State v. Turner

2024 Ohio 2196

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Turner, 2024-Ohio-2196.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT GREENE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : Appellee : C.A. No. 2023-CA-51 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2023 TRD 01446 : BREANNE RAE TURNER : (Criminal Appeal from Municipal Court) : Appellant : :

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OPINION

Rendered on June 7, 2024

ADAM JAMES STOUT, Attorney for Appellant

DANIELLE E. SOLLARS, Attorney for Appellee

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HUFFMAN, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Breanne Rae Turner appeals from her conviction for

leaving the scene of an accident. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm the judgment

of the trial court.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} On April 19, 2023, Melinda Richardson, a bus driver for Xenia City Schools, -2-

dropped off elementary school students at Cox Elementary School and was driving to

park the bus at the depot. While driving to the bus depot at approximately 8:52 a.m., she

stopped at the intersection of Church and Detroit Streets and was rear-ended by a black

sports utility vehicle (SUV).

{¶ 3} Officer Everett Harding of the Xenia Police Department was dispatched to

the scene of the collision. Richardson provided Officer Harding with the SUV’s license

plate number, and Turner, who was later identified as the operator of the SUV, was

charged with one count of leaving the scene of an accident under R.C. 4549.02 and one

count of failing to maintain assured clear distance under R.C. 4511.21(A). The matter

proceeded to bench trial on August 9, 2023.

{¶ 4} At trial, Richardson testified for the State. According to Richardson, when she

was stopped at the intersection, she heard a noise upon impact of the SUV in the rear of

the bus and felt the bus move forward. She then saw the driver of the SUV, a black female,

drive away without stopping or providing contact information but not before Richardson

noted the SUV’s license plate number and observed damage to the front of the SUV.

{¶ 5} Officer Harding also testified. Harding stated that, upon arriving at the scene,

he observed no damage to the bus. He entered the SUV’s license plate number provided

by Richardson into LEADS, which returned the address of the registered owner. Officer

Harding then went to the address provided by LEADS and spoke to the registered owner’s

mother, who explained that Turner was the registered owner of the SUV and provided

Harding with Turner’s phone number. Officer Harding then left a voicemail for Turner and,

the next day, Turner contacted Harding by phone. According to Harding, Turner stated -3-

that, while she was at the intersection in her SUV, she had looked in the backseat and

was not paying attention but apparently did not believe that she had actually hit the bus,

so she just backed up and drove off.

{¶ 6} Turner then testified. According to Turner, she was stopped in her SUV

behind the bus at the intersection when she looked in the backseat while keeping her foot

on the brake. When she turned back around, she realized that she was close to the bus

but did not believe that she had hit the bus, even though the bus driver had turned the

bus’s hazard lights on. She admitted that she “felt a bump,” but she still had her foot on

the brake and thus believed she had been stopped. She stated that she then waited for

a moment before backing up, turning right, and driving away. When she returned home

and looked at her vehicle, she realized that she had been in an accident because the

SUV’s hood was damaged. She stated that she then returned to the scene of the accident

but, by that time, no one was there.

{¶ 7} The trial court found Turner guilty of both counts, reasoning that, under the

circumstances of the case, a person like Turner would have known or should have known

that she had hit another vehicle.

{¶ 8} Turner appeals.

II. Assignment of Error

{¶ 9} Turner asserts the following sole assignment of error:

Defendant’s Conviction Under [R.C.] 4549.02 was Without Sufficient

Evidence and Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence.

{¶ 10} A sufficiency of the evidence argument relates to a dispute concerning -4-

whether the State “presented adequate evidence on each element of the offense to allow

the case to go to the jury or sustain the verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Wilson, 2d

Dist. Montgomery No. 22581, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 10, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio

St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). The test for sufficiency of the evidence was set forth

in State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991):

An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence

admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would

convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. In other words, on review for sufficiency, courts are

to assess not whether the State’s evidence is to be believed, but whether, if believed, the

evidence against a defendant would support a conviction. Thompkins at 390.

{¶ 11} A weight of the evidence argument, on the other hand, challenges the

believability of the evidence and asks which of the competing inferences suggested by

the evidence is more believable or persuasive. Wilson at ¶ 12, citing State v. Hufnagel,

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 15563, 1996 WL 501470, *3 (Sept. 6, 1996). The proper test to

apply to a manifest weight of the evidence inquiry is set forth in State v. Martin, 20 Ohio

App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1983), which states:

* * * [T]he court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all -5-

reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and

determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury lost its

way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction

must be reversed and a new trial ordered. * * *

“In order to find that a manifest miscarriage of justice occurred, an appellate court must

conclude that a guilty verdict is ‘against,’ that is, contrary to, the manifest weight of the

evidence presented.” (Citation omitted.) Wilson at ¶ 14.

{¶ 12} However, “[a]lthough sufficiency and manifest weight are different legal

concepts, manifest weight may subsume sufficiency in conducting the analysis; that is, a

finding that a conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily

includes a finding of sufficiency.” State v. Flores-Lopez, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27108,

2017-Ohio-690, ¶ 49, citing State v. McCrary, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-881, 2011-

Ohio-3161, ¶ 11; accord State v. Robinson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26441, 2015-Ohio-

1167, ¶ 17. As a result, “a determination that a conviction is supported by the weight of

the evidence will also be dispositive of the issue of sufficiency.” Flores-Lopez at ¶ 49,

citing State v. Braxton, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-725, 2005-Ohio-2198, ¶ 15.

{¶ 13} The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony

are matters for the trier of fact primarily to resolve. Wilson at ¶ 15, citing State v. DeHass,

10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967). In State v. Lawson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.

16288, 1997 WL 476684, *4 (Aug. 22, 1997), we explained:

Because the factfinder * * * has the opportunity to see and hear the

witnesses, the cautious exercise of the discretionary power of a court of -6-

appeals to find that a judgment is against the manifest weight of the

evidence requires that substantial deference be extended to the factfinder’s

determinations of credibility. The decision whether, and to what extent, to

credit the testimony of particular witnesses is within the peculiar

competence of the factfinder, who has seen and heard the witness.

{¶ 14} Additionally, the trier of fact is in the best position to consider

inconsistencies, along with the witnesses’ manner and demeanor, and determine whether

the witnesses’ testimony is credible. State v. Petty, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 11AP-716,

11AP-766, 2012-Ohio-2989, at ¶ 38, citing State v. Williams, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-

35, 2002-Ohio-4503, ¶ 58. “To that end, the fact finder is free to believe all, part or none

of the testimony of each witness appearing before it.” Id., citing State v. Raver, 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 02AP-604, 2003-Ohio-958, ¶ 21. “Mere disagreement over the credibility of

witnesses is not sufficient reason to reverse a judgment.” Id., citing State v. Wilson, 113

Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 24. Moreover, “[i]t is well-

established that when conflicting evidence is presented at trial, a conviction is not against

the manifest weight of the evidence simply because the trier of fact believed the

prosecution testimony.” In re M.J.C., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2014-05-124, 2015-Ohio-

820, ¶ 35. Thus, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact on the issue

of witness credibility unless it is patently apparent that the trier of fact lost its way in

arriving at its verdict. See Wilson at ¶ 17, citing State v. Bradley, 2d Dist. Champaign No.

1997-CA-3, 1997 WL 691510, *4 (Oct. 24, 1997).

{¶ 15} Turner presents one assignment of error containing two parts: (1) whether -7-

there was sufficient evidence presented for a finding of guilt; and (2) whether the finding

of guilt was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court found Turner guilty

of violating R.C. 4549.02, which requires an operator of a motor vehicle to stop after an

accident on a public road or highway. R.C. 4549.02 states, in part:

(A)(1) In the case of a motor vehicle accident or collision with persons or

property on a public road or highway, the operator of the motor vehicle,

having knowledge of the accident or collision, immediately shall stop the

operator's motor vehicle at the scene of the accident or collision. The

operator shall remain at the scene of the accident or collision until the

operator has given the operator's name and address and, if the operator is

not the owner, the name and address of the owner of that motor vehicle,

together with the registered number of that motor vehicle, to all of the

following:

(a) Any person injured in the accident or collision;

(b) The operator, occupant, owner, or attendant of any motor vehicle

damaged in the accident or collision;

(c) The police officer at the scene of the accident or collision.

{¶ 16} The crux of Turner’s argument is twofold: (1) there was insufficient evidence

that she was the operator of the vehicle involved in the collision; and (2) there was

insufficient evidence that she had knowledge of the accident. Turner contends that her

conviction for leaving the scene of an accident was determined with insufficient evidence

because there was no indication that an accident had occurred requiring her to stop at -8-

the scene. Turner asserts that Richardson did not observe damage to the bus and

probably could not have positively identified Turner’s SUV as the vehicle that struck the

back of the bus. Turner further argues that she did not have the requisite intent at the time

of the accident, as she did know that she had hit the bus when she backed up and drove

off. We disagree.

{¶ 17} The issue on review is whether the evidence presented at trial

demonstrated that Turner was the operator of a motor vehicle on a public road or highway

and failed to immediately stop her vehicle at the scene of an accident or collision. At trial,

Richardson testified that, while she was driving the bus stopped at the intersection, a

black SUV rear-ended the bus. Richardson stated that, although there was no observable

damage to the bus, she heard a noise on impact and felt the bus move forward.

Richardson then observed a damaged black SUV turn right and speed off with no attempt

to stop. She noted the SUV's license plate number and witnessed that a black female,

later identified at trial as Turner, was driving the SUV. While Turner argues that

Richardson could not have positively identified that the SUV that struck the bus was the

same SUV driven by Turner, it is undisputed that Turner was the registered owner of the

black SUV observed by Richardson driving away from the accident. Moreover, Officer

Harding spoke to Turner one day after the accident; Turner admitted to him that she had

been behind the bus at the intersection while looking in the backseat of her vehicle but

also claimed that she did not believe that she had actually hit the bus.

{¶ 18} Turner also admitted at trial that she was behind the bus at the intersection

and, while briefly looking backward, kept her foot on the brake. When she turned back -9-

around, she realized that she was close to the bus but did not believe that she had hit the

bus, despite the fact that the bus’s hazards lights were on. She also admitted that she

had “felt a bump” but believed she had been stopped because her foot remained on the

brake. She claimed that she was confused about why the bus’s hazard lights were on,

paused a moment, and then backed up, turned right, and drove away. When she returned

home and looked at her vehicle, she realized that she had been in an accident because

the hood of her SUV was damaged.

{¶ 19} Under these circumstances, we conclude that it was reasonable for the trial

court to find Turner guilty of leaving the scene of an accident. Based upon the testimony

of Richardson, Officer Harding, and Turner, the trial court could have reasonably found

that Turner was the operator of the black SUV that struck the bus and that she failed to

stop after an accident on a public road. The trial court was free to believe or disregard the

credibility of the State’s witnesses. The trial court was also free to believe or disregard

the credibility of Turner’s testimony concerning whether she knew that a collision had

occurred when she left the scene of the accident. After reviewing the entire record,

weighing the evidence presented by the State and all reasonable inferences, and

considering the credibility of the witnesses, we conclude that the evidence believed by

the trial court established the elements of leaving the scene of an accident, and the trial

court did not lose its way or create a manifest miscarriage of justice in connection with

Turner’s conviction.

{¶ 20} Having concluded that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support

Turner’s conviction and that Turner’s conviction was not against the manifest weight of -10-

the evidence, Turner’s sole assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 21} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

WELBAUM, J. and TUCKER, J., concur.