IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE ) ) v. ) Crim. ID. No. 2310008139 ) JAVON TURNER )
Submitted: October 13, 2025 Decided: January 12, 2025
Upon Javon Turner’s Motion for Postconviction Relief, DENIED.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Zachary D. Rosen, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Attorney for the State of Delaware
Javon Turner, Self Represented
Lugg, J. Javon Turner has filed a motion seeking postconviction relief in which he
challenges his attorney’s performance at various stages of his case. The Court has
reviewed Turner’s motion,1 memorandum, 2 and addendum, 3 the affidavit of Trial
Counsel,4 and the State’s response.5 Turner’s motion for postconviction relief is
denied.
BACKGROUND
On October 17, 2023, the Wilmington Police Department (“WPD”) received
a “ShotSpotter” alert of multiple shots fired in the area of the 800 Block of West 7th
Street in the City of Wilmington.6 WPD Officer Wilson, patrolling nearby, heard
gunshots in the area of 7th Street and North Monroe Street and ran in that direction
to investigate. 7 Officer Wilson saw three males running eastbound on West 6th
1 D.I. 51 (“Def. Mot.”). 2 D.I. 52 (“Def. Mem.”). 3 D.I. 61 (“Def. Addendum”). 4 D.I. 57 (“Aff. Trial Counsel”). 5 D.I. 65 (“State’s Resp.”). 6 D.I. 1, Aff. ¶ 3. Because Turner pled guilty, the Court draws the facts from the affidavit of probable cause supporting his arrest. “Shotspotter” is the name of a company that provides gunshot alerts to law enforcement through a “network of gunfire-detecting acoustic sensors.” ShotSpotter v. VICE Media, LLC, 2022 WL 2373418, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. June 30, 2022). When gunfire is detected, the system “provides a location of the gunfire” to the police department. 7 Aff. ¶ 4. 2 Street toward North Madison Street.8 He ordered the three men to stop; one stopped,
and the other two continued to flee.9 The man who stopped was later released and
not charged in this incident.10 Meziah Thompson, one of the two men who ignored
police commands and fled on foot, was apprehended by another officer.11
Meanwhile, investigators found a young man “in the 800 Block of West 7th
Street, suffering from numerous gunshot wounds about his body.”12 The “victim
was treated on scene and transported to the Christiana Hospital Emergency Room
for treatment.” 13 As the investigation progressed, officers found 27 spent shell
casings, a live round, and 8 projectiles “within the 800 Block of West 7 th Street,”14
and collected video surveillance of that location.15
The video surveillance showed the victim running eastbound in the 800 Block
of West 7th Street as a masked man chased and shot him.16 The victim fell to the
8 Id. 9 Id. 10 Aff. ¶ 10. 11 Aff. ¶ 4. 12 Aff. ¶ 6. 13 Id. 14 Aff. ¶ 7. 15 Aff. ¶ 8. 16 Aff. ¶¶ 8, 9. 3 ground, and the masked man continued to shoot him from close range.17 Other video
surveillance showed two men, wearing face masks and armed with firearms, running
from the scene immediately after the shooting.18 The first man—the shooter—wore
black and white sneakers, black pants, and a dark colored hooded sweatshirt with
white lettering, underneath a black jacket.19 The second man wore gray sneakers,
dark colored pants, and a light gray hooded jacket with a logo on the left chest area,
underneath a black jacket. 20 Meziah Thompson’s attire at the time of his arrest
matched that of the second man seen fleeing the scene.21
Officers canvassed the area and found a firearm in the rear yard of 823 West
6th Street.22 That weapon matched the description of the firearm possessed by the
first man in the surveillance video.23 Further review of surveillance footage revealed
Javon Turner, a few minutes prior to the shooting, clad in the attire worn by the
17 Aff. ¶ 9. 18 Aff. ¶ 8. 19 Aff. ¶¶ 8, 12. 20 Aff. ¶ 8. 21 Aff. ¶ 10. 22 Aff. ¶ 11. 23 Id. 4 shooter.24 In the video preceding the shooting, Turner’s face was not masked and
officers identified him by comparing the video footage to known pictures of Turner.25
On January 16, 2024, a New Castle County grand jury returned an indictment
charging Turner with Attempted Murder First Degree, Possession of a Firearm
