An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-364 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 21 October 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Wilson County Nos. 11-CRS-55061, 13-CRS- 00418-20 LONNELLE VAUGHN
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 18 November 2013
by Judge Walter H. Godwin, Jr., in Wilson County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 September 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Kimberly N. Callahan, for the State.
James W. Carter for Defendant.
STEPHENS, Judge.
This appeal arises from Defendant Lonnelle Vaughn’s plea of
guilty to one count of statutory rape of a person who is 13, 14,
or 15 years old. Defendant now petitions this Court to grant a
writ of certiorari and seeks to vacate his plea, arguing that
the trial court erred in accepting it because: (1) it was not
the product of an informed choice, based on his allegation that -2- the court violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022(a)(6) by failing
to accurately inform him of the maximum and minimum possible
sentences he faced, and (2) it was not supported by a factual
basis as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022(c). In our
discretion, we grant Defendant’s petition for certiorari review
and hold that the trial court did not err in accepting his
guilty plea.
Additionally, Defendant seeks certiorari review of the
trial court’s order that he enroll in Satellite-Based Monitoring
(“SBM”) for a period of 15 years following his release from
prison, arguing that the court’s finding that he was in a
supervisory role with the victim is insufficient to justify
subjecting him to the highest possible level of supervision and
monitoring because he was not convicted of an aggravated offense
and his STATIC-99 report indicated a low risk of reoffending.
The State has also petitioned for a writ of certiorari to
challenge the trial court’s conclusion that statutory rape of a
person who is 13, 14, or 15 years old is not an aggravated
offense. In light of this Court’s holding in State v. Sprouse,
217 N.C. App. 230, 719 S.E.2d 234 (2011), disc. review denied,
365 N.C. 552, 722 S.E.2d 787 (2012), that statutory rape of a
person who is 13, 14, or 15 years old does qualify as an -3- aggravated offense, we remand to the trial court for entry of an
SBM order consistent with this Court’s present ruling.
Facts and Procedural History
On 6 August 2012, Defendant was indicted by a Wilson County
grand jury for statutory rape of a person who is 13, 14, or 15
years old and sexual offense by a person in a parental role for
allegedly “guilt-tripping” a 13-year-old girl for whom he served
as guardian, and was more than six years older than, into
regularly having sex with him by threatening to withhold money,
food, and clothing from her and the other six children in
Defendant’s household. On 4 March 2013, Defendant was indicted
on three additional counts of statutory rape and sexual offense.
On 18 November 2013, pursuant to a plea agreement,
Defendant pled guilty to one count of statutory rape of a person
who is 13, 14, or 15 years old, with sentencing at the trial
court’s discretion, in exchange for dismissal of all other
pending charges. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court
imposed a sentence within the presumptive range for an offender
at Defendant’s prior record level of a minimum 267 and maximum
330 months in prison. The trial court also ordered that upon his
release from prison, Defendant must register as a sex offender -4- for a period of 30 years. Regarding SBM, the State’s STATIC-99
report classified Defendant at the lowest risk level for
reoffending with minus-one point, and the order the State
prepared for the trial judge to sign stated Defendant was not a
sexually violent predator or recidivist and that the offense of
conviction was not an aggravated offense. The prosecutor
explained that although these factors standing alone did not
require that Defendant be ordered to enroll in SBM, the trial
court could enter additional findings to support such an order,
which the trial court subsequently did. Citing Defendant’s
supervisory role with the victim as an additional finding that
required the highest possible level of supervision and
monitoring, the court ordered Defendant to enroll in SBM for a
period of 15 years following his release from prison. On 22
November 2013, Defendant filed a pro se notice of his intent to
appeal.
We note at the outset that Defendant is not entitled to an
appeal as a matter of right to challenge the trial court’s
acceptance of his guilty plea. See State v. Bolinger, 320 N.C.
