State v. Wahl

2025 Ohio 4576

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 30, 2025
• Docket: WD-24-014 & WD-24-15
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Wahl, 2025-Ohio-4576.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WOOD COUNTY

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. {87}WD-24-014 {87}WD-24-015

Appellee Trial Court No. 2023 CR 0349 2022 CR 0360 v.

Cody Wahl DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: September 30, 2025

*****

Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and David T. Harold, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Michael H. Stahl, for appellant.

SULEK, P.J.

{¶ 1} In this consolidated appeal, appellants Cody Wahl and Gail Henry appeal the

judgments of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas that amended the entries finding

them not guilty by reason of insanity and incompetent to stand trial, respectively. The

amended entries reflect an extended amount of time that appellants are subject to the

jurisdiction of the trial court pursuant to R.C. 2945.401(J)(1)(b) in consideration of the indefinite sentence allowed by the Reagen Tokes Law. For the reasons that follow, the

trial court’s judgments are affirmed.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

{¶ 2} This appeal involves two separate cases that present the same issue.

A. Cody Wahl

{¶ 3} In case No. 2023-CR-349, the Wood County Grand Jury indicted Wahl on

one count of attempted murder, a felony of the first degree; two counts of felonious

assault, felonies of the second degree; and two counts of domestic violence,

misdemeanors of the first degree. The trial court ultimately found Wahl not guilty by

reason of insanity. On November 21, 2023, it entered its judgment finding that Wahl met

the criteria for involuntary hospitalization pursuant to R.C. 2945.40. The trial court

further ordered that Wahl “shall be subject to the Court’s jurisdiction for a period of

eleven (11) years, which is the maximum time period the Defendant could have been

sentenced for this particular crime.”

B. Gail Henry

{¶ 4} In case No. 2022-CR-360, the Wood County Grand Jury indicted Henry on

one count of felonious assault, a felony of the second degree; and one count of domestic

violence, a misdemeanor of the first degree. On November 15, 2023, the trial court found

that Henry was not competent to stand trial, and that she could not be restored to

competency within the time set by statute. The trial court ordered her to remain at the

2. Northwest Ohio Psychiatric Hospital for up to eight years or until she is restored to

competency.

C. Trial Court Sua Sponte Amends Its Orders

{¶ 5} On January 16, 2024, the trial court sua sponte set a hearing in both cases to

advise appellants of a change to the maximum commitment date. At the hearings, the

parties presented arguments whether the indefinite sentence of up to one-half the stated

term pursuant to R.C. 2929.144(B)(1) applied to the maximum length of jurisdiction

under R.C. 2945.401(J)(1)(b). Following the hearings, on January 31, 2024, the trial

court entered its amended judgment entry informing Wahl that he was subject to the trial

court’s jurisdiction for 16 and 1/2 years. On February 1, 2024, it entered its judgment

informing Henry that she was subject to the trial court’s jurisdiction for 12 years.

II. Assignments of Error

{¶ 6} Appellants timely appealed the January 31, 2024, and February 1, 2024,

judgments, respectively. On July 23, 2024, upon the motion of Wahl, this court

consolidated the two appeals. In their joint brief, appellants present two assignments of

error:

1. The trial court erred, over objection, when it recalled these cases to impose a longer period of jurisdiction based upon the potential indeterminate maximum sentence under Reagan Tokes.

2. The trial court’s initial order, which imposed the statutory determinate maximum possible prison sentence as the period of the court’s ongoing jurisdiction in restrictive housing was a final appealable order: res judicata barred any alteration of that voidable order, resulting in a void subsequent order, or plain error.

3. III. Analysis

{¶ 7} For ease of discussion, this court will address appellants’ second assignment

of error first.

{¶ 8} In their second assignment of error, appellants argue that the trial court’s

initial orders were final and appealable, such that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to

amend them. Indeed, in general, “a trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to grant

reconsideration of a final order.” Goldstein v. Saber Healthcare Group, LLC, 2024-

Ohio-2259, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.); see also Johnson v. Geico Homesite, Inc., 2017-Ohio-7273, ¶

8 (6th Dist.) (“A motion for reconsideration of a trial court’s final judgment is a

nullity.”); Pitts v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 67 Ohio St.2d 378, 379 (1981); State v. Short,

2019-Ohio-1180, ¶ 5 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Carlisle, 2011-Ohio-6553, ¶ 1 (“Absent

statutory authority, a trial court is generally not empowered to modify a criminal sentence

by reconsidering its own final judgment.”).

{¶ 9} R.C. 2945.401, however, “provides a comprehensive scheme that gives

Ohio’s trial courts continuing jurisdiction over the commitment conditions of people

committed to mental-health institutions by court order.” State v. Stutler, 2022-Ohio-

2792, ¶ 10. Specifically, the statute states,

A defendant found incompetent to stand trial and committed pursuant to section 2945.39 of the Revised Code or a person found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed pursuant to section 2945.40 of the Revised Code shall remain subject to the jurisdiction of the trial court pursuant to that commitment, and to the provisions of this section, until the final

4. termination of the commitment as described in division (J)(1) of this section.

R.C. 2945.401(A).

{¶ 10} Furthermore, the length of time that appellants are subject to the

jurisdiction of the trial court under R.C. 2945.401(A) is not determined by an exercise of

the trial court’s discretion as a criminal sentence would be. Instead, it is determined

pursuant to the dictates of R.C. 2945.401(J)(1), which provides for jurisdiction to end, at

the latest, upon “(b) The expiration of the maximum prison term or term of imprisonment

that the defendant or person could have received if the defendant or person had been

convicted of the most serious offense with which the defendant or person is charged or in

relation to which the defendant or person was found not guilty by reason of insanity.”

See also Stutler at ¶ 10.

{¶ 11} Accordingly, the trial court retained continuing jurisdiction over appellants

under R.C. 2945.401, and therefore it did not err when it corrected its judgment entries to

reflect the maximum duration of its jurisdiction pursuant to R.C. 2945.401(J)(1)(b).

Appellants’ second assignment of error is not well-taken.

{¶ 12} In their first assignment of error, appellants argue that the trial court erred

when it considered the indefinite sentencing provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law when it

calculated the “maximum prison term or term of imprisonment.” Specifically, they

contend that the Reagan Tokes Law provides a rebuttable presumption of release once the

offender has served the minimum definite term, and that the presumption can only be

5. rebutted by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections (“ODRC”) upon a

showing of other infractions or violations. They stress that the additional punishment by

ODRC is outside of the “maximum prison term or term of imprisonment that the

defendant or person could have received if the defendant or person had been convicted of

the most serious offense with which the defendant or person is charged or in relation to

which the defendant or person was found not guilty by reason of insanity.” (Emphasis

added.) R.C. 2945.401(J)(1)(b). Appellants conclude, therefore, that the trial court’s

initial determination was correct and the final termination of the commitment must not

include the indefinite portion of their sentences—i.e. the final termination of commitment

must be eleven years for Wahl and eight years for Henry.

{¶ 13} Appellants rely on State v. Young, 2021-Ohio-215 (8th Dist.), in which the

Eighth District held that the trial court did not commit plain error when it did not include

the indefinite tail in its calculation of the maximum prison term under R.C.

2945.401(J)(1)(b).

{¶ 14} The State, on the other hand, relies on State v. Hopkins, 2023-Ohio-2816

(12th Dist.). In Hopkins, the Twelfth District affirmed the trial court’s determination that

the maximum prison term under R.C. 2945.401(J)(1)(b) included the indefinite tail. It

reasoned that the clear and unambiguous language of R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a) and

2929.144(B)(1) required that result. In particular, R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a), provides that

for a felony of the first degree, “the prison term shall be an indefinite prison term with a

stated minimum term selected by the court of three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten,

6. or eleven years and a maximum term that is determined pursuant to section 2929.144 of

the Revised Code . . .” (emphasis added), and R.C. 2929.144(B)(1) provides that for a

qualifying felony of the first degree “the maximum prison term shall be equal to the

minimum term imposed on the offender under division (A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) of section

2929.14 of the Revised Code plus fifty per cent of that term.” (Emphasis added.). The

Twelfth District therefore concluded that the maximum prison term as used in R.C.

2945.401(J)(1)(b) included the indefinite tail. Notably, in its decision, the Twelfth

District addressed Young and found that it was not persuasive because the court in Young

focused on “the state’s failure to argue, and to show plain error, along with the limited

circumstances for finding plain error in a civil case,” and did not focus on a statutory

analysis. Hopkins at ¶ 25.

{¶ 15} Like Hopkins, this court does not find Young persuasive. In addition to its

reliance on plain error, the decision in Young was entered prior to the decision in State v.

Hacker, 2023-Ohio-2535, in which the Ohio Supreme Court held that under the Reagan

Tokes Act, the ODRC’s authority to maintain incarceration beyond the minimum term

does not violate the separation of powers doctrine because that authority is “to be

exercised within the bounds of the sentence imposed by the trial court.” Hacker at ¶ 13.

It recognized that “[o]nce the trial court imposes minimum and maximum prison terms

under R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a) or (2)(a), the sentence for the offender has been set.

‘[D]efendants who have been sentenced under the Reagan Tokes Law have received the

entirety of their sentences and the sentences have been journalized.” Id. at ¶ 16, quoting

7. State v. Maddox, 2022-Ohio-764, ¶ 16. Thus, contrary to appellants’ arguments,

ODRC’s authority to extend the term of incarceration is not another sentence for separate

conduct. Rather, the maximum sentence imposed by the trial court under R.C.

2929.14(A)(1)(a) and R.C. 2929.144(B)(1) is the maximum for the “offense with which

the defendant or person is charged or in relation to which the defendant or person was

found not guilty by reason of insanity.” R.C. 2945.401(J)(1)(b).

{¶ 16} Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it amended its orders to notify

Wahl and Henry that the final termination of commitment would occur no later than 16

and 1/2 years, and 12 years, respectively. Appellants’ first assignment of error is not

well-taken.

{¶ 17} Furthermore, we find that this conclusion and analysis on appellants’ first

assignment of error directly conflicts with the Eighth District’s decision in Young, 2021-

Ohio-215 (8th Dist.). This court, therefore, pursuant to Article IV, Section 3(B)(4) of the

Ohio Constitution sua sponte certifies a conflict to the Supreme Court of Ohio on the

following question:

Does the “maximum prison term or term of imprisonment that the defendant or person could have received” as used in R.C. 2945.401(J)(1)(b) for determining the final termination of commitment include the maximum prison term imposed under the indefinite sentencing scheme required by the Reagan Tokes Law?

8. IV. Conclusion

{¶ 18} For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the Wood County Court of

Common Pleas are affirmed. This court certifies a conflict to the Ohio Supreme Court

and directs the parties to Sup.R.Pract. 8.01 for instructions on how to proceed.

Appellants are ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.

Judgments affirmed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, J. ____________________________ JUDGE Gene A. Zmuda, J. ____________________________ Charles E. Sulek, P.J. JUDGE CONCUR. ____________________________ JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

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