IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE, ) ) v. ) ) ANDREW WILLIAMS, ) C.A. No. 2403009628; 2403011045; Defendant. ) 2403009214; 2403010609; ) 2403009314 ) ) ) )
Submitted: October 15, 2025 Decided: November 14, 2025
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Upon consideration of Defendant’s Motion to Sever: GRANTED.
Nichole Whetham Warner, Esquire, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for the State of Delaware.
Kevin P. Tray, Esquire, LAW OFFICE OF KEVIN P. TRAY, Wilmington, Delaware; Natalie Woloshin, Esquire, COLLINS PRICE WARNER WOLOSHIN, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorneys for Defendant.
BUTLER, R.J. The defense has moved to sever the charges in this indictment, which
consolidates three separate sex offense investigations against the Defendant. The
issue has been fully brief, argued and supplemented by the State. After due
consideration, the Court grants the motion to sever.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
We begin with a chronological recitation of the events leading to the
indictment as alleged by the State. We note that the State places great weight on the
similarities in detail of the three sexual assaults. The State believes that specific
positions, behaviors and words used during the sex acts depict a modus operandi
showing both the identity of the Defendant and the victims’ nonconsent. We will
spare the reader other details, except to note that the assaults do indeed share
similarities.
Case #1 – Victim “T.S.”
On May 11, 2023, a woman identified as “T.S.” reported that the previous day,
she had come to Wilmington with a girlfriend to buy drugs. She ended up at the
Defendant’s house on Oakmont Drive and she and her friend spent the day there.
They fell asleep in Defendant’s living room. Defendant woke T.S. while her
2 girlfriend slept and directed her to an upstairs bedroom where they both ingested
drugs. This was followed by the Defendant’s sexual assault of T.S.
The next morning, T.S. woke her girlfriend. They departed the residence and
she promptly reported the rape. But during the interview process with the police,
she left the station, leading the police to conclude that she did not wish to cooperate
or pursue the matter further.
Case #2 – Victim “S.W.”
Some ten months later, the victim in Case #2, S.W., reported that she met the
Defendant near the Wilmington Riverfront on March 16, 2024. On this date, she had
a serious infection on her arm, and he helped her get to the Wilmington Hospital for
treatment. They left the hospital, walked around the city and ultimately ended up at
Defendant’s residence on Oakmont Drive in Wilmington. There, he offered her
fentanyl, which she accepted. He then sexually assaulted S.W.
S.W. escaped the residence when someone else came to the Oakmont Drive
residence to purchase drugs. She managed to get out, flagged down a stranger and
called 911.
Case #3 – Victim “A.T.”
Case #3 happened the day after Case #2. In this case, the victim knew the
Defendant and had known him for many years. They had previously shared drugs 3 together and had engaged in consensual sexual activity. On this day, she went to the
Defendant’s house, they smoked crack together and she was sexually assaulted by
the Defendant.
The Defendant’s Statements
Because the danger of unfair prejudice looms large in a joinder and severance
analysis, we are well served to understand not only the claims, but also the known
or likely defenses. Here, the Defendant made a lengthy statement to the police. In
the transcribed statement, the Defendant gave a different “explanation” for each of
the alleged assaults.
As to the 2023, Case #1, the Defendant told the police he never met the
complainant. He was not questioned further concerning this offense.
As to the first March 2024 case – Case #2 – the Defendant told police he has
known the complainant for some time, and she has previously been to his residence
and stayed there for a brief period when she was homeless. The Defendant told the
police he had consensual sex with S.W. in the previous year but that had been several
months previous when she stayed there.
He agreed that he escorted S.W. to the Wilmington Hospital for treatment of
her arm, but said they separated after her hospital visit. When confronted with
4 forensic evidence suggesting she had in fact been at the residence more recently, the
Defendant denied any sexual activity with her in March 2024.
As to the incident the next day – Case #3, the Defendant said A.T. was a
frequent sexual partner who took drugs when they had sex. He agreed they had
consensual sex in March and denied ever having non-consensual sex with A.T.,
expressing shock that she would level such a charge against him.
ANALYSIS
The general rule for joinder of offenses in a single indictment is spelled out in
Rule 8:
Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. 1 0F
The defense here does not and cannot dispute that the three incidents joined
in the indictment are “of the same or similar character” and they were properly
indicted together. The question of severing them is dealt with in Rule 14. It provides
that:
If it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate
1 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 8. 5 trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires. 21F
While these words are easy enough to articulate, the unfair prejudice to be
avoided – as opposed to highly probative, reasonably related evidence of similar
character – is a good bit less so. This is particularly true in sex offense prosecutions,
where evidence of other sex offenses can easily give rise to a conclusion that the
defendant is simply a sex offender, liable to commit sex crimes against anyone
within his class of victims. 3 2F
There are three types of prejudice that must be considered when multiple
offenses have been joined in a single indictment: 1) the danger of cumulating the
evidence of each charge and convicting on the basis of the aggregate of evidence
and not the evidence of each charge independently, 2) inferring a general criminal
disposition of the defendant and convicting on that basis instead of the evidence, and
3) the danger of confusion in cases where the defendant presents different defenses
to the different charges and victims. 4 3F
2 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 14. 3 Indeed, Federal Rule of Evidence 413 specifically allows that in a trial for sexual assault, evidence of the defendant’s commission of other sexual assaults shall be admitted. The federal rule is thus an exception to the general prohibition on permitting “propensity evidence.” 4 State v. McKay, 382 A.2d 260, 262 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978); Weist v. State, 542 A.2d 1193, 1195 (Del. 1988). 6 The Boughner Case
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE, ) ) v. ) ) ANDREW WILLIAMS, ) C.A. No. 2403009628; 2403011045; Defendant. ) 2403009214; 2403010609; ) 2403009314 ) ) ) )
Submitted: October 15, 2025 Decided: November 14, 2025
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Upon consideration of Defendant’s Motion to Sever: GRANTED.
Nichole Whetham Warner, Esquire, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for the State of Delaware.
Kevin P. Tray, Esquire, LAW OFFICE OF KEVIN P. TRAY, Wilmington, Delaware; Natalie Woloshin, Esquire, COLLINS PRICE WARNER WOLOSHIN, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorneys for Defendant.
BUTLER, R.J. The defense has moved to sever the charges in this indictment, which
consolidates three separate sex offense investigations against the Defendant. The
issue has been fully brief, argued and supplemented by the State. After due
consideration, the Court grants the motion to sever.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
We begin with a chronological recitation of the events leading to the
indictment as alleged by the State. We note that the State places great weight on the
similarities in detail of the three sexual assaults. The State believes that specific
positions, behaviors and words used during the sex acts depict a modus operandi
showing both the identity of the Defendant and the victims’ nonconsent. We will
spare the reader other details, except to note that the assaults do indeed share
similarities.
Case #1 – Victim “T.S.”
On May 11, 2023, a woman identified as “T.S.” reported that the previous day,
she had come to Wilmington with a girlfriend to buy drugs. She ended up at the
Defendant’s house on Oakmont Drive and she and her friend spent the day there.
They fell asleep in Defendant’s living room. Defendant woke T.S. while her
2 girlfriend slept and directed her to an upstairs bedroom where they both ingested
drugs. This was followed by the Defendant’s sexual assault of T.S.
The next morning, T.S. woke her girlfriend. They departed the residence and
she promptly reported the rape. But during the interview process with the police,
she left the station, leading the police to conclude that she did not wish to cooperate
or pursue the matter further.
Case #2 – Victim “S.W.”
Some ten months later, the victim in Case #2, S.W., reported that she met the
Defendant near the Wilmington Riverfront on March 16, 2024. On this date, she had
a serious infection on her arm, and he helped her get to the Wilmington Hospital for
treatment. They left the hospital, walked around the city and ultimately ended up at
Defendant’s residence on Oakmont Drive in Wilmington. There, he offered her
fentanyl, which she accepted. He then sexually assaulted S.W.
S.W. escaped the residence when someone else came to the Oakmont Drive
residence to purchase drugs. She managed to get out, flagged down a stranger and
called 911.
Case #3 – Victim “A.T.”
Case #3 happened the day after Case #2. In this case, the victim knew the
Defendant and had known him for many years. They had previously shared drugs 3 together and had engaged in consensual sexual activity. On this day, she went to the
Defendant’s house, they smoked crack together and she was sexually assaulted by
the Defendant.
The Defendant’s Statements
Because the danger of unfair prejudice looms large in a joinder and severance
analysis, we are well served to understand not only the claims, but also the known
or likely defenses. Here, the Defendant made a lengthy statement to the police. In
the transcribed statement, the Defendant gave a different “explanation” for each of
the alleged assaults.
As to the 2023, Case #1, the Defendant told the police he never met the
complainant. He was not questioned further concerning this offense.
As to the first March 2024 case – Case #2 – the Defendant told police he has
known the complainant for some time, and she has previously been to his residence
and stayed there for a brief period when she was homeless. The Defendant told the
police he had consensual sex with S.W. in the previous year but that had been several
months previous when she stayed there.
He agreed that he escorted S.W. to the Wilmington Hospital for treatment of
her arm, but said they separated after her hospital visit. When confronted with
4 forensic evidence suggesting she had in fact been at the residence more recently, the
Defendant denied any sexual activity with her in March 2024.
As to the incident the next day – Case #3, the Defendant said A.T. was a
frequent sexual partner who took drugs when they had sex. He agreed they had
consensual sex in March and denied ever having non-consensual sex with A.T.,
expressing shock that she would level such a charge against him.
