[Cite as State v. Veyon, 2025-Ohio-3201.]
COURT OF APPEALS MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO, Case No. CT2025-0054
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR 2022-0008 AARON VEYON, Judgment: Affirmed Defendant – Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: September 8, 2025
BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin; William B. Hoffman; David M. Gormley, Appellate Judges
APPEARANCES: AARON VEYON, Pro Se, for Defendant-Appellant; No Appearance, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
OPINION
Baldwin, P.J.
{¶1} The appellant, Aaron Veyon, appeals his conviction and sentence from the
Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas. The appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE
{¶2} On January 13, 2022, the Muskingum County Grand Jury indicted the
appellant on one count of Trafficking in Drugs with a firearm and a forfeiture specification
in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A), R.C. 2941.141, and R.C. 2941.1417; two counts of
Possession of Drugs with a firearm and a forfeiture specification in violation of R.C.
2925.11(A), R.C. 2941.141, and R.C. 2941.1417; one count of Possession of Drugs with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and R.C. 2941.141; and one count
of Having a Weapon while under a Disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(4).
{¶3} On March 14, 2022, the appellant entered a plea of guilty to the amended
charges of one count of Trafficking in Drugs with a forfeiture specification in violation of
R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and R.C. 2941.1417, two counts of Possession of Drugs with a
forfeiture specification in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and R.C. 2941.1417, and one count
of Possession of Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A). The appellant was sentenced on
April 28, 2022.
{¶4} On April 21, 2025, the appellant filed a Request for Judicial Notice asking
the trial court to take judicial notice of alleged deficiencies in the indictment by the
Muskingum County Grand Jury.
{¶5} On May 2, 2025, the appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss. The trial court
denied the Motion.
{¶6} The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and raised the following three
assignments of error:
{¶7} “I. IN (sic) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING MR. VEYON’S
MOTION TO DISMISS DUE TO THE STATE’S FAILURE TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH
THE STATUTORY MANDATE OF OHIO REVISED CODE 2939.20 IN VIOLATION OF
MR. VEYON’S 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.”
{¶8} “II. THE STATE VIOLATED MR. VEYON’S 5TH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
INDICTMENT.” {¶9} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION BY FAILING TO
TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE FACTS AS REQUESTED BY APPELLANT AND
MANDATORY BY LAW.”
{¶10} The State of Ohio failed to file a brief in this matter.
ANALYSIS
I., III.
{¶11} In the appellant’s first and third assignments of error, the appellant argues
that the trial court erred by denying his Motion to Dismiss and by failing to take judicial
notice of deficiencies in the indictment, which he alleges deprived the trial court of subject
matter jurisdiction. We disagree.
{¶12} In Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 2014-Ohio-4265, ¶19, the Supreme Court
of Ohio stated:
Subject-matter jurisdiction is the power of a court to entertain and
adjudicate a particular class of cases. Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d
86, 87, 290 N.E.2d 841 (1972). A court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is
determined without regard to the rights of the individual parties involved in
a particular case. State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75,
701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998); Handy v. Ins. Co., 37 Ohio St. 366, 370 (1881).
{¶13} Ohio Const., art. IV, §4(B) states, “[t]he courts of common pleas and
divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters … as may
be provided by law.” “The ‘provided by law’ qualification of Article IV means that there
must be a statutory basis for jurisdiction.” State ex rel. Mobarak v. Brown, 2024-Ohio-221,
¶7. {¶14} R.C. 2931.03 states that “[t]he court of common pleas has original
jurisdiction of all crimes and offenses, except in cases of minor offenses the exclusive
jurisdiction of which is vested in courts inferior to the court of common pleas.” “This
includes subject-matter jurisdiction over felony cases.” State ex rel. Mitchell v. Pittman,
2022-Ohio-2542, ¶12, citing Smith v. Sheldon, 2019-Ohio-1677, ¶8.
{¶15} The appellant does not raise a valid challenge to the trial court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that “felony jurisdiction is
invoked by the return of a proper indictment by the grand jury of the county.” Click v.
Eckle, 174 Ohio St. 88, 89 (1962). However, “[t]he manner by which an accused is
charged with a crime is procedural rather than jurisdictional, and after a conviction for
crimes charged in an indictment, the judgment binds the defendant for the crime for which
he was convicted.” Orr v. Mack, 83 Ohio St.3d 429, 430 (1998). Accordingly, the
appellant’s argument that his indictment is procedurally defective fails to demonstrate that
the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.
{¶16} Additionally, a defendant’s plea of guilty is a complete admission of guilt.
Crim.R. 11(B)(1). This Court has previously held that “ ‘a defendant who voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently admits “in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense
with which he is charged * * * may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the
deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” ’ ”
State v. Leeper, 2023-Ohio-239, ¶16 (5th Dist.), quoting State v. Howard, 2017-Ohio-
9392, ¶69, quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d
235, supra (1973). {¶17} The appellant’s challenge to the indictment, raised through a post-plea
motion to dismiss is barred. By entering a guilty plea, the appellant has waived his right
to assert pre-plea constitutional violations.
{¶18} Accordingly, the appellant’s first and third assignments of error are
overruled.
II.
{¶19} In the appellant’s second assignment of error, he summarily argues that his
Fifth Amendment constitutional right to indictment had been violated. We disagree.
{¶20} Initially, we note the appellant’s brief does not comply with Appellate Rule
16. The appellant has failed to provide citations to the record, statute, and other legal
authorities to support his argument.
{¶21} App.R. 16 states, in pertinent part:
Brief of the Appellant. The appellant shall include in its brief, under the
headings and in the order indicated all of the following:
***
(7) An argument containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to
each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support
of the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the
record on which appellant relies. The argument may be preceded by a
summary.
{¶22} App.R. 12(A)(2) states, in pertinent part, “(2) The court may disregard an
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[Cite as State v. Veyon, 2025-Ohio-3201.]
COURT OF APPEALS MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO, Case No. CT2025-0054
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR 2022-0008 AARON VEYON, Judgment: Affirmed Defendant – Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: September 8, 2025
BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin; William B. Hoffman; David M. Gormley, Appellate Judges
APPEARANCES: AARON VEYON, Pro Se, for Defendant-Appellant; No Appearance, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
OPINION
Baldwin, P.J.
{¶1} The appellant, Aaron Veyon, appeals his conviction and sentence from the
Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas. The appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE
{¶2} On January 13, 2022, the Muskingum County Grand Jury indicted the
appellant on one count of Trafficking in Drugs with a firearm and a forfeiture specification
in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A), R.C. 2941.141, and R.C. 2941.1417; two counts of
Possession of Drugs with a firearm and a forfeiture specification in violation of R.C.
2925.11(A), R.C. 2941.141, and R.C. 2941.1417; one count of Possession of Drugs with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and R.C. 2941.141; and one count
of Having a Weapon while under a Disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(4).
{¶3} On March 14, 2022, the appellant entered a plea of guilty to the amended
charges of one count of Trafficking in Drugs with a forfeiture specification in violation of
R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and R.C. 2941.1417, two counts of Possession of Drugs with a
forfeiture specification in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and R.C. 2941.1417, and one count
of Possession of Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A). The appellant was sentenced on
April 28, 2022.
{¶4} On April 21, 2025, the appellant filed a Request for Judicial Notice asking
the trial court to take judicial notice of alleged deficiencies in the indictment by the
Muskingum County Grand Jury.
{¶5} On May 2, 2025, the appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss. The trial court
denied the Motion.
{¶6} The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and raised the following three
assignments of error:
{¶7} “I. IN (sic) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING MR. VEYON’S
MOTION TO DISMISS DUE TO THE STATE’S FAILURE TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH
THE STATUTORY MANDATE OF OHIO REVISED CODE 2939.20 IN VIOLATION OF
MR. VEYON’S 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.”
{¶8} “II. THE STATE VIOLATED MR. VEYON’S 5TH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
INDICTMENT.” {¶9} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION BY FAILING TO
TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE FACTS AS REQUESTED BY APPELLANT AND
MANDATORY BY LAW.”
{¶10} The State of Ohio failed to file a brief in this matter.
ANALYSIS
I., III.
{¶11} In the appellant’s first and third assignments of error, the appellant argues
that the trial court erred by denying his Motion to Dismiss and by failing to take judicial
notice of deficiencies in the indictment, which he alleges deprived the trial court of subject
matter jurisdiction. We disagree.
{¶12} In Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 2014-Ohio-4265, ¶19, the Supreme Court
of Ohio stated:
Subject-matter jurisdiction is the power of a court to entertain and
adjudicate a particular class of cases. Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d
86, 87, 290 N.E.2d 841 (1972). A court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is
determined without regard to the rights of the individual parties involved in
a particular case. State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75,
701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998); Handy v. Ins. Co., 37 Ohio St. 366, 370 (1881).
