07/28/2026
DA 23-0500 Case Number: DA 23-0500
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2026 MT 169
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
WILLIE TODD VELTKAMP,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and For the County of Cascade, Cause No. CDC-20-241 Honorable John A. Kutzman, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Tammy A. Hinderman, Appellate Defender Division Administrator, Kathryn Grear Hutchison, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Selene Koepke, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Josh Racki, Cascade County Attorney, Ashlee Kummer, Deputy County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: April 29, 2026
Decided: July 28, 2026
Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Willie Veltkamp (Veltkamp) appeals his conviction for two counts of felony incest
in violation of § 45-5-507, MCA, following a jury trial in the Eighth Judicial District Court,
Cascade County. We affirm.
¶2 We restate the issues on appeal as follows:1
Issue One: Whether the admission of J.V.’s statements in the SANE Report was reversible error.
Issue Two: Whether allowing the jury to view the SANE Report during deliberations was reversible error.
Issue Three: Whether the admission of text messages between J.V. and her mother was reversible error.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 Veltkamp and his wife, Glenda, lived in Great Falls, Montana, with their daughters,
J.V. and C.V. On the night of April 15, 2020, 14-year-old J.V. was in her bedroom.
Veltkamp entered and began touching her. He told J.V., who was menstruating, to go to
the bathroom and remove her tampon. When she returned, Veltkamp held her down and
penetrated her vagina with his penis. He eventually ejaculated and left the room.
¶4 Around 12:00 p.m. on April 16, 2020, Glenda received a series of text messages
from J.V. which read:
1 Veltkamp, in one of his issue statements, suggests that “collectively, these errors prejudiced Willie’s right to a fair trial,” which presumably is a reference to the cumulative error doctrine. However, Veltkamp provides no discussion or authority for applying cumulative error except to address that each alleged error is not harmless. Because we find each of the alleged errors were harmless, we will not develop a cumulative error argument on Veltkamp’s behalf. “It is not this Court’s obligation to develop parties’ arguments for them.” City of Billings v. Peterson, 2004 MT 232, ¶ 45, 322 Mont. 444, 97 P.3d 532 (citation omitted).
2 Okay, so……. there is this thing I need [to tell you] but I’m scared to say because it will ruin my life and mess up other people’s to [sic] but I cant [sic] let this keep happening to me… [I don’t know] how to say it, because I dont [sic] want everything to change, and [please don’t] come down and talk to me about it cuz [sic] it’s hard as it is. . . . O[k]ay, so I’ll just put it that I’m technically not a virgin cuz [sic] of dad. . . .
Glenda immediately went to speak with J.V., who told her that Veltkamp had sex with her
the previous night. J.V. would allege the conduct had occurred several times a month since
she was nine or ten years old. Glenda had never suspected this and, according to J.V., the
abuse generally occurred when she was out of the house. On Glenda’s instruction, J.V.
gathered and bagged her clothes from the previous night. Glenda also gathered the fitted
sheet from J.V.’s bed. Glenda drove J.V. to the hospital.
¶5 Veltkamp returned to the house as Glenda pulled out of the driveway with both J.V.
and C.V. in the car. Whether Veltkamp noticed his family departing is unknown, but he
called the Great Falls police to report his family was missing at around 1:30 p.m. Great
Falls Police Department Detective Cara Guderian (Detective Guderian) answered
Veltkamp’s call. Almost contemporaneously, Detective Guderian also learned that Glenda
and J.V. were obtaining a sexual assault examination. Detective Guderian told Veltkamp
that his wife and daughters were safe but refused to disclose their location. Detective
Guderian then went to the hospital to meet J.V. and Glenda.
¶6 At the hospital, Nurse Steven Brant (Nurse Brant), a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner
(SANE), examined J.V. with Detective Guderian present. As a part of the examination,
Nurse Brant obtained a statement from J.V. describing the rape:
Probably about 2100, we were getting ready for bed. My dad, Willie Veltkamp, tucked my sister [C.V.] in first. He came down to tuck me in and
3 was lying on the bed with me. He told me to go to the bathroom and take my tampon out. Then he pulled my pants down and he put his penis inside of me. He did that for a while. He pulled out and came in his hand and left. He acted like nothing ever happened and then I went to bed.
