State v. Walton

2024 Ohio 5214

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 31, 2024
• Docket: 113688
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Walton, 2024-Ohio-5214.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff- Appellee, : No. 113688 v. :

KAREEM WALTON, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

_______________________________________

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 31, 2024

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-16-607989-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Anthony T. Miranda and Kerry Sowul, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.

Patituce & Associates, LLC, and Joseph C. Patituce, for appellant. MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J.:

Kareem Walton appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to

withdraw his guilty plea. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Walton’s motion, we affirm.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND RELEVANT FACTS

On July 26, 2016, Walton was indicted with three counts of

aggravated vehicular homicide, second-degree felonies in violation of

R.C. 2903.06(A)(1)(a); three counts of aggravated vehicular homicide, third-degree

felonies in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a); two counts of aggravated vehicular

assault, third-degree felonies in violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a); two counts of

aggravated vehicular assault, fourth-degree felonies in violation of

R.C. 2903.08(A)(2)(b); and one count of operating vehicle under the influence of

alcohol or drugs, a first-degree misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a).

The indictment followed a July 9, 2016 incident in which the then 20-year old

Walton, while traveling at a high rate of speed, crashed his vehicle into a tree in the

Glenville neighborhood of Cleveland. Three teenage girls died from injuries

sustained; two other people were injured.

On June 12, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on Walton’s motion

to suppress a blood test indicating he had alcohol in his blood. Prior to the hearing,

Walton’s trial counsel and the State stipulated that (1) blood draws were taken from

Walton after he was admitted to the hospital following the incident; (2) the blood

was properly maintained for purposes of analysis; (3) the State did not need to call the person who drew the blood; (4) there was no chain of custody issue with any

documented substance analysis result; and (5) the results were authentic and

admissible.

During the suppression hearing, Walton presented an expert witness

who testified that because Walton had suffered severe trauma, the blood alcohol test

could lead to a false positive result and/or elevate the results. As such, Walton

argued that the test should be suppressed. Through its expert witness, the State

presented conflicting testimony regarding the accuracy of the results of the blood

test. The State argued that Walton’s expert’s testimony merely attacked the weight

or credibility, not the admissibility, of the blood test. The trial court denied the

motion to suppress on this ground.

On June 13, 2017, appellant pled guilty to the charges in a plea

agreement, with the State agreeing that the six counts alleging aggravated vehicular

homicide would merge into three counts; the four counts alleging aggravated

vehicular assault would merge into two counts; and it would advocate for a sentence

that did not exceed 25 years’ imprisonment. On June 16, 2017, the trial court

imposed a sentence of 25 years.

Walton, pro se, filed an appeal of his convictions. This court

appointed appellate counsel, who thereafter filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738, (1967), and moved to withdraw. Walton, acting pro se,

filed two assignments of error, arguing that the State breached the terms of his plea

agreement and that the trial court impermissibly considered his juvenile record when imposing sentence. State v. Walton, 2018-Ohio-1963 (8th Dist.) (“Walton I”)

In Walton I, this court independently reviewed the record, overruled Walton’s pro

se assignments of error, and affirmed his convictions. Id. at ¶ 27-28. This court

specifically stated that we “found no nonfrivolous issues for review regarding

appellant’s guilty plea . . . .” Id. at ¶ 27.

After his convictions were affirmed, Walton sought to reopen

Walton I by asserting appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise error

regarding the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. This court denied the

motion and held “Walton did not demonstrate that the test was sufficiently

unreliable that the results should be excluded. Therefore, Walton has not

demonstrated a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.” State

v. Walton, 2018-Ohio-4021, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.) (“Walton II”).

On March 10, 2022, Walton filed a postconviction motion to

withdraw his guilty plea. Within the motion, he argued that his plea constituted a

manifest injustice because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically,

he argued trial counsel was ineffective because he did not file a comprehensive

motion to suppress, did not challenge the manner in which the blood was taken or

tested at the hospital, and did not challenge the fact that the State’s expert at the

suppression hearing did not draw the blood or perform the testing.

On May 10, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the motion in

which Walton’s trial counsel testified. On direct examination, he explained that he

investigated the law, obtained an expert, and filed a motion to suppress the blood tests. When asked about the motion to suppress, trial counsel stated that he

challenged the results of the test because the expert could refute the results. Trial

counsel also testified that he researched the law but could not be precise about the

research because of the five-year gap between the case and his testimony. Trial

counsel also said he did not challenge the manner in which the blood was drawn at

the hospital. As to his memory of why he advised Walton to plead, he recounted that

there were sympathetic victims, the outcome of a jury trial would have been a “crap

shoot,” and there was a possibility Walton could receive a maximum sentence.

On cross-examination, trial counsel admitted that his advice to

defendants as to whether to plea included consideration of a defendant’s criminal

record and whether the defendant faced multiple cases. As to Walton, trial counsel

testified that his advice to plea would include consideration that Walton made

admissions to drinking alcohol, the police had detected an odor of alcohol on his

breath, and witnesses observed him driving at a high rate of speed prior to the crash.

On November 18, 2022, the trial court denied the motion to

withdraw. It found that it did not have jurisdiction over the motion to withdraw

plea. Walton appealed the denial of his motion. In State v. Walton, 2023-Ohio-

2879 (“Walton III”), we reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion to withdraw

plea. In doing so, we found the trial court did have jurisdiction to consider Walton’s

postconviction motion to withdraw plea and remanded the case for the trial court to

determine the motion on its merits. Id. at ¶ 21. After remand, the trial court denied the motion to withdraw on

March 1, 2024. It is from this denial that Walton now appeals.

LAW AND ARGUMENT

Walton raises one assignment of error, which reads:

The trial court erred when it denied Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea where trial counsel’s admission to being ineffective constituted a manifest injustice.

Walton argues his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and

intelligently made because he relied upon trial counsel’s advice and trial counsel

provided ineffective assistance. He alleges counsel was ineffective because “he had

no strategy to attack the allegations that Mr. Walton was driving while impaired and

. . . there were valid defenses that demonstrate Mr. Walton may be innocent of these

charges.” The State argues that Walton did not receive ineffective assistance of

counsel and that there is nothing in the record indicating that even if Walton

received ineffective assistance of counsel, he would have not have entered his guilty

plea.

We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea

for an abuse of discretion. State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527, 584 N.E.2d 715

(1992). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in an

unwarranted way regarding a matter over which it has discretionary authority.

Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35.

A criminal defendant has a right to the effective assistance of counsel

when deciding whether to enter a guilty plea. State v. Ayesta, 2015-Ohio-1695, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.), citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010). When arguing

ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant has to satisfy the two-part test

enunciated in Strickland v Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which requires the

defendant to show that 1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness and 2) he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance.

Padilla at 367. “In the context of constitutional challenges to guilty pleas, the

prejudice prong of the test requires that the defendant show that there is a

reasonable probability that were it not for counsel’s errors, he would not have

pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Ayesta, 2015-Ohio-1695,

¶ 14, citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).

As to whether the first prong of the Strickland test was met, Walton

argues trial counsel had no strategy to attack the methodology of blood alcohol

testing and posits that such challenge would be meritorious under our opinion in

State v. Harper, 2018-Ohio-690 (8th Dist.). In Harper, we found that a trial court

did not abuse its discretion in suppressing the results of the blood test where “[t]he

expert testimony that the State presented during the trial court’s suppression

hearing failed to indicate that the results of Harper’s blood test were, in fact, valid,

accurate, or reliable.” Id. at ¶ 37. We also found “[t]here was no direct evidence or

testimony indicating that the policies and procedures were followed when Harper’s

blood was drawn and tested.” Id. at ¶ 29. We further found the State’s expert

“acknowledged during the suppression hearing that he had not performed any of his

own work in the case.” Id. at ¶ 27. Walton’s argument presumes the State would not have been able to

present the foundational requirements found lacking in Harper. However, the State

was relieved of this burden because of the stipulations made before the suppression

hearing. As such, Walton’s reliance on Harper is misplaced. Further, Walton has

not pointed to anything in the record to indicate the State would not have been able

to present such evidence had there been no stipulation or there existed a basis for

trial counsel to challenge the method of the blood testing or that such challenge

would have resulted in the suppression of the blood test. As such, we cannot say

trial counsel’s decision to enter the stipulation and focus his efforts on challenging

the results of the blood testing through expert testimony fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness.

As to the second prong of the Strickland test, Walton argues his

challenges to his conviction throughout his appeals and his motion to withdraw plea

are evidence that had trial counsel not been ineffective he would have gone to trial.

We note that there is no affidavit or testimony by Walton stating affirmatively he

would have gone to trial. In this case, Walton, who had a criminal record and was

facing multiple cases, faced 34 years’ imprisonment if convicted of the charges in

this indictment had he not entered into a plea agreement. Even had the blood results

been suppressed, the State had evidence Walton was operating a motor vehicle at a

high rate of speed, crashed into a tree, killed three teenage girls, and injured two

others. It further had evidence of his impairment; police detected an odor of alcohol

from Walton after the accident and Walton admitted he had been drinking earlier that day. Given these circumstances and where there was other evidence of Walton’s

impairment beyond the blood alcohol testing, we are not persuaded that Walton has

shown he would not have entered his guilty plea.

Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion

by denying Walton’s motion to withdraw guilty plea where the record does not show

trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or

that even had he suffered ineffective assistance of counsel, he would not have

entered his guilty plea.

Walton’s sole assignment of error is overruled.

CONCLUSION

Walton argues that his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and

intelligently made because trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because he

had no strategy to attack blood alcohol testing beyond accuracy of the tests. Walton

has not identified anything in the record to indicate had counsel done so, blood

alcohol tests would have been suppressed. Because of this, we cannot find trial

counsel’s strategy to challenge the results of the blood testing through expert

testimony fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Further, Walton has

not identified anything in the record that affirmatively shows that had trial counsel

pursued a strategy to attack the blood results on other grounds and been successful

he would not have entered his guilty plea where the record contained other evidence

of his impairment.

Judgment affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

___________________________ MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, JUDGE

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J., and SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR