[Cite as State v. Williams-Stupp, 2025-Ohio-1815.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : Appellee : C.A. No. 30304 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2024 CR 01426 : TION WILLIAMS-STUPP : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellant : :
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OPINION
Rendered on May 21, 2025
ARVIN S. MILLER, Attorney for Appellant
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by ANDREW T. FRENCH, Attorney for Appellee
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LEWIS, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Tion Williams-Stupp appeals from his convictions in the
Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas following his no contest pleas to one count
of carrying a concealed weapon and one count of violating a protection order. He argues -2-
that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress and abused its discretion by
reopening the suppression hearing to call an additional witness. For the following
reasons, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
I. Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} On May 21, 2024, a Montgomery County grand jury indicted Williams-Stupp
on one count of carrying a concealed weapon, a fourth-degree felony in violation of R.C.
2923.12(A)(2), and one count of violating a protection order, a first-degree misdemeanor
in violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(3). These charges resulted from a May 8, 2024
investigatory stop of Williams-Stupp after a police detective observed him jaywalking.
Williams-Stupp pleaded not guilty to the charges in the indictment.
{¶ 3} On June 4, 2024, Williams-Stupp filed a motion to suppress any evidence
“obtained from the unjustified and illegal investigation and arrest.” According to the
motion, Williams-Stupp did not jaywalk. Therefore, Williams-Stupp argued that the
police did not have a reasonable suspicion of articulable facts to stop him and any
evidence and statements that were obtained following the stop were inadmissible.
{¶ 4} A hearing on the motion to suppress was held on July 18, 2024. Detective
Dustin Phillips of the Dayton Police Department testified at the hearing. He worked for
17 years for the Dayton Police Department, most recently within the Special
Investigations Bureau. On May 8, 2024, he was surveilling the DeSoto Bass area, which
the police considered a high crime area. Detective Phillips witnessed Williams-Stupp
cross a street in such a way that Detective Phillips believed he had jaywalked in violation -3-
of the Dayton City Ordinances. In particular, Detective Phillips explained, “When I first
observed him, again he was crossing -- it would have been from south to north, across
Bancroft Street, mid-block between Frizell and North -- South Euclid. Again, he could
have gone either direction approximately half a block to hit the intersection. However,
he just walked directly across the street mid-block.” Tr. 10-11.
{¶ 5} Detective Phillips also saw a gun magazine sticking out of Williams-Stupp’s
clothes and saw him clutching his right pocket and looking back over both shoulders,
which Detective Phillips considered suspicious behavior. Detective Phillips
subsequently observed that Williams-Stupp had possession of a gun. Detective Phillips
communicated this information by radio to Police Officer Vincent Carter and Detective
Tyler Orndorff. These officers were sharing the same police channel. Detective Phillips
then lost sight of Williams-Stupp for several minutes. During the time Detective Phillips
lost sight of Williams-Stupp, Detective Orndorff radioed that he witnessed Williams-Stupp
jaywalking a second time. According to Detective Phillips, Detective Orndorff informed
him that he saw Williams-Stupp “exit Attucks Place, walk down the street, the middle of
the street, and then cross over the intersection of Bancroft.” Id. at 25. Officer Carter
then conducted a stop of Williams-Stupp.
{¶ 6} Once Williams-Stupp was stopped by Officer Carter, he began raising his
voice and getting angry. Detective Phillips arrived and immediately grabbed the gun
from Williams-Stupp’s pocket. Williams-Stupp was placed in handcuffs due to his
aggressive behavior. When questioned, Williams-Stupp provided what the police
officers suspected was false information as to his identity. Therefore, Williams-Stupp -4-
was transported to the jail for fingerprinting to confirm his identity. Before being
fingerprinted, Williams-Stupp revealed his true identity, which revealed an active warrant.
{¶ 7} Following the suppression hearing, Williams-Stupp filed a memorandum in
support of his motion to suppress. The State filed a memorandum in opposition to the
motion to suppress. On October 1, 2024, the trial court issued an order requiring
additional testimony relating to the motion to suppress. The court stated, in part: “In an
effort to render a proper decision, the Court needs to hear from an additional witness,
Detective [Tyler] Orndorff. It is the Court’s duty to get to the truth of a case and
subsequently, it is the Court’s opinion Detective Orndorff’s testimony will elicit information
necessary for the Court to render an accurate decision.”
{¶ 8} On October 10, 2024, the trial court reopened the suppression hearing and
called Detective Orndorff to testify regarding the events of May 8, 2024. According to
the trial court, Williams-Stupp’s memorandum in support of his motion to suppress
convinced the trial court to provide Williams-Stupp with an opportunity to cross-examine
Detective Orndorff about whether he had alerted the other two officers at the scene that
he had witnessed Williams-Stupp jaywalking. Williams-Stupp objected to reopening the
suppression hearing.
{¶ 9} At the time of the October 10, 2024 hearing, Detective Orndorff had worked
for the Dayton Police Department for approximately 12 years. He had worked within the
Narcotics Bureau since April 2019. On May 8, 2024, Detective Orndorff was surveilling
the Miami Chapel area with Detective Jeremy Stewart, Detective Phillips, and Officer
Carter. A few moments before Detective Orndorff observed Williams-Stupp walking, -5-
Detective Phillips radioed him that he had witnessed Williams-Stupp walking with a
firearm in his pocket. Detective Orndorff then witnessed Williams-Stupp do the following:
He'd exited off of Attucks Place walking down the thoroughfare of
that parking area, and then from there, he traveled directly to the -- I would
call it the eastern curb, and then walked down the middle - - I would call it
the middle of the street, in the street, roadway, and then, basically
approached and made his approach onto the sidewalk of that eastern
sidewalk of Danner and Bancroft. So I call that the southeast corner of
Danner and Bancroft.
Tr. 49. Detective Orndorff radioed this information to the other officers sharing the police
channel. Officer Carter then conducted a stop of Williams-Stupp.
{¶ 10} When asked questions to clarify where Williams-Stupp had been walking,
Detective Orndorff explained that Williams-Stupp “didn’t go on the road that far on the
Danner part, but stayed along that curb right there. . . . He walked along the eastern
curb.” Id. at 51. Detective Orndorff confirmed that Williams-Stupp walked on the street
and not on the sidewalk the entire way until he reached the corner of the street.
{¶ 11} On cross-examination, Detective Orndorff conceded that he had not created
a report on May 8, 2024, and that he had reviewed Detective Phillips’s report to help
refresh his recollection before the suppression hearing. However, he stated that he had
independent memories of the events of May 8, 2024.
{¶ 12} On October 17, 2024, the trial court overruled the motion to suppress. The
same day, the trial court held a change of plea hearing at which Williams-Stupp changed -6-
his pleas to no contest to the two charges in the indictment. After a plea colloquy, the
trial court accepted the two no contest pleas and found Williams-Stupp guilty as charged
in the indictment. The court then sentenced Williams-Stupp to five years of community
control sanctions. Williams-Stupp filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Reopening the Suppression
Hearing and Calling an Additional Witness
{¶ 13} Williams-Stupp’s first assignment of error is partially based on arguments
raised in his second assignment of error. Therefore, we will first resolve the second
assignment of error, which concerns the trial court’s decision to reopen the suppression
hearing and call an additional witness to testify about the events of May 8, 2024.
Williams-Stupp’s second assignment of error states:
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A
FAIR AND IMPARTIAL DISPOSITION OF HIS MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE, BY THE JUDGE FAILING TO REMAIN DETACHED AND
NEUTRAL, WHEN RATHER THAN RULING ON THE MOTION BASED
UPON THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTOR, AND
AFTER BOTH PARTIES BRIEFED THE ISSUE, AND ABSENT ANY
REQUEST BY THE PROSECUTOR, SHE DECIDED TO HELP THE
PROSECUTOR’S CASE BY ORDERING AN ADDITIONAL WITNESS TO
TESTIFY. -7-
{¶ 14} On July 18, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress.
During this hearing, Detective Phillips testified about why an investigatory stop was
conducted. The stop resulted from radio interactions between Detective Phillips,
Detective Orndorff, and Officer Carter during which the respective Detectives alerted each
other and Officer Carter to their observations of Williams-Stupp. During the suppression
hearing, Detective Phillips explained that Detective Orndorff had shared the fact that he
witnessed Williams-Stupp jaywalking. The trial court allowed this testimony over
defense counsel’s hearsay objections. At the end of the hearing, defense counsel asked
for an opportunity to file a brief before the trial court made its ruling on the motion to
suppress. The trial court granted this request.