J.V. also disclosed that Veltkamp penetrated her vagina with his fingers and tongue. Nurse
Brant compiled a written report (SANE Report) which included all of J.V.’s statements
regarding the incident as well as Nurse Brant’s observations of lacerations and abrasions
present on and around J.V.’s vagina. The SANE Report noted J.V. had showered that
morning. The SANE Report, J.V.’s clothing, J.V.’s current tampon, and J.V.’s bedding
were sent to the Montana State Crime Lab for analysis.
¶7 Following the conclusion of the sexual assault exam, Detective Guderian returned
to the Great Falls police station to interview Veltkamp. Law enforcement obtained a search
warrant to conduct an exam on Veltkamp: a nurse gathered penile scrotal and buccal swab
samples from him. These swabs were also sent to the Montana State Crime Lab for testing.
¶8 Veltkamp’s penile scrotal swab tested positive for J.V.’s blood and J.V.’s bed sheet
tested positive for Veltkamp’s semen. J.V.’s clothing and a cervical swab conducted in the
SANE exam tested negative for Veltkamp’s DNA.
¶9 On April 23, 2020, the State filed an Information charging Veltkamp with one count
of incest. On June 5, 2020, the State filed an Amended Information charging Veltkamp
with three counts of incest. Count I referred to the incident of April 15, 2020; Count II
referred to the continuous course of conduct J.V. alleged had occurred between January 1,
2016, and April 1, 2020; and Count III referred to an incident alleged to have occurred on
April 10, 2020. The matter proceeded to trial in early February 2023.
4 ¶10 Nurse Brant testified about the SANE exam he conducted on J.V. Through Nurse
Brant, the State moved to admit J.V.’s narrative statement in the SANE Report. Veltkamp
raised a hearsay objection. The State asserted the narrative statement constituted a medical
record “taken for purposes of diagnosis.” Veltkamp maintained that narrative statements
in the context of a sexual assault examination were not diagnostic but rather were
testimonial in nature because they were obtained to gather evidence “to be used in a future
court proceeding.” The District Court agreed with the State and overruled the objection.
Nurse Brant read J.V.’s narrative statement concerning the incident of April 15, 2020, to
the jury. Nurse Brant additionally described J.V.’s statements during the examination,
including her recollection that Veltkamp had also penetrated her vulva digitally and orally
before ejaculating into his hand. J.V. had not described any previous assaults by Veltkamp
during the examination and Nurse Brant’s report did not include any details about those
other instances.
¶11 J.V. testified that, beginning when she was eight or nine years old, Veltkamp would
rub his penis between her legs near her vagina “about once a month[.]” This behavior
increased in frequency as J.V. got older until Veltkamp eventually began penetrating J.V.’s
vagina with his penis when she was about 11 or 12. Regarding the April 15 incident, J.V.
testified Veltkamp touched her vagina before instructing her to remove her tampon. After
she removed it, he penetrated her with his penis. J.V. estimated that Veltkamp assaulted
her for approximately 30 minutes and she was not sure whether he had ejaculated, but that
“probably” he did. Over Veltkamp’s objection, the State provided J.V. with Nurse Brant’s
SANE Report, already admitted into evidence, to refresh her recollection that Veltkamp
5 had penetrated her orally and ejaculated in his hand. With her recollection refreshed, J.V.
affirmed that she made the statements in the SANE Report.
¶12 After J.V. testified about the April 15 incident, the State asked J.V. how she had
disclosed Veltkamp’s abuse to her mother. The prosecutor handed J.V. a copy of her
April 16, 2020 text messages to Glenda. Veltkamp raised a hearsay objection. The State
argued the text messages were admissible because they established the beginning of J.V.’s
disclosure and were a relevant part of the investigation. The court reasoned the text
messages were “central to the event that we’re here to litigate” and concluded the text
messages were admissible under the res gestae rule. J.V. then read the April 16 text
messages into the record.
¶13 On cross-examination, J.V. acknowledged only disclosing the April 15 incident to
Nurse Brant and not the previous incidents. J.V. explained on redirect that on April 16,
2020, at the time of her SANE exam, she was not ready to come forward with the other
incidents of abuse perpetrated by Veltkamp. J.V. did testify that the most recent abuse
prior to April 15 took place approximately five days earlier, or around April 10, 2020.