ANALYSIS
The general rule for joinder of offenses in a single indictment is spelled out in
Rule 8:
Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. 1 0F
The defense here does not and cannot dispute that the three incidents joined
in the indictment are “of the same or similar character” and they were properly
indicted together. The question of severing them is dealt with in Rule 14. It provides
that:
If it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate
1 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 8. 5 trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires. 21F
While these words are easy enough to articulate, the unfair prejudice to be
avoided – as opposed to highly probative, reasonably related evidence of similar
character – is a good bit less so. This is particularly true in sex offense prosecutions,
where evidence of other sex offenses can easily give rise to a conclusion that the
defendant is simply a sex offender, liable to commit sex crimes against anyone
within his class of victims. 3 2F
There are three types of prejudice that must be considered when multiple
offenses have been joined in a single indictment: 1) the danger of cumulating the
evidence of each charge and convicting on the basis of the aggregate of evidence
and not the evidence of each charge independently, 2) inferring a general criminal
disposition of the defendant and convicting on that basis instead of the evidence, and
3) the danger of confusion in cases where the defendant presents different defenses
to the different charges and victims. 4 3F
2 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 14. 3 Indeed, Federal Rule of Evidence 413 specifically allows that in a trial for sexual assault, evidence of the defendant’s commission of other sexual assaults shall be admitted. The federal rule is thus an exception to the general prohibition on permitting “propensity evidence.” 4 State v. McKay, 382 A.2d 260, 262 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978); Weist v. State, 542 A.2d 1193, 1195 (Del. 1988). 6 The Boughner Case
The State “asks the Court to follow the reasoning in State v. Boughner, 5 where 4F
the Court considered severance of four separate and unrelated abuse victims.” 6 5F
Doing so is as good a place as any to begin our review.
Robert Boughner was charged in a seventeen-count indictment with having
sexual relations with four different minor boys. In each case, the defendant
befriended the children, bought them gifts, invited them into his residence and
eventually began sexually abusing them. The trial court denied the defendant’s
motion to sever fifteen of the counts, finding the charges were relevant to intent,
modus operandi and identity. 7 6F
However, the Court did sever one count relating to a victim who was fifteen
years old when he met the defendant. The victim alleged a single incident of sexual
abuse, occurring two years after they met, so he had reached the age of majority at
the time of the incident. The defendant claimed the sex was consensual. The Court
severed this count on the basis that it would be “highly prejudicial” for the defendant
to offer this separate and distinct defense. 8 Obviously, consent was not available to 7F
5 1995 WL 19200095 (Del. Super. July 13, 1995). 6 State’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Sever, ¶31. 7 Boughner, 1995 WL 19200095, at *4. 8 Id. at *6. 7 the defendant as to the remaining victims and the Court denied severance as to the
minors.
Thus, Boughner recognizes that severance may be necessary in cases where
evidence would be otherwise admissible to prove motive, intent or modus operandi
but the defendant presents a defense that is inconsistent with his defense to other
charges.
The Conaway Case
State v. Conaway is a thorough treatment of the question of joinder and
severance in the context of sex offenses in which consent is asserted. In Conaway,
the state charged that the defendant had “date raped” six women after initial
consensual encounters. As here, the “core question(s) for each case” was “whether
the alleged victim consented to sexual intercourse in that case.” 9 8F
One of the critical considerations in both Conaway and this case is the
admissibility of each offense in a separate trial of the others. 10 Analyzing this 9F
element of prejudice relies upon the Supreme Court’s six-part test articulated in Getz
v. State. 11 As in Conaway, the State argues that evidence of each rape would be 10F
9 State v. Conaway, 2019 WL 3431594, at *10 (Del. Super. July 30, 2019). 10 State’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Sever, ¶28. See Weist, 542 A.2d at 1195 n.3 (“[A] crucial factor to be considered . . . should be whether the evidence of one crime would be admissible in the trial of the other crime.”). 11 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988). 8 admissible in a trial of the others to show motive, intent and modus operandi. 12 But11F
the Conaway Court rejected similar arguments, quoting Getz: “no evidential purpose
is served by proof that the defendant committed other intentional acts of the same
type.” 13 12F
The Conaway Court also addressed the common plan or scheme exception:
“[W]hether a defendant raped others in other situation(s) is not relevant to whether
the particular alleged victim consented to sexual intercourse with the defendant.” 14 13F
Put another way, again quoting Getz, “[r]epetition is not, in itself, evidence of a plan
and other crimes of the sort with which he is charged cannot be admitted against the
defendant under that guise.” 15 14F
Finding that the proposed joint trial presented a likelihood that the jury would
use the evidence for one of the improper purposes above, the Conaway Court
concluded that “this is nothing but evidence of the defendant’s trait to rape being
introduced to prove that with regard to every other episode, defendant raped the
alleged victim.” 16 15F
12 State’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Sever, ¶30. 13 Conaway, 2019 WL 3431594, at *9 (quoting Getz, 538 A.2d at 733). 14 Id. at *10. 15 Id. at *9 (quoting Getz, 538 A.2d at 733). 16 Id. at *10. 9 It is not possible to distinguish the logic or holding in Conaway from the
evidence proffered in this case. The Court finds that, following the holdings in Getz
v. State and State v. Conaway, and consistent with Rule 14 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the Court must order severance of the cases for trial.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Charles E. Butler Charles E. Butler, Resident Judge