[Cite as State v. Williamson, 2016-Ohio-690.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 102555
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
MAURICE WILLIAMSON
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-13-578649-A
BEFORE: Jones, A.J., Stewart, J., and Blackmon, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 25, 2016 2
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Paul A. Daher Paul A. Daher & Associates 700 W. St. Clair Avenue, Suite 218 Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Shannon M. Musson Assistant County Prosecutor The Justice Center, 9th Floor 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 3
LARRY A. JONES, SR., A.J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Maurice Williamson, appeals his convictions after
entering a guilty plea. We affirm Williamson’s convictions but remand the case for a
nunc pro tunc sentencing entry.
{¶2} In 2013, Williamson was charged with attempted murder, two counts of
felonious assault, domestic violence, improperly discharging a firearm at or into a
habitation, having weapons while under disability, and criminal damaging. The felony
charges carried one- and three-year firearm and repeat violent offender specifications and
notices of prior conviction.
{¶3} Williamson entered into a plea deal with the state, in which he agreed to
plead guilty to felonious assault with three-year firearm and repeat violent offender
specifications and notice of prior conviction, domestic violence, improperly discharging a
firearm at or into a habitation with a repeat violent offender specification and notice of
prior conviction, and having weapons while under disability.
{¶4} In January 2014, the trial court sentenced Williamson to eight years for
felonious assault plus three years for the firearm specification, consecutive to eight years
for the improperly discharging a firearm at or into a habitation conviction. The court
also sentenced him concurrently to six months for domestic violence and 36 months for
having weapons while under disability, for a total sentence of 19 years in prison.
{¶5} This court granted Williamson a delayed appeal and Williamson raises two 4
assignments of error for our review:
I. The trial court erred when it did not merge his felonious assault conviction with his improper discharge of a firearm conviction.
II. The trial court erred when it sentenced him to consecutive terms
because the trial court did not make the required findings in the sentencing
entry.
{¶6} In the first assignment of error, Williamson argues that the trial court
committed plain error when it failed to merge his felonious assault and improper
discharge convictions.
{¶7} Under Ohio law, “[w]here the same conduct by a defendant can be construed
to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or information
may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only
one.” R.C. 2941.25(A). However, where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or
more offenses of dissimilar import, or where his or her “conduct results in two or more
offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as to
each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, and the
defendant may be convicted of all of them.” R.C. 2941.25(B).
{¶8} In State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, ¶
21, the Ohio Supreme Court found that an appellant forfeits his or her allied offenses
claim for appellate review by failing to seek the merger of his or her convictions as allied
offenses of similar import in the trial court. An accused’s failure to raise the issue of 5
allied offenses of similar import in the trial court forfeits all but plain error, which is not
reversible error unless it affected the outcome of the proceeding and reversal is necessary
to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice. Id. at the syllabus. Moreover, unless an
accused shows a reasonable probability that his or her convictions are allied offenses of
similar import committed with the same conduct and without a separate animus, he or she
cannot demonstrate that the trial court’s failure to inquire whether the convictions merge
for purposes of sentencing was plain error. Id.
{¶9} In State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892, the
Ohio Supreme Court recently clarified the test a trial court and a reviewing court must
employ in determining whether offenses are allied offenses that merge into a single
conviction, concluding that “two or more offenses of dissimilar import exist within the
meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant’s conduct constitutes offenses involving
separate victims or if the harm that results from each offense is separate and identifiable.”
Id. at ¶ 23. Thus,
[i]f any of the following is true, the offenses cannot merge and the
defendant may be convicted and sentenced for multiple offenses: (1) the
offenses are dissimilar in import or significance—in other words, each
offense caused separate, identifiable harm, (2) the offenses were committed
separately, and (3) the offenses were committed with separate animus or
motivation. 6
Id. at ¶ 25. The court also concluded that “a defendant’s conduct that constitutes two or
more offenses against a single victim can support multiple convictions if the harm that
results from each offense is separate and identifiable from the harm of the other offense.”
Id. at ¶ 26.
{¶10} This court has previously held it is possible to commit felonious assault by
means of a deadly weapon and discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises by
the same conduct. State v. Robinson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99290, 2013-Ohio-4375, ¶
113; State v. Melton, 2013-Ohio-257, 984 N.E.2d 1112, ¶ 54 (8th Dist.). But, in
Robinson and Melton, decided before Ruff, this court only considered the conduct and the
animus of the defendant. Pursuant to Ruff, a trial court and a reviewing court must ask:
(1) Were the offenses dissimilar in import or significance? (2) Were they committed
separately? or (3) Were they committed with separate animus or motivation? Id. at ¶ 31.