¶14 Following J.V.’s testimony, the State called Detective Guderian to testify. Detective
Guderian recounted J.V.’s statements during the sexual assault examination:
[J.V.] disclosed that the night prior, it would have been April 15th, her dad had come downstairs to snuggle her. And during that time, he had pulled down her pants, pushed her onto the bed and pinned her arms onto the bed and proceeded to put his penis inside her vagina and then also he digitally penetrated her and then licked her vagina as well.
The State next asked whether J.V. had said “anything else about what had happened at the
end[,]” alluding to J.V.’s SANE Report statements that Detective Guderian had witnessed.
6 Veltkamp objected on hearsay grounds. The State responded that the narrative statement
was admissible for impeachment of J.V. because J.V. failed to testify that Veltkamp
penetrated her orally and that Veltkamp had ejaculated into his hand. The District Court
overruled the objection and allowed Detective Guderian to answer.
¶15 Glenda also testified and read to the jury the text messages she had received from
J.V., which had already been admitted into the record following an objection by Veltkamp.
The exhibit was published to the jury.
¶16 During the discussion between the District Court and the parties regarding what
evidence the jury could review during deliberations, Veltkamp reiterated his objection to
providing the jury with Nurse Brant’s SANE Report on hearsay grounds. The District
Court concluded the jury could review the SANE Report.
¶17 The jury convicted Veltkamp on Count I, for incest on April 15, 2020, and Count
II, for incest occurring between January 1, 2016, and April 1, 2020. The jury acquitted
Veltkamp on Count III, regarding the alleged incident on April 10, 2020. On May 25,
2023, the court sentenced Veltkamp to the Montana State Prison for two consecutive
100-year sentences, with no time suspended. Veltkamp now appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶18 This Court generally reviews a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Sage, 2010 MT 156, ¶ 21, 357 Mont. 99, 235 P.3d 1284; State v.
Stewart, 2012 MT 317, ¶ 23, 367 Mont. 503, 291 P.3d 1187. However, a district court is
bound by the Montana Rules of Evidence as well as applicable statutes, and to the extent
7 the district court’s ruling is based on an interpretation of an evidentiary rule or statute, we
review the ruling de novo. Sage, ¶ 21; Stewart, ¶ 23.
¶19 We review a district court’s decision on the evidence that may be taken into the jury
room during deliberations for an abuse of discretion. State v. Nordholm, 2019 MT 165,
¶ 8, 396 Mont. 384, 445 P.3d 799; State v. Bales, 1999 MT 334, ¶ 24, 297 Mont. 402, 994
P.2d 17. A district court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without
employing conscientious judgment, resulting in substantial injustice. Nordholm, ¶ 8.
DISCUSSION
¶20 Issue One: Whether the admission of J.V.’s statements in the SANE Report was reversible error.
¶21 “Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” M. R.
Evid. 801(c). Hearsay is inadmissible except as provided by statute, the Rules of Evidence,
or other applicable rules. M. R. Evid. 802.
¶22 The State argued at trial that the narrative statements J.V. made in the SANE Report
were admissible as statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and
therefore an exception to the rule against hearsay. M. R. Evid. 803(4). The District Court
admitted them pursuant to this exception. On appeal, the State concedes this was error and
further maintains that Veltkamp’s reliance on State v. Martinez, 2023 MT 251, ¶¶ 26-27,
414 Mont. 340, 545 P.3d 652 and State v. Tome, 2021 MT 229, ¶ 27, 405 Mont. 292, 495
P.3d 54, is misplaced because those cases involve the right of confrontation and
Veltkamp’s accuser, J.V. testified and was subject to cross-examination.
8 ¶23 A SANE report serves to compile evidence as part of an investigation in anticipation
of future litigation and thus does not constitute a statement made for the purpose of
diagnosis. Martinez, ¶¶ 26-27; Tome, ¶ 27. In Martinez, the victim made statements to the
forensic nurse during a SANE examination, and was referred to a physician for follow-up
care, to whom she again disclosed Martinez’s abuse. Martinez, ¶¶ 6, 10. We explained
that the victim’s statements to the SANE nurse and the physician must be evaluated
independently to determine whether they are testimonial. Martinez, ¶ 22. We explained
that the victim’s statements to the physician were nontestimonial because they were made
for the primary purpose of obtaining medical care. Martinez, ¶ 23. We further explained
that the victim’s statements to the physician, while hearsay, were admissible under
M. R. Evid. 803(4), because the statements were made “for the purposes of medical
diagnosis” insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. Martinez, ¶ 23.
