05/13/2025
DA 23-0371
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2025 MT 100
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM JAMES PILLANS,
Defendant and Appellant
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and For the County of Flathead, Cause Nos. DC-18-098(A), DC 18-298(A), DC-18-329(A) Honorable Amy Eddy, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Tammy A. Hinderman, Appellate Defender, Charlotte Lawson, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Katie F. Schulz, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Travis R. Ahner, Flathead County Attorney, Andrew Clegg, Deputy County Attorney, Kalispell, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: February 26, 2025
Decided: May 13, 2025
Filed:
Ver-6A.—if __________________________________________ Clerk Justice James Jeremiah Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 William James Pillans appeals from the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead
County’s May 11, 2023 Judgment. Pillans appeals the District Court’s calculation of his
credit for time served and elapsed time.
¶2 We restate the issues on appeal as follows:
Issue 1: Whether the District Court erred when it calculated Pillans’s credit for time served.
Issue 2: Whether the District Court erred when it calculated Pillans’s credit for elapsed time.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 Pillans was arrested on February 12, 2018 (“Arrest 1”) and charged with Assault
with a Weapon in DC-18-098. He was released on his own recognizance on March 15,
2018 (“ROR 1”). The State petitioned to revoke Pillans’s release based on allegations that
he had violated the terms of his release, and the District Court issued a bench warrant on
March 21, 2018 (“Bench Warrant 1”). Pillans was arrested on April 22, 2018, pursuant to
Bench Warrant 1 (“Arrest 2”) and was released on his own recognizance again on April 26,
2018 (“ROR 2”).
¶4 On August 2, 2018, the State petitioned to involuntarily commit Pillans, and he was
placed at Pathways Treatment Center. He was arrested the next day, August 3, 2018, for
stabbing an officer with a pen while at the treatment center (“Arrest 3”) and was transported
to the Flathead County Detention Center (“FCDC”). As a result of the stabbing, the State
charged Pillans with Assault with a Weapon in a new case, DC-18-298.
2 ¶5 On August 26, 2018, while still in custody at FCDC, Pillans threatened two
corrections officers with a hand-made weapon. The State charged Pillans with Assault on
Peace Officer in a third case, DC-18-329. The District Court issued a bench warrant for
Pillans in DC-18-329 on August 29, 2018 (“Bench Warrant 2”), and the State served Pillans
with the warrant the same day.
¶6 On July 17, 2018, Pillans and the State reached a plea agreement under which Pillans
agreed to enter an Alford plea to Criminal Endangerment in DC-18-098. Pillans moved
the District Court to release him on his own recognizance in all three cases on February 20,
2019. The District Court granted the motion, and Pillans was released for a third time on
February 26, 2019 (“ROR 3”).
¶7 On November 5, 2019, Pillans and the State reached a second plea agreement under
which Pillans agreed to enter a plea of guilty but mentally ill to Criminal Endangerment in
DC-18-298, and a plea of guilty but mentally ill to Assault on Peace Officer in DC-18-329.
On January 28, 2020, the District Court sentenced Pillans in each of the three cases to a
concurrent sentence of 5 years with the Department of Corrections, with all 5 years
suspended. At that point, the District Court credited Pillans with 37 days of time served in
DC-18-098 and 208 days in both DC-18-298 and DC-18-329. If Pillans’s legal troubles
had ended that day, the District Court’s calculation of his credit for time served would have
already been complicated enough. Pillans’s legal troubles did not end that day.
¶8 On February 25, 2020, the State petitioned the District Court to revoke Pillans’s
suspended sentences based, in part, on the fact that he had been arrested on February 8,
3 2020, in an unrelated case (“Arrest 4”). The District Court issued a bench warrant on
February 26, 2020, in all three cases (“Bench Warrant 3”), and the State served him with
the warrant on the same day. The District Court released Pillans on his own recognizance
in all three cases on March 12, 2020 (“ROR 4”). The State moved on June 17, 2020, to
dismiss its revocation petition, and the District Court granted the motion the same day.
¶9 The State petitioned the District Court for revocation a second time on July 28, 2021,
based on another recent arrest in an unrelated case (“Arrest 5”). In the attached report of
violation, the State notified the District Court that Pillans had spent a night in jail on
August 16, 2020, and February 5, 2021, as sanctions for violations of his conditions of
release. The District Court issued a bench warrant on July 29, 2021, in all three cases
(“Bench Warrant 4”), and the State served Pillans with it the same day. Pillans posted bond
and was released on August 17, 2021 (“Bond 1”).
¶10 On November 8, 2021, the State filed an addendum to its second petition for
revocation alleging that Pillans had sexually assaulted two minors. The District Court
issued a bench warrant on November 10, 2021 (“Bench Warrant 5”), and Pillans was
arrested the same day (“Arrest 6”). Pillans posted bond for a second time and was released
on December 2, 2021 (“Bond 2”).
¶11 Also on December 2, 2021, the District Court revoked Pillans’s deferred sentences
based on the allegations in the second petition to revoke but without reference to the
allegations in the addendum, which were still under investigation. On January 27, 2022,
the District Court held a sentencing hearing on the revocation, at which Pillans’s probation
4 and parole officer, Jody McLeod, testified. The District Court sentenced Pillans in each of
the three cases to a concurrent sentence of 5 years with the Department of Corrections,
with all time suspended.1 The District Court carried forward its initial credit
determinations and credited Pillans with an additional 42 days of time served credit and 16
months of elapsed time credit in all three cases.
¶12 Pillans was arrested on April 13, 2022, in connection with the investigation into his
alleged sexual contact with minors (“Arrest 7”). On April 26, 2022, the State petitioned
the District Court for a third time to revoke Pillans’s suspended sentence. The District
Court issued a bench warrant the same day in all three cases (“Bench Warrant 6”). Pillans
posted bond for a third time and was released on May 5, 2022 (“Bond 3”).
¶13 On July 22, 2022, the State petitioned the District Court to revoke Pillans’s bond
based on allegations that he had absconded from supervision. The District Court issued an
arrest warrant the same day in all three cases. Pillans was arrested in Juneau Alaska on
August 21, 2022, pursuant to this warrant (“Arrest 8”). The District Court revoked
Pillans’s suspended sentence for a second time on May 11, 2023, and sentenced him to 5
years with the Department of Corrections, with no time suspended. The District Court
carried forward its prior credit determinations and credited Pillans with an additional 285
1 The District Court’s written January 27, 2022, revocation order incorrectly stated that Pillans was sentenced to “a period of 5 year(s), with 0 years suspended.” But the transcript from the revocation hearing makes clear that the District Court intended to reimpose the 5-year suspended sentence. Our precedent establishes that “in the event of a conflict between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment and commitment, the oral pronouncement controls.” State v. Lane, 1998 MT 76, ¶ 48, 288 Mont. 286, 957 P.2d 9. Pillans does not dispute that he was serving a suspended sentence when the District Court issued its May 11, 2023 Judgment revoking that sentence. 5 days of time served and 60 days of elapsed time in all three cases. In total, Pillans was
credited with the following amounts of time:
DC-18-098: 364 days time served, 18 months elapsed time
DC-18-298: 535 days time served, 18 months elapsed time
DC-18-329: 535 days time served, 18 months elapsed time
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶14 “A district court’s calculation of credit for time served is reviewed for legality and
we exercise de novo review.” State v. Risher, 2024 MT 309, ¶ 6, 419 Mont. 395, 560 P.3d
1203 (quoting State v. Crazymule, 2024 MT 58, ¶ 8, 415 Mont. 536, 545 P.3d 66).2 Where
the issue on appeal is whether the trial court followed the statutory requirements for a
sentence revocation, the question is a matter of law, and our review is plenary. State v.
Williams, 2003 MT 136, ¶ 8, 316 Mont. 140, 69 P.3d 222.
DISCUSSION
¶15 Issue 1: Whether the District Court erred when it calculated Pillans’s credit for time served.
¶16 Two statutes govern a district court’s calculation of credit for time served at an
initial sentencing. Section 46-18-403(1)(a), MCA, titled “Credit for Incarceration Prior to
Conviction,” provides:
2 Neither party objected to the District Court’s calculations of credit for time served or elapsed time at any stage of this case. But neither party raises the other’s failure to object before the District Court as the basis for any arguments on appeal. Therefore, we neither consider nor address whether either party’s failure to object before the District Court affects the standard of review we apply to their respective arguments on appeal.
6 A person incarcerated on a bailable offense against whom a judgment of imprisonment is rendered must be allowed credit for each day of incarceration prior to or after conviction, except that the time allowed as a credit may not exceed the term of the prison sentence rendered.
Section 46-18-201(9), MCA, provides:
When imposing a sentence under this section that includes incarceration in a detention facility or the state prison, . . . the court shall provide credit for time served by the offender before trial or sentencing.
A third statute governs district courts’ calculation of credit for time served at a sentencing
pursuant to a revocation. Section 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, provides:
Credit must be allowed for time served in a detention center or for home arrest time already served.
Under all three statutes, the sentencing court “must determine the amount of time to credit
based on the record relating to the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced on
without considering other criminal proceedings or DOC incarcerations or holds.” Killam
v. Salmonsen, 2021 MT 196, ¶ 17, 405 Mont. 143, 492 P.3d 512.
¶17 Pillans asserts that the District Court made three errors in calculating his credit for
time served: (1) failing to credit him with the time between August 3, 2018 (Arrest 3) and
February 26, 2019 (ROR 3) in DC-18-098; (2) undercounting the time he served between
his original sentencing and his first revocation in all three cases; and (3) undercounting the
time he served between the first revocation and second revocation in all three cases.
¶18 The State responds: (1) the District Court properly denied Pillans credit in
DC-18-098 for the period between Arrest 3 and ROR 3 because he was not detained in that
case during that period; (2) the District Court credited Pillans with too much time in
7 DC-18-329 because he was not detained in that case until he was served with Bench
Warrant 2; (3) Pillans is correct that the District Court undercounted the time he served
between his original sentencing and his first revocation but is incorrect in his calculation;
and (4) the District Court credited Pillans with too much time between the first and second
revocations because he was not served with Bench Warrant 6 until April 26, 2022.
1. Arrest 3 – ROR 3: DC-18-098
¶19 The District Court declined to grant Pillans credit for time served in DC-18-098 for
the time he spent incarcerated between Arrest 3 and ROR 3. Pillans argues that he was
entitled to credit for that period in DC-18-098 because § 46-18-201(9), MCA, entitles him
to credit for all of the time he spent “in a detention facility or the state prison . . . before
trial or sentencing.” He asserts that Killam eliminated the need for district courts to look
at the reason why a defendant is incarcerated. The State responds that Killam also
announced a rule that credit for time served does not start to accrue until the defendant is
served with an arrest warrant in the case. Because Pillans was not served with an arrest
warrant in DC-18-098 between Arrest 3 and ROR 3, the State argues he did not begin to
accrue credit. Pillans replies that he must have been held in DC-18-098 during this period
because the District Court issued ROR 3 as to all three cases.
¶20 We recently held that a defendant begins to serve time when “the sentencing court
gain[s] jurisdiction over the offender and the offender [is] detained subject to that
jurisdiction.” Risher, ¶ 14. This includes, but is not limited to, when a defendant is first
arrested for an offense on which he or she is being sentenced, see State v. Spagnolo, 2022
8 MT 228, ¶ 15, 410 Mont. 457, 520 P.3d 330, and when a warrant is issued in the case on
which the defendant is being sentenced while a defendant is already incarcerated, either in
Montana or another jurisdiction, see Risher, ¶ 17; Crazymule, ¶ 8. In short, the correct test
is, looking only at the record in the sentencing case, whether the sentencing court had
jurisdiction over the defendant because of the case, and the defendant was detained
pursuant to that jurisdiction.3
¶21 Arrest 3, as it relates to DC-18-098, provides an example of a situation where a court
has jurisdiction over a defendant because of a case, but the record does not reflect that the
defendant was detained as a result of that case. Looking only at the record in DC-18-098,
this prosecution began with Arrest 1. Therefore, the District Court correctly credited
Pillans with time accrued after Arrest 1. After the District Court released Pillans on his
own recognizance (ROR 1), it issued Bench Warrant 1 in DC-18-098, which resulted in
Arrest 2. Therefore, the District Court correctly credited Pillans with time accrued after
Arrest 2. But there is nothing in the record of DC-18-098 to indicate that Arrest 3 was
related in any way to DC-18-098. Arrest 3 was due to a new charge and nothing in the
record of DC-18-098 indicated Pillans was held as a result of this arrest. The fact that
3 Pillans argues in his reply brief that this test may prove unworkable in instances where a defendant is detained without a warrant or additional charges, as is permitted with respect to probationers under §§ 46-23-1012(2), (3), -1023(2), and (4), MCA. But this problem would only arise in instances where the defendant’s probation is subsequently revoked. Once a district court has determined to revoke a defendant’s probationary period, the court is required to “consult the records and recollection of the probation and parole officer” when calculating credit for time served. Section 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA. Thus, a district court facing the possibility of calculating credit for time served without a warrant in the record will be able to consult sufficient documentation to determine the proper credit to grant.
9 ROR 3 was later issued as to all three cases appears to be a result of Pillans’s motion for
release being filed in all three cases; it was not an acknowledgement by the District Court
that it had surreptitiously detained him in DC-18-098 after Arrest 3. Therefore, the District
Court correctly declined to credit Pillans with time served in DC-18-098 after Arrest 3.
2. Arrest 3 – ROR 3: DC-18-329
¶22 The State asserts that the District Court erred when it granted Pillans credit for time
served between Arrest 3 and ROR 3. Arrest 3 occurred on August 3, 2018, after Pillans
stabbed an officer with a pen at Pathways Treatment Center. This resulted in his being
charged with Assault with a Weapon in DC-18-298. But there is nothing in the record of
DC-18-329 indicating that he was being held in that case beginning with Arrest 3. The
State argues that Pillans’s credit in DC-18-329 did not begin to accrue until he was served
with Bench Warrant 2, which was the first arrest warrant issued in DC-18-329. For reasons
we explained in Risher and reiterated above, the State is incorrect when it states that credit
does not begin to accrue until a defendant who is already incarcerated is served with an
arrest warrant in the sentencing case. The defendant begins to accrue credit on the date
that the warrant acts as a detainer. Risher, ¶ 16. This discrepancy does not affect the
calculation in this case, though, because the State served Pillans with Bench Warrant 2 on
the same day that it was issued. The State is correct, therefore, that Pillans was entitled to
credit in DC-18-329 beginning on August 29, 2018, the date Bench Warrant 2 was issued,
not the date of Arrest 3. Pillans is entitled to 182 days of credit for time served in
DC-18-329 between Bench Warrant 2 and ROR 3.
10 3. Original Sentencing – First Revocation: All Three Cases
¶23 In total, the District Court credited Pillans with 42 days of time served between his
original sentencing and his first revocation in all three cases. The parties agree that Pillans
is entitled to more than 42 days of credit attributable to that period. The parties also agree
that Pillans was entitled to 2 days of credit for the time he served as sanctions and 23 days
of credit for the time he served between Arrest 6 and Bond 2. The parties disagree as to
the remaining periods of credit, as summarized in the table below.
Pillans’s Calculations The State’s Calculations Service of Bench Warrant 3 – Arrest 4 – ROR 4: 34 days ROR 4: 16 days4 Arrest 5 – Bond 1: 25 days Service of Bench Warrant 4 – Bond 1: 20 days Total including agreed time: Total including agreed time: 61 84 days days
As reflected in the table, the disputes arise from the parties’ disagreement as to when
Pillans’s credit began to accrue. Both Arrest 4 and Arrest 5 were due to cases that are
unrelated to the three cases before us on appeal. Nothing on the face of the records of the
cases on appeal indicates that Pillans was detained because of these arrests. As it pertains
to these periods, Pillans’s detention attributable to the cases on appeal did not commence
until the District Court issued Bench Warrant 3 and Bench Warrant 4, respectively. Pillans
4 The State’s calculation puts the time between the service of Bench Warrant 3 on February 26, 2020, and ROR 4 on March 12, 2020, at 15 days. Because 2020 was a leap year, there were actually 16 days between the service of Bench Warrant 2 and ROR 4. 11 is entitled to a total of 61 days of credit for time served in all three cases between his
original sentencing and his first revocation.
4. First Revocation – Second Revocation: All Three Cases
¶24 The District Court credited Pillans with 285 days of credit for time served between
his first and second revocations after the parties stipulated to that amount of credit. Pillans
argues that he is entitled to additional credit for this period based on two discrete periods
of incarceration during this time: (1) the time from Arrest 7 to Bond 3 (22 days); and (2) the
time from Arrest 8 to his second revocation (264 days). The State does not dispute Pillans’s
calculation of 264 days for the second period. But the State asserts that the District Court
credited Pillans with surplus time during the first period because Pillans was not served
with Bench Warrant 6 until April 26, 2022, rendering the length of the first period of
incarceration 10 days instead of 22.
¶25 Arrest 7 was on April 13, 2022, and was in connection with an unrelated case that
is not before us on appeal. At that time, Pillans was not being detained on any of the three
cases before us on appeal, and he would not be detained on these cases until April 26, 2022,
when the State petitioned the District Court for a third time to revoke Pillans’s suspended
sentence, and the District Court issued Bench Warrant 6 on that day. Pillans began
accruing time on these cases upon the issuance of Bench Warrant 6. Pillans is entitled to
a total of 274 days credit for time served between his first and second revocations.
12 5. Total Credit for Time Served
¶26 Consistent with the calculations reflected above, Pillans is entitled to the following
credit for time served.
DC-18-098: 372 days time served
DC-18-298: 543 days time served
DC-18-329: 517 days time served
¶27 Issue 2: Whether the District Court erred when it calculated Pillans’s credit for elapsed time.
¶28 Section 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, provides:
If a suspended or deferred sentence is revoked, the judge shall consider any elapsed time, consult the records and recollection of the probation and parole officer, and allow all of the elapsed time served without any record or recollection of violations as a credit against the sentence.
“[I]t is . . . insufficient for a district court to base a denial of street time credit solely on a
‘pattern’ of criminal behavior.” State v. Jardee, 2020 MT 81, ¶ 11, 399 Mont. 459, 461
P.3d 108. Instead, “the records and recollection of the probation and parole officer” must
contain “specific violations” that occurred in the period for which the district court denies
elapsed time credit. State v. Gudmundsen, 2022 MT 178, ¶ 13, 410 Mont. 67, 517 P.3d
146. “The defendant is statutorily entitled to the credit unless specific violations during
the times in question are demonstrated.” Gudmundsen, ¶ 14 (emphasis added).
¶29 Pillans asserts that the records and recollections of Officer McLeod regarding the
time period between May 11, 2021, and June 30, 2021, do not contain sufficiently specific
violations to support the District Court’s denial of elapsed time credit for those 50 days.
13 The State responds that the record contains evidence that during the relevant period, Pillans
tampered with his SCRAM, failed to complete the Day Reporting Program until the end of
June, and had been “inconsistent with his attendance” at mandated psychiatric treatment.
¶30 The record does not support the State’s contention that Pillans tampered with his
SCRAM during the relevant period. Officer McLeod’s Report of Violation (“ROV”) states
that Pillans completed his SCRAM monitoring on May 11, 2021, the day the relevant
period began. Nor does the record support the State’s contention that Pillans’s completion
of the Day Reporting Program was a violation. The ROV states that Pillans was referred
to the program on February 10, 2021, and that he completed it on June 29, 2021. Neither
the ROV nor Officer McLeod’s testimony at the revocation hearing indicate that Pillans
failed to engage with the program or failed to complete it within a prescribed period.
¶31 The ROV does state that on June 30, 2021, Pillans’s psychologist reported that
Pillans had been “inconsistent with his attendance” at mental health counseling and anger
management courses. The ROV states that Pillans had been involved in counseling
“[s]ince starting supervision” on January 23, 2020. But it is not clear from the face of the
ROV when Pillans’s inconsistent attendance took place, and Officer McLeod’s testimony
did not add any specificity. The record does not contain sufficient evidence of “specific
violations during the times in question” to demonstrate that Pillans was not entitled to credit
for elapsed time between May 11, 2021, and June 30, 2021. Gudmundsen, ¶ 14 (emphasis
added). Pillans is entitled to an additional 50 days of elapsed time credit for that period.
14 ¶32 Pillans asserts that he is also entitled to an additional 42 days of elapsed time credit
from March 1, 2022, through April 13, 2022. The State agrees, and the record does not
reflect any violations took place during that time period. Therefore, Pillans is entitled to
an additional 42 days of elapsed time credit.
CONCLUSION
¶33 This matter is reversed and remanded to the District Court to grant Pillans credit for
the following amounts of time:
DC-18-098: 372 days time served, 21 months and 2 days elapsed time
DC-18-298: 534 days time served, 21 months and 2 days elapsed time
DC-18-329: 517 days time served, 21 months and 2 days elapsed time.
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
We Concur:
/S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ LAURIE McKINNON