The conduct, animus, and import must all be considered and an affirmative answer to any
of the above inquiries will permit separate convictions. Id.
{¶11} Thus, by failing to seek the merger of his convictions as allied offenses of
similar import in the trial court, Williamson has forfeited his allied offenses claim for
appellate review. Rogers at ¶ 21. In order to show plain error, Williamson must
demonstrate a reasonable probability that he has been convicted of allied offenses of
similar import committed with the same conduct and with the same animus and the error
resulted in prejudice, i.e., affected the outcome of the proceeding. To do so, this court 7
must determine whether there is sufficient information in the record before us to decide
whether (1) the offenses were dissimilar in import or significance (2) the offenses were
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[Cite as State v. Williamson, 2016-Ohio-690.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 102555
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
MAURICE WILLIAMSON
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-13-578649-A
BEFORE: Jones, A.J., Stewart, J., and Blackmon, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 25, 2016 2
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Paul A. Daher Paul A. Daher & Associates 700 W. St. Clair Avenue, Suite 218 Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Shannon M. Musson Assistant County Prosecutor The Justice Center, 9th Floor 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 3
LARRY A. JONES, SR., A.J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Maurice Williamson, appeals his convictions after
entering a guilty plea. We affirm Williamson’s convictions but remand the case for a
nunc pro tunc sentencing entry.
{¶2} In 2013, Williamson was charged with attempted murder, two counts of
felonious assault, domestic violence, improperly discharging a firearm at or into a
habitation, having weapons while under disability, and criminal damaging. The felony
charges carried one- and three-year firearm and repeat violent offender specifications and
notices of prior conviction.
{¶3} Williamson entered into a plea deal with the state, in which he agreed to
plead guilty to felonious assault with three-year firearm and repeat violent offender
specifications and notice of prior conviction, domestic violence, improperly discharging a
firearm at or into a habitation with a repeat violent offender specification and notice of
prior conviction, and having weapons while under disability.
{¶4} In January 2014, the trial court sentenced Williamson to eight years for
felonious assault plus three years for the firearm specification, consecutive to eight years
for the improperly discharging a firearm at or into a habitation conviction. The court
also sentenced him concurrently to six months for domestic violence and 36 months for
having weapons while under disability, for a total sentence of 19 years in prison.
{¶5} This court granted Williamson a delayed appeal and Williamson raises two 4
assignments of error for our review:
I. The trial court erred when it did not merge his felonious assault conviction with his improper discharge of a firearm conviction.
II. The trial court erred when it sentenced him to consecutive terms
because the trial court did not make the required findings in the sentencing
entry.
{¶6} In the first assignment of error, Williamson argues that the trial court
committed plain error when it failed to merge his felonious assault and improper
discharge convictions.
{¶7} Under Ohio law, “[w]here the same conduct by a defendant can be construed
to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or information
may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only
one.” R.C. 2941.25(A). However, where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or
more offenses of dissimilar import, or where his or her “conduct results in two or more
offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as to
each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, and the
defendant may be convicted of all of them.” R.C. 2941.25(B).
{¶8} In State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, ¶
21, the Ohio Supreme Court found that an appellant forfeits his or her allied offenses
claim for appellate review by failing to seek the merger of his or her convictions as allied
offenses of similar import in the trial court. An accused’s failure to raise the issue of 5
allied offenses of similar import in the trial court forfeits all but plain error, which is not
reversible error unless it affected the outcome of the proceeding and reversal is necessary
to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice. Id. at the syllabus. Moreover, unless an
accused shows a reasonable probability that his or her convictions are allied offenses of
similar import committed with the same conduct and without a separate animus, he or she
cannot demonstrate that the trial court’s failure to inquire whether the convictions merge
for purposes of sentencing was plain error. Id.
{¶9} In State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892, the
Ohio Supreme Court recently clarified the test a trial court and a reviewing court must
employ in determining whether offenses are allied offenses that merge into a single
conviction, concluding that “two or more offenses of dissimilar import exist within the
meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant’s conduct constitutes offenses involving
separate victims or if the harm that results from each offense is separate and identifiable.”
Id. at ¶ 23. Thus,
[i]f any of the following is true, the offenses cannot merge and the
defendant may be convicted and sentenced for multiple offenses: (1) the
offenses are dissimilar in import or significance—in other words, each
offense caused separate, identifiable harm, (2) the offenses were committed
separately, and (3) the offenses were committed with separate animus or
motivation. 6
Id. at ¶ 25. The court also concluded that “a defendant’s conduct that constitutes two or
more offenses against a single victim can support multiple convictions if the harm that
results from each offense is separate and identifiable from the harm of the other offense.”
Id. at ¶ 26.
{¶10} This court has previously held it is possible to commit felonious assault by
means of a deadly weapon and discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises by
the same conduct. State v. Robinson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99290, 2013-Ohio-4375, ¶
113; State v. Melton, 2013-Ohio-257, 984 N.E.2d 1112, ¶ 54 (8th Dist.). But, in
Robinson and Melton, decided before Ruff, this court only considered the conduct and the
animus of the defendant. Pursuant to Ruff, a trial court and a reviewing court must ask:
(1) Were the offenses dissimilar in import or significance? (2) Were they committed
separately? or (3) Were they committed with separate animus or motivation? Id. at ¶ 31.
The conduct, animus, and import must all be considered and an affirmative answer to any
of the above inquiries will permit separate convictions. Id.
{¶11} Thus, by failing to seek the merger of his convictions as allied offenses of
similar import in the trial court, Williamson has forfeited his allied offenses claim for
appellate review. Rogers at ¶ 21. In order to show plain error, Williamson must
demonstrate a reasonable probability that he has been convicted of allied offenses of
similar import committed with the same conduct and with the same animus and the error
resulted in prejudice, i.e., affected the outcome of the proceeding. To do so, this court 7
must determine whether there is sufficient information in the record before us to decide
whether (1) the offenses were dissimilar in import or significance (2) the offenses were
committed separately or (3) the offenses were committed with separate animus or
motivation. We find the record on review insufficient to conduct a plain error analysis.
{¶12} The only record of facts underlying Williamson’s convictions is the
presentence investigation report. During the plea and sentencing hearing, there was no
discussion of the facts other than defense counsel’s statement that Williamson was
intoxicated during the event, the prosecutor’s description of the victim’s injuries, and
Williamson’s statements of remorse.
{¶13} The presentence investigation report states, in part:
The defendant is the father of [the victim’s] child. The defendant
proceeded to walk behind a vacant house next door to 11616 Durant. A
short time later, the defendant walked back in front of the house with a gun
in his hand. He pointed the gun at [the victim] and shot her one time in the
back of the upper right thigh. The defendant fled on foot and was taken
into custody a short time later.
{¶14} The improper discharge offense is listed, but not discussed in the report.
Therefore, this court is left with little to no knowledge of the facts surrounding the
conviction.
{¶15} Pursuant to Rogers, it is Williamson’s burden to demonstrate a reasonable 8
probability that the convictions were for allied offenses of similar import committed with
the same conduct and without a separate animus. On this record, we find that
Williamson has failed to demonstrate any probability that he was convicted of allied
offenses of similar import committed with the same conduct and with the same animus.
{¶16} Thus, in light of the above, we cannot say that the trial court committed
plain error when it failed to merge the two offenses.
{¶17} Within this assignment of error, Williamson also contends that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not ask for an allied offenses
review.
{¶18} To support a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Williamson must
satisfy the two-prong test developed in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). That is, he must show counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and a reasonable probability exists that the
result of the proceedings would have been different, but for counsel’s error. Id. at
687-688, 694.
{¶19} Based on our analysis of the first assignment of error, we find Williamson
has failed to meet his burden to demonstrate he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
We cannot say that trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness in failing to move the trial court to merge his sentences. And
Williamson cannot show there is a reasonable probability that, but for his trial counsel’s 9
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.
{¶20} In light of the above, the first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶21} In the second assignment of error, Williamson claims that the trial court
erred when it failed to incorporate its findings for imposing consecutive sentences into its
sentencing entry. Williamson is correct; the trial court did not incorporate its findings
into the sentence judgment entry, as required under State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209,
2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 29. Thus, under Bonnell, we remand the case to the
trial court so that it can issue a nunc pro tunc entry incorporating its findings into its
sentencing judgment entry. Id.
{¶22} The second assignment of error is sustained.
{¶23} Judgment affirmed; case remanded for the trial court to put forth a nunc pro
tunc sentencing entry with its consecutive sentence findings.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having
been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court
for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 10
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
LARRY A. JONES, SR., ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
MELODY J. STEWART, J., and PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR