State v. Washington

2024 Ohio 1784

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Washington, 2024-Ohio-1784.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 112872 v. :

AAREN A. WASHINGTON, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 9, 2024

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-20-651280-B

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, Kevin R. Filiatraut and Owen Knapp, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.

Jennifer N. McTernan, LLC, and Jennifer N. McTernan, for appellant.

MARY J. BOYLE, J.:

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Aaren A. Washington (“Washington”), appeals

his conviction for the shooting death of Amir Bradley, arguing that his plea was not

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made and the trial court abused its discretion when his presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea was denied. After

careful review and for the reasons set forth below, we find that the court did not

abuse its discretion and affirm Washington’s convictions.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On March 30, 2020, in Cleveland, Ohio, 15-year-old Amir Bradley,

while walking with his friend, Elliot Swift, in the Woodland Avenue area, was shot

and killed at approximately 10:50 a.m. Within months, Washington, along with his

codefendant Tinisha Thomas, were arrested and indicted with one count each of

aggravated murder, murder, and felonious assault.1 Each count carried both one-

and three-year firearm specifications. Washington entered not guilty pleas and two

legal counsel were assigned to represent him. Discovery and pretrials began

promptly. Two months later, after discovering that he represented Amir Bradley,

one of Washington’s counsel requested to withdraw. The court granted this request

and assigned another counsel for Washington.

{¶ 3} After many pretrials, a trial date was set in August 2021. The day

before trial was to begin, Washington filed a motion to continue trial because of a

death in defense counsel’s family. The trial court granted the motion and set the

matter for pretrial. In December 2021, Washington’s trial was scheduled for April

4, 2022. Five days before the trial, Washington filed a notice of alibi. Two days later,

1 The codefendant pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter with the three-year

firearm specification and was sentenced to 9-12 years in prison. State v. Thomas, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-20-651280-A (July 26, 2023). As of the date of this opinion, no appeal has been filed by the codefendant. the state filed a motion for the trial court to admit and find that statements made by

Washington, in a video recording from the county jail, be deemed “admissions”

under Evid.R. 801(D)(2). Washington filed two briefs in opposition to the state’s

motion to admit video recording. The April 4th trial date was again continued.

{¶ 4} On April 13, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the state’s motion

to admit the video recording. At the conclusion of the hearing, and after reviewing

the video recording, the court granted the state’s motion and held that the

statements made by Washington on the video recording are “Admissions” under

Evid.R. 801(D)(2) and admissible. (See Journal Entry 4/13/22.)

{¶ 5} The trial date was reset for September 26, 2022. Twenty-one days

before this trial date, Washington retained new counsel who filed a notice of

appearance, a motion for a bill of particulars, and a motion for discovery. Six days

before the scheduled trial, counsel filed a motion for continuance seeking additional

time to review the evidence and prepare for the case, which was granted. Eventually,

the case was rescheduled for trial on May 8, 2023.

{¶ 6} In the meantime, Washington filed a motion for relief from

prejudicial joinder because the trial was scheduled to proceed jointly with

Washington’s codefendant. In addition, the state filed a motion for transactional

immunity for a witness who would identify Washington as the shooter. A hearing

was held, and the court granted transactional immunity for the witness in exchange

for testimony. {¶ 7} Several weeks before the trial, the court and counsel prepared the jury

instructions. Alibi instructions were not included because Washington planned to

withdraw his notice of alibi according to his counsel.

{¶ 8} On May 8, 2023, the matter was called for trial. Prior to empaneling

the jury, the trial court was informed of a change of plea by Washington. Whereupon

a change-of-plea hearing was held, and Washington entered his plea to an amended

indictment. Washington pled guilty to murder with the three-year firearm

specification. The remaining counts were dismissed. The matter was set for

sentencing.

{¶ 9} Three days later, at the sentencing hearing, when the court asked

Washington if he was ready to proceed to sentencing, he responded, “I mean, if it’s

up to you, I would like to withdraw my plea.” (Tr. 63.) The court informed

Washington that it was up to her, and more discussions were had. When asked why

he wanted to withdraw his plea Washington replied, “I don’t feel like I need to accept

that plea.” (Tr. 65.) Washington indicated that he wanted to hire a new attorney

because he wanted another attorney to go over his case. The trial court continued

the sentencing hearing to allow Washington time to hire another attorney.

{¶ 10} When Washington failed to hire new counsel, the court appointed

new counsel who filed a motion to withdraw plea on behalf of Washington. In his

motion, Washington argued that his plea should be withdrawn because it was filed

before he was sentenced and thus it should be liberally and freely granted. Further,

Washington argued [t]hat defendant was offered a plea only on the day it was entered and did not have the time necessary to evaluate the pros, cons, and consequences of the offer. The defendant felt undue pressure to make a life altering decision without proper time for reflection. The defendant has lost faith in the ability of former counsel and has requested a new counsel to represent him in the instant case. Therefore, the defendant is now seeking to withdraw his plea to afford new counsel an opportunity to fully evaluate the case, its merits, the strength and weaknesses of his alibi and the evidence to have been presented by the State. A full review of the discovery to protect the defendant’s constitutional and statutory trial rights is necessary. Allowing the defendant to withdraw his plea does not prejudice the State and is not being offered to delay or harass the justice system, but rather to protect the rights of the accused.

(Motion to Withdraw Plea 5/17/23.)

{¶ 11} On May 23, 2023, the trial court held a full hearing on Washington’s

motion to withdraw plea. At this hearing the state argued that Washington’s plea of

guilty to murder was made knowingly, voluntarily, and with a full understanding of

his rights and that the trial court fully complied with Crim.R. 11 when taking

Washington’s change of plea. The state reminded the trial court that Washington

admitted to shooting A.B. on video, yelling at the witness, who was in jail on an

unrelated matter, as follows: “That’s why I smoked your ‘N.’ That’s why I smoked

your ‘N.’ * * * That ‘N’ dead and gone.” (Tr. 95-96.) Additionally, the state argued

that the evidence at trial included a witness that would identify Washington as the

shooter and a video showing the crime taking place.

{¶ 12} Washington countered with the same arguments he made in his

written motion and referenced his notice of alibi that his previous attorneys filed but had not been, according to the court’s docket, withdrawn. Washington maintained

that he was innocent and had an alibi witness.

{¶ 13} The trial court denied Washington’s motion to withdraw his plea

stating that it had “carefully reviewed the transcript the plea colloquy and, * * *

[u]pon careful consideration, the court finds and concludes that the defendant’s plea

was knowing, intelligent and voluntary, that there is no reasonable and legitimate

basis for the requested withdrawal of plea, and that there is no evidence of manifest

injustice.” (Tr. 108.)

{¶ 14} After Washington’s motion was denied, the court proceeded to

sentence Washington to a total of 18 years to life in prison. Washington timely

appeals, raising a single assignment of error for our review:

Assignment of Error I: The trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion to vacate his plea.

II. Law and Analysis

{¶ 15} In his sole assignment of error, Washington claims that the trial court

abused its discretion by denying his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

He argues it should have been freely granted because the motion was filed before

sentence was imposed; it was not a “mere change of heart”; and he was not the

shooter. Washington further argues that he did not have proper time to consider

the plea offer. We find Washington’s arguments unpersuasive. A. Standard of Review

{¶ 16} The decision to grant or deny a presentence motion to withdraw a

guilty plea is within the trial court’s discretion. State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527,

584 N.E.2d 715 (1992), at paragraph two of the syllabus. Absent an abuse of

discretion, the trial court’s decision must be affirmed. Id. at 527. An abuse of

discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in an unwarranted way

regarding a matter over which it has discretionary authority. Johnson v. Abdullah,

166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35. This court has held that

an abuse of discretion may be found where a trial court “applies the wrong legal

standard, misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies on clearly erroneous

findings of fact.” Thomas v. Cleveland, 176 Ohio App.3d 401, 2008-Ohio-1720, 892

N.E.2d 454.

B. Motions to Withdraw

{¶ 17} Crim.R. 32.1 governs the withdrawal of guilty pleas and provides that

“[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before

sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice, the court after sentence may

set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or

her plea.” Ordinarily, a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should be

freely and liberally granted. Xie at 527. However, a defendant does not have an

absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing. Id. Therefore, a trial

court must conduct a hearing to determine whether there is a reasonable and

legitimate basis for the plea-withdrawal request. Id. {¶ 18} A trial court’s denial of a presentence motion to withdraw is not an

abuse of discretion when the record reflects:

(1) the defendant is represented by highly competent counsel; (2) the accused was afforded a full hearing, pursuant to Crim.R. 11, before he entered the plea; (3) after the motion to withdraw is filed, the accused is given a complete and impartial hearing on the motion; and (4) the court gives full and fair consideration to the plea withdrawal request.

State v. Read-Bates, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 108848, 108849, 108850, and 108851,

2020-Ohio-3456, ¶ 16, citing State v. Peterseim, 68 Ohio App.2d 211, 214, 428

N.E.2d 863 (8th Dist.1980).

{¶ 19} The trial court might also consider additional factors in its

determination:

(5) whether the motion was made timely; (6) whether the motion states specific reasons for withdrawal; (7) whether the defendant understood the nature of the charges and the possible penalties; (8) whether the defendant was perhaps not guilty or had a complete defense; and (9) whether the state would suffer prejudice if the defendant is allowed to withdraw the plea. State v. Benson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83718, 2004-Ohio-1677, ¶ 9; State v. Sellers, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-76, 2007-Ohio-4523, ¶ 34; State v. Moore, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98132, 2012-Ohio-5734, ¶ 13.

State v. Hines, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108326, 2020-Ohio-663, ¶ 10.

{¶ 20} “A trial court’s adherence to Crim.R. 11 raises a presumption that a

plea is voluntarily entered.” State v. Balducci, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109262,

2020-Ohio-5334, ¶ 31, quoting State v. Abercrombie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 108147, 2019-Ohio-4786, ¶ 12, citing State v. McKissick, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 105607, 2018-Ohio-282, ¶ 23. “And a defendant moving to withdraw the plea

bears the burden of rebutting that presumption by demonstrating that the plea was infirm.” Id. quoting Abercrombie at id., citing State v. Robinson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 89651, 2008-Ohio-4866, ¶ 26.

{¶ 21} In his appellate brief, Washington admits that he was represented by

competent counsel, that the court fully complied with the requirements of

Crim.R. 11, that Washington was given a hearing on the motion, and that there was

likely some inconvenience to the prosecution and the court in delaying the trial.

Washington mentions a notice of alibi filed on his behalf with little details regarding

a possible defense.

{¶ 22} At the hearing on Washington’s motion to withdraw his plea, the trial

court again confirmed that Washington previously expressed that he wanted to

withdraw his plea because he did not want to accept it, that he wanted to go to trial,

and that he wanted new counsel to reevaluate his case. The court addressed the

notice of alibi and why it was absent from the jury instructions. The court

specifically recalled, and the state confirmed, that Washington’s counsel planned to

withdraw the notice of alibi prior to trial in light of a jail call wherein Washington

asked someone to be his alibi. (Tr. 98.)

{¶ 23} As this court has previously stated, “A mere change of heart regarding

a guilty plea and the possible sentence is insufficient justification for the withdrawal

of a guilty plea.” State v. Hoyle, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102791, 2016-Ohio-586,

¶ 31, citing State v. Westley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97650, 2012-Ohio-3571, ¶ 7,

citing State v. Drake, 73 Ohio App.3d 640, 645, 598 N.E.2d 115 (8th Dist.1991). And

“the fact that a defendant may have felt ‘pressured’ to enter a plea is not a sufficient basis to withdraw a plea in the absence of evidence of coercion.” State v. Musleh,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105305, 2017-Ohio-8166, ¶ 42, citing State v. Shaw, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102802, 2016-Ohio-923, ¶ 6-9.

{¶ 24} A review of the record before us shows that the trial court considered

all nine factors when it considered Washington’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

It also shows that Washington is insincere when he argues that he was pressured to

plead because the plea offer was made on the day of trial and that he felt undue

pressure to accept it. At the time of plea, over three years had passed since Amir

Bradley was shot and killed and Washington faced these criminal charges since

June 2020. Washington changed representation multiple times. Multiple trial

dates were set and rescheduled, several at Washington’s request. And a number of

hearings were held wherein Washington was able to observe the evidence the state

would present at trial, including an eyewitness who would identify Washington as

the shooter at trial, and more importantly, the video recording of him admitting that

he killed the victim.

{¶ 25} Based upon the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court

abused its discretion when it denied Washington’s presentence motion to withdraw

his plea. Accordingly, Washington’s sole assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 26} We find that Washington was not coerced into pleading guilty, and a

mere change of heart is insufficient to warrant the withdrawal of his plea. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Washington’s motion to

withdraw his plea.

{¶ 27} Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

________________________ MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J., and MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR