State v. White

2025 Ohio 306

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 29, 2025
• Docket: 2024CA00044
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. White, 2025-Ohio-306.]

COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO JUDGES: Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. Michael D. Hess, J. Hon. Jason P. Smith, J.

-vs- Judges Hess and Smith Sitting by Assignment by the Supreme Court of Ohio

PATRICIA JO WHITE Case No. 2024CA00044

Defendant-Appellant OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Appeal from the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2023CR1792

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: January 29, 2025

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant

KYLE L. STONE D. COLEMAN BOND Prosecuting Attorney 116 Cleveland Avenue, N.W., Suite 600 Stark County, Ohio Canton, Ohio 44702

LISA A. NEMES Appellate Division Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 110 Central Plaza South, Suite 510 Canton, Ohio 44702-1413 Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00044 2

Hoffman, P.J. {¶1} Defendant-appellant Patricia Jo White appeals the judgment entered by the

Stark County Common Pleas Court convicting her following jury trial of

telecommunications harassment (R.C. 2917.21(A)(1) and/or (5)) and sentencing her to

seven months incarceration in the Stark County Jail. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of

Ohio.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

{¶2} Officer Todd Gillilan has served on the Canton Police Department for 23

years. Since 2020, Officer Gillilan has held the role of mental health liaison, working to

address the high volume of mental health issues which present to Canton police and to

city officials.

{¶3} In July of 2023, Officer Gillilan was on bereavement leave. The police

captain called Officer Gillilan about Appellant, who was sending numerous emails on a

daily basis to the captain, the police chief, the safety director, the mayor, the sheriff, and

other city officials. The captain was concerned Appellant’s behavior was escalating,

which involves behavior related to a mental health issue. Appellant expressed concern

Aultman Hospital was engaged in child trafficking.

{¶4} When Officer Gillilan returned to work, he began investigating Appellant’s

behavior. He reviewed the emails and confirmed a link between Appellant and the email

address from which the emails were sent. Officer Gillilan emailed Appellant on July 15,

telling her if she did not stop making false accusations on social media platforms, she

would be charged with telecommunications harassment, as she had been in 2020.

Appellant’s behavior did not cease, and she began emailing Officer Gillilan. Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00044 3

{¶5} Officer Gillilan attempted to get mental health assistance for Appellant, but

she declined assistance and refused to stop sending emails. Officer Gillilan continued

to inform Appellant repeated emails would result in charges, and expressed his belief she

needed help. Appellant questioned the officer’s qualifications to diagnose mental health

issues. She repeatedly emailed the officer asking what judge was signing her arrest

warrant so she could have her friends conduct research on the judge.

{¶6} A warrant for Appellant’s arrest was issued on July 19, 2023. Appellant

emailed Officer Gillilan throughout the day regarding warrants, probation, and questioning

how anyone could make her stop emailing government officials. Appellant continued to

complain about Aultman Hospital engaging in trafficking. Officer Gillilan repeatedly asked

Appellant to discontinue her emails to public officials.

{¶7} Appellant was arrested on July 20, 2023, and her cell phone was

confiscated to preserve evidence in the form of emails from the phone. Appellant was

released on July 21, 2023, and began emailing Officer Gillilan once again. She needed

contact numbers from her phone, and suggested the officer should “review his

paperwork.” She claimed she would go to the police station to file a report for her stolen

phone. She sent a series of emails concerning her claim her phone was stolen to Officer

Gillilan and other officials, stating she had not realized her arresting officer was a warlock

until after she was released. Appellant stated, “Sure got me going…I don’t think I’ve ever

screamed ‘shut your fucking mouth’ to a cop. I know how powerful I am as a witch…I

would likely bow to his powers however.” State’s Ex. 3C. She continued to send emails

referring to the biggest sting operation in human history. One email stated, “You people

really aren’t very smart when it comes to documentation. Seriously…you should move Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00044 4

me, put me up in a luxury hotel…with a cute pool girl to look at…and then start figuring

this shit out. My guess is…if you don’t…exposure is coming soon. Might want to get in

front.” Id. Appellant suggested Officer Gillilan and others should turn themselves in to

“General Flynn,” to whom she claimed she tweeted a report of their psychological torture.

{¶8} Appellant was indicted by the Stark County Grand Jury with two counts of

telecommunications harassment. The first count related to her emails sent from July 1,

2023 through July 18, 2023. The second count related to her emails sent on or about

July 21, 2023, after she had been arrested and released. Both counts included a

specification of a prior conviction of telecommunications harassment.

{¶9} The case proceeded to jury trial in the Stark County Common Pleas Court.

The jury found Appellant not guilty of the charge of telecommunications harassment from

July 1, 2023 through July 18, 2023, but guilty of the charge related to conduct after her

arrest. The trial court convicted Appellant in accordance with the jury’s verdict, and

sentenced her to seven months incarceration in the Stark County Jail. It is from the March

5, 2024 judgment of the trial court Appellant prosecutes her appeal, assigning as error:

I. THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO

SUSTAIN A CONVICTION AGAINST THE APPELLANT, AND THE

CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED.

II. THE APPELLANT’S CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED AS

THE CONDUCT OF APPELLANT WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY

PROTECTED FREE SPEECH, AND R.C. 2917.21 CANNOT BE APPLIED

TO APPELLANT’S SPEECH IN THIS CASE. Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00044 5

III. THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF

COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF HER RIGHTS UNDER THE 6TH AND 14TH

AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND

ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.

I.

{¶10} In her first assignment of error, Appellant argues her conviction was not

supported by sufficient evidence. She specifically argues the State did not present

evidence she acted with purpose to harass Officer Gillilan, a necessary element of R.C.

2917.21(A)(1). While she concedes she continued to email Officer Gillilan after he told

her to stop, satisfying the elements of R.C. 2917.21(A)(5), she argues because she used

his professional and not his personal email address, he did not have the right to tell her

to stop sending emails.

{¶11} An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence

is to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259, paragraph two of

the syllabus (1991).

{¶12} Appellant was convicted of telecommunications harassment in violation of

R.C. 2917.21(A)(1) and/or (5):

(A) No person shall knowingly make or cause to be made a

telecommunication, or knowingly permit a telecommunication to be made Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00044 6

from a telecommunications device under the person's control, to another, if

the caller does any of the following:

(1) Makes the telecommunication with purpose to harass, intimidate,

or abuse any person at the premises to which the telecommunication is

made, whether or not actual communication takes place between the caller

and a recipient;

(5) Knowingly makes the telecommunication to the recipient of the

telecommunication, to another person at the premises to which the

telecommunication is made, or to those premises, and the recipient or

another person at those premises previously has told the caller not to make

a telecommunication to those premises or to any persons at those

premises[.]

{¶13} Appellant first argues pursuant to R.C. 2917.21(A)(1), the State failed to

prove she sent emails to Officer Gillilan with purpose to harass, intimidate, or abuse him.

She argues her repeated emails were an attempt to communicate with him regarding her

concerns about child trafficking, and her need to recover her cell phone after her arrest.

{¶14} In support of her argument, Appellant cites State v. Golga, 2024-Ohio-1410

(9th Dist.). In that case, the defendant’s water was shut off for nonpayment. He called

the water department eight times over the course of 26 minutes, screaming, using

profanity, and demanding his water service be restored. The court found there was no Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00044 7

evidence of purposeful intent to harass, intimidate, or abuse on the part of the defendant,

because his actual purpose was to have his water service restored. Id. at ¶8-10.

{¶15} The telecommunications-harassment statute “focuses on the caller rather

than on the content of the speech; it is the intent with which the call is made that

establishes the criminality of the conduct.” Id. at ¶6. The inquiry is not whether the

recipient was in fact abused, intimidated, or harassed by the telecommunication, but

whether the purpose of the caller was to abuse, intimidate, or harass the recipient. Id.

“A person acts purposely when it is the person's specific intention to cause a certain

result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature,

regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is the offender's specific

intention to engage in conduct of that nature.” R.C. 2901.22(A). “In the absence of direct

evidence, a defendant's intent to abuse, [intimidate], or harass may be established by the

surrounding facts and circumstances.” Golga at ¶6.

{¶16} Appellant was convicted of telecommunications harassment solely with

regard to emails sent beginning July 21, 2023, after her initial arrest. In the emails sent

after her arrest, while Appellant continued to maintain Aultman Hospital was engaged in

trafficking and inquired after her cell phone, her emails also accused her arresting officer

of being a warlock, referred to herself as a witch, accused police of engaging in a sting

operation, and threatened to expose the police with documentation unless she was put

up in a hotel with a cute pool girl to look at. She also claimed she had tweeted about

psychological torture on the part of police. From this evidence, the jury could find

Appellant acted with purpose to harass, intimidate, or abuse Officer Gillilan. We find the

conviction is supported by sufficient evidence. Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00044 8

{¶17} Appellant also argues the officer did not have the right to tell her to stop

contacting him in his official capacity in regard to legitimate concerns or issues, and thus

the State did not present sufficient evidence to convict her under R.C. 2917.21(A)(5). We

disagree. As discussed above, Appellant concedes she continued to email the officer

after he told her to stop. However, her emails as set forth earlier in this opinion did not

all attempt to raise what she believed to be legitimate concerns over trafficking, warrants

for her arrest, and the return of her cell phone, but rather accused the police of witchcraft

and threatened action against the police if they did not put her up in a hotel. We find the

fact the emails were sent to Officer Gillilan’s professional email account rather than to his

personal email account to be a distinction without a difference in this case. Nothing in the

telecommunications harassment statute prohibits prosecution for contacting a public

official only in a professional capacity, if the defendant’s conduct otherwise meets the

definition of telecommunications harassment. We find the State presented sufficient

evidence from which the jury could find Appellant continued to email Officer Gillilan after

he requested she stop.

{¶18} The first assignment of error is overruled.

II.

{¶19} In her second assignment of error, Appellant argues her conduct in

contacting Officer Gillilan with regards to her concerns about trafficking and the return of

her cell phone was constitutionally protected by the First Amendment.

{¶20} The State argues Appellant failed to raise this claim in the trial court. We

disagree. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss in the trial court. While the primary thrust

of the motion was the city of Canton was not a “person” within the meaning of the statute Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00044 9

and therefore the indictment did not charge an offense, Appellant also argued in her

motion the First Amendment prohibited her prosecution for exercising her First

Amendment right to criticize police performance and express her opinions. We find

Appellant raised her First Amendment claim in the trial court, and we therefore do not

apply the plain error standard as argued by the State.

{¶21} Appellant argues the statute is unconstitutional as applied to her. In an as-

applied challenge, the challenger contends the statute's application violates his or her

constitutional rights under the circumstances of a particular case. United States v.

Christian Echoes Natl. Ministry, Inc., 404 U.S. 561, 565, (1972).

{¶22} In considering a claim R.C. 2917.21 was unconstitutionally overbroad on its

face, the Eighth District Court of Appeals discussed the purpose of the statute in relation

to the First Amendment:

Kronenberg argues that the “statute prohibits constitutionally

protected conduct that would otherwise be legal.” She contends that the

statute punishes a simple call for help and her right to free speech. We find

her argument unpersuasive. The statute operates to prohibit people from

purposely making abusive, threatening, or harassing telecommunications;

it does not restrict protected speech. See generally State v. Gibbs, 134 Ohio

App.3d 247, 730 N.E.2d 1027 (12th Dist. 1999) (finding R.C. 2917.21(A)(5)

is not unconstitutionally over broad, even though statute restricts person's

ability to make a telephone call). Indeed, Kronenberg does not have a

constitutionally protected right to make a telephone call for the purpose of Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00044 10

harassing another person. R.C. 2917.21(B) is not over broad since the First

Amendment does not protect the type of activity that Kronenberg

committed.

{¶23} State v. Kronenberg, 2015-Ohio-1020, ¶ 38 (8th Dist.).

{¶24} In the instant case, Appellant was not prosecuted for the content of her

speech, nor was she prosecuted for exercising her right to complain or express a

constitutionally-protected opinion to a government official. Rather, she was prosecuted

for purposely making abusive, threatening, or harassing telecommunications. As in

Kronenburg, Appellant does not have a constitutionally protected right to send repeated

emails for the purpose of harassing Officer Gillilan.

{¶25} The second assignment of error is overruled.

III.

{¶26} In her third assignment of error, Appellant argues her trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to argue her conduct was constitutionally protected under the First

Amendment at trial, and for failing to move to suppress evidence of her mental health

issues.

{¶27} A properly licensed attorney is presumed competent. State v. Hamblin, 37

Ohio St.3d 153, 524 N.E.2d 476 (1988). Therefore, in order to prevail on a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant must show counsel's performance fell below

an objective standard of reasonable representation and but for counsel’s error, the result

of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674(1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00044 11

373 (1989). In other words, Appellant must show counsel’s conduct so undermined the

proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having

produced a just result. Id.

{¶28} Appellant first argues while counsel raised a First Amendment claim in her

motion to dismiss, counsel failed to pursue a First Amendment argument at trial, and

counsel’s failure to raise the issue at trial was ineffective. For the reasons set forth in our

discussion of Appellant’s second assignment of error, we find Appellant has not

demonstrated a reasonable probability of a change in the outcome had counsel raised a

First Amendment claim at trial.

{¶29} Appellant also argues counsel was ineffective for failing to move to

suppress Officer Gillilan’s testimony he was the mental health liaison for the City of

Canton, thus implying he is assigned to interact with people who are mentally ill, as well

as his testimony he found Appellant’s concerns were delusional ideations resulting from

mental illness.

{¶30} Appellant sets forth no legal theory on which the evidence should have been

suppressed. Appellant’s emails were admitted into evidence at trial, allowing the jury to

form its own conclusion as to whether they were delusional as testified to by Officer

Gillilan, or “legitimate concerns or criticism of the government,” as Appellant argues in her

brief. Appellant has not demonstrated had counsel moved to suppress all suggestion of

mental illness concerns in this case, the evidence would have been suppressed, nor has

she demonstrated in the absence of such evidence, the result of her trial would have been

different. We find Appellant has not demonstrated a reasonable probability of a change Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00044 12

in the outcome had her counsel objected to all mention of mental illness in the instant

case.

{¶31} The third assignment of error is overruled.

{¶32} The judgment of the Stark County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.

By: Hoffman, P.J. Hess, J. Smith, J. concur