{¶ 15} On August 2, 2024, Williams-Stupp filed a memorandum in support of his
motion to suppress. In this memorandum, Williams-Stupp argued that “Detective Phillips
testified as to what Detective Orndorff allegedly told him. Those hearsay words are the
sole justification for the stop. Cross examination of Phillips was worthless, he both did
not observe the event nor does he understand the jaywalking ordinance.” Memorandum
(Aug. 2, 2024), p. 3. Despite acknowledging that the rules of evidence are largely
inapplicable at suppression hearings, Williams-Stupp argued that the admission of
Detective Phillips’s testimony about what Detective Orndorff stated he had observed was
crucial to the determination of the motion to suppress, and there was no objective support
for Orndorff’s hearsay statement. Therefore, Williams-Stupp contended that the
admission of hearsay at the suppression hearing was “reversable error.” Id. at 4-5. The
State filed a memorandum in opposition to Williams-Stupp’s motion to suppress. -8-
{¶ 16} On October 1, 2024, the trial court issued an order requiring additional
testimony relating to the motion to suppress. The court stated, in part: “In an effort to
render a proper decision, the Court needs to hear from an additional witness, Detective
[Tyler] Orndorff. It is the Court’s duty to get to the truth of a case and subsequently, it is
the Court’s opinion Detective Orndorff’s testimony will elicit information necessary for the
Court to render an accurate decision.”
{¶ 17} On October 10, 2024, Detective Orndorff testified relating to the events of
May 8, 2024. Both parties were given an opportunity to question Detective Orndorff.
Before the questioning began, Williams-Stupp objected to the trial court’s decision to
reopen the hearing. The trial court then gave the following explanation as to why it had
decided to call Detective Orndorff as a witness:
I will tell you, [defense counsel], the Court made prior rulings that
Det. Phillips could testify to the hearsay information that he had, hearsay is
admissible in a motion to suppress, and the collective knowledge doctrine
applies in this case, as well, which the Court was analyzing all of those
things.
In reading, quite frankly, your brief, you convinced me that you
should have the opportunity to cross-examine and undermine that
testimony because it is critical to the stop in this case, which is why I’m
bringing him back in. To give you that opportunity.
...
Your [brief] is the one that convinced me to allow you to be able to -9-
cross-examine him and basically reverse my prior ruling that I made at the
time of the hearing because the Court wants to get to the bottom of it. So
I don’t want to say, at this point, the Court has not made a decision, but I
certainly had not made a decision that the State hadn’t sustained its burden
either. However, you now will have the opportunity to undermine that
through your cross-examination, and I think that that is important for the
Court to hear all of the evidence and allow you the opportunity to cross-
examine that witness to see if that changes what the Court has heard so
far. So that’s why the Court ordered Det. Orndorff to come in. It was on
the Court’s own motion so that I can feel comfortable that I am making a
proper ruling on whether or not the police acted in accordance with the law
in this particular case.
Tr. 42-43.
{¶ 18} Williams-Stupp contends that the trial court lost any semblance of
impartiality when it injected itself into the case by helping the State meet its burden of
proof at the suppression hearing by ordering an additional hearing and additional
testimony. Appellant’s Brief, p. 9. According to Williams-Stupp, “[t]he fact that the court
was having difficulty writing a decision based upon what the State presented at the
hearing indicates that the State failed to carry its burden of proof.” Id. at 10. We
disagree.
{¶ 19} Evid.R. 614(A) provides: “The court may, on its own motion or at the
suggestion of a party, call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine -10-
witnesses thus called.” This is done in the court's sound discretion, and as “ ‘long as the
court maintains its impartiality and does not assume the role of an advocate, such practice
does not prejudice the rights of the defendant to a fair and impartial trial.’ ” State v.
Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, fn. 10 (1980), quoting State v. Weind, 50 Ohio St.2d 224,
235-236 (1977). Evid.R. 614(A) “ ‘simply codifies a judge's well-established common
law authority to call witnesses.’ ” State v. Pettiford, 2019-Ohio-892, ¶ 86 (2d Dist.),
quoting United States Marshals Serv. v. Means, 741 F.2d 1053, 1058 (8th Cir. 1984)
(discussing Fed.R.Evid. 614(a), which is identical to Ohio’s rule). Further, “[t]rial courts
routinely exercise their right to ask questions as provided in Evid.R. 614, particularly when
the court sits as the trier of fact.” In re Adoption of A.R.Z., 2022-Ohio-4810, ¶ 26 (4th
Dist.).
{¶ 20} Based on our review of the record, we do not agree with Williams-Stupp
that the trial court showed any partiality in its decision to call Detective Orndorff as a
witness. Rather, the court explained that it believed allowing defense counsel to cross-
examine Detective Orndorff was vital to obtaining the truth about the events of May 8,
2024, which were at issue in the motion to suppress. The court allowed the parties to
take the lead in questioning Detective Orndorff and did not assume the role of an advocate
for either party. Indeed, the trial court asked no questions of Detective Orndorff. While
Williams-Stupp believes the motion to suppress should have been granted based on the
evidence presented on the first day of the suppression hearing, this belief does not
establish that the trial court reopened the suppression hearing and called Detective
Orndorff as a witness in order to assist the State in proving its case or to act as an -11-
advocate for the State. Rather, the trial court exercised its discretion to hear additional
testimony when it reasonably determined that Williams-Stupp deserved an opportunity to
cross-examine Detective Orndorff about the information he had provided to Detective
Phillips and Officer Carter. See State v. Knisley, 2010-Ohio-116, ¶ 48-50 (2d Dist.)
(holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in calling an additional witness at a
suppression hearing where the court wanted to give the defendant the benefit of any
testimony that the witness could add for “more certainty” and “in the [d]efendant’s
interest”). Therefore, we cannot conclude on this record that the trial court abused its
discretion in calling an additional witness to testify at the suppression hearing.
{¶ 21} The second assignment of error is overruled.
III. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Overruling the Motion to Suppress
{¶ 22} Williams-Stupp’s first assignment of error states:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT SUPPRESSING THE
EVIDENCE THAT WAS THE PRODUCT OF THE POLICE VIOLATING
THE DEFENDANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTED RIGHTS UNDER
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AND SECTION 14, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION TO BE
FREE FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
{¶ 23} “In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court ‘assumes the role of the
trier of fact, and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate
the credibility of the witnesses.’ ” State v. Prater, 2012-Ohio-5105, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.), quoting -12-
State v. Retherford, 93 Ohio App.3d 586, 592 (2d Dist. 1994). “As a result, when we
review suppression decisions, ‘we are bound to accept the trial court's findings of fact if
they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Accepting those facts as true, we
must independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court's
conclusion, whether they meet the applicable legal standard.’ ” Id., quoting Retherford
at 592.
{¶ 24} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9
(1968). “The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” Florida v.
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991), citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967).
Whether a stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment depends upon the particular
facts and circumstances, viewed objectively by examining the totality of the
circumstances. State v. Leak, 2016-Ohio-154, ¶ 14, citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S.
33, 39 (1996).
{¶ 25} “The law recognizes three types of police-citizen interactions: 1) a
consensual encounter, 2) a brief investigatory stop or detention, and 3) an arrest.” State
v. Weisgarber, 2017-Ohio-8764, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Millerton, 2015-Ohio-34,
¶ 20 (2d Dist.). As to investigatory stops, police officers may briefly stop and/or
temporarily detain individuals to investigate possible criminal activity if the officers have
a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot, including a traffic
violation. State v. Mays, 2008-Ohio-4539, ¶ 7-8. We determine the existence of
reasonable suspicion by evaluating the totality of the circumstances, considering those -13-
circumstances “through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the
scene who must react to events as they unfold.” State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86,
87-88 (1991), citing United States v. Hall, 525 F.2d 857, 859 (D.C. 1976), and State v.
Freeman, 64 Ohio St.2d 291, 295 (1980).
{¶ 26} In ruling on a motion to suppress, a court may consider the collective
knowledge of police officers involved in a common investigation. State v. Henderson, 51
Ohio St.3d 54, 57 (1990). Police may rely on information broadcast over a police radio
for reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop. See State v. Fultz, 13 Ohio St.2d
79 (1968), paragraph two of the syllabus (holding that an officer has probable cause to
make an arrest where he received information over the police radio that gave him
reasonable grounds to believe a felony had been committed).