Regarding the statements to the SANE nurse, we held, relying on Tome, that the statements
were testimonial in nature and inadmissible “absent Martinez having an opportunity for
cross-examination.” Martinez, ¶ 27. Because the victim in Martinez did not testify and
was not available for cross-examination, we held that the admission of the victim’s
statements through the SANE nurse violated Martinez’s right to confrontation. Martinez,
¶ 27; see also State v. Harris, 247 Mont. 405, 412, 808 P.2d 453, 457 (1991) (declining to
extend the Rule 803(4) exception beyond doctors in cases involving abuse of young
children).
¶24 In Tome, the victim was developmentally disabled and determined by the court to
be incompetent to testify. Tome, ¶ 13. We held that because her statements made to a
9 SANE nurse were testimonial and she was not available to testify, their admission violated
Tome’s right of confrontation. Tome, ¶ 35. Noting that while Tome had the opportunity
to cross-examine those who read or reiterated the victim’s statements, we reversed Tome’s
conviction because the statements, which were provided to the jury through a video were
“a powerful presentation of the State’s complaining witness––a witness who was
out-of-reach and unavailable for cross-examination.” Tome, ¶¶ 35, 37.
¶25 The confrontation clause is not implicated here as it was in Martinez and Tome
because J.V. was present at trial, testified, and was cross-examined by Veltkamp. The error
that occurred was under the hearsay rule––admitting the hearsay statements contained in
the SANE Report when the statements were clearly not provided for the purpose of medical
diagnosis or treatment. Thus, the SANE Report was erroneously admitted under the
medical diagnosis exception to the rule against hearsay. M. R. Evid. 803(4). Veltkamp
has established, and the State has conceded, this was error. We turn now to whether the
other admissible evidence proved the same facts as the tainted evidence. State v. Van Kirk,
2001 MT 184, ¶ 43, 306 Mont. 215, 32 P.3d 735.
¶26 “A cause may not be reversed by reason of any error committed by the trial court
against the convicted person unless the record shows the error was prejudicial.”
Section 46-20-701(1), MCA. This Court utilizes a two-step analysis to determine whether
an error prejudiced a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial and therefore merits reversal.
Van Kirk, ¶ 37. First, we determine whether the error presents a structural error or a trial
error. Van Kirk, ¶ 41. If a structural error exists, our inquiry ends and the verdict is
reversed. Van Kirk, ¶ 41. Instead, if the error presents “the more typical ‘trial’ error,” we
10 proceed to the second step of our analysis to determine whether “the error was harmless
under the circumstances.” Van Kirk, ¶ 41.
¶27 Trial error refers to “that type of error that typically occurs during the presentation
of a case to the jury” and is “amenable to qualitative assessment by a reviewing court for
prejudicial impact relative to the other evidence introduced at trial.” Van Kirk, ¶ 40.
Moreover, “[t]rial error is not presumptively prejudicial and therefore not automatically
reversible[.]” Van Kirk, ¶ 40 (citing § 46-20-701(1), MCA). “As a threshold matter, once
a convicted person raises and establishes that the evidence in question was erroneously
admitted and has alleged prejudice under the ‘reasonable possibility’ test, it then becomes
incumbent on the State to demonstrate that the error at issue was not prejudicial.” Van
Kirk, ¶ 42. This question turns on whether the factfinder “was presented with admissible
evidence that proved the same facts as the tainted evidence proved.” Van Kirk, ¶ 43
(emphasis in original).
¶28 Here, the cumulative evidence properly admitted at trial negated any prejudice
incurred by Veltkamp by the erroneously admitted SANE Report. This cumulative
evidence includes J.V.’s narrative statement in the SANE Report which was properly
admitted as a prior inconsistent statement through testimony of Detective Guderian.
Detective Guderian witnessed the exam: she was present and able to corroborate J.V.’s
narrative statement in the SANE Report, which differed from her testimony at trial where
she did not testify to some of Veltkamp’s specific actions, including oral penetration and
Veltkamp ejaculating into his hand. A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at
trial, is subject to cross-examination, and the statement is inconsistent with the declarant’s
11 testimony. M. R. Evid. 801(d)(1). A prior inconsistent statement is admitted as substantive
evidence in Montana, for the truth of the matter asserted therein. State v. White Water,
194 Mont. 85, 88-89, 634 P.2d 630, 638 (1981). Thus, the SANE Report, properly admitted
as J.V.’s prior inconsistent statement through Detective Guderian to prove the same facts
as the erroneously admitted evidence, negated any prejudice to Veltkamp from the
erroneous admission of the same through Nurse Brant.
¶29 Under our harmless error test, the proper admission of this evidence as a prior
inconsistent statement proved the same facts the tainted evidence proved. Van Kirk, ¶ 43.
Thus, Veltkamp was not prejudiced by the erroneous introduction of the SANE Report
through Nurse Brant’s testimony. Accordingly, the erroneous initial introduction of the
SANE Report, in the context of the specific facts of the instant case, did not constitute
reversible error because cumulative evidence of the same facts was also admitted at trial.
¶30 Issue Two: Whether allowing the jury to view the SANE Report during deliberations was reversible error.
¶31 “Generally, jurors may take into the jury room ‘all exhibits that have been
[admitted] as evidence in the [case] that in the opinion of the court will be necessary’ to
their deliberations.” State v. Walks, 2025 MT 147, ¶ 12, 423 Mont. 35, 571 P.3d 648
(citing § 46-16-504, MCA). Despite the statute not distinguishing between demonstrative
and testimonial exhibits, we have held that “nothing in the plain language of § 46-16-504,
MCA, suggests that the legislature intended this statute to abrogate the common law rule
against the submission of testimonial materials” to the jury during deliberations. Bales,
¶¶ 18, 24.
12 ¶32 “When assessing whether the jury may access certain evidence, the threshold
question is whether the evidence is either testimony or testimonial in nature[.]” Walks,
¶ 13. “Testimonial evidence” refers to “a person’s testimony offered to prove the truth of
the matter asserted[,]” especially evidence elicited from a witness. State v. Stout, 2010 MT
137, ¶ 30, 356 Mont. 468, 237 P.3d 37 (citing Testimonial Evidence, Black’s Law
Dictionary (9th ed. 2009)).
¶33 Here, the SANE Report submitted to the jury in the instant case was testimonial
evidence. See Martinez, ¶¶ 26-27 (citing Tome, ¶ 15) (a SANE examination is testimonial
when conducted to collect evidence of sex-based crimes for purposes of future litigation).
Submitting testimonial evidence to the jury for review during deliberations is an abuse of
discretion by the district court. Bales, ¶ 24. “A violation of the rule prohibiting a jury’s
unsupervised and unrestricted access to testimonial evidence during deliberations is trial
error rather than structural error.” Walks, ¶ 23 (citing State v. Hoover, 2021 MT 276, ¶ 23,
406 Mont. 132, 497 P.3d 598; Nordholm, ¶ 12; State v. Hart, 2009 MT 268, ¶ 35, 352
Mont. 92, 214 P.3d 1273). Thus, it is incumbent upon the State to prove the error was
harmless by demonstrating “that there is no reasonable possibility that the unsupervised
review of the [testimonial evidence] by the jury during its deliberations might have
contributed to [the] conviction.” Walks, ¶ 23 (citing Nordholm, ¶ 12; Van Kirk, ¶ 47). The
State may satisfy this burden by “pointing to other admitted evidence that proved the same
facts as the tainted evidence and showing by qualitative comparison that it could not
reasonably have contributed to the conviction.” Walks, ¶ 23 (citing Hoover, ¶ 23; Van
Kirk, ¶ 47).
13 ¶34 We have held that unsupervised and unrestricted access to testimonial evidence by
a jury during deliberations constituted reversible error. Nordholm, ¶ 14. There, the court
provided the jury with unrestricted access to four recordings of statements made to police
by witnesses and the defendant. Nordholm, ¶ 14. The recordings at issue captured
out-of-court conversations between police officers, the defendant, the victim, and multiple
witnesses concerning the events leading up to the defendant’s arrest. Nordholm, ¶¶ 4-6.
Regardless of whether the “other evidence presented at trial proved at least some of the
same facts as those in the videos[,]” the State could not prove “that there [was] no
reasonable possibility that the jury’s review of these testimonial videos contributed” to the
conviction because the “qualitative effect of the jury’s review of the videos is both
unknown and unknowable because they were given unsupervised access to view the videos
as many times as they wished.” Nordholm, ¶¶ 13-14 (citing Van Kirk, ¶ 47). Because the
jury could review the recordings “repeatedly[,]” we found the jury could “therefore give
[. . .] undue emphasis” to the videos rather than “rely on its collective memory to assess
the testimony of those witnesses[.]” Nordholm, ¶ 14 (citation omitted). Our conclusion in
Nordholm turned on the ability of the jury to “repeatedly view the statements” made by the
defendant and others in the recordings. Nordholm, ¶ 13. The risk, therefore, of undue
emphasis on these videos, to the detriment of the jury’s collective memory of “testimony
given at trial, including statements made during cross examination,” created “a
fundamental imbalance” meriting remand for a new trial. Nordholm, ¶¶ 13-14.
¶35 On the other hand, we have concluded that the erroneous submission of testimonial
materials to the jury during deliberations, when viewed in the context of the evidence
14 presented at trial, did not prejudice the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Walks, ¶ 28. In
Walks, the eight-year-old victim, K.P., “hesitated to discuss in court” what had occurred
with the defendant. Walks, ¶ 3. To accommodate her reluctance to testify at trial, the State
presented K.P. with an anatomical drawing and she circled where Walks had touched her.
Walks, ¶ 3. This image, with K.P.’s identifying circle, was admitted into evidence. Walks,
¶ 3. In response to a question regarding “what touched the circled body part,” K.P. offered
to “draw it” and then drew a hand. Walks, ¶ 3. This was also admitted into evidence.
Walks, ¶ 3. She identified the hand as Walks’s. Walks, ¶ 3. The district court allowed the
jury to view the two drawings during deliberations. Walks, ¶ 9. On appeal, this Court
affirmed, finding the error was harmless regardless of the testimonial nature of the
drawings because “the State also presented other compelling cumulative evidence proving
the same facts as the [t]rial [d]rawings and, by qualitative comparison, there [was] no
reasonable possibility that the limited communicative content” contained therein
contributed to the conviction. Walks, ¶ 26. We distinguished the Nordholm body camera
footage from the trial drawings because the drawings did not identify Walks as the
perpetrator, communicate the victim’s allegations as to what happened and where, and did
not include any identifying features. Walks, ¶ 27 (citing Nordholm, ¶¶ 4-6, 13-14).
¶36 Here, the abuse of discretion by the District Court in submitting the SANE Report
to the jury during deliberations was ultimately harmless because the testimonial content of
the SANE Report was sufficiently cumulative to other evidence presented at trial to not
unduly emphasize the SANE Report. Bales, ¶ 30. The SANE Report is more analogous
to the trial drawings in Walks than the body camera footage in Nordholm. Both the SANE
15 Report and J.V.’s trial testimony identified Veltkamp as the perpetrator and that he
vaginally penetrated her with his penis. Although the SANE Report identified Veltkamp
as the perpetrator, J.V.’s testimony and the forensic evidence demonstrating J.V.’s blood
on Veltkamp’s penis and Veltkamp’s semen on the bed sheets provided cumulative
evidence of the identity of her assailant. Moreover, J.V. was subject to cross-examination
and Veltkamp took the opportunity to ask her whether her statements in the SANE Report
were accurate. We conclude the submission of the SANE Report to the jury during
deliberations and the additional details contained therein—J.V.’s April 16 recollections to
Nurse Brant that Veltkamp orally penetrated her and later ejaculated into his hand—was
harmless. The SANE Report was cumulative of the testimony and evidence presented at
trial.
¶37 Issue Three: Whether the admission of text messages between J.V. and her mother was reversible error.
¶38 Veltkamp also challenges the admission of J.V.’s April 16 text messages to Glenda.
He notes the District Court’s reasoning that the text messages were part of the same
transaction was pursuant to the principle of res gestae, which “generally refers to
spontaneous declarations that are so closely connected to an occurrence that they are
considered part of the occurrence.” State v. Hansen, 1999 MT 253, ¶ 73, 296 Mont. 282,
989 P.2d 338. Under this rule, “‘a remark made spontaneously and concurrently with an
affray, collision or the like’” carries an inherent “‘degree of credibility and will be
admissible because of its spontaneous nature.’” Hansen, ¶ 73 (quoting Res Gestae, Black’s
Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)).
16 ¶39 This Court and contemporary rules of evidence have progressed past res gestae and
we instead utilize modern exceptions to the hearsay rule provided for in M. R. Evid. 803.
Hansen, ¶ 81 (“The phrase res gestae, in itself, adds nothing but confusion to an already
complex area of the law. The better practice is to abandon the use of the phrase altogether
and to, instead, use the specific rule of evidence or statute that applies to the particular
factual situation presented.”); see also State v. Lake, 2022 MT 28, ¶ 45, 503 P.3d 274,
407 Mont. 350 (quoting State v. Guill, 2010 MT 69, ¶¶ 26-27, 355 Mont. 490, 229 P.3d
1152) (“While we have discarded the common law concept[] of res gestae . . . ‘which, like
magic incantations, ha[s] been invoked . . . [to] admit evidence of questionable value
without subjecting it to critical analysis,’ we have continued to recognize the validity of
the statutory transaction rule where applicable by its terms, and relevant in the context of
a particular case.”). The modern transaction rule and associated rules of evidence permit
admission of evidence that is “inextricably linked or intertwined with the defendant’s
criminal conduct” and that is “relevant to provide a comprehensive and complete picture
of the defendant’s criminal conduct.” State v. Sandberg, 2026 MT 45, ¶ 56, 426 Mont.
416, 585 P.3d 422 (citations omitted).
¶40 Here, despite grounding the admission of the text messages in res gestae, the District
Court properly admitted the text messages as the beginning of J.V.’s story––a story that
included how J.V. began to cope with years of abuse and the difficult process of notifying
someone about the abuse. The admission of the text messages was thus relevant both to
Veltkamp’s guilt and to J.V.’s credibility. Accordingly, the text messages were
inextricably linked and relevant under the Rules of Evidence.
17 ¶41 Moreover, “a defendant is not prejudiced by hearsay testimony when the statements
that form the subject of the inadmissible hearsay are admitted through the direct testimony
of ‘out-of-court’ declarant or by some other direct evidence.” State v. Veis, 1998 MT 162,
¶ 26, 289 Mont. 450, 962 P.2d 1153 (citing State v. Stuit, 277 Mont. 227, 232, 921 P.2d
866, 869 (1996); State v. Riley, 270 Mont. 436, 440, 893 P.2d 310, 313 (1995); State v.
Graves, 272 Mont. 451, 460, 901 P.2d 549, 555 (1995), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Herman, 2008 MT 187, ¶ 12 n.1, 343 Mont. 494, 188 P.3d 978). In situations
where “a defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine a declarant because he or she is
present at trial and testifies, the dangers that the hearsay rule seeks to avoid are not present
and, therefore, hearsay regarding the declarant’s out-of-court statement that is admitted
during another witnesses testimony is harmless.” Veis, ¶ 26 (citing State v. Canon¸ 212
Mont. 157, 164, 687 P.2d 705, 709 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Allen,
2010 MT 214, ¶¶ 43-44, 46, 357 Mont. 495, 241 P.3d 1045).
¶42 Here, J.V. and Glenda both testified; and Veltkamp cross-examined his wife and
daughter. Both testified to the content and method of J.V.’s initial disclosure on April 16.
J.V.’s April 16 text messages and her trial testimony identified Veltkamp as her assailant.
The text messages were thus cumulative of J.V.’s trial testimony. Accordingly, based on
our review of the record, the admission of the April 16 text messages was harmless.
CONCLUSION
¶43 The District Court erred as a matter of law in admitting J.V.’s statements contained
within the SANE Report as statements made for the purpose of obtaining a medical
diagnosis. The introduction of cumulative evidence proving those same facts rendered this
18 error harmless. The District Court abused its discretion by submitting the SANE Report to
the jury during deliberations. This error, too, was harmless because other cumulative
evidence presented at trial negated any possible prejudice that the jury may have placed
undue emphasis on the SANE Report. Finally, the court properly admitted the April 16
text messages.
¶44 Affirmed.
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
We Concur:
/S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ JIM RICE