[Cite as State v. Weaver, 2025-Ohio-2256.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CLARK COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : C.A. No. 2024-CA-53 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 23-CR-808 v. : : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas WILLIE WEAVER : Court) : Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION
...........
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on June 27, 2025, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
[[Applied Signature]] CHRISTOPHER B. EPLEY, PRESIDING JUDGE
[[Applied Signature 2]] MARY K. HUFFMAN, JUDGE -2- [[Applied Signature 3]] ROBERT G. HANSEMAN, JUDGE -3-
OPINION CLARK C.A. No. 2024-CA-53
NICOLE K. DIETZ, Attorney for Appellant CHRISTOPHER P. LANESE, Attorney for Appellee
HANSEMAN, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant, Willie Weaver, appeals from his conviction for having
weapons under disability. In support of his appeal, Weaver contends the trial court erred in
overruling his motion to suppress. Weaver also asserts the State failed to provide sufficient
evidence to prove the elements of the crime.
{¶ 2} After reviewing the record, we find the trial court did not err in overruling
Weaver’s motion to suppress his statements and evidence of a firearm. The encounter was
consensual. In addition, the firearm was in plain view of state agents who were conducting
an administrative inspection of a bar where Weaver was engaged in providing security
services. Even if a brief detention had occurred, the investigating agents had reasonable
suspicion, based on specific, articulable facts, that criminal activity was afoot. Weaver’s
conviction for having weapons under disability was also supported by sufficient evidence of
his prior conviction of a felony offense of violence. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court
is affirmed.
I. Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 3} In November 2023, an indictment was filed charging Weaver with having
weapons under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2). The indictment also included a -4- specification seeking forfeiture of an SCCY Industries Model CPX-2 handgun. After Weaver
pled not guilty, the trial court released him on his own recognizance. In January 2024,
Weaver filed a motion to suppress evidence of the gun and statements that he had made.
After holding hearings, the court denied the suppression motion and set a trial date for
August 13, 2024. The trial occurred as scheduled and, after hearing the evidence, the jury
found Weaver guilty as charged. The court sentenced Weaver to 18 months in prison and
ordered the gun forfeited to law enforcement. Weaver timely appealed.
II. Denial of Motion to Suppress
{¶ 4} Weaver’s first assignment of error states that:
The Trial Court Erred by Overruling Appellant’s Motion to Suppress the
Firearm and Statements Made by Appellant.
{¶ 5} Under this assignment of error, Weaver admits that the facts surrounding his
interaction with law enforcement officers from the Ohio Investigative Unit (“OIU”) are not
disputed. The officers came to the club at which Weaver was working as a security officer
to conduct an administrative inspection, and they observed that he was armed but was not
wearing photo identification indicating that he had passed the firearms qualification, as
required. However, Weaver contends the warrantless search by the OIU officers did not
qualify under any exception to the requirement that a warrant be obtained before a search
is conducted. Consequently, Weaver argues the trial court incorrectly applied the law in
refusing to suppress evidence (his gun and statements to the officers). In response, the
State maintains that the search was authorized either by the plain view or consensual
encounter exception to the warrant requirement.
{¶ 6} After hearing the evidence, the trial court found the warrantless search was -5- permissible based on two exceptions to the warrant requirement. First, the search was
consensual; second, even if the search had moved to an investigatory stage, the plain view
doctrine applied. Journal Entry Denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress and Setting Trial
Date (June 5, 2024) (“Supp. Entry”), p. 2-3.
{¶ 7} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and
fact. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact
and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility
of witnesses.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. “Consequently, an
appellate court must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by
competent, credible evidence. . . . Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must
then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether
the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” (Citations omitted.) Id.
{¶ 8} “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals
from unreasonable searches and seizures.” State v. Garrett, 2018-Ohio-4530, ¶ 18 (2d
Dist.), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). “A seizure for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment occurs when law enforcement, through physical force or a display of authority,
restrains a person's liberty of movement such that the person would believe they could not
leave.” State v. Hale, 2024-Ohio-4866, ¶ 14, citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544, 553-554 (1980). However, “these guarantees are not implicated in every situation
where the police have contact with an individual.” State v. Taylor, 106 Ohio App.3d 741, 747
(2d Dist. 1995), citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), and State v. Retherford,
93 Ohio App.3d 586 (2d Dist.1994).
{¶ 9} There are three types of police and citizen interaction. “The first is referred to
as a ‘consensual encounter,’ in which there is no restraint on the person's liberty. There -6- need be no objective justification for such an encounter.” Retherford at 594, citing Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). In this situation, “officers may approach someone in a public
place, identify themselves, ask whether the individual is willing to answer questions, and use
any voluntary responses they receive in a criminal prosecution without the Fourth
Amendment being implicated.” Id. at 595, citing Royer at 498. This is the first conclusion that
the trial court made, i.e., that the interaction was consensual.
