State v. Walker

416 S.W.2d 134, 1967 Mo. LEXIS 883
CourtSupreme Court of Missouri
DecidedJune 12, 1967
Docket51605
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 416 S.W.2d 134 (State v. Walker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Walker, 416 S.W.2d 134, 1967 Mo. LEXIS 883 (Mo. 1967).

Opinion

BARRETT, Commissioner.

On April 29, 1964, Hattie Biscoe, in her 80’s, and her daughter, Marion Biscoe, 67, were found dying, Hattie in Marion’s Ford automobile parked on route KK and Marion alongside the embankment of an obscure lane into the Smith Cemetery in Platte County. Hattie had been shot in the back of the head and was slumped out of sight in the seat of the Ford. Marion had been ravished and shot in the back of the head. Marion died alongside the lane and Hattie died after removal to the Smithville Hospital about seven miles southwest. The appellant Andrew Jackson Walker, a Negro age 39, with five prior felony convictions, three alleged here — forgery, larceny, attempted robbery — was charged with Marion’s murder, found guilty by a jury and sentenced to life imprisonment by the court.

An affidavit for Walker’s arrest was issued on June 15, 1964, and, according to his brief, he was arraigned on that day *135 before the magistrate of Platte County who appointed three members of the Platte County Bar to represent him. In background of the claims made here it should be noted in passing that these three lawyers made thorough investigation and preparation, they filed numerous motions, took depositions, employed available discovery procedures and safeguarded the appellant’s rights by every possible means as finally evidenced by a six-day trial, a 1200 page record, and their brief and argument here. Since it has been deemed proper to comment on appellant’s counsel perhaps it is only fair to say that there was also thorough and complete police-highway patrol-sheriffs’ cooperation and investigation and a well-organized vigorous prosecution led by an able assistant attorney general. A month after arraignment and appointment of counsel, July 14, 1964, there was a preliminary hearing after which the magistrate bound Walker over to the Circuit Court of Platte County. An information charging murder in the first degree was filed on September 4, 1964, he was arraigned in circuit court and entered a plea of not guilty on September 8, 1964, and was tried May 3 through May 8, 1965. In addition to his diligent court-appointed counsel Walker has also been represented in this court by the Greater Kansas City Civil Liberties Union who joined in briefing and arguing this appeal.

There are three or four collateral points in the appellant’s brief but they are without citation of authority, in one or more instances there were no proper or timely objections, and in any event these subsidiary points are encompassed in the principal arguments of both appellant’s counsel and the civil liberties union and will be disposed of inferentially or in passing. One matter not involved here, particularly with respect to the one and only written statement given by the appellant, is that there was a preliminary and formal motion to suppress evidence and a hearing in which eleven police officers were called, there was no other testimony upon the motion, and the court found that “the statement,” meaning the written statement, was voluntary and therefore this appeal is not concerned with the problems of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908, and Sims v. State of Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 87 S.Ct. 639, 17 L.Ed.2d 593. In substance these are the abstractly stated points relied upon: (1) that the court erred in admitting in evidence “any written or oral statement, admission or confession of appellant for the reason that appellant was not properly advised of his constitutional rights before or during interrogation by the State,” (2) that any statements appellant may have made were invalid for the reason that the state failed to appoint counsel “at the proper time and stage of the proceeding,” and (3) that the court erred in admitting in evidence any statements or admissions appellant may have made because in violation of his constitutional rights he was, his counsel assert, “interrogated continuously for approximately 36 hours without rest, was kept without sleep for 56 continuous hours” and after one night’s sleep was again “continuously interrogated for four consecutive days” by law enforcement officers, all members of the regional Metro Squad, sheriffs and police officers in the several counties in both Kansas and Missouri in the Kansas City area, a law professor-criminologist, Mr. Duane A. Nedrud, (who incidentally was one of several lawyers arguing the Miranda v. State of Arizona and Johnson v. State of New Jersey cases) and a psychologist trained in the techniques of interrogation, Dr. Virgil W. Harris, a clinical psychologist.

In support of these arguments counsel have cited, sometimes without discrimination, an overwhelming list of cases but in essence the problem here is whether upon the “totality of the circumstances” of this record the rules and guidelines of these recently decided leading cases have been infringed; Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694; Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882; Davis v. State of North Carolina, 384 U.S. *136 737, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 16 L.Ed.2d 895; Clewis v. State of Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 423, and Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921, 88 L.Ed. 1192. And while this case was tried in May 1965 and is not directly controlled by Miranda v. State of Arizona the case is “relevant on the issue of voluntariness” of any confession or admission. Clewis v. State of Texas, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 1. c. 426. And of interest here is the fact that Miranda v. State of Arizona involved four separate cases of “custodial police interrogation,” one of which, Westover v. United States, involved a Kansas City police arrest and interrogation. And, contrary to an inferential contention by the state here, “No distinction can be drawn between statements which are direct confessions and statements which amount to ‘admissions’ of part or all of an offense” — the privilege is against self-incrimination in any manner and there is no distinction in “inculpatory statements and statements alleged to be merely ‘exculpatory,’ ” the court could have employed the word “incriminatory” rather than “inculpatory.” Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 1. c. 477, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Having thus indicated an awareness of the rules and controlling guidelines the question, as indicated, is whether upon the totality of the circumstances of this record there has been an infringement of these governing principles and therefore an invasion of Walker’s constitutional rights so as to compel the granting of a new trial.

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Bluebook (online)
416 S.W.2d 134, 1967 Mo. LEXIS 883, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-walker-mo-1967.