State v. Weaver
This text of 248 P.3d 1116 (State v. Weaver) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
STATE of Washington, Appellant,
v.
Anna WEAVER, Respondent.
Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.
*1117 Sara I. Beigh, Lewis County Prosecutor's Office, Chehalis, WA, for Appellant.
Allen N. Shabino, Allen N. Shabino PS, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.
WORSWICK, A.C.J.
¶ 1 The State appeals from the Lewis County Superior Court's dismissal of Anna Weaver's traffic infraction for failing to yield to an emergency vehicle. The State argues that the Superior Court misinterpreted RCW 46.61.210(1) in holding that it applies only in situations when an emergency vehicle is responding to an "actual emergency" and not when a police officer is making a traffic stop. The State further argues that public policy requires us to hold that RCW 46.61.210(1) applies when a driver is being stopped for a traffic infraction. We affirm the Superior Court, holding that the "failure to yield" statute does not apply in situations where a police officer is in the process of stopping a motorist for a traffic infraction.
FACTS
¶ 2 On February 3, 2009, Weaver was driving northbound on Interstate 5 in Lewis County. Washington State Patrol Trooper D. Pardue was stopped on the side of the freeway watching for speeding motorists. After Trooper Pardue observed Weaver's vehicle exceeding the posted speed limit, he activated his emergency lights and siren and pulled behind her to perform a traffic stop.
¶ 3 Weaver slowed down, signaled to the left, and pulled to the left shoulder of the freeway. Trooper Pardue directed Weaver to move across the freeway to the right shoulder, which Weaver did. Trooper Pardue then cited Weaver for, among other infractions, failing to yield under RCW 46.61.210.[1]
¶ 4 Weaver contested the infraction and the District Court found that she committed the infraction of failing to yield to an emergency vehicle. Weaver appealed to the Superior Court, which reversed the District Court's ruling and held that the failure to yield statute applies only when the approaching emergency vehicle is responding to an "actual emergency," not when making a traffic stop. We granted the State's motion for discretionary review.
ANALYSIS
¶ 5 The State contends that the Superior Court erred when it held that the "failure to yield to emergency vehicle" statute, RCW 46.61.210, requires that the emergency vehicle be responding to an "actual emergency" to trigger a duty to yield to the right shoulder. Br. of Appellant at 12. The State further contends that sound public policy requires us to hold that under RCW 46.61.210, drivers being stopped for a traffic infraction must pull to the right shoulder whenever they are targeted for a traffic stop. Weaver counters that the failure to yield statute is not implicated here. We agree with Weaver.
¶ 6 This matter turns on statutory construction. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Dot Foods, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 166 Wash.2d 912, 919, 215 P.3d 185 (2009). When construing a statute, our fundamental objective is to ascertain and carry out the legislature's intent. Arborwood Idaho, LLC v. City of Kennewick, 151 Wash.2d 359, 367, 89 P.3d 217 (2004). We first look to the plain language of the statute. Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass'n, 169 Wash.2d 516, 526, 243 P.3d 1283 (2010). If the plain language is subject to only one interpretation, our inquiry ends. Lake, 169 Wash.2d at 526, 243 P.3d 1283. And if the statute's meaning is plain on its face, we must then give effect to the plain meaning as an expression of legislative *1118 intent. Arborwood, 151 Wash.2d at 367, 89 P.3d 217. But if the statute is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation after analyzing the plain language, it is ambiguous. City of Seattle v. Winebrenner, 167 Wash.2d 451, 456, 219 P.3d 686 (2009). "[A] statute is ambiguous only if susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations, but a statute is not ambiguous merely because different interpretations are conceivable." Burton v. Lehman, 153 Wash.2d 416, 423, 103 P.3d 1230 (2005). Only if the statute is ambiguous do we consider the legislative history and circumstances surrounding the statute's enactment to determine legislative intent. Lake, 169 Wash.2d at 527, 243 P.3d 1283.
¶ 7 There are four statutes relevant to our analysis. The primary statute at issue, RCW 46.61.210(1), provides:
Upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle making use of audible and visual signals meeting the requirements of RCW 46.37.190, or of a police vehicle properly and lawfully making use of an audible signal only the driver of every other vehicle shall yield the right-of-way and shall immediately drive to a position parallel to, and as close as possible to, the right-hand edge or curb of the roadway clear of any intersection and shall stop and remain in such position until the authorized emergency vehicle has passed, except when otherwise directed by a police officer.
RCW 46.04.672 defines "vehicle ... right-of-way" as "the right of one vehicle ... to proceed in a lawful manner in preference to another vehicle ... approaching under such circumstances of direction, speed, and proximity as to give rise to danger of collision unless one grants precedence to the other." The failure to abide by RCW 46.61.210(1) is a civil infraction. RCW 46.63.020.
¶ 8 The third statute, RCW 46.61.021(1), provides that "[a]ny person requested or signaled to stop by a law enforcement officer for a traffic infraction has a duty to stop." And finally, RCW 46.37.190 provides in pertinent part:
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
248 P.3d 1116, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-weaver-washctapp-2011.