State v. Tyrone Meade

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON

JUNE SESSION, 1998 FILED September 11, 1998

TYRONE G. MEADE, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9708-CR-00316 ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appe llant, ) Appellate C ourt Clerk

)

) SHELBY COUNTY

VS. )

) HON. JAMES C. BEASLEY, JR.

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE )

Appellee. ) (Post Conviction)

ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CRIMINAL COURT OF SHELBY COUNTY

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

RANDALL B. TOLLEY JOHN KNOX WALKUP 242 Poplar Avenue Attorney General and Reporter Memphis, TN 38103 DOUGLAS D. HIMES

Assistant Attorney General 425 5th Avenu e North

Nashville, TN 37243

WILLIAM GIBBONS

District Attorney General

JOHN CAMPB ELL

Assistant District Attorney General Criminal Justice Complex, Suite 301 201 Poplar Street

Memphis, TN 38103

OPINION FILED ________________________ AFFIRMED DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE

OPINION

The Defendant ap peals the trial court’s de nial of his pe tition for post-

conviction relief. He was convicted by a jury verdict of two counts of second degree murder. He sought post-conviction relief asserting that he received ineffective assistan ce of counsel at trial. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief and we affirm.

The Defendant was co nvicted of tw o coun ts of second degree murder for shooting and killing Charles Matthews and Lavester Jefferson in Memphis, Tennessee. He originally received an effective sentence of forty years. He appealed his convictions and his sentence and this court affirmed his convictions but rem anded for resen tencing. State v. Meade, 942 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). The record indicates that upon resentencing he received two concu rrent twen ty-year sen tences .

With the assis tance of c ounse l, the Defe ndant filed a petition for post-

conviction relief on March 18, 1997. The petition alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to zea lously re prese nt the D efend ant, failin g to file pretrial motions, failing to objec t to testim ony, failin g to investigate, failing to cross- examine witnesses, failing to properly advise the Defendant concerning his right to testify, failing to request a mental evaluation, failing to raise the issue of dimin ished capa city and failing to adeq uately p repar e for trial.

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First, we will briefly discuss the underlying facts. The Defendant gave the police a statement, which was introduced at his trial, in which he admitted that he had shot and killed bo th victims. He said tha t the victims were “crazy” and “high” on both a lcoho l and d rugs. T he m en we re insu lting bo th him and h is girlfriend and he felt threatened by the way they were talking. He told them to leave but they would not, so he shot the first victim. He subsequently got into an argument with the second victim and shot him also. The autop sy report indicated that both victims died of multiple gunshot wounds with at least one wound to the back of each victim’s head at close range. Both victims tested positive for cocaine and alcoh ol. 1 At the post-convictio n hea ring, the Defe ndan t testified and a gain admitted that he had k illed bo th victim s. He s aid that he killed one of the victims in self defense because he was “threatened or provoked” and that the victim had a gun. H e said that the other v ictim a lso thre atene d him , but he didn’t know if that victim had a gun or not. He further stated that he had “over-reacted” when he shot the s econd victim and that his ove rreaction may have been due to the fact that he had consumed alcohol that evening.

In this appeal, the Defendant argues that his trial cou nsel was ineffec tive because (1) he filed no pre trial mo tions to test the streng th of the State’s case, (2) he failed to file a motion to suppress the statements Defendant had give n to police, (3) he filed no motions for discove ry, (4) he filed n o motio n in limine to inquire as to whether a prior manslaughter conviction could be used against the Defendant if he testified, (5) he performed an inadequate investigation of the facts, (6) he fa iled to in vestiga te or rais e the is sue o f dimin ished capacity or

1 For a detailed summary of the facts developed at trial, see State v. Meade, 942 S.W.2d 561, 563-564 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

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request a pretrial mental eva luation, (7) he ma de unpro fessional e rrors in judgment, (8) he gave improp er advice conce rning the decision not to offer any defense proof, including proof of self defense, (9) he misrepresented to the Defendant that he would prevail at trial, and (10) he exhibited an overall lack of effort an d zea l.

Trial couns el testified at g reat leng th concerning the various allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. He testified that he filed no pretrial motions because he though t none were necessary in view of his theory of self defense. He said he saw no grounds on which to file a m otion to supp ress th e Def enda nt’s statem ent. He stated that he filed no discovery motions because the district attorne y’s office gave him free and o pen a cces s to the ir entire file . Trial co unse l’s testimony was un clear con cerning his failure to file a motion to test the admissibility of the De fenda nt’s prior manslaughter conviction as contemplated by Rule 609(a)(3) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. It is clear, however, that at trial the judge ruled that the Defe ndan t’s testim ony co uld not be impeached by reference to this prior conviction and that the Defendant nevertheless decided not to testify.

