State v. Walker, No. Cr96-0090077-T (Jul. 12, 2000)

2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 8625
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedJuly 12, 2000
DocketNo. CR96-0090077-T
StatusUnpublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 8625 (State v. Walker, No. Cr96-0090077-T (Jul. 12, 2000)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Walker, No. Cr96-0090077-T (Jul. 12, 2000), 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 8625 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Sometime between October 31 and November 1, 1996, two individuals entered the West Hartford home of John and Patricia Haugh. During the course of an apparent burglary, both Dr. and Mrs. Haugh were killed. Within days, the defendant and a second suspect were arrested. The state CT Page 8626 has charged the defendant with Capital Felony, Murder, Felony Murder, Burglary, Conspiracy to Commit Burglary, Larceny and Conspiracy to Commit Larceny. His trial is scheduled to begin October 1, 2000.

By motion dated May 3, 2000, the defendant seeks a change in venue claiming:

"3. The victims were well known and prominent members of the community.

"4. Said coverage has included, inter alia, items containing the police investigation and subsequent arrest of the defendant, the personal characteristics of the victims and the effect of their deaths on family and friends, and the arrest and prosecution of the defendant for alleged crimes unrelated to the case.

"5. Said coverage has continued and will continue in nature and intensify until and including the trial of this case.

"6. Result of the foregoing is the creation of a substantial likelihood that the defendant will be denied his constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial within the Judicial District of Hartford."

The State opposes this motion. Therefore, a hearing was held on June 21 and 26, during which the defendant offered eighteen exhibits, including four television tapes and thirty newspaper articles. Additionally, the defendant provided a public opinion survey conducted by the University of Connecticut's Center for Survey Research and Analysis wherein residents of Hartford and New Haven County were questioned concerning, inter alia, their familiarity with the Haugh homicides.

The court has reviewed the exhibits and oral testimony, and concludes that the defendant's motion should be denied without prejudice.

II. GOVERNING LEGAL PRINCIPALS
In the present case, the defendant's central allegation is that adverse pretrial publicity would taint any Hartford proceeding. He therefore seeks a transfer to a different judicial district. New Haven County has been suggested as a possible site. CT Page 8627

Among the many protections enumerated in our state and federal constitutions are the rights to a public trial and a trial by jury. A public trial confers benefits upon both society and the accused. It not only protects defendants against persecution but also allows a community to observe and appreciate the criminal justice process.1

In balancing the rights of the defendant and the surrounding community, the court is guided by Practice Book Section 41-23 which provides: "Upon motion of the prosecuting authority or the defendant, or upon his own motion, the judicial authority may order that any pending criminal matter be transferred to any other court location: (1) If the judicial authority is satisfied that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had where the case is pending, or (2) If the defendant and the prosecuting authority agree." The defendant bears the burden of showing that he could not otherwise receive a fair and impartial trial." Statev. Townsend, 211 Conn. 215, 224, 558 A.2d 699 (1989). When extensive publicity surrounds a criminal trial, a defendant's right to an impartial jury can be affected in two ways: (1) where the pretrial publicity has so saturated the community that prejudice is presumed; and (2) when the accused can demonstrate actual prejudice in the jury panel.

In assessing "presumed prejudice" the inquiry is whether the conviction was "obtained in a trial atmosphere that had been utterly corrupted by press coverage" or the proceedings were "entirely lacking in the solemnity and sobriety to which a defendant is entitled in a system that subscribes to any notion of fairness and rejects the verdict of a mob." Murphy v.Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 798, 799 (1975). Among the factors considered are: the size of the relevant community; the time between the crime and the trial; whether the past crimes of the defendant had been saturated throughout the community; the amount of media coverage and whether their treatment of the case is either factual or inflammatory; whether the press was allowed to make a "circus" out of the trial. Murphy v. Florida,supra, 421 U.S. 797-801; State v. Crafts, 226 Conn. 237, 257, 627 A.2d 977 (1993).

The necessary predicate for a finding of presumptive prejudice is exemplified by Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963), Estes v.Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 551 (1965), and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,363 (1966). In Rideau, prejudice was presumed when the defendant's twenty-minute confession was televised three times in a community of 150,000. In Estes, the courtroom was overrun by the press; television cameras were permitted within the bar, and pretrial proceedings were televised and viewed by some jurors. In Sheppard, the trial was infected not only by a background of extremely inflammatory publicity, but "bedlam reigned at the courthouse during the trial and newsmen took over practically the entire courtroom, hounding most of the participants, CT Page 8628 especially [the defendant]" Sheppard, supra, 384 U.S. 355.

On the other hand, in determining whether actual prejudice invaded the jury box, the relevant inquiry focuses on the partiality of an individual juror. If the voir dire examination of prospective jurors is thorough and extensive, and defense counsel are permitted fully to explore the level and effects of each prospective juror's exposure to publicity concerning the defendant, then actual prejudice cannot be presumed. See State v.Marra, 195 Conn. 421, 431-33, 489 A.2d 350 (1985). See also State v.Miller, 202 Conn. 463, 480, 522 A.2d 249 (1987).

To the extent that individuals might exhibit some knowledge of the case, it is clear "[q]ualified jurors need not . . . be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved." State v. Marra, supra, 195 Conn. 433,quoting Murphy v. Florida, supra, 421 U.S. 800-01.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

State v. Sostre, No. Hhd-Cr99-0165989-T (Oct. 7, 2002)
2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 13678 (Connecticut Superior Court, 2002)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 8625, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-walker-no-cr96-0090077-t-jul-12-2000-connsuperct-2000.