{¶ 10} “ ‘The request to examine one's identification does not make an encounter
nonconsensual. Nor does the request to search a person's belongings. The Fourth
Amendment guarantees are not implicated in such an encounter unless the police officer
has by either physical force or show of authority restrained the person's liberty so that a
reasonable person would not feel free to decline the officer's requests or otherwise terminate
the encounter. Once a person's liberty has been restrained, the encounter loses its
consensual nature and falls into one of the next two Supreme Court categories.’ ” State v.
Hardin, 2005-Ohio-130, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.), quoting Taylor at 747-748. “Examples of
circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave,
would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer,
some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice
indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled.” United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). See also State v. Penwell, 2021-Ohio-1216, ¶ 12
(2d Dist.).
{¶ 11} During the suppression hearing, the court heard testimony from Travis Kling
and Travis Woodruff. For purposes of analysis, we have reviewed the suppression hearing
transcripts and the exhibits, which included Kling’s body cam video. The video began when
Kling arrived at the club and ended when he left the scene. -7- {¶ 12} Kling was a police officer employed by the OIU, which is part of the Ohio
Department of Public Safety (“Safety Dept.”). On August 25-26, 2024, the Safety Dept.
initiated and completed an administrative inspection of a premises called “Club Hollywood”
in Springfield, Ohio. Kling testified that the inspection was done pursuant to provisions of the
Ohio Administrative Code that authorize the Safety Dept. to determine compliance with
provisions of the Liquor Control Act. Such inspections are allowed as long as a business is
open or operating or appears to be open or operating. Transcript of Proceedings (“Tr. 1”), 9,
11-12, and 13; State’s Ex. 6 (Kling’s body-cam video).1
{¶ 13} OIU brought about five or six officers to the club and arrived at around 11:15
p.m. When Kling arrived, he first encountered Weaver on the steps in front of the club, which
was open for business. Kling saw lights on inside the club’s window, and the door was open.
Kling also saw dance lights and patrons outside, and people were cooking food in a food
truck. At the time, Weaver was wearing security garb, including a vest marked “Security.”
When Kling first approached Weaver, he saw the butt of a gun in a holster on Weaver’s
person. Weaver also wore an attachment carrier on which a stun gun and multiple other
items hung, including a body camera and cuffs. Tr. 1 at 20, 22, 27-28, and 29-31; State’s
Ex. 1; and State’s Ex. 6. The OIU officers left the scene around 12:16 p.m. on August 26,
i.e., about an hour after they had arrived. Id.
{¶ 14} Kling did not announce to Weaver why he was there but asked if Weaver was
a licensed private security guard. Generally, licensed security guards have photo
identification stating they have passed the firearms qualification, and they are required to
1 The suppression hearing transcript consists of two volumes that are numbered sequentially and will be referenced as Tr. 1. As the jury trial transcript is contained in a separate volume that is not numbered sequential to the others, it will be referenced as “Tr. 2.” -8- carry that on their person. In response to the question, Weaver said he was licensed, but he
did not have any identification or a driver’s license on his person. When Kling told Weaver
that he was required to carry a license in that capacity, Weaver stated that he worked for
someone who did. The initial encounter between Kling and Weaver was quite brief (less than
a minute) because the bar owner, Travis Woodruff, asked if the officers had a search
warrant. Consequently, Kling thought it prudent to explain to Woodruff that a search warrant
was neither needed nor required. Kling then went into the bar to conduct his investigation.
Kling did not take Weaver’s weapon, and Weaver was free to walk around the bar. Tr. 1 at
12-13, 20-21, 27, and 29-30; State’s Ex. 6, 01:51 to 02:10 (referring to time that had elapsed
on the video, such as one minute and 51 seconds, rather than the actual date and time
reflected at the top of the video screen).
{¶ 15} This initial encounter fell within the category of a consensual encounter with
no restraint on Weaver’s liberty and no need for objective justification. Kling did testify,
however, that when he went into the bar, he had a reasonable suspicion that Weaver was
operating as a security guard in possession of a firearm without being licensed. Tr. 1 at 43.
While this is unneeded for a consensual encounter, we agree that the circumstances gave
rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
{¶ 16} R.C. Chap. 4749 governs licensing of private investigators and security
services and, per R.C. 4749.02, is administered by the director of public safety. Under R.C.
4749.01, firearm license holders are separated into three classes – A, B, or C – depending
on whether they are engaging in the business of private investigation, security services, or
both. As relevant here, R.C. 4749.01(G) defines a “Class C license” as “a license issued
under section 4749.03 of the Revised Code that qualifies the person issued the license to
engage only in the business of security services.” Before obtaining a license, applicants -9- must provide various information and meet certain requirements specified in R.C.
4749.03(A), (B), and (C). These include passing an examination, providing references,
submitting a set of fingerprints to the superintendent of the bureau of criminal investigation
(“BCI”), undergoing a criminal records check, and so forth.
{¶ 17} Under R.C. 4749.03(C)(1), applicants who intend to carry a firearm as defined
in section 2923.11 of the Revised Code in the course of business or employment must notify
the BCI superintendent. A “firearm” is defined in R.C. 2923.11(B)(1) as “any deadly weapon
capable of expelling or propelling one or more projectiles by the action of an explosive or
combustible propellant. ‘Firearm’ includes an unloaded firearm, and any firearm that is
inoperable but that can readily be rendered operable.” Id.
{¶ 18} In this situation, after being notified of an applicant’s intent to carry a firearm,
the BCI superintendent must ask the FBI for any information about the applicant and review
it. The superintendent then submits all investigation reports to the public safety director. R.C.
4749.03(C)(2). If the application is approved, the director issues an A, B, or C license and
provides the applicant with an identification card stating “the licensee's name, the
classification of the license, the location of the licensee’s principal place of business in this
state, and the expiration date of the license. . . .” R.C. 4749.03(D).
{¶ 19} Furthermore, R.C. 4749.10(A) prohibits Class A, B, or C licensees and
registered employees of a class A, B, or C licensee from carrying firearms in the course of
the business of security services unless five listed requirements have been met. Among
these requirements is that “[t]he licensee or employee receives a notation on the licensee's
or employee's identification card that the licensee or employee is a firearm-bearer and
carries the identification card whenever the licensee or employee carries a firearm in the
course of engaging in the business of private investigation, the business of security services, -10- or both businesses.” R.C. 4749.10(A)(3). See also R.C. 4749.06(A)-(D) (noting that even if
individuals are providing security services for an entity that has a Class A, B, or C license, if
these individuals intend to carry firearms in the course of business or employment, they must
complete a firearms training program and must comply with the requirements of R.C.
4749.10). As noted, that includes carrying an identification card.
{¶ 20} Finally, R.C. 4749.13(A) prohibits people who are not licensed under R.C.
Chap. 4749 from engaging in the business of security services; subdivision (D) also prohibits
unlicensed people from holding themselves out as Class A, B, or C licensees. The penalty
for violating these sections, respectively, is: (1) being charged with a first-degree
misdemeanor crime; or (2) being assessed a fine between $100 and $1,000 or a year in
prison, or both. See R.C. 4749.99(A) and (B). Thus, even though Weaver was not ultimately
charged with a crime under this statute, when Kling saw that Weaver was armed with a gun,
was operating as a security guard, and was unable to produce an identification card, Kling
had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
{¶ 21} As noted, before entering the bar, Kling already had a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity. In total, OIU was on the scene for only about an hour. Kling’s liquor
inspection of the bar records and liquor stock lasted a bit more than 11 minutes; Weaver
was not involved in that situation. State’s Ex. 6 at 02:10 to 13:54. At that point, Kling asked
another officer if the security guard had been identified yet. Kling then asked Weaver if he
had any felonies, and Weaver said no. Id. at 13:59. In fact, Weaver stated several times
during the encounter that he did not have any felony convictions. Tr. 1 at 23.
{¶ 22} At the beginning of Kling’s second conversation with Weaver, Kling explained
that even if Weaver were employed by someone who had a firearm license, Weaver was
required to have his own license. Based on this discussion and Weaver’s reaction on the -11- video, he appeared to acknowledge that he did not have a firearm license. See State’s Ex.
6 at 14:01-1440. Kling then told Weaver he needed to check the gun to make sure it was
not stolen. Kling took the gun, unloaded it, and found the serial number. Id.
{¶ 23} This was when the plain view exception became relevant. According to
Weaver, this was the only exception that could arguably have applied in the case before us.
