

his 2012 conviction was inappropriate because Wilson-Jones had not been out of

prison for a sufficiently long period of time to demonstrate rehabilitation.

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{¶22} Ultimately, we cannot conclude on this record that the trial court abused

its discretion in finding that Wilson-Jones did not establish that he was adequately

rehabilitated. His criminal history revealed a pattern of convictions for drug-

trafficking offenses at regular intervals beginning in 2012. And Wilson-Jones concedes

that a “trial court can very well take the extent of an applicant’s criminal record into

consideration during its fact finding” regarding whether an applicant is adequately

rehabilitated. Indeed, if a trial court cannot consider an applicant’s pattern of

committing similar offenses at regular intervals in determining whether a defendant

is rehabilitated, then it is not clear what the trial court can do with an applicant’s

criminal history.

{¶23} We note that while Wilson-Jones’s affidavit explained that he had

attended Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholics Anonymous meetings “on and off from

2011 to 2021,” he attended those meetings before his most recent conviction and there

was no evidence that he attended them after his release from prison. Wilson-Jones’s

remaining evidence of lawful employment, while certainly commendable, is

insufficient to allow us to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.

{¶24} A trial court may consider defendants’ criminal history incurred after

the offense they seek to seal to determine whether their postconviction conduct shows

adequate rehabilitation. And viewing the evidence Wilson-Jones presented in support

of his rehabilitation against his criminal history, we hold that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in denying his application to seal his 2012 conviction. Simply

because a conviction is statutorily eligible to be sealed, the trial court is not required

to determine that the applicant is rehabilitated.

{¶25} Finally, Wilson-Jones argues that the trial court failed to make “the

specific determinations as required by R.C. 2953.32(D)(1)” before denying his

8 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

application. He asserts that trial courts must make specific determinations when

considering an application to seal records. But this court has held that the trial court

is not required to make any specific findings under R.C. 2953.32(D)(1). State v.

Lanxiang Yu, 2024-Ohio-3083, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.). Instead, “the record must contain

some analysis supporting the trial court’s ultimate decision.” Id.; see State v. Stringer,

2009-Ohio-909, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.) (reversing denial of sealing application where

transcript from an “extremely brief” hearing prevented the appellate court from

determining whether the applicant received a full and fair hearing).

{¶26} The record contains some analysis supporting the trial court’s ultimate

decision that Wilson-Jones was not adequately rehabilitated and therefore not entitled

to have his 2012 conviction sealed. The trial court’s statements at the hearing were

sufficient to allow us to review the trial court’s decision. And the trial court did

specifically “determine” that (1) Wilson-Jones’s 2012 conviction was eligible for

sealing, R.C. 2953.32(D)(1)(a), (2) that Wilson-Jones had no pending convictions as

evidenced by Wilson-Jones’s unchallenged representation to this fact, R.C.

2953.32(D)(1)(b), and (3) Wilson-Jones was not adequately rehabilitated, R.C.

2953.32(D)(1)(c).

{¶27} We accordingly overrule the assignment of error.

III. Conclusion

{¶28} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule the assignment of error and

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Judgment affirmed.

NESTOR and MOORE, JJ., concur.