{¶ 27} Detectives Phillips and Orndorff testified about the fact that they were
working in tandem, along with Detective Stewart and Officer Carter, to surveil a high crime
area. As part of their surveillance efforts, they exchanged communications on the same
police radio channel. In short, the officers had a reliable channel of communication set
up to exchange observations with each other in real time.
{¶ 28} Williams-Stupp contends that the police officers lacked probable cause to
stop and detain him for jaywalking. According to Williams-Stupp, “[n]o reasonable officer
in Detective Phillips’s position would have concluded that Mr. Williams-Stupp was
jaywalking.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 5. Williams-Stupp cites our prior decision in State v.
Lemanski-Jester, 1999 WL 1034449 (2d Dist. Nov. 12, 1999), as support for his argument
that what Detective Phillips observed was not jaywalking. Further, Williams-Stupp -14-
argues that “the hearsay statements from Detective Orndorff, by themselves, were
insufficient to support probable cause that Mr. Williams-Stupp jaywalked. The hearsay
statements of Detective Orndorff testified to by Detective Phillips should have been
excluded as lacking in indicia of reliability due to them being more in the nature of
conclusions reached by Detective Orndorff and not facts to support those conclusions.”
Appellant’s Brief, p. 7. Finally, Williams-Stupp contends that the fact that the trial court
sought the additional testimony of Detective Orndorff proved that there was insufficient
evidence presented by Detective Phillips to support the jaywalking defense. According
to Williams-Stupp, “[t]he only reason to seek additional evidence was because the
hearsay evidence was lacking in specifics to find that Detective Orndorff observed a
jaywalking violation.” Id.
{¶ 29} Given our resolution of the second assignment of error, we need not
address Williams-Stupp’s arguments regarding whether the trial court should have
precluded Detective Phillips from testifying about what Detective Orndorff told him or
whether Detective Phillips’s testimony, by itself, was sufficient to establish reasonable,
articulable suspicion justifying the investigatory stop. Rather, we will consider the
testimony of both detectives in resolving the first assignment of error. Based on our
review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err in overruling Williams-
Stupp’s motion to suppress.
{¶ 30} Detectives Phillips and Orndorff testified that Williams-Stupp was stopped
on May 8, 2024, due to his jaywalking in violation of Section 75.02(A) of the Dayton City
Ordinances. That section provides: “Where usable walks or paths parallel a street or -15-
highway, pedestrians shall not travel in, along, or on the vehicular traveled portion of such
street or highway, except to cross the roadway in the manner provided by law.” We
agree with Williams-Stupp that what Detective Phillips observed was not jaywalking,
because there was no evidence that there were traffic control devices on the road that
Williams-Stupp crossed or that he did not yield the right of way to any traffic on that road.
See Lemanski-Jester, 1999 WL 1034449 (2d Dist.). However, what Detective Orndorff
observed qualified as jaywalking in violation of Section 75.02(A) of the Dayton City
Ordinances.
{¶ 31} Detective Orndorff testified that he observed Williams-Stupp walking on the
street and not on the sidewalk the entire way until he reached the corner of the street.
The exhibits introduced at the suppression hearing showed that there were sidewalks
available running parallel to the street on which Williams-Stupp walked. Therefore,
Detective Orndorff had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Williams-Stupp had
committed a violation of Section 75.02(A) of the Dayton City Ordinances.
{¶ 32} The trial court found both Detective Phillips and Detective Orndorff to be
credible witnesses. In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court is in the best position
to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. Retherford, 93
Ohio App.3d at 592 (2d Dist.). The observations of Detective Orndorff, communicated
to the other officers in real time, provided reasonable, articulable suspicion that Williams-
Stupp had committed a violation of Section 75.02(A) of the Dayton City Ordinances, which
supported the investigatory stop of Williams-Stupp. Therefore, we cannot conclude that
the trial court erred in overruling the motion to suppress. -16-
{¶ 33} The first assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 34} Having overruled both assignments of error, we will affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
EPLEY, P.J. and HANSEMAN, J., concur.