State v. Walraven

428 P.3d 958, 293 Or. App. 406
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedAugust 15, 2018
DocketA164952
StatusPublished

This text of 428 P.3d 958 (State v. Walraven) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Walraven, 428 P.3d 958, 293 Or. App. 406 (Or. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

AOYAGI, J.

*407The state appeals an order of conditional release entered under ORS 420A.206. Defendant was convicted of aggravated murder and related charges for crimes that he committed in 1998 when he was 14 years old. In 2017, the sentencing court held a second-look hearing. The court determined that defendant should be conditionally released and entered a dispositional order to that effect under ORS 420A.203. The state did not appeal. A month later, the court entered an order of conditional release under ORS 420A.206, specifying the conditions and terms of defendant's release. The state appeals that order, arguing that defendant was statutorily ineligible for a second look and therefore should not have been conditionally released. Because we agree with defendant that his eligibility for a second look was reviewable only on appeal from the dispositional order of April 7, 2017-which the state did not appeal-we affirm.

A detailed rendition of the procedural history of this case is unnecessary. For purposes of the present appeal, the relevant facts are minimal and undisputed. In 2000, defendant was convicted of aggravated murder and related charges for crimes that he committed in 1998 when he was 14 years old, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment with a 30-year minimum term. In 2014, the sentencing court held a second-look hearing pursuant to ORS 420A.203, which allows certain persons convicted of crimes that they committed when they were under the age of 18 to be considered for conditional release once they have served half of their sentence of imprisonment. The court entered a dispositional order in late 2014, ruling that defendant should be conditionally released, which the state appealed. While that appeal was pending, defendant successfully obtained unrelated *959post-conviction relief. Defendant's conviction for aggravated murder was thereafter set aside, and, as a result, the state's appeal of the 2014 second-look order was dismissed as moot on the state's motion. State v. Walraven , 282 Or. App. 649, 654-55, 385 P.3d 1178 (2016).

Defendant later entered a new plea that resulted in a new aggravated murder conviction, and the sentencing court again imposed the sentence of life imprisonment with *408a 30-year minimum term. Based on the new conviction, the sentencing court held a new second-look hearing in 2017. After the hearing, the court determined that defendant should be conditionally released under ORS 420A.203. On April 7, 2017, it entered an order "that conditional release is the appropriate disposition pursuant to ORS 420A.203 (4)(a)(B)." The state did not appeal the dispositional order. Thereafter, on May 17, 2017, the sentencing court entered an order of conditional release, specifying the conditions and terms of defendant's release, as required by ORS 420A.206. In this appeal from that order, the state argues that the sentencing court committed an error of law in its order of May 17, 2017, because defendant is not eligible for a second look under ORS 420A.203 and therefore should not have been conditionally released. In particular, the state argues that, as a matter of law, under ORS 420A.203(1), the second-look procedure does not apply to persons sentenced to life imprisonment with a 30-year minimum term.

Defendant's response is two-fold. First, he contends that his eligibility for a second look under ORS 420A.203(1) is not reviewable on appeal of the sentencing court's order of conditional release of May 17, 2017, and could only have been reviewed on appeal of the court's dispositional order of April 7, 2017, which was not appealed. Second, on the merits, defendant argues that he was eligible for a second look under ORS 420A.203(1) and that the sentencing court did not err in giving him a second look.1

The parties' arguments pose a question of statutory construction regarding ORS 420A.203 and ORS 420A.206. The correct construction of a statute is a question of law. Karjalainen v. Curtis Johnston & Pennywise, Inc ., 208 Or. App. 674, 681, 146 P.3d 336 (2006), rev. den. , 342 Or. 473, 155 P.3d 51 (2007). In construing a statute, the text and context are "primary" and "must be given primary weight in the analysis." State v. Gaines , 346 Or. 160, 171, 206 P.3d 1042 (2009). In this case, as explained below, our analysis of the text and context of ORS 420A.203 and ORS 420A.206 leads us to conclude that *409we cannot review defendant's eligibility for a second look in this appeal.2

ORS 420A.203

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

State v. Gaines
206 P.3d 1042 (Oregon Supreme Court, 2009)
Karjalainen v. Curtis Johnston & Pennywise, Inc.
146 P.3d 336 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 2006)
State v. Walraven
385 P.3d 1178 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 2016)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
428 P.3d 958, 293 Or. App. 406, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-walraven-orctapp-2018.