State v. Williams, Unpublished Decision (9-22-1999)

CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedSeptember 22, 1999
DocketC.A. No. 19477.
StatusUnpublished

This text of State v. Williams, Unpublished Decision (9-22-1999) (State v. Williams, Unpublished Decision (9-22-1999)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Williams, Unpublished Decision (9-22-1999), (Ohio Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

This cause was heard upon the record in the trial court. Each error assigned has been reviewed and the following disposition is made: Appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals an order of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas that granted Defendant's motion to suppress evidence acquired during an investigative stop. We reverse.

On November 4, 1998, Akron Police narcotics officers observed a man lingering at the end of a driveway in a known drug area. Detective Michael Shadie was dispatched to the scene in an unmarked vehicle. When he arrived, he noted that the subject continued to linger at the end of the driveway, glancing in both directions up and down the street. The subject ran behind a house when a marked police cruiser turned onto the street. He reappeared several minutes later and resumed his post at the end of the driveway. Officer Shadie continued to observe as a green Oldsmobile pulled alongside the curb. The subject approached the car, had a discussion with the occupants, and then walked behind the house again. After reappearing, he returned to the curb and got into the rear seat of the car. The car pulled onto Copley Road and proceeded westbound.

Detective Donny Williams initiated a traffic stop of the green automobile near the 1200 block of Copley Road. He was joined by four other units in marked cars. Detective Williams approached the passenger side of the car and visually identified the occupants in the front seats as Defendant and his brother. Williams and his partner, Detective Bell, proceeded to take administrative information from the subjects. Detective Bell informed the occupants of the car that they were suspected of engaging in illicit drug activity. Defendant and his brother stated that they were providing a ride to a friend.

At that point, Defendant consented to a search of his person. He opened the door and stepped from the car, but then immediately sat down on the passenger seat again and reached for the glove compartment. Startled by Defendant's actions, the officers restrained him and instructed him not to open the compartment. Defendant stepped from the car and agreed to a search of his person for drugs and weapons. As Detective Williams conducted the pat-down, he detected a bulge in Defendant's pocket. Detective Williams suspected that the object was a film container or pill bottle. Aware that crack cocaine is often transported in these containers, Officer Williams removed the container for inspection and discovered several rocks of crack cocaine.

Defendant was arrested and charged with one count of possession of crack cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of the fourth degree. On November 30, 1998, Defendant moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the search and any statements made by him before counsel was present. The trial court granted the motion after conducting a hearing. The State timely appealed pursuant to Crim.R. 12(J) and App. R. 4(B)(4) and has raised one assignment of error for review.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court committed error when it suppressed the evidence in this case.

The State has argued that the trial court erred by concluding that the police lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to initiate an investigative stop. We agree.

A police officer may stop a civilian to investigate unusual behavior, even absent probable cause to make an arrest, when the officer reasonably suspects that the civilian is engaged in criminal activity. State v. Andrews (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87,cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1220, 115 L.Ed.2d 1002, citing Terry v.Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 21 L.Ed.2d 889. This belief cannot be justified by mere intuition, but must instead be grounded in specific, articulable facts and such rational inferences as may be drawn from those facts. Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 21-22,20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906-07. The propriety of an investigative stop must be assessed in light of the totality of the surrounding circumstances as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable police officer who must confront those circumstances on the scene. Statev. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d at 87-88. While we defer to the findings of the trial court on a motion to suppress provided that they are supported by competent, credible evidence, our review of the application of the law to the facts is de novo. State v.McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 710.

In State v. Bobo (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 179, cert.denied, 488 U.S. 910, 102 L.Ed.2d 252, the Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that an investigative stop was justified in light of the totality of the circumstances, including the location of the events in an area known for heavy drug activity; the fact that the events took place at night; the experience of the officers and the number of related arrests in which they had participated; and furtive movements made by the defendant. The Court emphasized that:

The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur * * *. On the contrary, * * * it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate response. * * * A brief stop of a suspicious individual * * * may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.

Id. at 180, quoting Adams v. Williams (1972), 407 U.S. 143,145-46, 32 L.Ed.2d 612, 616-17.

An investigatory stop is justified when an officer is able to articulate a reasonable suspicion of either a traffic violation or some other violation of law. Akron v. Dotson (Dec. 9, 1998), Summit App. No. 19053, unreported, at 5, citing Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 663, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 673. Accordingly, an officer need not observe a traffic violation before making an investigative stop. Akron v. Dotson, supra. See, also, Tallmadgev. McCoy (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 604, 608.

In Dotson, officers observed the defendant seated in a stopped car in the middle of a road, in an area known for drug activity, engaged in a conversation with a man leaning in the passenger window of the car.

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Related

Terry v. Ohio
392 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1968)
Adams v. Williams
407 U.S. 143 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Delaware v. Prouse
440 U.S. 648 (Supreme Court, 1979)
State v. McNamara
707 N.E.2d 539 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1997)
City of Tallmadge v. McCoy
645 N.E.2d 802 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1994)
State v. Bobo
524 N.E.2d 489 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1988)
State v. Andrews
565 N.E.2d 1271 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1991)
Gacho v. Illinois
488 U.S. 910 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Zatko v. United States District Court
501 U.S. 1220 (Supreme Court, 1991)

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Bluebook (online)
State v. Williams, Unpublished Decision (9-22-1999), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-williams-unpublished-decision-9-22-1999-ohioctapp-1999.