596, 601, 359 S.E.2d 459, 462 (1987) (“[A] defendant is not
entitled as a matter of right to appellate review of his
contention that the trial court improperly accepted his guilty -5- plea.”). Under North Carolina law, a defendant who pleads guilty
has a right of appeal limited to the issues of whether the
sentence: (1) is supported by sufficient evidence, but only if
the minimum term of imprisonment does not fall within the
presumptive range; (2) is based on an erroneous finding of the
defendant’s prior record or conviction level; (3) imposes a type
of sentence disposition or term of imprisonment that is not
authorized for the defendant’s class of offense and prior record
or conviction level; (4) resulted from the trial court’s
improper denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress; or (5)
resulted from the trial court’s improper denial of the
defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A–1444 (2013). However, our Supreme Court has held
that a defendant who alleges the trial court improperly accepted
his guilty plea “may obtain appellate review of this issue only
upon grant of a writ of certiorari.” Bolinger, 320 N.C. at 601,
359 S.E.2d at 462.
Here, through his appointed appellate counsel, Defendant
has timely petitioned this Court for writs of certiorari
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444(e) and N.C.R. App. P. 21
to challenge (1) whether his guilty plea was voluntarily and
knowingly entered and was the product of an informed choice; and -6- (2) whether his guilty plea was supported by an adequate factual
basis. Additionally, Defendant has petitioned for a writ of
certiorari to challenge whether the trial court erred in
ordering him to enroll in SBM after his release from prison, and
the State has filed its own petition for a writ of certiorari
seeking to challenge the trial court’s ruling that statutory
rape of a person 13, 14, or 15 years old was not an aggravated
offense pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.6(1a) (2013). We
first address Defendant’s argument that his guilty plea should
be vacated.
Since our decision in State v. Rhodes, 163 N.C. App. 191,
592 S.E.2d 731 (2004), this Court has regularly granted
certiorari to review alleged violations of the procedural
requirements set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022 for
accepting guilty pleas. Id. at 194, 592 S.E.2d at 733. See also,
e.g., State v. DeMaio, 216 N.C. App. 558, 562, 716 S.E.2d 863,
866 (2011) (allowing review of defendant’s challenge that his
plea was improperly accepted because it was not the product of
informed choice and did not provide him the benefit of his
bargain). Accordingly, we grant Defendant’s petition and review
the issues.
I. Defendant’s Guilty Plea -7- A. Voluntary and Knowing Product of an Informed Choice
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in
determining that his plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily
as the product of an informed choice, as required by N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-1022(b), because the terms of his plea were not
sufficiently clear to allow him to be fully aware of its direct
consequences. Specifically, Defendant contends the trial court
violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022(a)(6) by failing to inform
him of the minimum term of imprisonment and by misinforming him
of the maximum possible punishment on the charge for which he
was being sentenced. As a result of this alleged error,
Defendant argues that the trial court’s judgment must be
vacated. We disagree.
Because a plea of guilty requires a defendant to forfeit
fundamental rights such as a trial by jury and the right against
self-incrimination, due process requires that the record must
affirmatively establish that the entry of the plea was made
voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly. See Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 280 (1969). In
order for a guilty plea to be voluntary, it must be “entered by
one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual
value of any commitments made to him by the court . . . .” Brady -8- v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 760
(1970) (citation omitted). Thus, our General Assembly has
codified the procedural requirements governing the adjudication
of guilty pleas. Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A–1022, a trial court
may not accept a guilty plea from a defendant without first
addressing him personally and:
(1) Informing him that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used against him;
(2) Determining that he understands the nature of the charge;
(3) Informing him that he has a right to plead not guilty;
(4) Informing him that by his plea he waives his right to trial by jury and his right to be confronted by the witnesses against him;
(5) Determining that the defendant, if represented by counsel, is satisfied with his representation;
(6) Informing him of the maximum possible sentence on the charge for the class of offense for which the defendant is being sentenced, including that possible from consecutive sentences, and of the mandatory minimum sentence, if any, on the charge; and
(7) Informing him that if he is not a citizen of the United States of America, a plea of guilty or no contest may result in deportation, the exclusion from admission to this country, or the denial of naturalization under federal law. -9-
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A–1022(a) (2013). However, this Court has
“refuse[d] to adopt a technical, ritualistic approach” to
assessing compliance with the requirements of section 15A-1022.
State v. Richardson, 61 N.C. App. 284, 289, 300 S.E.2d 826, 829
(1983). “Failure to strictly adhere to the requirements of the
statute, without more, does not entitle [a] defendant to have
the judgment vacated.” State v. Salvetti, 202 N.C. App. 18, 27,
687 S.E.2d 698, 704, disc. review denied, 364 N.C. 246, 699
S.E.2d 919 (2010). “Even when a violation occurs, there must be
prejudice before a plea will be set aside.” State v. McNeill,
158 N.C. App. 96, 103, 580 S.E.2d 27, 31 (2003). Indeed, “the
omission of this inquiry has been held to be harmless error if
the record demonstrates that the defendant’s plea was knowingly
and voluntarily entered.” State v. Santos, 210 N.C. App. 448,
451, 708 S.E.2d 208, 211 (2011). Thus, we must “look to the
totality of the circumstances” surrounding the acceptance of the
plea and “determine whether non-compliance with the statute
either affected [the] defendant’s decision to plead or
undermined the plea’s validity.” State v. Hendricks, 138 N.C.
App. 668, 670, 531 S.E.2d 896, 898 (2000).
In the present case, Defendant insists that the trial court
erred when it told him he could potentially be sentenced to life -10- in prison because——as a prior record level II offender——the
presumptive range maximum he faced for one class B1 felony
conviction is only 344 months according to our State’s
structured sentencing grid. N.C. Gen Stat. § 15A-1340.17(c)
(2013). Defendant relies on this Court’s decision in State v.
Reynolds, 218 N.C. App. 433, 721 S.E.2d 333, disc. review
denied, 366 N.C. 219, 726 S.E.2d 855 (2012), as support for his
argument that because he was not properly informed of the
maximum sentence he faced, his plea was not knowing, voluntary,
or the product of an informed choice. Defendant’s reliance on
Reynolds is misplaced.
In Reynolds, this Court vacated a guilty plea of a
defendant who was erroneously informed by the trial court that
the maximum possible sentence he faced for felony breaking and
entering and felony larceny as an habitual felon was 168 months
imprisonment when, in actuality, he received a maximum sentence
of 171 months. As we explained, “[w]hile the difference between
the maximum sentence described by the trial court and the
correct maximum sentence is only three months, we cannot say
that an additional three months of possible imprisonment is not
prejudicial.” Id. at 437, 721 S.E.2d at 336. Thus, we held that
“the trial court’s failure to properly inform [the d]efendant of -11- the maximum sentence he faced calls into question the
voluntariness of his guilty plea” and remanded the case for a
new trial. Id. at 438, 721 S.E.2d at 336 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Here, Defendant essentially argues that because he got a
better deal than he bargained for——267 to 330 months in prison,
rather than a life sentence——we should stretch our holding in
Reynolds to apply under the opposite circumstances and vacate
his plea. But this argument ignores a crucial distinction
between the two cases. In Reynolds, the voluntariness of the
defendant’s guilty plea was called into question because he
received a harsher sentence than he was told he could receive as
a result of the trial court’s error, whereas here, Defendant not
only received a lighter sentence but, more significantly, our
cases indicate that the trial court did not err at all.
Our Supreme Court has stated that the maximum possible
sentence “is that which could be imposed if the defendant were
in the highest criminal history category and the offense were
aggravated.” State v. Lucas, 353 N.C. 568, 596, 548 S.E.2d 712,
730 (2001), overruled on other grounds by State v. Allen, 359
N.C. 425, 615 S.E.2d 256 (2005). The rationale for such a rule
is that: -12- Although the parties may have agreed to the sentence that will actually be imposed, the court must nevertheless again advise the defendant of the maximum possible sentence. Warning a defendant of the harshest possible outcome ensures that the defendant is fully advised of the implications of the charge against him or her and, if pleading, is aware of the possible consequences of the plea.
Id. (citation omitted). Thus, when advising a defendant of the
consequences of his guilty plea, the trial court does not err by
focusing on the theoretical maximum sentence that any defendant
could receive. Indeed, in at least two prior unpublished
opinions, this Court has explained that the plain language of
section 15A-1022(a)(6) does not require the trial court to
specifically tailor its explanation of the maximum possible
sentence to fit a particular defendant’s projected prior record
level. See State v. Felton, __ N.C. App. __, 606 S.E.2d 458
(2005) (unpublished), available at 2005 WL 14623 (“[N]othing in
G.S. § 15A-1022(a)(6) requires the trial court to adjust the
‘maximum possible sentence’ based upon a particular defendant’s
projected prior record level.”); State v. Hayes, __ N.C. App.
