State v. Vela
This text of 656 P.2d 536 (State v. Vela) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Defendant, Marcia Ann Vela, appeals her judgment and sentence for felony "hit and run," contrary to RCW 46.52.020. We affirm.
The defendant's automobile struck another car from the rear, forcing the latter into oncoming traffic where it collided with a third car. The ultimate impact was severe, causing extensive damage to the vehicles and seriously injuring the driver and passenger in the car that defendant had struck. Defendant stopped her car about 200 feet from the scene of the accident, got out, took about six steps back toward the scene, hesitated, then returned to her car and left. The front end of her car had been damaged and the hood popped up as she drove away. Defendant has not contested the fact that she was involved in the accident. At the trial, she claimed that she was so intoxicated that she was not aware that the accident had occurred.
Defendant assigns error to the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury that an element of the offense was defendant's knowledge that a person or persons were injured in the accident. The statute, RCW 46.52.020,1 is [601]*601silent as to the element of knowledge. It has been interpreted to require knowledge of involvement in an accident. State v. Martin, 73 Wn.2d 616, 625, 440 P.2d 429 (1968). The court included this element in instruction 6,2 to which defendant excepted and now assigns error. Cf. WPIC 97.02 (revised 1982), which does not include the element of knowledge required by Martin.
Defendant urges that at the very least, the court should have instructed the jury according to the so-called "Holford" rule:
[C]riminal liability attaches to a driver who knowingly leaves the scene of an accident if he actually knew of the injury or if he knew that the accident was of such a nature that one would reasonably anticipate that it resulted in injury to a person. . . .
People v. Holford, 63 Cal. 2d 74, 80, 403 P.2d 423, 427, 45 [602]*602Cal. Rptr. 167 (1965). We decline to adopt the "Holford" rule for two reasons. First, the standard of constructive knowledge set out in this rule is contrary to the subjective knowledge required by State v. Shipp, 93 Wn.2d 510, 514-16, 610 P.2d 1322 (1980). Second, requiring actual knowledge of injuries would preclude the statute from fulfilling its purpose. In this regard, we find the reasoning of the Illinois Supreme Court persuasive:
the prosecution is required to prove that the accused had knowledge that the vehicle he was driving was involved in an accident or collision. We do not, however, hold that it is necessary for the prosecution to show also that the accused knew that injury or death resulted from the collision. To require this additional proof would impose a burden that would be unrealistically difficult to sustain and would tend to defeat the public interest which is served by requiring persons involved in vehicle collisions to stop and provide identification . . . and to be available to render assistance if required.
People v. Nunn, 77 Ill. 2d 243, 252, 396 N.E.2d 27, 31 (1979). The gravamen of the offense is failure to stop when one knows his vehicle has been involved in an accident. The court did not err by so instructing the jury.
Affirmed.
Swanson and Scholfield, JJ., concur.
Reconsideration denied March 14, 1983.
Review granted by Supreme Court July 19, 1983.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
656 P.2d 536, 33 Wash. App. 599, 1983 Wash. App. LEXIS 2121, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-vela-washctapp-1983.