State v. Underwood
This text of 661 S.E.2d 529 (State v. Underwood) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
In 2005, Matthew R Underwood was pulled over, placed under arrest, and read the statutory implied consent warning. Underwood consented to drug and alcohol testing but later moved to suppress the unfavorable results at trial. The trial court granted Underwood’s suppression motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. 1 We granted the State’s petition for certiorari to answer the following question:
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the grant of a defendant’s motion to suppress the results of a State-administered breath test where an officer who had probable cause to arrest a defendant for DUI read the implied consent rights of OCGA § 40-5-55[ 2 ] to the defendant but arrested *499 the defendant... for a non-DUI offense? See Hough v. State, 279 Ga. 711, 715 (2) (a) (620 SE2d 380) (2005).
We have determined that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s grant of the motion to suppress. Accordingly, we now reverse.
The following facts are undisputed. In 2005, Underwood was pulled over as a suspect in a hit-and-run incident. Underwood displayed obvious signs of intoxication, and a crack pipe fell out of his glove compartment as he was searching for his insurance card to show to the investigating officer. As the officer was putting Underwood in handcuffs, Underwood inquired whether he was under arrest. The officer responded that he was and mentioned two potential charges: hit-and-run and possession of illegal drug paraphernalia. The officer did not explicitly advert to any DUI charges at that precise moment, but shortly thereafter, he read Underwood the statutory implied consent warning, which is replete with references to DUI. 3 Underwood consented to be tested for drugs and alcohol in his system, and the results showed that he had a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.161, well above the legal limit.
The State eventually charged Underwood with reckless driving, two drug offenses, and two counts of DUI, and Underwood filed a *500 motion to suppress the results of the drug and alcohol testing. Underwood argued that the results were not admissible under the implied consent law because at the time the implied consent warning was read, he had not been “arrested for any offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed in violation of” the DUI statute. 4 Underwood seized on the arresting officer’s mention of the crimes of possession of illegal drug paraphernalia and hit-and-run as he was placing Underwood in handcuffs as proof that he was “arrested for” those crimes and not for a violation of the DUI statute.
The trial court expressly found that the officer had probable cause to arrest Underwood for DUI but held, based on the officer’s statement, that Underwood was not “arrested for” an offense arising out of the acts that constitute DUI and granted the suppression motion on that basis. The Court of Appeals felt bound by what it described as the trial court’s resolution of “an issue of fact” and concluded it could not say, based on the evidence in the record, that the trial court’s factual finding was clearly erroneous. 5 The Court of Appeals therefore affirmed the trial court’s judgment granting the motion to suppress.
The Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard of review to the trial court’s judgment. In cases such as this, where the facts relevant to a suppression motion are undisputed, the proper standard of review on appeal is de novo, not clearly erroneous. 6 Our statement in Vansant v. State applies equally well in this case:
While the trial court’s findings as to disputed facts in a ruling on a motion to suppress will be reviewed to determine whether the ruling was clearly erroneous, where the evidence is uncontroverted and no question regarding the credibility of witnesses is presented, the trial court’s application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo appellate review. [Cit.] While we recognize that a trial court’s ruling frequently involves a mixed question of fact *501 and law, such is not the case in the instant appeal. Accordingly, we will conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s ruling. 7
Had the Court of Appeals applied the proper standard of review, we have no doubt that it would have concluded, as we do, that the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress. As the trial court held and the Court of Appeals acknowledged, the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest Underwood for violating the DUI statute. The officer then arrested Underwood and read him the statutory implied consent warning. The coincidence of probable cause to arrest Underwood for a violation of the DUI statute and Underwood’s actual arrest meant that Underwood was, as a matter of law, “arrested for an[ ] offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed in violation of” the DUI statute. 8 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment granting the motion to suppress.
Judgment reversed.
State v. Underwood, 285 Ga. App. 640 (647 SE2d 338) (2007).
OCGA § 40-5-55 (a) provides in relevant part as follows:
The State of Georgia considers that any person who drives or is in actual physical control of any moving vehicle in violation of any provision of Code Section 40-6-391 [i.e., the DUI statute] constitutes a direct and immediate threat to the welfare and *499 safety of the general public.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
661 S.E.2d 529, 283 Ga. 498, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 1701, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 422, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-underwood-ga-2008.