Trial counsel testified that he adeq uately investig ated th is case and th at his investigator contacted eleven of the eighteen witnesses whose names were given him by the Defendant. He obtained statements from these witnesses and statem ents from other witnesses who testified for the State. Trial counsel further testified that he saw no indications that the Defendant suffered from any mental defects or that “diminished capacity” was a legitimate issue in this case. Counsel testified that in his view, the only defense to the second degree murder charges

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was self defense or provocation, and he believed he raised these issues fully by cross examination of witnesses and through the statements which the Defendant had made to the police. Trial counsel further testified that he advised the Defendant fully concerning the decision whether to testify at trial. He stated that the Defenda nt decided he did not desire to testify. Trial counsel generally denied the remaining factual allegations presented in the post-conviction petition as alleged by the Defendant during his testimony at the post-conviction proceeding.

Other than the De fendant and his trial counsel, the primary additional witness at the post-conviction hearing was a clinical psychologist who testified gene rally that the Defendant’s history of alcohol abu se could po ssibly have affected his mental capacity and decision-making process at the time of the killings.

Subsequent to the e videntia ry hea ring, the post-c onvictio n court filed a written order denying post-conviction relief. The court found that many of coun sel’s decisions and the actions complained of by the Defendant fell clear ly in the category of trial strategy and trial tactics, and the court found no shortcomings in counsel’s actions. Concerning the lack of pretrial motions and discovery, the post-conviction court accredited counsel’s decision not to pursue said motions in view of the open acce ss cou nsel w as give n to the State’s file and his judgmen t that further motions were unnecessary. The court further found that trial counsel had thoroughly investigated the case prior to proceeding to trial. The post-conviction court concluded that defense c ounsel had provided effective representation to the Defendant and had represented the Defendant to the best of his ability. The court further concluded that defense counsel had the

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experience and ab ility to evaluate and properly prepare a criminal case for trial and h ad do ne so in the case at bar. The court accordingly determined that the Defendant had not established his c laim of ineffective assistance of counsel and therefore was no t entitled to po st-convictio n relief.

In determining whether counsel provided effective assistance at trial, the court must decide whether counsel’s performance was within the range of competence dema nded o f attorneys in crimina l cases. Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 93 6 (Ten n. 1975). To succeed on a claim that his counsel was ineffective at trial, a petitioner bears the burden of showing that his counsel made errors so serious that he was not functioning as counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and that the deficient representation prejudiced the petitioner resulting in a failure to produ ce a reliab le result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (19 84); Cooper v. State, 849 S.W .2d 744 , 747 (T enn. 19 93); Butler v. State, 789 S.W .2d 898 , 899 (T enn. 19 90). To satisfy the second prong, the petitioner must sh ow a rea sonab le proba bility that, but for counsel’s unrea sona ble error, the fact finder would have had reasonable doubt regarding petition er’s guilt. Strickland, 466 U .S. at 69 5. This reasonable probability must be “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outc ome.” Harris v. S tate, 875 S.W .2d 662, 665 (Tenn. 199 4).

When reviewing trial counsel’s ac tions, th is cour t shou ld not u se the bene fit of hindsight to secon d-gues s trial strategy and criticize couns el’s tactics. Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982). Counsel’s alleged errors should be judged at the time they were made in light of all facts and circumstances. Strickland, 466 U.S . at 690; see Cooper, 849 S.W.2d at 746.

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In post-conviction relief proceedings, the petitioner has the burden of proving the allegations of fact in his or her petition by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-210(f). The factual findings of the trial court are conclusive on appeal unless the appellate court finds that the evidence preponderates against the judgm ent. Butler, 789 S.W.2d at 899. In the case at bar, the trial court found that defense counsel had adequately investigated the case against the Defendant and had d iligently p repar ed for tr ial and zealo usly represented this Defendant. The post-conviction court further determined that other actions of trial counsel properly fell within the category of trial strategy and tactics. The Judge further concluded that the De fenda nt had not es tablish ed his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. We believe the record supports the findings and conclusions of the post-conviction ju dge. F rom o ur revie w of this record, even if we determined that trial counsel was ineffective in some way, we do not believe that the Defendant has established prejudice. He has not demonstrated a reasona ble probability, sufficient to unde rmine our co nfiden ce in the outcome, that but for counse l’s error, the jury w ould h ave ha d a rea sona ble doubt re garding the Defe ndant’s g uilt.

According ly, the judgment of the trial court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed.

___________________________________

DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE

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CONCUR:

___________________________________

PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE

___________________________________

JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE