IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 44A23
Filed 13 December 2024
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. JAMEY LAMONT WILKINS
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) (2023) from the decision of a divided
panel of the Court of Appeals, 287 N.C. App. 343 (2022), finding no error in a
judgment entered on 29 July 2021 by Judge Edwin G. Wilson Jr. in Superior Court,
Caswell County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 25 September 2024.
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Keith T. Clayton, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellee.
Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Wyatt Orsbon, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant.
NEWBY, Chief Justice.
In this case we decide whether defendant waived his statutory right to a
competency hearing when he failed to assert the right at trial. The statutory right,
which this Court has considered waivable for nearly half a century, is different from
the nonwaivable right to a competency hearing under the Federal Constitution. See,
e.g., State v. Young, 291 N.C. 562, 566, 231 S.E.2d 577, 580 (1977). Defendant
concedes that his appeal is based solely on the statutory right and that he did not
raise the issue of competency at trial despite ample opportunity to do so. We therefore STATE V. WILKINS
Opinion of the Court
hold that defendant waived his statutory right to a competency hearing and affirm
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
On 11 February 2018, deputies with the Caswell County Sheriff’s Office
stopped an SUV upon suspicion that its occupants had thrown contraband over the
walls of a nearby prison yard. The deputies ordered both the driver and the
passenger, defendant, to step out of the SUV. The driver consented to a search of the
vehicle, which revealed two footballs that had been split open, filled with drugs, and
duct-taped back together. During the stop, defendant became “irate” with the
deputies for searching the vehicle and with the driver for consenting to the search.
Defendant was arrested and charged with several offenses, including possession with
intent to sell or distribute the seized drugs, attempting to provide contraband to an
inmate, and habitual felon status. He was detained at the Caswell County Jail while
awaiting trial.
After about three weeks in custody, defendant was involved in an altercation
at the jail. A detention officer reported defendant for approaching him with clenched
fists and threatening “to whip [his] a[--].” Defendant was charged with assaulting a
government employee and communicating threats.
Ten days after the incident at the jail, defendant’s court-appointed counsel filed
an unopposed motion questioning defendant’s competency to stand trial. The motion,
which counsel filed at defendant’s request, stated that defendant believed he was
“losing his grip on reality.” Counsel referenced defendant’s “odd behavior while in
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custody” and noted that defendant experienced rapid mood swings, spoke to him in
elevated tones, and “[did] not completely comprehend his situation.” No record
evidence suggests that defendant suffered from mental health issues before or after
these events.
At a hearing on 15 March 2018—the same day defendant’s counsel filed his
motion—the trial court granted defendant’s request to have his competency
evaluated. Because defendant remained in custody, the trial court noted that he
would need transportation to and from the evaluation.
That same day, the trial court signed a form ordering a medical evaluation of
defendant’s competency and designating Central Regional Hospital in Butner as the
evaluating facility. Paragraph 6 of the form order provided two options for
defendant’s transportation, each of which was listed next to a blank box for marking
the appropriate selection:
a. The Sheriff is Ordered to transport the defendant and all relevant documents to the Certified Local Forensic Evaluator designated by the Local Management Entity and return the defendant afterwards.
b. The defendant shall present himself/herself to the Certified Local Forensic Evaluator designated by the Local Management Entity for evaluation.
Because defendant was still in custody, the trial court selected the first option.
Following the entry of the order, defendant continued to threaten the safety of
officers, other inmates, and himself. At this point, defendant had not posted bond.
Accordingly, on 20 March 2018, the trial court ordered the sheriff’s office to transport
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defendant to Central Prison in Raleigh for safekeeping. The sheriff’s office completed
the transfer the next day.
On 28 March 2018—one week after the transfer to Central Prison and roughly
two weeks after the trial court ordered a competency evaluation—defendant posted
bond and was released from custody. Defendant did not undergo a competency
evaluation prior to his release, nor did he seek one after.
Almost a year later, on 19 March 2019, the trial court held a hearing on the
State’s proposed plea offer. Defendant’s counsel, the same court-appointed attorney
who filed the motion for a competency evaluation, rejected the State’s offer and
entered a not guilty plea on defendant’s behalf. Counsel did not mention the
unfulfilled evaluation order, address defendant’s mental health, or otherwise
acknowledge the competency issue. The State did not raise the issue either.
The State subsequently offered another plea deal. On 13 May 2019, two months
after the first hearing, the trial court held a hearing on the new offer. At the second
hearing, defendant’s counsel again rejected the deal without any mention of the
outstanding evaluation order, defendant’s competency, or defendant’s mental health
in general. Defendant’s counsel instead seemed focused on securing the return of
defendant’s two cell phones, which the State had seized as evidence.
Defendant’s trial began on 28 July 2021, nearly three-and-a-half years since
his arrest and more than two years after the second hearing. Nothing in the record
indicates that defendant took any steps to seek a competency evaluation or address
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his mental health whatsoever over his three-plus years out on bond. He did, however,
make an independent choice to replace his court-appointed counsel with a team of
private attorneys about two months before the trial started.
Over the course of trial, neither defendant nor his new attorneys mentioned
defendant’s competency. When the State rested its case-in-chief, defendant moved to
dismiss the charges for lack of sufficient evidence, again making no reference to
competency. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant presented no evidence of
his own and chose not to testify. In confirming that choice, the trial court and
defendant had the following exchange:
THE COURT: Stand up just a minute, Mr. Wilkins. So this is your time to testify if you’d like. You need to talk to your attorney and think about that. . . . Do you have any questions about your decision to testify or not testify?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. I made the decision.
THE COURT: You’re firm in your decision not to testify?
THE DEFENDANT: I made a decision. I thought about it before I made it.
THE COURT: And that’s what you’d like to do[,] is not testify?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir, I don’t want to testify.
Once again, neither defendant nor his counsel raised the question of defendant’s
competency.
The jury found defendant guilty on four of seven charges. Following the verdict,
defendant stipulated to being a habitual felon in exchange for a reduced sentence,
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again confirming to the trial court that he had consulted with counsel and understood
the charges, his rights, his possible defenses, and the proceedings before him.
Defendant acted similarly during sentencing. The trial court noted that
defendant had “carr[ied] [him]self in a pleasant way” at trial, citing his good conduct
as one reason for imposing the minimum sentence of fifty-one months. The trial court
expressed optimism that defendant “w[ould] take advantage [of opportunities in
prison] and . . . be out in four years.” In response, defendant stated, “I hope to be out
next year[,] but I understand, sir, and I appreciate you.”
Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals. He argued that the trial court’s
original competency evaluation order prevented him from being tried without first
determining his competency under section 15A-1002 of the North Carolina General
Statutes. See generally N.C.G.S. § 15A-1002(a)–(b)(1) (2023) (governing a criminal
defendant’s right to a competency hearing). The majority below rejected that
argument, relying on this Court’s decisions in Young and its progeny. State v. Wilkins,
287 N.C. App. 343, 348, 882 S.E.2d 454, 457 (2022); see Young, 291 N.C. at 566, 231
S.E.2d at 580 (holding that a criminal defendant could waive his statutory right to a
competency hearing).
The dissent, however, agreed with defendant that Young and its progeny were
distinguishable from his case. Wilkins, 287 N.C. App. at 356, 882 S.E.2d at 462–63
(Inman, J., dissenting). Instead, the dissent looked in part to this Court’s decision in
State v. Sides, 376 N.C. 449, 852 S.E.2d 170 (2020), in which this Court held that a
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trial court’s failure to conduct a competency hearing for a potentially incompetent
defendant sua sponte violated her constitutional right and required a new trial.
Wilkins, 287 N.C. App. at 355–56, 882 S.E.2d at 462 (citing Sides, 376 N.C. at 466,
852 S.E.2d at 182). Defendant appealed to this Court based on the dissent.1
The issue presented is whether defendant waived his statutory right to a
competency hearing.2 Section 15A-1002 of the North Carolina General Statutes
governs that right. It provides, in relevant part:
(a) The question of the capacity of the defendant to proceed may be raised at any time on motion by the prosecutor, the defendant, the defense counsel, or the court. The motion shall detail the specific conduct that leads the moving party to question the defendant’s capacity to proceed.
(b) (1) When the capacity of the defendant to proceed is questioned, the court shall hold a hearing to determine the defendant’s capacity to proceed. If an examination is ordered[,] . . . the hearing shall be held after the examination.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1002(a)–(b)(1). We review questions of law de novo, considering the
matter anew and freely substituting our own judgment for those of the lower courts.
State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632–33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008).
1 See N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) (2023), repealed by Current Operations Appropriations Act
of 2023, S.L. 2023-134, § 16.21(d). The repeal of subsection 7A-30(2) only applies to cases filed with the Court of Appeals on or after 3 October 2023. See Current Operations Appropriations Act § 16.21(e). 2 Defendant disclaimed a constitutional challenge at the Court of Appeals, Wilkins,
287 N.C. App. at 346, 882 S.E.2d at 456, and did so again before this Court. Therefore, our review only considers whether defendant waived his statutory right.
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As this Court explained in Young, a defendant may generally waive a statutory
right through “express consent, failure to assert it in apt time, or . . . conduct
inconsistent with a purpose to insist upon it.” Young, 291 N.C. at 567, 231 S.E.2d at
580 (quoting State v. Gaiten, 277 N.C. 236, 239, 176 S.E.2d 778, 781 (1970)).
Ordinarily, a defendant waives a right if he fails to assert it to the trial court. Id. The
record must show affirmative evidence of the defendant’s assertion. Id.
In the instant case, defendant waived his statutory right to a competency
hearing. He had several chances—over several years, with several attorneys, and in
several procedural contexts—to assert the right, but never did so. Rather than remain
in pretrial custody and wait for a competency evaluation, he instead chose to post
bond and leave.3 Even while defendant was out on bond, he and his counsel had
several options at their disposal. For example, counsel could have moved to modify
the competency order, or defendant could have checked himself into the hospital. But
they did not take any of these actions.
Further, defendant repeatedly presented himself as competent at trial by
making affirmative statements to that effect in the presence of counsel. Defendant
stated, among other things, that he could hear and understand the trial court, was
3 Of course, defendant had a right to leave pretrial custody once he satisfied the trial
court’s conditions of release. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-537(a) (2023) (“Following any authorization of release of any person [in pretrial custody], . . . any judicial official must effect the release of that person upon satisfying himself that the conditions of release have been met.”). But as the State points out, defendant’s decision to leave cuts both ways: once he posted bond, the State could not hold him in custody against his will. Upon choosing to leave custody, defendant became solely responsible for pursuing his competency evaluation.
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not under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and thought about his trial decisions
before making them. He assured the trial court that he had spoken with counsel and
understood the charges, his rights, and his possible defenses. Nothing in the record
indicates that defendant had any mental health issues before or after his pretrial
custody in 2018, and nothing supports concluding that he was incompetent at the
time of trial in 2021. See State v. Allen, 377 N.C. 169, 181, 856 S.E.2d 494, 504 (2021)
(holding that a defendant is competent to stand trial if he is competent at the time of
trial itself). To the contrary, the record affirmatively demonstrates that defendant’s
hearing, which occurred just one month after his arrest, was the only time his mental
health was ever in controversy. For the next three-plus years, defendant interacted
with his multiple lawyers and several judges. Not one questioned his competency.
These facts clearly indicate that defendant waived his statutory right to a
competency hearing by “fail[ing] to assert it in apt time” and otherwise acting
“inconsistent with a purpose to insist upon it.” See Young, 291 N.C. at 567, 231 S.E.2d
at 580. Rather than contest his competency with the trial court, defendant instead
proceeded with trial and waited for a jury verdict. Only after the jury ruled against
him did defendant raise the issue on appeal. As the majority at the Court of Appeals
observed:
If [defendant]’s counsel believed the competency evaluation was necessary[,] . . . there was ample opportunity to raise the issue and have the trial court act on it. By saving this argument for appeal, [defendant] was able to await the jury’s verdict and then, after the verdict was unsatisfactory, seek a second bite at the apple by arguing
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for a new trial.
Wilkins, 287 N.C. App. at 348, 882 S.E.2d at 458. Defendant’s conduct squarely
indicated that he was competent and ready to move forward with trial. Thus, he
waived his statutory right to a competency hearing.
Our precedent over the last half century confirms that defendant waived his
statutory right. For example, the trial court in Young ordered the defendant to
undergo a competency evaluation, the competency hearing was not held, and the
defendant never raised the issue at trial. Young, 291 N.C. at 566–67, 231 S.E.2d at
580. This Court concluded that the defendant waived his statutory right. Id. at 568,
231 S.E.2d at 581. Similarly, this Court held in State v. King that the defendant had
waived his statutory right to a competency hearing when his counsel discussed
competency at a pretrial hearing but did not pursue the issue beyond that initial
mention. State v. King, 353 N.C. 457, 466, 546 S.E.2d 575, 584–85 (2001). Other cases
citing Young reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., State v. Badgett, 361 N.C. 234,
259, 644 S.E.2d 206, 221 (2007); State v. Dollar, 292 N.C. 344, 350–51, 233 S.E.2d
521, 525 (1977).
Like in Young, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for a competency
hearing, but the hearing was never held. Like in King, defendant’s competency was
briefly questioned before trial but subsequently abandoned. And like both of those
cases, defendant waited until appeal to argue that the trial court violated his
statutory right. The result is the same: defendant waived his right when he failed to
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assert it at trial.
Defendant argues that this Court effectively overruled the Young line of cases
in 2020 when it issued the Sides decision. But defendant’s reliance on Sides is
misplaced. The Court there explicitly limited its holding to the right to a competency
hearing under the Federal Constitution, making only passing references to the
statutory right protected by section 15A-1002. See Sides, 376 N.C. at 457–58, 852
S.E.2d at 176. As the Court explained, it “need not resolve the parties’ dispute
regarding the [statutory] issue” because “[the] defendant possessed a constitutional
due process right.”4 Id.
This distinction is important because the constitutional and statutory rights to
a competency hearing are not equivalent. Though defendants can generally waive
constitutional rights in the same way as statutory rights, see Young, 291 N.C. at 567,
231 S.E.2d at 580, the Supreme Court of the United States has explained that the
constitutional right to a competency hearing cannot be waived, see, e.g., Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384, 86 S. Ct. 836, 841 (1966). But for the constitutional right
to apply, there must be substantial evidence of the defendant’s incompetency. See
Young, 291 N.C. at 568, 231 S.E.2d at 581 (citing Crenshaw v. Wolff, 504 F.2d 377,
378 (8th Cir. 1974)). In contrast, the statutory right under section 15A-1002 does not
4 The dissent at the Court of Appeals in this case acknowledged the limited holding in
Sides as well. See Wilkins, 287 N.C. App. at 355, 882 S.E.2d at 462 (Inman, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur Supreme Court has most recently erred on the side of vindicating a defendant’s right to a competency determination—albeit on constitutional rather than statutory grounds . . . .”).
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specify an evidentiary requirement. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1002.
In recognition that the two sources of the right are governed by different
criteria, our caselaw has carefully delineated between the statutory and
constitutional analyses. See, e.g., Badgett, 361 N.C. at 259–60, 644 S.E.2d at 221
(holding first that the defendant waived his statutory right because he never raised
the issue at trial, then separately concluding that his constitutional right was not
violated because there was not substantial evidence of incompetency). Sides—a case
decided on purely constitutional grounds—did not overrule Young, which addressed
both the constitutional and statutory standards. Thus, Sides has no bearing on the
entirely statutory argument defendant raises here, and Young continues to control.
Under Young, defendant waived his statutory right.
Defendant waived his statutory right to a competency hearing and did not raise
a constitutional challenge on appeal. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Justice DIETZ did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
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Earls, J., dissenting
Justice EARLS dissenting.
Because the majority faults Mr. Wilkins for the State’s failure to follow its
duties, I respectfully dissent. This case turns on a distinct statutory issue: the State’s
obligation to carry out, and the trial court’s duty to oversee, a court-ordered
competency evaluation. Section 15A-1002 places unmistakable obligations on the
trial court and automatically preserves Mr. Wilkins’s claim for appellate review. The
majority’s unflinching reliance on past cases misses the mark—those decisions differ
in critical ways, both factually and legally, from this one. Finally, the majority
improperly treats Mr. Wilkins’s conduct as evidence of his competence, a circular
argument that presumes the very competence that remains unresolved due to the
State’s failure to act. For these reasons, I dissent from this Court’s judgment and
would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
I. The Statutory Protections for Mentally Ill Defendants
The General Assembly has instructed the courts of this state to take special
steps to protect an acutely vulnerable group of defendants—those who suffer from
mental illness. Indeed, our statutes recognize that
[n]o person may be tried, convicted, sentenced, or punished for a crime when by reason of mental illness or defect he is unable to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to comprehend his own situation in reference to the proceedings, or to assist in his defense in a rational or reasonable manner.
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N.C.G.S. § 15A-1001(a) (2023). The statutory framework for competency evaluations
is as clear as it is essential. When a defendant’s competence to stand trial is
questioned, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1002(b)(1) directs the trial court to act. The court “shall
hold a hearing to determine the defendant’s capacity to proceed” or, when more
evidence is necessary, order a forensic assessment. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1002(b)(1), (1a)
(2023). This mandate exists for a critical reason: when capacity is disputed, a
defendant’s ability to meaningfully participate in their defense must be established
by evidence rather than blithely assumed. A trial conducted without resolving
genuine concerns about competence imperils fundamental principles of fairness. See
Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996) (“Competence to stand trial is
rudimentary, for upon it depends the main part of those rights deemed essential to a
fair trial, including the right to effective assistance of counsel, the rights to summon,
to confront, and to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to testify on one’s own
behalf or to remain silent without penalty for doing so.” (cleaned up)).
Mr. Wilkins’s case falls squarely within this statutory scheme. But the issue
before this Court is more specific—and more nuanced—than the majority
acknowledges. Mr. Wilkins focuses on the State’s failure to comply with, and the trial
court’s failure to enforce, a judicial order requiring a competency evaluation. That
order was not issued lightly—it was grounded in credible worries about Mr. Wilkins’s
capacity to stand trial.
The facts confirm that these concerns were real. While in custody, Mr. Wilkins
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began exhibiting conduct that alarmed both the jail staff and him. Jail employees
flagged his “odd behavior” and urged that he be evaluated. Mr. Wilkins seconded
those worries, telling his attorney that he was “losing his grip on reality.” Defense
counsel observed troubling signs, too. So troubling, in fact, that on 15 March 2018,
defense counsel moved for a competency evaluation under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1002(a),
outlining specific conduct that raised questions about Mr. Wilkins’s capacity. Echoing
others’ concerns, defense counsel recounted Mr. Wilkins’s rapid mood swings,
elevated speech, and confusion about his circumstances.
That same day, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. At the hearing,
defense counsel explained that, beyond his own observations, “[t]here’s been some
reports from the jail, Judge, that Mr. Wilkins has been exhibiting some odd
behaviors.” The State did not oppose the motion for an evaluation. In fact, defense
counsel noted that an evaluation was in everyone’s interests, as it “was something
that the staff at the jail ha[d] been requesting” for about a week. Based on this
evidence, the trial court found that Mr. Wilkins’s competence was in question and
ordered an evaluation.
The trial court’s order was clear and specific. It required a forensic evaluator
to submit a written report with “findings and recommendations” on Mr. Wilkins’s
capacity to proceed. It also directed the sheriff’s office to transport Mr. Wilkins to
Central Regional Hospital in Butner for the evaluation and to return him to custody
afterward. The court even acknowledged during the hearing that transportation was
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necessary because Mr. Wilkins was in jail.
But the State disregarded the court’s order. The sheriff’s office failed to
transport Mr. Wilkins to Central Regional Hospital as directed, leaving the “Return
of Service” section of the order blank. Instead, the State, acting on an ex parte order,
transferred Mr. Wilkins to a “safekeeping” unit at Central Prison in Raleigh on 21
March 2018.
The trial court, meanwhile, compounded this failure. Despite statutory
deadlines for completing evaluations, the court failed to follow up. It did not ask
whether Mr. Wilkins had been transported, whether the evaluation had been
conducted, or why the State ignored its directive. Then, on 28 March 2018, Mr.
Wilkins posted bond and was released from custody—without ever receiving the
court-ordered evaluation.
This sequence of events reveals the scope of the statutory failure. The State
defied a direct court order. The trial court, in turn, neglected its duty to enforce
compliance. As a result, Mr. Wilkins, whose competence remained in question, was
denied the professional evaluation needed to determine whether he could
meaningfully participate in his defense. These facts reveal a breakdown of statutory
duties at every level—duties designed to protect precisely the type of defendant whose
capacity to proceed is in doubt.
II. Section 15A-1002 automatically preserves Mr. Wilkins’s appeal because it mandates that the trial court oversee and complete judicially ordered competency evaluations.
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In its haste to discard Mr. Wilkins’s appeal, the majority overlooks the distinct
statutory right at issue and the trial court’s unique role in enforcing it. A closer look
at the statutory regime shows that Mr. Wilkins did not waive his claim because the
right to a court-ordered competency evaluation is automatically preserved for appeal.
As this Court has long recognized, when “a statute is clearly mandatory, and its
mandate is directed to the trial court, the statute automatically preserves statutory
violations as issues for appellate review.” In re E.D., 372 N.C. 111, 117 (2019) (cleaned
up) (quoting State v. Hucks, 323 N.C. 574, 579 (1988)). Our cases have identified two
classes of statutory mandates: (1) laws that “require[ ] a specific act by a trial judge,”
or (2) laws that “leave[ ] no doubt that the legislature intended to place the
responsibility on the judge presiding at the trial or at specific courtroom proceedings
that the trial judge has authority to direct.” Id. at 121 (cleaned up). Section 15A-1002
satisfies both conditions. Its plain language assigns the trial court—not the
defendant—the duty to ensure that a court-ordered evaluation is completed and to
resolve the competency concerns that prompted it.
The statute makes the court’s obligations clear. When competence is
questioned and the trial court orders an evaluation under subsections (b)(1a) or (b)(2),
the court “shall” defer a competency hearing until after the evaluation is done.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1002(b)(1). These provisions are phrased in mandatory terms. If a
defendant’s capacity is so disputed that the trial court seeks professional input, then
the court must see the evaluation through.
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Section 15A-1002 reinforces the court’s responsibility at every turn. Subsection
(b)(1a) speaks to evaluations for defendants charged with a misdemeanor or felony,
allowing the court to appoint “impartial medical experts” to “examine the defendant
and return a written report describing the present state of the defendant’s mental
health.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1002(b)(1a). As well, the court may “call any expert so
appointed to testify” at the post-evaluation competency hearing. Id. Felony
defendants may be detained before an evaluation for up to sixty days in a state mental
health facility, so long as the trial court makes a specific finding that a facility-based
evaluation is more suitable than an outpatient examination under subsection (b)(1a).
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1002(b)(2) (2023). Subsection (b)(4) inserts the trial court into the
mechanics of the evaluation, instructing that a judge who mandates an evaluation
“shall order the release of relevant confidential information to the examiner.”
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1002(b)(4) (2023). The same provision places control over confidential
records in the trial court’s hands, ensuring that the court—not the parties—
determines what information examiners may access and how they may do so. See id.
To make sure evaluations happen promptly, the statute sets firm deadlines for
when “[r]eports made to the court pursuant to this section shall be completed and
provided to the court.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1002(b2) (2023). Subsection (b2) imposes
timelines for filing evaluation reports after the examination is completed: ten days
for in-custody misdemeanants, twenty days for out-of-custody misdemeanants, and
thirty days for felony defendants, regardless of custody. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1002(b2)(1)–
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(2). Subsection (d) directs that all reports “shall be forwarded to the clerk of superior
court in a sealed envelope addressed to the attention of a presiding judge.” N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-1002(d) (2023). And the contents of the report are confidential and “kept under
such conditions as are directed by the court.” Id.
When the evaluation is complete, the court must resolve the competency
questions that prompted it to act. Subsection (b)(1) mandates a post-evaluation
hearing, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1002(b)(1), and subsection (b1) requires the court to make
findings of fact to support its determination of a defendant’s capacity, N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1002(b1) (2023). The legislature made clear that competency decisions belong
exclusively to the court—the parties “shall not be allowed to stipulate that the
defendant lacks capacity to proceed.” Id. Section 15A-1002’s provisions are
unmistakably directed at the trial court and itemize the court’s central role and
specific duties to manage competency evaluations from start to finish.
The majority nonetheless faults Mr. Wilkins for bonding out of prison. It
asserts that when he “cho[se] to leave custody,” he became “solely responsible for
pursuing his competency evaluation.”1 But section 15A-1002 does not key its
statutory mandate to a defendant’s custody status.
1 This assertion rests on circular reasoning because it assumes that Mr. Wilkins was
competent even though he was never evaluated. This point is addressed in more detail below, but I underscore the perverse logic of placing the burden on a person potentially suffering from mental illness to obtain a competency examination mandated by a court. In some cases, people who are mentally ill may not realize that they need treatment or understand the value of an evaluation.
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The statutory timeframes make this clear. Subsection (b2)(1) sets deadlines for
when an evaluator must file their report with the court after examining the
defendant. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1002(b2)(1). Critically, the statute accounts for custody
status—it allows ten days to file when a misdemeanant defendant is in state custody
but extends the deadline to twenty days when the defendant is not. Id. For a felony
defendant, the deadline is thirty days, regardless of custody. N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1002(b2)(2). These timeframes show that the legislature recognized practical
challenges, like scheduling evaluations for defendants who are no longer confined.
The statute thus gives courts some flexibility based on the custody status and type of
charge. Yet it imposes no lesser duty on the trial court to see the process through.
Custody may affect logistics—but not the court’s core responsibility.
Subsection (c) confirms this by authorizing temporary confinement orders
while the competency issue is being resolved, allowing the trial court to ensure the
process is not disrupted. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1002(c) (2023). This provision confirms that
overseeing competency determinations is the court’s obligation—not something that
shifts based on a defendant’s custody status. For if custody relieved the court of its
duty, as the majority claims, subsection (c) would be unnecessary. Together, these
statutory directives show that custody status does not affect the trial court’s mandate
to ensure the completion of the competency examinations it orders.
Section 15A-1002’s comprehensive framework leaves no room for doubt: when
a trial court orders a competency evaluation, it must see the process through. A
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defendant’s release on bond does not shift that burden. The statute’s timelines, its
grant of authority to secure defendants temporarily, and its instructions for
channeling reports to the presiding judge all reflect the legislature’s intent to keep
responsibility with the trial court. In short, section 15A-1002 requires “specific act[s]”
by the trial court and confirms its central role and singular responsibility to oversee
judicially ordered competency evaluations. See In re E.D., 372 N.C. at 121. Because
of that statutory mandate, the trial court’s failure to secure an examination of Mr.
Wilkins’s competence—an examination that it ordered—was automatically preserved
for appeal, and Mr. Wilkins did not forfeit his right to challenge that dereliction of
duty.
III. Legally and factually, Mr. Wilkins’s case differs from the precedents cited by the majority.
The majority resolves this appeal by mechanically importing the framework
used in past competency cases. That black-and-white approach ignores the unique
facts and distinct statutory mandate involved in Mr. Wilkins’s case. Unlike Young,
King, Dollar, and Badgett—cases where capacity was either never raised or where a
professional examination found the defendant competent—this appeal involves a
breakdown in the statutory framework and the defiance of a judicial mandate.
Because the State and the trial court neglected their obligations, Mr. Wilkins’s
competency was never assessed, leaving the question unresolved both before and
during trial. This failure separates Mr. Wilkins’s case from our prior decisions in this
realm and places the blame squarely on the State and the trial court.
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Begin with Young and Dollar. In Young, the trial court ordered a competency
evaluation, and the examiner deemed the defendant competent. State v. Young, 291
N.C. 562, 566–67 (1977). No evidence suggested otherwise, and neither the defendant
nor his counsel challenged the findings or sought a post-evaluation hearing. Id. at
567–68. Similarly, in Dollar, a court-ordered evaluation confirmed the defendant’s
capacity to proceed, and the defense raised no objections. State v. Dollar, 292 N.C.
344, 350–51 (1977). In both cases, we held that the defendants waived their right to
a post-evaluation hearing by failing to contest the diagnostic findings or request
further proceedings. In both cases, too, we emphasized that the completed
evaluations provided professional assessments, unchallenged and uncontradicted,
finding the defendants were “competent to stand trial, understood the charges and
w[ere] able to cooperate with [their] attorney[s].” See Young, 291 N.C. at 568.
Not so here. In Mr. Wilkins’s case, the trial court ordered an evaluation, but
that order went unfulfilled. Unlike in Young or Dollar, the court developed no
evidence on the issue of competence. Without the evaluation, no professional
assessment was available to either confirm or dispute Mr. Wilkins’s ability to proceed.
The defense had no diagnostic finding to challenge—or accept—because no evaluation
ever occurred. What happened here, unlike in Young and Dollar, was a dissolution of
the statutory process by the State and court’s compounded inaction.
The majority’s reliance on King and Badgett fares no better. In King, the trial
court asked defense counsel whether competence was an issue. State v. King, 353
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N.C. 457, 466 (2001). Neither counsel nor the defendant questioned the defendant’s
capacity to stand trial, sought an evaluation, or asked for a competency hearing. Id.
In Badgett, too, nothing in the record prompted the “prosecutors, defense counsel,
defendant, or the court” to “raise[ ] the question of defendant’s capacity to proceed at
any point during the proceedings.” State v. Badgett, 361 N.C. 234, 259 (2007)
(emphasis added). Nor did the defendant or his attorney move for an evaluation or
request a hearing. Id. In both cases, this Court found that the defendants waived the
issue by failing to assert their rights. See id.
Again, that is not what happened here. Mr. Wilkins’s lawyer filed a detailed
motion, flagging serious concerns about his client’s competence. Those concerns were
supported by observations from jail staff. The trial court agreed that an evaluation
was warranted and issued an order accordingly. Unlike in King and Badgett,
Mr. Wilkins’s defense counsel did not passively accept the status quo. Counsel
brought the issue of competence to the court’s attention and sought the necessary
evidence to resolve it. The failure in this case lies with the State, which disregarded
the court’s directive, and with the court itself, which failed to enforce compliance.
These distinctions are crucial. In Young and Dollar, the trial courts followed
through on their orders, obtaining professional evaluations that settled the issue of
competence. In King and Badgett, the defendants never raised their statutory rights
and thus forfeited them. But here, the system collapsed at the hands of those tasked
with upholding it. The trial court recognized the need to evaluate Mr. Wilkins’s
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capacity, ordered an examination, and then failed to ensure that its directive was
carried out. The State’s noncompliance with that order, coupled with the court’s
inaction, left Mr. Wilkins without the statutory protections meant to safeguard
defendants in situations like this. The majority’s comparison to other cases cannot
paper over the fundamental breakdown that happened here.
IV. Inferring waiver from Mr. Wilkins’s conduct puts the cart before the horse.
The majority infers waiver from Mr. Wilkins’s behavior during trial,
concluding that his actions “squarely indicated that he was competent and ready to
move forward with trial.” That conclusion rests on a circular premise. Waiver requires
competence. See State v. Harvin, 382 N.C. 566, 585 (2022) (defining “waiver” as “an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege” (cleaned
up)); State v. Sides, 376 N.C. 449, 459 (2020) (“Logically, competency is a necessary
predicate to voluntariness.”). A defendant who lacks the capacity to understand the
proceedings or assist in his own defense cannot knowingly relinquish a statutory
right. See id. (“[I]t is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be incompetent,
and yet knowingly or intelligently waive his right to have the court determine his
capacity to stand trial.” (cleaned up) (quoting Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384
(1966))).
That is true regardless of whether competence is raised under a statutory or
constitutional standard. For both types of legal interests, voluntariness is an
essential ingredient to waiver. Cf. State v. Saldierna, 369 N.C. 401, 405–07 (2016)
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(examining whether “defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived” both his
constitutional and statutory rights); see also State v. Gibson, 342 N.C. 142 148–50
(1995) (same); In re K.M.W., 376 N.C. 195, 208–10 (2020) (assessing whether the
respondent-parent voluntarily waived their “statutory right to counsel for parents
involved in termination proceedings”).
Here, by ordering the evaluation, the trial court acknowledged doubts about
Mr. Wilkins’s competence—doubts that required professional assessment. Without
that examination, those doubts remain unanswered. By pointing to Mr. Wilkins’s
conduct to prove his capacity, the majority assigns dispositive weight to conduct that
may itself be the product of incompetence. This is circular in the extreme. Much like
a snake eating its own tail, inferring waiver from Mr. Wilkins’s actions assumes the
very competence the evaluation was supposed to determine. The majority’s analysis
is not just illogical; it turns section 15A-1002 on its head, allowing conduct that may
well reflect incompetence to override the statutory duties to ensure a defendant’s
V. Conclusion
To conclude that Mr. Wilkins waived his right is to overlook the trial court’s
responsibility to enforce its own order and the State’s duty to follow it. It was not
Mr. Wilkins who ignored the court’s directive, nor was it his responsibility to hold the
State and the court to their lawful duties. The majority’s reasoning effectively
absolves the State and the trial court of their obligations and shifts the burden onto
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the very person whose competence was in question. Here, section 15A-1002’s
mandates are clear, and their violation is even more so—not by Mr. Wilkins, but by
the State and the trial court. I respectfully dissent.
Justice RIGGS joins in this dissenting opinion.
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