State v. United Electric Light & Water Co.

97 A. 857, 90 Conn. 452
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
DecidedJune 5, 1916
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 97 A. 857 (State v. United Electric Light & Water Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. United Electric Light & Water Co., 97 A. 857, 90 Conn. 452 (Colo. 1916).

Opinion

Thayer, J.

The questions reserved in each of the two cases whose captions appear above depend upon the *456 construction which is to be placed upon Part II of chapter 292 of the Public Acts of 1915. The cases have been argued together and this opinion will apply to both.

Chapter 292 of the Public Acts of 1915 lays a State tax upon various corporations and companies operating within the State. Part one relates to railroad and street-railway corporations; part two to certain water, gas, electric and power companies; part three to stock insurance corporations; and part four to miscellaneous corporations. The defendants are companies taxed under part two, which provides that such companies shall pay an annual tax of one and one half per centum on their gross earnings from operations in this State. As their operations are entirely within the State, the board of equalization in fixing the amount of the gross earnings of the defendants included therein the earnings from all their operations. The defendants say that only the earnings from those operations which constitute the “principal business” of each company should have been included in that amount; that as it is the principal business of the companies which subjects them to taxation, it is the earnings in those operations only which are taxable.

Section 11 designates or describes the companies which are to be taxed under part two, by reference to their “principal business.” Companies whose principal business is not the manufacture of gas, electricity or power, or. the operation of water-works, may, under the statutes or their charters, operate plants for these purposes in connection with their principal business, and may sell surplus power, water, gas or electricity to their neighbors. Such companies are not included in the class of companies taxed under part two, but in classes taxed under other provisions of the Act. The words “principal business” in § 11 designate the com *457 panies and not the operations to be taxed. The statute says that these companies shall pay a tax upon their gross earnings from operations. The operations are not limited by the language to operations in the principal business. The natural purport of the language used is that they shall pay a tax upon their gross earnings from all their operations. It is inconsistent with the purpose of the statute that a company which manufactures and sells electricity to be used for light, heat or power as its principal business, and also manufactures and sells gas for similar uses, and operates a system of water-works for selling and distributing water for domestic and power purposes, should pay a tax only upon the earnings from operations of the principal business, and that a company whose sole business is to manufacture and sell electricity to be used for light, heat and power, or one which as its sole business manufactures gas to be sold and used for like purposes, shall pay a tax upon its entire earnings. Most of this class of companies are corporations organized under broad special charters, having the power to carry on, and in fact carrying on, not only the “principal business” which brings them within the class taxed under part two of the statute, but other business as well.

The clear intention of the legislature, from the language used, was that companies of the class designated should pay a tax measured by a percentage of the gross earnings from all their operations. This would have been no clearer had the words “from all sources” been inserted between the words “gross earnings” and “from operations in this State,” as is done in part one, which refers to railroad and street-railway corporations.

The fact that in cases where a company carries on business a part of which is without this State, the statute, § 12, provides that gross earnings (i. e. gross *458 earnings from operations in this State), for purposes of assessment and taxation, shall be such proportional part of the entire earnings of the corporation as the mileage of water pipes, gas mains, and electric wires, operated by it in this State bears to its entire mileage, offers, so far as we can see, no substantial basis for the claim that only earnings from operations in the principal business of the company are intended to be taxed. The method of arriving at the gross earnings in such cases is an arbitrary one, whether earnings from all operations or only from those in the principal business are referred to; but, so far as appears, the rule would be as applicable to subordinate as to principal operations. We hold, therefore, that by gross earnings from operations in this State was intended all operations in this State, including incidental, subordinate and subsidiary operations as well as principal operations.

If, therefore, the defendants are correct in their claims that the sums received by the water company for the sale of apples and hay grown upon its land, and the sum received for the right to take ice from its pond did not constitute earnings arising from operations in its principal business, they were properly included in the gross earnings of the company, for they were earnings arising from operations of the company incidental to^ its principal business. The same is true of the sums received by the electric light and water company for the sale of coke, tar and other residual products, and from the sale of gas and electric appliances for heating, cooking and lighting. These operations are so closely connected with the principal business of the manufacture and sale of gas and electricity, as to seem to be a part of the principal business of the company. If not so, they are clearly included in the taxable operations of the company as incidental and subsidiary thereto. The demurrers to the partial defenses which allege *459 that these were not taxable operations should, therefore, be sustained.

The demurrers to the remaining partial defenses raise the question whether the words “gross earnings,” when used in part two of the statute, mean the entire earnings from all operations, or such earnings less operating expenses, taxes and bad debts. The result to the State would be very different under the latter construction than under the former. Under the latter, there will be no tax upon the companies and no revenue to the State if the companies make no profit from their operations, while under the former construction the State will receive a revenue from the corporations if there are earnings although no profits to the companies.

Section 16 provides that the tax in question shall be in lieu of all license, corporate excess, and income taxes payable to the State, and exempts the owner of any share of stock, bond, or other evidence of indebtedness of the company hable to tax under part two, from taxation thereon. Under the construction claimed by the defendants, the corporation would escape State taxation, and the holders of its securities would escape taxation thereon, if the company failed to make a profit. The purpose of part two manifestly was to raise revenue for the State by taxing these companies upon their franchises or business. The class of companies taxed necessarily operate under Special Acts permitting them to lay their pipes and string their wires in the streets and highways of the State. They are thus properly subject to a State tax upon the franchises and privileges thus granted them.

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Bluebook (online)
97 A. 857, 90 Conn. 452, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-united-electric-light-water-co-conn-1916.