State v. Voshell

Supreme Court of Iowa

State v. Voshell

216 N.W.2d 309, 1974 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1306

CourtSupreme Court of Iowa

DecidedMarch 27, 1974

Docket56594

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 216 N.W.2d 309 (State v. Voshell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Voshell, 216 N.W.2d 309, 1974 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1306 (iowa 1974).

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Opinion

LeGRAND, Justice.

Defendant entered a plea of guilty to an information charging him with the crime of burglary with aggravation in violation of section 708.2, The Code, 1973. No issue is raised here concerning the voluntariness of that plea. Defendant assails only the severity of the punishment meted out to him. That is the sole matter before us for review. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant insists the trial court acted solely on the recommendation of the county attorney in fixing the penalty without exercising its own independent judgment and discretion. The record refutes this argument.

Section 708.2 permits the court to sentence one who has been convicted of aggravated burglary to imprisonment “in the penitentiary for life or any term of years.” Of course, the sentencing judge is required to make his own judicial determination of what the punishment should be. State v. Jackson, 204 N.W.2d 915, 916 (Iowa 1973). Equally well settled is the principle that we will not interfere with a judgment imposing sentence as long as it does not exceed the statutory maximum unless an abuse of the trial court’s discretion is shown. State v. Stakenburg, 215 N.W.2d 265 (Iowa); State v. Evans, 189 N.W.2d 582 (Iowa 1971).

We have reviewed the record before us, including the transcript of the sentencing proceedings. We find no merit in defendant’s claim. The trial court carefully considered the matters presented and concluded defendant should serve five years, which is the period of incarceration recommended by the county attorney. This does not mean the trial court abdicated its judicial obligation in fixing the penalty. In fact the record clearly shows the contrary.

Neither can we accept defendant’s argument that the negotiations which preceded the plea and sentence amounted to illegal plea bargaining, rendering the proceedings void. State v. Lindsey, 171 N.W.2d 859, 864 (Iowa 1969); State v. Whitehead, 163 N.W.2d 899, 902 (Iowa 1969). See exhaustive discussion of this subject in 8 Moore’s Federal Practice (Second Edition, 1973 Revision) section 11.05.

Affirmed.

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LeGRAND, Justice.

Defendant entered a plea of guilty to an information charging him with the crime of burglary with aggravation in violation of section 708.2, The Code, 1973. No issue is raised here concerning the voluntariness of that plea. Defendant assails only the severity of the punishment meted out to him. That is the sole matter before us for review. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant insists the trial court acted solely on the recommendation of the county attorney in fixing the penalty without exercising its own independent judgment and discretion. The record refutes this argument.

Section 708.2 permits the court to sentence one who has been convicted of aggravated burglary to imprisonment “in the penitentiary for life or any term of years.” Of course, the sentencing judge is required to make his own judicial determination of what the punishment should be. State v. Jackson, 204 N.W.2d 915, 916 (Iowa 1973). Equally well settled is the principle that we will not interfere with a judgment imposing sentence as long as it does not exceed the statutory maximum unless an abuse of the trial court’s discretion is shown. State v. Stakenburg, 215 N.W.2d 265 (Iowa); State v. Evans, 189 N.W.2d 582 (Iowa 1971).

We have reviewed the record before us, including the transcript of the sentencing proceedings. We find no merit in defendant’s claim. The trial court carefully considered the matters presented and concluded defendant should serve five years, which is the period of incarceration recommended by the county attorney. This does not mean the trial court abdicated its judicial obligation in fixing the penalty. In fact the record clearly shows the contrary.

Neither can we accept defendant’s argument that the negotiations which preceded the plea and sentence amounted to illegal plea bargaining, rendering the proceedings void. State v. Lindsey, 171 N.W.2d 859, 864 (Iowa 1969); State v. Whitehead, 163 N.W.2d 899, 902 (Iowa 1969). See exhaustive discussion of this subject in 8 Moore’s Federal Practice (Second Edition, 1973 Revision) section 11.05.

Affirmed.

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216 N.W.2d 309, 1974 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1306, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-voshell-iowa-1974.

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