Appellant's Brief, p. 9. In this regard, Weaver argues that carrying a weapon is not illegal in
Ohio, and the gun was not stolen, as Kling stated. Id. at p. 10.
{¶ 24} “One exception to the warrant requirement is the ‘plain view’ doctrine, first
expressly established in Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022,
29 L.Ed.2d 564. In essence, the plain view doctrine allows police officers, under particular
circumstances, to seize an ‘article of incriminating character’ which is not described in their
search warrant.” State v. Halczyszak, 25 Ohio St.3d 301, 303 (1986). Under this doctrine,
“an officer may seize an object in plain view without a warrant if (1) the officer did not violate
the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be viewed, (2)
the object's incriminating nature is immediately apparent, and (3) the officer has a right to
access the object where it is located.” State v. Burroughs, 2022-Ohio-2146, ¶ 15, citing
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-137 (1990).
{¶ 25} These criteria were met here. Kling had the right to be at the bar, and he
immediately saw the gun in a holster on Weaver’s hip. Concerning “the second requirement
of the plain-view doctrine, the police need to have probable cause, with some narrow
exceptions, to immediately believe upon discovery of the article in plain view that it is
obviously incriminating evidence or contraband.” State v. Willoughby, 81 Ohio App.3d 562,
568 (6th Dist. 1992), citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987). Notably, “probable
cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the -12- officer would ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ . . . that certain items may
be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any
showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false.” Texas v. Brown, 460
U.S. 730, 742 (1983), quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). “A ‘practical,
nontechnical’ probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required.” Id.,
quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
{¶ 26} When Kling took the gun, he reasonably believed Weaver was engaged in
security services without being licensed, and the gun, therefore, was involved in criminal
activity. That the gun was eventually found not to be stolen was irrelevant. The focus is on
the circumstances when the gun was seized. Confirming whether the gun was stolen took
several minutes due to difficulty reading the serial number and because the gun initially
turned up as having been stolen. Id. at 14:40 to 21:16. Kling later discovered it was not
stolen. Apparently, manufacturer serial numbers can overlap, and this weapon’s make
differed from one with the same serial number that had been stolen. Tr.1 at 15-16. Kling also
had the authority to access the gun where it was located, as he had arrest authority in Clark
County. Id. at 46. Accordingly, the trial court correctly applied the plain view doctrine.
{¶ 27} The trial court found the entire proceeding consensual based on various
factors like the lack of any show of force and that the officers used appropriate language
and tone of voice. Supp. Entry at p. 2-3. We agree. However, even if this were otherwise,
another recognized exception “to the warrant requirement is an investigative detention,
commonly referred to as the Terry stop. Under Terry . . . a police officer may detain an
individual without probable cause when the officer has reasonable suspicion, based on
specific, articulable facts, that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Bursey, 2021-Ohio-2857,
¶ 19 (2d Dist.), quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. -13- {¶ 28} “Reasonable suspicion entails some minimal level of objective justification for
making a stop – that is, something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
‘hunch,’ but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause.” State v. Jones, 70
Ohio App.3d 554, 556-557 (2d Dist. 1990), quoting Terry at 27. The test for assessing this
is objective and considers the totality of the circumstances, “viewed through the eyes of the
reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they unfold.”
State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88 (1991), citing United States v. Hall, 525 F.2d 857,
859 (D.C. Cir. 1976), and State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio St.2d 291, 295 (1980).
{¶ 29} While checking the gun’s serial number, Kling received information from Agent
Love, who had run Weaver’s name and date of birth. Once Weaver was identified, it was
found that he had “suspect cautions” associated with his LEADS file. The caution was
basically that officers should be cautious in interacting with Weaver. This prompted further
investigation. Love had shown Kling information on OLEG (a law enforcement database),
and Kling was able to see that Weaver had an FBI number and a BCI number. Tr. 1 at 23,
37-39, and 42; State’s Ex. 6 at 22:02-22:06.
{¶ 30} To investigate this, Kling spent time on the phone with a police post, which had
to create an incident report in order to run a records check. After being on hold for some
time, Kling learned that all charges in Ohio had been dismissed, but Weaver had a violent
felony tag from New York. Id. at 24:17 to 24:27 and 34:35-34:40.
{¶ 31} After ending the first phone call at around 39:40, Kling told Weaver about the
report of a felony conviction for robbery in New York, which was a felony of violence.
Because Weaver continued to deny any prior convictions, Kling then called the Intelligence
Center in Columbus. After again being on hold for some time, Kling was told that Weaver
had felony offenses from Pennsylvania and New York, including a weapons conviction. -14- However, the Intelligence Center was unable to provide a booking photo for comparison at
that point. See State’s Ex. 6 at 39:45 to 53:44. When Weaver continued to deny any
involvement, the OIU officers decided to take Weaver’s photo rather than arrest him. They
also said they would retain the gun and continue to attempt to verify the information. In
addition, they stated the gun would be returned to Weaver if his story checked out. After
taking the photo, the officers left around 12:16 a.m.
{¶ 32} Based on the video and the totality of the circumstances, the trial court could
have reasonably concluded that the OIU officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
Weaver had committed a crime and did not unreasonably detain him. Any delay was
unavoidable due to the difficulty in obtaining information. In fact, when the officers left, they
were still attempting to verify whether Weaver had the alleged felony convictions of violence.
Because of this, they simply took Weaver’s photo and did not arrest him. The video also
indicated that the police were very cordial, did not coerce Weaver in any way, and did not
make a show of force. In fact, during parts of the video, Weaver was joking and chatting with
the police.
{¶ 33} Based on the preceding discussion, the trial court did not err in overruling the
motion to suppress. Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.
III. Denial of Motion for Acquittal
{¶ 34} Weaver’s second assignment of error states that:
The Trial Court Erred by Overruling Appellant’s Motion for Acquittal
(Crim.R. 29) Where the State Failed to Present Sufficient Evidence to Prove
Each Element of Weapons Under Disability.
{¶ 35} Under this assignment of error, Weaver contends his motion for acquittal -15- should have been granted because the State failed to prove a prior conviction that prevented
him from carrying a firearm in Ohio. Specifically, Weaver argues that State’s Ex. 3-B was
not a proper judgment of conviction for this purpose, as it did not contain a judge’s signature
and there was no indication it had been entered into a journal. In response, the State notes
other methods exist for establishing a prior conviction.
{¶ 36} “When considering a Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal, the trial court must
construe the evidence in a light most favorable to the state and determine whether
reasonable minds could reach different conclusions on whether the evidence proves each
element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Hawn, 138 Ohio
App.3d 449, 471 (2d Dist. 2000), citing State v. Bridgeman, 55 Ohio St.2d 261 (1978). “A
sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument challenges whether the state has presented adequate
evidence on each element of the offense to allow the case to go to the jury or sustain the
verdict as a matter of law.” Id., citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 (1997). Because
sufficiency involves a question of law, courts apply de novo review. Thompkins at 386.
{¶ 37} “The proper test to apply to such an inquiry is the one set forth in paragraph
two of the syllabus of State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492: ‘An
appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such
evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Hawn at 471, quoting Jenks.
{¶ 38} The offense in question, set forth in R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), provides that, “Unless
relieved from disability under operation of law or legal process, no person shall knowingly -16- acquire, have, carry, or use any firearm or dangerous ordnance, if . . . [t]he person is under
indictment for or has been convicted of any felony offense of violence . . . .” As relevant here,
an offense of violence as defined in R.C. 2901.01(A)(9) “means any of the following: (a) A
violation of section . . . 2911.01 [aggravated robbery] or . . . 2911.02 [robbery],” or “(b) A
violation of an existing or former . . . law of this or any other state or the United States,
substantially equivalent to any section, division, or offense listed in division (A)(9)(a) of this
section.” Weaver has not claimed either at trial or on appeal that his alleged prior robbery
conviction in New York was not an offense of violence.
{¶ 39} “R.C. 2945.75(B)(1) ‘governs the introduction of prior convictions as an
element of an offense.’ ” (Emphasis deleted.) State v. Johnson, 2022-Ohio-4629, ¶ 60 (2d
Dist.), quoting State v. Werfel, 2003-Ohio-6958, ¶ 40 (11th Dist.). This section of the statute
says that: “Whenever in any case it is necessary to prove a prior conviction, a certified copy
of the entry of judgment in such prior conviction together with evidence sufficient to identify
the defendant named in the entry as the offender in the case at bar, is sufficient to prove
such prior conviction.”
{¶ 40} To support his argument that the State presented insufficient evidence of a
prior conviction, Weaver relies on State v. Gwen, 2012-Ohio-5046. See Appellant’s Brief at
p. 11. In Gwen, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed two questions: (1) “whether a
judgment of conviction is the exclusive method of proving a prior conviction under R.C.
2945.75(B)(1)”; and (2) “whether the judgment entry must comply with Crim.R. 32(C) when
the state elects to use it to prove a prior conviction.” Gwen at ¶ 9. Concerning the first
question, the court held that “R.C. 2945.75(B)(1) sets forth one way to provide ‘sufficient’
proof of a prior conviction, but does not provide the only method to prove it.” (Emphasis in
original). Id. at ¶ 14. -17- {¶ 41} Regarding the second question, the supreme court stated:
We do not agree with the Ninth District's acceptance of the argument
that the word “convicted” refers only to a determination of guilt and not a
judgment of conviction. In State v. Henderson, 58 Ohio St.2d at 178, 389
N.E.2d 494, this court held that a sentence must have been imposed before
an offender may be regarded as having a prior conviction[.] “ ‘Conviction’
includes both the guilt determination and the penalty imposition.” State v.
Poindexter, 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 5, 520 N.E.2d 568 (1988). A judgment of
conviction does not exist without a sentence. State v. Robinson, 187 Ohio
App.3d 253, 2010-Ohio-543, 931 N.E.2d 1110, ¶ 27 (1st Dist.). And we have
determined that a judgment entry of conviction must follow Crim.R. 32(C) to
be appealable. State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893
N.E.2d 163. A final, appealable judgment entry of conviction must contain (1)
the fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the judge's signature, and (4)
the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by the clerk. State v.
Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142, paragraph one
of the syllabus. When the state chooses to provide a judgment of conviction
pursuant to R.C. 2945.75(B)(1), the entry must comply with Crim.R. 32(C).
This will be “sufficient” proof of the conviction.
Gwen, 2012-Ohio-5046, at ¶ 20.
{¶ 42} Weaver argues that State’s Ex. 3-B, admitted at trial, was insufficient proof
because it lacked a judge’s signature. According to the State, the evidence here falls within
Gwen’s statement that R.C. 2945.75(B)(1) provides only one means to prove prior
convictions, and other methods exist. State’s Brief at p. 8. The State then relies on three -18- cases that Gwen approved as examples of other methods of proof. Id.
{¶ 43} In this regard, the State is correct. In Gwen, the court stressed: “We agree with
those appellate courts that have held that other methods may exist to prove the element
beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., State v. Frambach, 81 Ohio App.3d 834, 843, 612
N.E.2d 424 (1992); State v. Chaney, 128 Ohio App.3d 100, 105-106, 713 N.E.2d 1118
(1998); In re R.B., 6th Dist. Nos. H-10-018 and H-10-019, 2011-Ohio-5042, ¶ 10.” Gwen at
¶ 22. Applying those cases, the State lists trial testimony and various documents it submitted
to establish the prior conviction. See State’s Brief at p. 8-9, referencing State’s Exs. 3-A and
3-B and Kling’s testimony.
{¶ 44} Based on our review, State’s Ex. 3-B is not a “judgment of conviction” and,
therefore, the Crim.R. 32(C) elements did not need to be established. For purposes of
analysis, we have reviewed the cases citing Gwen since it was decided in 2012 and found
that none deal with the specific situation involved here. Most of the cases involve prior Ohio
convictions, and in these situations, Crim.R. 32(C) would clearly apply. One case that
involved a judgment entry from another state (New Jersey) had a stamp on the entry labeled
“True Copy.” State v. Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2093, ¶ 35-36 (7th Dist.). The court of appeals
remarked that the issue there was not whether the entry complied with Crim.R. 32(C) but
whether it was a certified copy per R.C. 2945.75(B)(1). The court’s reasoning was that Ohio
courts use a different certified copy stamp than the one on the New Jersey entry.2 The court
decided it did not need to answer this question, because the State had failed to furnish
2 In our view, this is irrelevant. R.C. 2945.75(B)(1) does not specify a particular format for
certified copies. Furthermore, Evid.R.902(1) and (4) allow domestic public documents under seal and certified copies of public records to be admitted without extrinsic evidence of admissibility. In fact, the trial court here found the certified documents admissible. E.g., Tr. 2, 156. We agree with the trial court that State’s Exs. 3-A and 3-B were admissible. -19- evidence that the defendant in New Jersey (who had a different name) was the same person
as the defendant who was before the court in Ohio. Id. at ¶ 38-43.
{¶ 45} Here, State’s Ex. 3-B was a “Certificate of Disposition” from the Kings Supreme
Criminal Court in Brooklyn, New York. The document was embossed with the court’s seal
and signed by Nancy Sunshine, the clerk for the court. The Certificate contained the caption
“The People of the State of New York vs. Willie Weaver” and a “Legacy Docket Number” of
SCI-05053 and an NYSID number of 07213062Z. Id. at p. 1.