__, 615 S.E.2d 739 (2005) (unpublished) available at 2005 WL
1669612 (“Contrary to defendant’s assertion, nothing in N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022(a)(6) requires a trial court to tailor
the information regarding the maximum and minimum possible -13- sentences for an offense by inquiring into each defendant’s
projected prior record level.”).1
According to our State’s structured sentencing grid, the
maximum possible sentence for an aggravated B1 felony for a
defendant with either of the highest two prior record levels (V
or VI) is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.17(c). Because Defendant was
accurately informed of this in the written transcript of his
plea and during his plea colloquy, we hold that the trial court
did not err in advising Defendant of the maximum sentence he
faced.
Defendant further contends that his plea could not have
been the result of an informed decision because the trial court
erred by failing to inform him of the minimum sentence he faced.
This argument also fails. Under section 15A-1022(a)(6), the
trial court is required to inform defendants “of the mandatory
minimum sentence, if any, on the charge[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. §
15A-1022(a)(6). Thus, the statute’s plain language demonstrates
that this requirement only applies to certain offenses that are
1 Although Rule 30(e)(3) of North Carolina’s Rules of Appellate Procedure holds that this Court’s unpublished decisions do not constitute controlling legal authority, we find these two cases persuasive and consistent with the precedent established by our Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas. -14- not subject to our State’s structured sentencing scheme because
our General Assembly has prescribed statutory mandatory minimum
sentences for those offenses. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-
95(h) (2013) (providing for mandatory sentences based upon the
type and weight of the controlled substance trafficked); N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 20-138.5(b) (2013) (providing a person convicted of
habitual impaired driving shall be sentenced to a minimum active
term of not less than 12 months of imprisonment). Rather than
prescribing a mandatory minimum sentence for statutory rape of a
person who is 13, 14, or 15 years old, our General Assembly has
classified the offense as a Class B1 felony, subject to
structured sentencing. In the present case, this means that the
trial court was not under any duty to inform Defendant of any
mandatory minimum sentence, and we accordingly find no violation
of section 15A-1022(a)(6).
Finally, considering the totality of the circumstances, in
both the written transcript of his plea and during his plea
colloquy, Defendant averred that he understood that he had the
right to remain silent, he understood the nature of the charges
against him, and that he had discussed with his lawyer any
possible defenses. Defendant understood that he was pleading
guilty to one count of statutory rape of a person who is 13, 14, -15- or 15 years old, a Class B1 felony with a maximum punishment of
life imprisonment, and that in exchange for his plea, the State
had agreed to dismiss three additional charges of statutory rape
and four counts of sex offense by a person in a parental role.
Defendant also averred that no one had promised him anything or
threatened him in any way to cause him to enter the plea against
his wishes. Thus, the record indicates Defendant’s plea was, in
fact, knowingly and voluntarily entered. Accordingly, because
Defendant’s argument for vacating his guilty plea under section
15A-1022(b) is predicated entirely on these erroneous assertions
that the trial court failed to comply with section 15A-
1022(a)(6), we hold that the trial court did not err in finding
Defendant’s guilty plea was the product of an informed choice.
B. Factual Basis to Support Guilty Plea
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in
determining that there was a factual basis to support his guilty
plea to statutory rape of a person who is 13, 14, or 15 years
old because the State failed to prove each element of the
offense. Specifically, Defendant claims that the State did not
prove that he engaged in vaginal intercourse with the victim. We
find this argument to be entirely devoid of merit. -16- Under North Carolina law, the trial court may not accept a
guilty plea “without first determining that there is a factual
basis for the plea.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022(c). While a
guilty plea standing alone is itself insufficient to establish a
factual basis, see State v. Sinclair, 301 N.C. 193, 199, 270
S.E.2d 418, 421 (1980), the statute expressly provides that the
trial court’s determination may be based upon “[a] statement of
the facts by the prosecutor.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022(c)(1).
This Court has repeatedly held that when a prosecutor recites
the factual basis at the plea hearing and the defendant
stipulates to those facts, the trial court does not err in
determining that a factual basis exists to support a guilty
plea. See, e.g., State v. Crawford, __ N.C. App. __, __, 737
S.E.2d 768, 771, disc. review denied, 366 N.C. 590, 743 S.E.2d
196 (2013).
In the present case, Defendant stipulated in the transcript
of his plea agreement and again during his plea colloquy that
there was a factual basis for his plea, and he also consented to
the prosecutor summarizing the facts for the trial court. The
prosecutor summarized the factual basis to support Defendant’s
guilty plea as follows:
In the fall of 2009 a minor child at the time age 13-years-old, [A.M.], was placed -17- into this Defendant’s home along with that, along with Lonnelle Vaughn’s wife, Kitrell (phonetic) Vaughn. He was the guardian for that minor at the time. A sexual relationship started by this Defendant. This Defendant was the only person who got income to the house. It was a disability check that’s fairly sizeable and he would withhold money and food and clothing for the other children in the house which there were six other children in the house at the time, Your Honor, and force the minor child, 13- years-old, to have sex with him in order for him to provide money, clothing, food for the other children in the house. In a sense he guilt tripped her into having sex with him.
During that time around, between the times of January and April of that year she was having sex with the Defendant regularly, several times a week. She became pregnant and had a child who is alive today born in November of 2010, [L.M.], Your Honor. At the time she was 13. At the time the Defendant was more than six-years-older than her, his birthday being October 9th, 1973. He was not legally married to her at the time. He is legally married to a Kitrell Vaughn.
Defense counsel did not object to this recitation of the facts
and expressly declined to add anything further for the trial
court to consider. In defining the offense of statutory rape of
a person who is 13, 14, or 15 years old, section 14-27.7A of our
General Statutes provides that,
[a] defendant is guilty of a Class B1 felony if the defendant engages in vaginal intercourse or a sexual act with another person who is 13, 14, or 15 years old and the defendant is at least six years older -18- than the person, except when the defendant is lawfully married to the person.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.7A(a) (2013). Although Defendant insists
that the State failed to prove he engaged in vaginal intercourse
with the victim, he has already stipulated to the facts that he
forced the victim “to have sex with him” and that she later gave
birth to his child. Our prior cases make clear that, combined
with the prosecutor’s recitation of the facts, those
stipulations are sufficient to establish a factual basis for
Defendant’s guilty plea. See Crawford, __ N.C. App. at __, 737
S.E.2d at 771. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not
err in finding Defendant’s guilty plea was supported by a
factual basis.
II. SBM for Aggravated Offense
Finally, both Defendant and the State filed petitions for
writs of certiorari seeking to challenge the trial court’s order
requiring Defendant to enroll in SBM for a period of 15 years
following his release from prison. On appeal from an SBM order,
this Court reviews “the trial court’s findings of fact to
determine whether they are supported by competent record
evidence, and . . . the trial court’s conclusions of law for
legal accuracy and to ensure that those conclusions reflect a
correct application of law to the facts found.” State v. Kilby, -19- 198 N.C. App. 363, 367, 679 S.E.2d 430, 432 (2009) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). “The trial court’s findings
of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent
evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting.” Id. at 366, 679
S.E.2d at 432 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Section 14-208.40A of our General Statutes provides that a
trial court shall order a criminal defendant to enroll in
lifetime SBM if it finds, inter alia, that the offender has
committed an aggravated offense. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
208.40A(c) (2013). An “aggravated offense” is defined as
any criminal offense that includes either of the following: (i) engaging in a sexual act involving vaginal, anal, or oral penetration with a victim of any age through the use of force or the threat of serious violence; or (ii) engaging in a sexual act involving vaginal, anal, or oral penetration with a victim who is less than 12 years old.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.6(1a) (2013). Section 14-208.40A(d)
provides that if the defendant was not convicted of an
aggravated offense, or determined to be a recidivist or sexually
violent predator, the trial court can only order SBM enrollment
after reviewing a STATIC-99 risk assessment report. The STATIC-
99 risk assessment “is an actuarial instrument designed to
estimate the probability of sexual and violent recidivism among
male offenders who have already been convicted of at least one -20- sexual offense against a child or non-consenting adult.” State
v. Thomas, __ N.C. App. __, __, 741 S.E.2d 384, 386 (2013)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If, based on
the STATIC-99, the trial court determines that the defendant
“require[s] the highest possible level of supervision and
monitoring, the court shall order the offender to enroll in
[SBM] for a period of time to be specified by the court.” N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-208.40A(e). Even if the defendant’s STATIC-99
score indicates his risk of reoffending is low, the trial court
can still order SBM by making additional findings based on “any
proffered and otherwise admissible evidence relevant to the risk
posed by a defendant.” State v. Morrow, 200 N.C. App. 123, 131,
683 S.E.2d 754, 760–61 (2009), affirmed per curiam, 364 N.C.
424, 700 S.E.2d 224 (2010). “These additional findings must be
supported by competent record evidence and must support the
trial court’s ultimate conclusion of law.” See Thomas, __ N.C.
App. at __, 741 S.E.2d at 386 (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted).
In the present case, Defendant contends the trial court’s
additional finding that he was in a supervisory role with the
victim was insufficient to justify its SBM order, given that the
AOC-CR-615 form the State prepared for his sentencing hearing -21- did not classify him as a sexually violent predator or
recidivist, and did not classify the offense of his conviction
as an aggravated offense, while the DOC’s STATIC-99 risk
assessment indicated he had a low risk of reoffending. On the
other hand, the State argues that, in light of this Court’s
holding in Sprouse, the trial court erred by ruling that the
offense of statutory rape of a person who is 13, 14, or 15 years
old is not an aggravated offense as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. §
14-208.6(1a). The State therefore seeks remand for the trial
court to order that Defendant be enrolled in lifetime SBM in
accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. §14-208.40A(c).
Both parties concede they have lost their chance to appeal
as of right: Defendant admits his original pro se notice of
appeal was defective insofar as it omitted the docket number of
the case he sought to appeal, failed to address the appropriate
appellate court, and was never properly served on the State,
while the State acknowledges that it failed to give notice of
its intent to appeal within the thirty-day window allowed by
Rule 3 of our Rules of Appellate Procedure, which governs here
because SBM is a civil regulatory scheme rather than a criminal
punishment. See State v. Brooks, 204 N.C. App. 193, 194, 693
S.E.2d 204, 206 (2010). Rule 21 of North Carolina’s Rules of -22- Appellate Procedure vests us with discretion to grant certiorari
review, and we turn first to the State’s petition, as its
resolution is dispositive on this issue.
Defendant opposes the State’s petition for certiorari on
the grounds that it failed to meet its filing deadline, failed
to preserve the issue for appellate review by objecting at
trial, and is complaining of an error that came at its own
invitation, given that the State originally advised the trial
court that Defendant’s offense was not an aggravated one.
However, this Court has previously allowed the State’s petition
for a writ of certiorari in a virtually identical scenario in
State v. Oxendine, 206 N.C. App. 205, 696 S.E.2d 850 (2010). In
Oxendine, the State petitioned for certiorari to challenge an
SBM determination, arguing that the trial court erred by failing
to classify the defendant’s guilty plea to three counts of
second-degree rape of a mentally disabled victim as an
aggravated offense. Id. at 209, 696 S.E.2d at 853. Although the
prosecutor never objected at trial and the State failed to file
a timely appeal, this Court granted certiorari in light of its
decision in State v. McCravey, 203 N.C. App. 627, 692 S.E.2d
409, disc. review denied, 364 N.C. 438, 702 S.E.2d 506 (2010),
where we held that second-degree rape, as defined by statute, -23- does indeed qualify as an aggravated offense and thus requires
lifetime SBM enrollment. Consequently, in Oxendine, we vacated
the trial court’s original 10-year SBM order and remanded for
entry of an appropriate order in light of McCravey. 206 N.C.
App. at 212, 696 S.E.2d at 854-55.
Similarly, in the present case, the State argues, based on
this Court’s decision in Sprouse, that the trial court’s 15-year
SBM order derives from an improper conclusion of law——
specifically, that statutory rape of a person who is 13, 14, or
15 years old is not an aggravated offense. We agree. In Sprouse,
this Court held that a person who is 13, 14, or 15 years old is
statutorily incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse. 217
N.C. App. at 241, 719 S.E.2d at 242. As we explained, because
“an act of sexual intercourse with a person deemed incapable of
consenting as a matter of law is a violent act,” statutory rape
of a person who is 13, 14, or 15 years old qualifies as an
aggravated offense for lifetime SBM purposes. Id. (citation
omitted).
Because we agree with the State that in light of our prior
holding in Sprouse the trial court erred as a matter of law in
concluding that Defendant had not committed an aggravated
offense, we need not reach Defendant’s argument regarding the -24- trial court’s additional findings. Accordingly, we vacate the
trial court’s 15-year SBM order and remand for entry of an
appropriate order in light of Sprouse.
AFFIRMED in part; VACATED and REMANDED in part.
Judges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur.
Report per 30(e).