Reverse and Remand. Opinion Filed November 5, 2018.
In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-18-00406-CR
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant V. WILLIAM FULLER, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 6 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. MA 16-16913-G
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Stoddart, Whitehill, and Boatright Opinion by Justice Stoddart The State of Texas charged William Fuller with assault. Following a hearing, the trial court
issued an order granting a motion to suppress, stating: “a probable cause hearing to determine the
identity of the person who committed the assault was had. Because the evidence shows that the
defendant only encouraged and solicited others to commit the assault and did not commit the
assault himself, no probable cause existed to arrest him for assault. The motion to suppress is
granted based on lack of probable cause.” In a single issue, the State asserts the trial court erred
by granting the motion to suppress. We agree. We reverse the trial court’s order and remand the
case to the trial court for further proceedings.
On March 22, 2018, the trial court conducted a hearing. At the outset, the court announced
the purpose of the hearing was “to discuss the matter of an identity.” Appellee confirmed the “scope of the ID hearing is just whether or not the defendant is the actual person that committed
the offense that he’s being accused of today.” The court instructed the State to call its first witness,
which it did.1 Testimony showed on October 1, 2016, Maria Sanchez was at a DART station and
asked appellee, a DART employee, which bus would take her to her destination. Appellee told
her he did not know and she needed to make that determination. Sanchez left, but subsequently
returned to appellee and told him he did not need to be rude or disrespectful. An argument ensued
and appellee yelled at Sanchez.
Thomas Johnson, the complainant, intervened and told appellee not to talk to Sanchez in
that manner. Appellee and Johnson began arguing and Sanchez called 911. Appellee yelled that
he would pay someone $25 to assault Johnson. At least one person chased Johnson and assaulted
him behind the bus. Sanchez did not see appellee strike Johnson, but identified appellee in court
as the man who solicited someone to assault Johnson. DART Police Sergeant Jorge Ruiz
responded to Sanchez’s call and identified appellee as the bus operator about whom Sanchez
complained.
The record shows an arrest warrant was issued for appellee on October 7, 2016, and
executed on December 5, 2016.
After the State presented two witnesses at the hearing, both sides rested. Appellee argued
the evidence shows he did not commit the assault. The trial court asked the State what it charged
in the information, which was read into the record. The information charged appellee with
“intentionally and knowingly and recklessly caus[ing] bodily injury to another, namely: Thomas
Johnson, hereinafter called complainant, by striking complainant with a hand.” The trial court
asked why appellee was charged with assault if Sanchez testified appellee did not strike Johnson.
1 Following the hearing, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. To the extent those findings are supported by the record, we rely on them here in reviewing the trial court’s order.
–2– The State informed the court that the case involved “accomplice liability,” and the trial court noted
the State did not make that allegation in the information.
The trial court then asked appellee: “Well, I don’t know if I’m understanding the defense
correctly. Is the defense asking me to suppress the arrest due to lack of probable cause for the
arrest?” Appellee answered affirmatively. When the State noted that no motion to suppress was
filed and the hearing did not begin as a suppression hearing, the court responded: “he [appellee’s
counsel] just asked.” The trial court granted the motion to suppress the arrest because the
information did not allege party liability. The court stated it was suppressing the “arrest,
everything.” The trial court subsequently entered a written order as well as findings of fact and
conclusions of law. This appeal followed.
The record is unclear about what type of hearing the trial court held. However, because
the trial court announced it was granting a motion to suppress, titled its order as ruling on a motion
to suppress, and the parties briefed the issue before us as a suppression issue, we too will address
the trial court’s hearing and order as a suppression issue.
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of
review. Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We review the trial
court’s factual findings for an abuse of discretion, but review the trial court’s application of the
law to the facts de novo. Id. We give almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of
historical facts. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We give the
same deference to the trial court’s conclusions with respect to mixed questions of law and fact that
turn on credibility or demeanor. See State v. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011). We review mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on credibility and demeanor
as well as purely legal questions de novo. Id.
