State v. Westbrook
This text of 183 P.3d 757 (State v. Westbrook) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
STATE OF HAWAII, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
WALTER WESTBROOK, JR. Defendant-Appellant.
Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawaii.
On the briefs:
JOYCE K. MATSUMORI-HOSHIJO, for Defendant-Appellant.
BRIAN R. VINCENT, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, City and County of Honolulu, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
RECKTENWALD, C.J. FUJISE and LEONARD, JJ.
Defendant-Appellant Walter Westbrook, Jr. (Westbrook) appeals from the Judgment of Conviction and Sentence filed on April 25, 2007 in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (circuit court).[1]
On November 30, 2005, Westbrook was charged with Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the Third Degree, in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 712-1243 (Supp. 2007) and Unlawful Use of Drug Paraphernalia, in violation of HRS § 329-43.5(a) (1993).
The charges stemmed from a search conducted by Honolulu police on November 22, 2005 at a two-story residence located at 1746 Kamehameha IV Road in Honolulu. During the search of the first floor of that residence, various items were found in a room designated by police as Room 3. Those items formed the basis of the charges against Westbrook.
The case was tried to a jury, and Westbrook moved for a judgment of acquittal under Hawai`i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 29(a) at the end of the State of Hawai`i's (State) case. That motion was denied. Westbrook did not renew the motion at the end of all the evidence. The jury found Westbrook guilty of both counts, and the circuit court sentenced him to five years of imprisonment on each of the two counts, to be served concurrently, with a mandatory term of imprisonment of one year and eight months.
On appeal, Westbrook claims that (1) the circuit court erred by admitting what appears to be a rental receipt and a traffic citation with Westbrook's name on it without proper foundation, (2) the circuit court plainly erred by failing to instruct the jury that they must unanimously agree which act constituted the conduct element of each offense that Westbrook was charged with, (3) there was insufficient evidence to support Westbrook's conviction for Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the Third Degree and Unlawful Use of Drug Paraphernalia,[2] and (4) "[i]n the alternative," Westbrook's trial counsel was ineffective by (a) failing to object to the admission of the citation, and (b) failing to request a jury instruction on unanimity.
After a careful review of the record and the briefs submitted by both parties, and having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve Westbrook's points of error as follows:
(1) With regard to the rental receipt, the State concedes that "no foundation was laid by the apparent landlady . . . as to its significance[,]" and "[t]hus the rental receipt would not appear to fall under the business records exception to the hearsay rule." We agree that there was no basis for admitting the receipt to establish the truth of the matters asserted on the receipt,[3] and accordingly the circuit court should not have admitted it into evidence. Hawai`i Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 802. Because the receipt was not admissible, we will not consider it in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Wallace, 80 Hawai`i 382, 411-13, 910 P.2d 695, 724-26 (1996).
With regard to the citation, we review for plain error since Westbrook did not object to its admission. HRPP Rule 52(b). When Westbrook testified at trial, he acknowledged that the citation had been issued to him and that he had given the address "1746 Kamehameha IV." In these circumstances, we find no plain error.
(2) We conclude that the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence of Westbrook's guilt on both counts. "The test on appeal for a claim of insufficient evidence is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact." State v. Kido, 102 Hawaii 369, 379, n.16, 76 P.3d 612, 622, n.16 (App. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "Substantial evidence is credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a man of reasonable caution to reach a conclusion." Id. "The jury, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence." Id.
"In this jurisdiction, possession can be either actual or constructive." State v. Moniz, 92 Hawaii 472, 475, 992 P.2d 741, 744 (App. 1999) (citation omitted). "Constructive possession reflects the common sense notion that an individual may possess a controlled substance even though the substance is not on his or her person at the time of arrest." Id. (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).
There was no evidence that Westbrook had actual possession of any of the items at issue in this case. Thus, the State was required to prove that Westbrook had constructive possession to convict him of Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the Third Degree and Unlawful Use of Drug Paraphernalia.
In Moniz, this court stated:
Factors that have been considered by other courts as inferring a nexus between a defendant and the drugs found include:
1) the defendant's ownership of ... or right to possession of the place where the controlled substance was found; 2) the defendant's sole access to the [place where the controlled substance was found]; 3) defendant under the influence of narcotics when arrested; 4) defendant's presence when the search warrant executed; 5) the defendant's sole occupancy of the [place where the controlled substance was found] at the time the contraband is discovered; 6) the location of the contraband ...; 7) contraband in plain view; 8) defendant's proximity to and the accessibility of the narcotic; 9) defendant's possession of other contraband when arrested; 10) defendant's incriminating statements when arrested; 11) defendant's attempted flight; 12) defendant's furtive gestures; 13) presence of odor of the contraband; 14) presence of other contraband or drug paraphernalia, not included in the charge; 15) place drugs found was enclosed.
Wallace v. State, 932 S.W.2d 519, 524 n. 1 (Tex.App.1995). Other factors that have been deemed relevant include "the consistent presence of known narcotics users on the premises[,]" State v. Brown, 80 N.J. 587, 404 A.2d 1111, 1119 (1979); the large quantity of drugs found, id.; the presence of large sums of money, State v. Steward, 844 S.W.2d 31, 33, 35 (Mo.App.1992); the fact that the defendant had previously sold drugs, Dodson v. State, 213 Md. 13, 130 A.2d 728 (1957), or used drugs, State v. Harris, 159 Conn. 521, 271 A.2d 74 (1970), cert. dismissed, 400 U.S. 1019, 91 S.Ct. 578, 27 L.Ed.2d 630; and the fact that the drugs were found among the defendant's personal belongings. State v. Baxter, 285 N.C. 735, 208 S.E.2d 696 (1974).
92 Hawaii at 476, 992 P.2d at 745.
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