{¶13} Ohio Const., art. IV, §4(B) states, “[t]he courts of common pleas and
divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters … as may
be provided by law.” “The ‘provided by law’ qualification of Article IV means that there
must be a statutory basis for jurisdiction.” State ex rel. Mobarak v. Brown, 2024-Ohio-221,
¶7. {¶14} R.C. 2931.03 states that “[t]he court of common pleas has original
jurisdiction of all crimes and offenses, except in cases of minor offenses the exclusive
jurisdiction of which is vested in courts inferior to the court of common pleas.” “This
includes subject-matter jurisdiction over felony cases.” State ex rel. Mitchell v. Pittman,
2022-Ohio-2542, ¶12, citing Smith v. Sheldon, 2019-Ohio-1677, ¶8.
{¶15} The appellant does not raise a valid challenge to the trial court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that “felony jurisdiction is
invoked by the return of a proper indictment by the grand jury of the county.” Click v.
Eckle, 174 Ohio St. 88, 89 (1962). However, “[t]he manner by which an accused is
charged with a crime is procedural rather than jurisdictional, and after a conviction for
crimes charged in an indictment, the judgment binds the defendant for the crime for which
he was convicted.” Orr v. Mack, 83 Ohio St.3d 429, 430 (1998). Accordingly, the
appellant’s argument that his indictment is procedurally defective fails to demonstrate that
the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.
{¶16} Additionally, a defendant’s plea of guilty is a complete admission of guilt.
Crim.R. 11(B)(1). This Court has previously held that “ ‘a defendant who voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently admits “in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense
with which he is charged * * * may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the
deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” ’ ”
State v. Leeper, 2023-Ohio-239, ¶16 (5th Dist.), quoting State v. Howard, 2017-Ohio-
9392, ¶69, quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d
235, supra (1973). {¶17} The appellant’s challenge to the indictment, raised through a post-plea
motion to dismiss is barred. By entering a guilty plea, the appellant has waived his right
to assert pre-plea constitutional violations.
{¶18} Accordingly, the appellant’s first and third assignments of error are
overruled.
II.
{¶19} In the appellant’s second assignment of error, he summarily argues that his
Fifth Amendment constitutional right to indictment had been violated. We disagree.
{¶20} Initially, we note the appellant’s brief does not comply with Appellate Rule
16. The appellant has failed to provide citations to the record, statute, and other legal
authorities to support his argument.
{¶21} App.R. 16 states, in pertinent part:
Brief of the Appellant. The appellant shall include in its brief, under the
headings and in the order indicated all of the following:
***
(7) An argument containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to
each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support
of the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the
record on which appellant relies. The argument may be preceded by a
summary.
{¶22} App.R. 12(A)(2) states, in pertinent part, “(2) The court may disregard an
assignment of error presented for review if the party raising it fails to identify in the record the error on which the assignment of error is based or fails to argue the assignment
separately in the brief as required by App.R. 16(A).”
{¶23} An appellate court may rely upon App.R. 12(A) in overruling or disregarding
an assignment of error because of “the lack of briefing” on the assignment of error. Hawley
v. Ritley, 35 Ohio St.3d 157 (1988). “Error not treated in the brief will be regarded as
having been abandoned by the party who gave them birth.” Uncapher v. Baltimore & Ohio
Rd. R.R., 127 Ohio St. 351 (1933). “ ‘It is not the function of this court to construct a
foundation for [an appellant’s] claims; failure to comply with the rules governing practice
in the appellate courts is a tactic which is ordinarily fatal.’ ” State v. Romy, 2021-Ohio-
501, ¶36 (5th Dist.), quoting Catanzarite v. Boswell, 2009-Ohio-1211, ¶16 (9th Dist.).
{¶24} Furthermore, we again note that a defendant’s plea of guilty is a complete
admission of guilt. Crim.R. 11(B)(1). This Court has previously held that “ ‘a defendant
who voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently admits “in open court that he is in fact guilty
of the offense with which he is charged * * * may not thereafter raise independent claims
relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the
guilty plea.” ’ ” State v. Leeper, 2023-Ohio-239, ¶16 (5th Dist.), quoting State v. Howard,
2017-Ohio-9392, ¶69, quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36
L.Ed.2d 235, supra (1973).
{¶25} The appellant is attempting to assign error to the original indictment.
However, by pleading guilty, the appellant waived his right to appeal the deprivation of
his constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of his guilty plea.
{¶26} Accordingly, the appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled. CONCLUSION
{¶27} Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of the Muskingum County Court of
Common Pleas is hereby affirmed.
{¶28} Costs to the appellant.
By: Baldwin, P.J.
Hoffman, J. and
Gormley, J. concur.