{¶ 46} Beneath that information, the clerk stated: “THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the
undersigned has examined the files of the Kings Supreme Criminal Court concerning the
above entitled matter and finds the following.” Id. The clerk then listed the following
information: “Number of Counts” – “1”; “Incident Date” – “04/20/1995”; “Sentence Charge” –
“PL 160.05”; “Charge Description” – “Robbery-3rd”; “Charge Weight” – “DF”; “Conviction
Type” – “Pled Guilty”; “Conviction/Sentence Date” – “Conv: 05/08/1995”, “Sent: 05/17/1995”;
and “Sentence Highlight” – “• Imprisonment (1years - 3 years)”, “• Surcharge (MS ($5.00) -
due 05/17/1995 (Other Agency to Collect).” Id. The clerk further found that a balance
remained due and owing for the fines, fees, and surcharges imposed at the time of
sentencing. Finally, the clerk included a “Charge Weight Key” indicating that “DF” was a
Class Felony. Id.
{¶ 47} The Certificate further stated: “CAUTION: THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT
OFFICIAL UNLESS EMBOSSED WITH THE COURT SEAL.” Id. The document was
embossed with a seal. In addition, the Certificate said: “Pursuant to Judiciary Law § 212.2(z),
a certificate of disposition for the public contains only records of convictions, if any, and
information about pending cases. . . . Conviction charges may not be the same as arrest
charges.” Id. -20- {¶ 48} N.Y. Judiciary Law 212 deals with functions of the chief administrator of the
New York court system. Under N.Y. Judiciary Law 212.2, “The chief administrator shall . . .
(z) take such actions and adopt such measures as may be necessary to ensure that a
certificate of disposition or a written or electronic report of a criminal history search
conducted for the public by the office of court administration contains only records of
convictions, if any, and information about pending cases.” In New York, these documents
are referred to both as “certificates of disposition” and “certificates of conviction.” E.g.,
People v. Parsons, 84 Misc.3d 637, 639 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 2024) (disposition); People v.
Melvin, 279 A.D.2d 481 (N.Y.App. 2001) (conviction). New York courts use these certificates
to establish prior convictions. Id. Again, they are not judgment entries.
{¶ 49} Furthermore, New York has a specific rule of evidence providing for the effect
of such certificates. Under N.Y. Crim. P. 60.60.1, “A certificate issued by a criminal court, or
the clerk thereof, certifying that a judgment of conviction against a designated defendant has
been entered in such court, constitutes presumptive evidence of the facts stated in such
certificate.” See also People v. Clyde, 90 A.D.3d 1594, 1596 (N.Y.App. 2011) (noting
presumptive effect); People v. Sykes, 167 Misc.2d 588, 590, 638 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe Cty. 1995) (same). Like Ohio, New York requires some connecting evidence of
identity to satisfy the State’s burden of proving the prior conviction beyond a reasonable
doubt. See People v. Taylor, 827 N.Y.S.2d 584, 585-586 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Cty. 2006).
{¶ 50} Accordingly, because the State did not submit judgment entries here, the
documents did not have to satisfy the requirement of having a judge’s signature. As noted,
a certified judgment entry is not the only means of establishing a prior conviction and, in
Gwen, the court approved of other methods in three cases it cited. Gwen, 2012-Ohio-5046,
at ¶ 22. Of the cited cases, the decision of the Ninth District Court of Appeals is most on -21- point. In that case, a certified copy of the judgment did not comply with Crim.R. 32(C).
However, the court found that the “uncontested avowal” of an agent of the Department of
Agriculture “to the effect that [the defendant] had suffered ‘a prior theft conviction’ was
sufficient to allow the jurors to conclude beyond all reasonable doubt that this element of the
offense had been established.” Frambach, 81 Ohio App.3d at 843.
{¶ 51} In the case before us, the State submitted both certified evidence and
testimony about Weaver’s prior conviction. State’s Ex. 3-A contained documents with the
same heading and case number as Ex. 3-B and certifications by the same clerk of courts,
who stated that she had compared the annexed documents with the original information in
the court files, and they were true transcripts. Ex. 3-A was also embossed with the court’s
seal.
{¶ 52} These documents included an April 26, 1995 criminal complaint, which alleged
that Willie Weaver had forcibly stolen property and had displayed “what appears to be a
pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun, or other firearm.” Id. at p. 4. Although the initial
complaint had charged first and second-degree robbery, the State then filed an information
charging Weaver with third-degree robbery, which was a lesser charge. Compare N.Y. Penal
Law 160.15, 160.10, 160.05, and 55.05 (unchanged in relevant part since the May 1995
conviction). Weaver waived the right to an indictment and agreed to be prosecuted by the
information document the prosecution had filed for the third-degree robbery charge. This
charge listed the same date, time, and place for the crime as was listed for the offenses
charged in the complaint. In addition, Weaver waived the right to appeal any plea and
sentence. The court accepted Weaver’s waiver of the right to appeal, and this entry was
signed by the judge. State’s Ex. 3-A at p. 4.
{¶ 53} In addition to the documentary evidence, Agent Kling testified at Weaver’s trial. -22- After arriving at the Hollywood Club around 11:00 p.m., Kling observed Weaver, who was
wearing a black balaclava or ski mask, a vest that said “Security,” and a badge on a neck
chain that said “private security.” Weaver also had a body camera, handcuffs, a 110 taser
of some kind, and an outside waistband holster with a light blue handgun that was at his hip
and plainly visible. Tr. 2 at 107-110 and 139. Their initial encounter occurred as related
above, with Weaver claiming he was licensed but unable to produce a license or
identification to that effect or a driver’s license. Id. at 113-114 and 140.
{¶ 54} During the second encounter and while Kling was on the phone with dispatch
confirming that Weaver’s weapon was not stolen, Kling also worked to identify Weaver. Kling
identified Weaver through a law enforcement database called OLEG, which officers can pull
up on their phones. OLEG provides a driver’s license image and allows confirmation that
individuals are who they say they are. OLEG generated an “approach with caution” warning,
which indicated Weaver had been arrested for possible past acts of violence. That caused
Kling to start digging deeper. The OLEG form provided Kling with the following information:
Weaver’s social security number, his BCI number for arrests in Ohio, his date of birth, and
his FBI number, which indicated arrests in multiple states. Id. at 115-116 and 158-159.
{¶ 55} Kling stated that he had access to OLEG, which combined information from
multiple sources, including the bureau of motor vehicles, driving records, computerized
criminal histories, court records, traffic tickets, license suspensions, misdemeanor arrests,
and things of that nature. Kling was able to search OLEG by inputting things like names,
addresses, birthdates, and social security numbers. Id. at 147-148. Kling further said that on
the night of the incident, he had had multiple communications with dispatch, beginning with
his dispatch center in Athens through the Ohio State Highway Patrol and ending with the
Springfield Dispatch Center for the Ohio State Highway Patrol. He also talked to the -23- Intelligence Center for the Ohio State Highway Patrol. Kling was able to confirm Weaver’s
identity through driver’s license images that corresponded with tattoos that Weaver had
displayed. Id. at 122-123.
{¶ 56} After pulling up Weaver’s driver’s license on OLEG, Kling was able to select a
social security number hyperlink, which then pulled up additional files. The case in State’s
Ex. 3-B had what is called a CCH (computerized criminal history), which revealed any time
that an individual had been arrested, booked into jail, or convicted of a criminal offense.
Kling’s access was limited to Ohio, so he then called the Intelligence Center, which had
trained analysts and full access to LEADS. Kling provided the center with the CCH numbers.
Tr. 2 at 145, 149 and 159. From his communications that night, Kling discovered that there
were additional law enforcement records for an individual who had information that seemed
to match Weaver’s across multiple states, and there was an indication of a prior conviction
that would have disqualified Weaver from carrying a firearm. Id. at 124, 126, and 171.
{¶ 57} The birth date for Weaver on OLEG (July 10, 1976) matched the driver’s
license provided for Weaver, and the birth date and name also matched the ones in State’s
Ex. 3-B. The social security number that Kling saw in OLEG also matched the computerized
criminal history that was provided for Weaver. Id. at 133 and 160-161. During his testimony,
Kling additionally identified the certified records in State’s Exs. 3-A and 3-B. The trial court
found them to be self-authenticated documents and admitted them into evidence. Id. at 130-
132, 156, and 178-178.
{¶ 58} Kling’s testimony was not refuted in any way and, viewing the evidence most
favorably to the prosecution, “ ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt’ ” based on this evidence. Hawn,
138 Ohio App.3d at 471. Accordingly, the second assignment of error is overruled. -24-
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 59} Both of Weaver’s assignments of error having been overruled, the judgment
of the trial court is affirmed.
.............
EPLEY, P.J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.