During the Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”), Conspiracy First Degree, Wearing
a Disguise During the Commission of a Felony, Possession of a Firearm by a Person
Prohibited (“PFBPP”), and Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited
(“PABPP”).26 On April 8, 2024, Turner moved to suppress evidence found in the
search of an apartment27 and evidence secured from an iPhone.28 The hearing on
these motions was continued at the defendant’s request from August to November
2024 to allow the defendant to develop mitigation material to provide to the State
before it conveyed its final plea offer.29 On November 15, 2024, the Court heard
argument on Turner’s motions and took the matter under advisement.30 Meanwhile,
Turner’s trial was scheduled to begin on January 6, 2025.31
24 Aff. ¶ 12. 25 Aff. ¶ 13. 26 D.I. 5. 27 D.I. 13. 28 D.I. 14. 29 D.I. 29. 30 D.I. 33. 31 D.I. 46. 5 On December 3, 2024, the State informed the Court that it agreed “not to enter
any evidence obtained from Mr. Turner’s phone in its case-in-chief”32 rendering that
suppression motion moot.33 Then, on December 23, 2024, Turner pled guilty to
Attempted Murder in the First Degree. 34 At the parties’ mutual request and
recommendation, the Court sentenced Turner immediately to the minimum term of
fifteen years incarceration followed by decreasing levels of supervision.35 Turner
did not appeal his conviction or sentence.36
On January 30, 2025, Turner, acting pro se, filed a Motion for Postconviction
Relief 37 accompanied by a memorandum in support of his motion. 38 His Trial
32 D.I. 37. 33 D.I. 39. 34 D.I. 47 (“Plea Agreement”) Both Turner’s Plea Agreement and Truth-in- Sentencing Guilty Plea Form are docketed as D.I. 47. 35 D.I. 48 (“Sentence Order”). 36 Turner filed a “Rule 35 Correction of Illegally Imposed Sentence” in which he argued the Court’s sentence violated the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024). D.I. 63. This Court denied the motion, finding that “Turner’s sentence was authorized by his judgment of conviction and is legal.” D.I. 66 ¶ 7. 37 Def. Mot. 38 Def. Mem. 6 Counsel submitted an affidavit responding to Turner’s allegations,39 and the State
filed a response.40 Turner did not reply. 41
Turner asserts two claims in his motion. First, he contends his Trial Counsel
was ineffective for failing to inform him of “newly discovered co-defendant’s
statements upon agreement with the State.” 42 Second, he asserts that his Trial
Counsel’s “failures to raise critical pretrial motions amount[ed] to an actual
prejudice in violation [of the] Due Process Clause.” 43 For the reasons set forth
below, the Court denies Turner’s motion.
ANALYSIS
“Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 provides the exclusive remedy for setting
aside a final judgment of conviction.”44 The Rule is “intended to correct errors in
the trial process, not to allow defendants unlimited opportunities to relitigate their
39 Aff. Trial Counsel. 40 State’s Resp. 41 The Court’s May 19, 2025, Scheduling Order directed Turner to “file any reply to the State’s response within 45 days of the docketing of the State’s response.” D.I. 58 ¶ 7. The State docketed its response on August 29, 2025. State’s Resp. Turner did not reply. The Court considers this motion under consideration 45 days after the docketing of the State’s response, October 13, 2025. 42 Def. Mem. at 1. 43 Id. 44 Jackson v. State, 2007 WL 2231072, at *1 (Del. Aug. 2, 2007). 7 convictions.”45 Rule 61 provides incarcerated individuals a procedure to seek to
have a conviction set aside on the ground that the Court lacked jurisdiction or to
collaterally attack their conviction.46 Before addressing any substantive issues this
Court must first consider and apply Rule 61’s procedural bars. The rule prohibits
the Court from considering a motion that is: (1) untimely (filed more than one year
after the judgment of conviction is final); 47 (2) repetitive; 48 (3) procedurally
defaulted; 49 or (4) formerly adjudicated. 50 Turner’s first, timely, ineffective
assistance of counsel claims are not procedurally barred.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Turner must meet
the two-prong test established by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v.