–3– When, as here, the trial court makes explicit findings of fact, we determine whether the
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, supports the fact
findings. State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). If the trial court fails to
make explicit findings, we imply a fact finding to support the trial court’s ruling when the evidence
supports the implied finding. Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
We afford the prevailing party the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 571 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013). We will uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record
and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. State v. Story, 445 S.W.3d 729, 732
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
“For an arrest to be justified under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer must have
probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed or is committing an offense. State v.
Ford, 537 S.W.3d 19, 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (probable cause exists when a police
officer has “reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to
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Reverse and Remand. Opinion Filed November 5, 2018.
In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-18-00406-CR
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant V. WILLIAM FULLER, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 6 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. MA 16-16913-G
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Stoddart, Whitehill, and Boatright Opinion by Justice Stoddart The State of Texas charged William Fuller with assault. Following a hearing, the trial court
issued an order granting a motion to suppress, stating: “a probable cause hearing to determine the
identity of the person who committed the assault was had. Because the evidence shows that the
defendant only encouraged and solicited others to commit the assault and did not commit the
assault himself, no probable cause existed to arrest him for assault. The motion to suppress is
granted based on lack of probable cause.” In a single issue, the State asserts the trial court erred
by granting the motion to suppress. We agree. We reverse the trial court’s order and remand the
case to the trial court for further proceedings.
On March 22, 2018, the trial court conducted a hearing. At the outset, the court announced
the purpose of the hearing was “to discuss the matter of an identity.” Appellee confirmed the “scope of the ID hearing is just whether or not the defendant is the actual person that committed
the offense that he’s being accused of today.” The court instructed the State to call its first witness,
which it did.1 Testimony showed on October 1, 2016, Maria Sanchez was at a DART station and
asked appellee, a DART employee, which bus would take her to her destination. Appellee told
her he did not know and she needed to make that determination. Sanchez left, but subsequently
returned to appellee and told him he did not need to be rude or disrespectful. An argument ensued
and appellee yelled at Sanchez.
Thomas Johnson, the complainant, intervened and told appellee not to talk to Sanchez in
that manner. Appellee and Johnson began arguing and Sanchez called 911. Appellee yelled that
he would pay someone $25 to assault Johnson. At least one person chased Johnson and assaulted
him behind the bus. Sanchez did not see appellee strike Johnson, but identified appellee in court
as the man who solicited someone to assault Johnson. DART Police Sergeant Jorge Ruiz
responded to Sanchez’s call and identified appellee as the bus operator about whom Sanchez
complained.
The record shows an arrest warrant was issued for appellee on October 7, 2016, and
executed on December 5, 2016.
After the State presented two witnesses at the hearing, both sides rested. Appellee argued
the evidence shows he did not commit the assault. The trial court asked the State what it charged
in the information, which was read into the record. The information charged appellee with
“intentionally and knowingly and recklessly caus[ing] bodily injury to another, namely: Thomas
Johnson, hereinafter called complainant, by striking complainant with a hand.” The trial court
asked why appellee was charged with assault if Sanchez testified appellee did not strike Johnson.
1 Following the hearing, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. To the extent those findings are supported by the record, we rely on them here in reviewing the trial court’s order.
–2– The State informed the court that the case involved “accomplice liability,” and the trial court noted
the State did not make that allegation in the information.
The trial court then asked appellee: “Well, I don’t know if I’m understanding the defense
correctly. Is the defense asking me to suppress the arrest due to lack of probable cause for the
arrest?” Appellee answered affirmatively. When the State noted that no motion to suppress was
filed and the hearing did not begin as a suppression hearing, the court responded: “he [appellee’s
counsel] just asked.” The trial court granted the motion to suppress the arrest because the
information did not allege party liability. The court stated it was suppressing the “arrest,
everything.” The trial court subsequently entered a written order as well as findings of fact and
conclusions of law. This appeal followed.
The record is unclear about what type of hearing the trial court held. However, because
the trial court announced it was granting a motion to suppress, titled its order as ruling on a motion
to suppress, and the parties briefed the issue before us as a suppression issue, we too will address
the trial court’s hearing and order as a suppression issue.
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of
review. Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We review the trial
court’s factual findings for an abuse of discretion, but review the trial court’s application of the
law to the facts de novo. Id. We give almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of
historical facts. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We give the
same deference to the trial court’s conclusions with respect to mixed questions of law and fact that
turn on credibility or demeanor. See State v. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011). We review mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on credibility and demeanor
as well as purely legal questions de novo. Id.
–3– When, as here, the trial court makes explicit findings of fact, we determine whether the
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, supports the fact
findings. State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). If the trial court fails to
make explicit findings, we imply a fact finding to support the trial court’s ruling when the evidence
supports the implied finding. Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
We afford the prevailing party the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 571 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013). We will uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record
and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. State v. Story, 445 S.W.3d 729, 732
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
“For an arrest to be justified under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer must have
probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed or is committing an offense. State v.
Ford, 537 S.W.3d 19, 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (probable cause exists when a police
officer has “reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to
believe a particular person has committed or is committing an offense.”).
The trial court stated at the hearing that it was granting the motion to suppress the “arrest,
everything,” but its written order does not specify what evidence is being suppressed. The
suppression hearing focused solely on the events of October 22, 2016, the date of the assault, and
there was no testimony concerning any evidence collected after that day, including after appellee
was arrested. No evidence was offered about the arrest itself. Accordingly, the only evidence the
trial court suppressed based on this record relate to the assault. See State v. Yates, No. 05-15-
00507-CR, 2016 WL 230351, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 19, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication). Further, based on the issues raised below, the trial court’s order
–4– granting the motion to suppress, and its findings of fact and conclusions of law, it appears the trial
court suppressed evidence of the assault on the basis that testimony showed appellee did not
personally hit Johnson, the person who did strike Johnson was not identified, and the State did not
charge appellee as a party.
A person may be convicted as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own
conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or both. TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 7.01(a). Under section 7.02(a), a person is criminally responsible as a party if, acting
with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs,
aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. Id. § 7.02(a)(2). The law of parties,
as stated in section 7.02 may be applied to a case even though no such allegation is contained in
the indictment. Id. § 7.01(c); Montoya v. State, 810 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989);
Rayo v. State, No. XX-XXXXXXX-CR, 2017 WL 3097659, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 21, 2017,
no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). “It is well-settled that the law of parties need
not be pled in the indictment.” Marable v. State, 85 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Giving
almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts, we conclude the court
erred by granting a motion to suppress on the basis the State did not charge party liability in the
information. Because the State was not required to charge the law of parties in the information,
failure to do so is not a legal ground to suppress appellee’s arrest or evidence of the assault.2
A person commits assault if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury
to another. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1). The trial court’s written findings state appellee
“called out he would pay $25 to anyone who would assault” Johnson. A man then chased Johnson
around the bus and assaulted him. Applying section 22.01(a)(1) and the law of parties, at the time
2 In reaching this conclusion, we do not conclude that a motion to suppress is a proper vehicle for challenging the sufficiency of an information. Our conclusion here is necessitated by the unusual procedural facts of this case wherein a trial court made such a determination during a hearing that began as a hearing to “discuss the matter of an identity” and became a motion to suppress proceeding after which the trial court determined the charging instrument was deficient.
–5– appellee was arrested, the reasonably trustworthy facts would have warranted a reasonable person
believing appellee committed an offense. See Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 87. Thus probable cause
existed for the arrest. We conclude the trial court erred by granting a motion to suppress. We
make no determination about whether such motion was timely or whether the trial court’s order
finding there was no probable cause for an arrest would have suppressed evidence of events that
occurred nearly two months earlier. Because we conclude the order was in error, we need not
address these issues. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. We sustain the State’s issue and reverse the trial court’s
order. We remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings.
/Craig Stoddart/ CRAIG STODDART JUSTICE
Do Not Publish TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) 180406F.U05
–6– Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 6, Dallas County, Texas No. 05-18-00406-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. MA 16-16913-G. Opinion delivered by Justice Stoddart. WILLIAM FULLER, Appellee Justices Whitehill and Boatright participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s order granting a motion to suppress is REVERSED and the cause REMANDED for further proceedings.
Judgment entered this 5th day of November, 2018.
–7–