Washington. 51 Under Strickland, a defendant must show (1) “that counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness;”52 and (2) “that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
45 Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 820 (Del. 2013). 46 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1). 47 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 48 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2). 49 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 50 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 51 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 52 Id. at 688. 8 result of the proceeding would have been different.”53 “A reasonable probability is
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”54
The Court may dispose of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim if the
defendant fails to show a reasonable probability of a different result but for the
counsel’s alleged errors.55 “[A]ctual ineffectiveness claims alleging a deficiency in
attorney performance are subject to a general requirement that the defendant
affirmatively prove prejudice.” 56 A defendant must allege prejudice and then
substantiate that allegation. 57 Because a defendant must prove both parts of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a failure to establish sufficient prejudice
alone is enough to defeat an ineffective assistance of counsel allegation. “It is not
enough ‘to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the
proceeding.’”58 The “court must consider the ‘totality of the evidence,’ and ‘must
53 Id. 54 Id. at 694. 55 Id. at 697. 56 Id. at 693. 57 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1196 (Del. 1996). 58 Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). 9 ask if the [movant] has met the burden of showing that the decision reached would
reasonably likely have been different absent the errors.’”59
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a question of whether Trial
Counsel’s actions were adequate.60 A review of counsel’s representation is subject
to a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was professionally reasonable. 61 As
such, mere allegations will not suffice; instead, a defendant must make concrete
allegations of ineffective assistance, and then substantiate them, or risk summary
dismissal.62
Turner’s Claims
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – “Newly Discovered” Co-Defendant’s Statement
Turner contends that his co-defendant, Meziah Thompson, used privileged
information to “get a lesser sentence” and he, Turner, was never informed of the
agreement.63 Turner fails to substantiate these allegations, and his recitation of the
circumstances surrounding Thompson’s guilty plea are belied by the record.
Thompson pled guilty on September 4, 2024; his plea was not premised on his
59 State v. Reyes, 155 A.3d 331, 343 (Del. 2017) (citing Swan v. State, 28 A.3d 362, 384 (Del. 2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96)). 60 State v. Wright, 2023 WL 2128338, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 21, 2023). 61 Id. 62 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 553, 556 (Del. 1990). 63 Def. Mem. at 16. 10 cooperation with the State.64 Nor did Thompson provide any information to the State
to secure his plea. The State, responding to Turner’s allegation, stated “there was
never any information given to the State by the co-defendant that [Turner] was not
privy to. There was no agreement to testify.”65
Trial Counsel’s representation of Turner was professionally reasonable. On
October 20, 2024, after learning of Thompson’s plea, Trial Counsel met with
Turner.66 During this meeting, “Turner informed Counsel that he wished to accept a
plea that was the same as his co-defendant’s.” 67 So informed, Trial Counsel
negotiated a plea with the State on Turner’s behalf. 68 Trial Counsel’s efforts
convinced the State to extend a plea to Attempted Murder First Degree and to
recommend the statutorily required minimum term of incarceration for that
offense.69 Furthermore, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges against
Turner.70
64 State v. Thompson, Crim. ID. No. 2310007956, D.I. 18. 65 State’s Resp. at 7. 66 Aff. Trial Counsel ¶2. 67 Id. 68 Id. 69 Sentence Order. 70 Plea Agreement. 11 Trial Counsel met with Turner several times before and after Thompson’s plea
and sentencing. She met with Turner to review discovery “on January 3, 2024;
February 9, 2024; March 15, 2024; May 2, 2024; June 1, 2024; June 17, 2024; [and]
August 14, 2024.”71 After learning of Thompson’s plea, Counsel met with Turner
by Zoom “on October 23, 2024; November 1, 2024 [the day of Thompson’s
sentencing]; November 17, 2024; and December 6, 2024” and “in December counsel
met with Mr. Turner at Howard R. Young Correction Institution on two (2)
occasions.” 72 On December 23, 2024, Turner appeared in the Superior Court,
tendered his plea and, with Trial Counsel at his side, engaged in a colloquy with the
Court.73 The record establishes that Turner was fully aware of Thompson’s plea and
sentence when he—Turner—chose to plead guilty. After accepting his plea, the
Superior Court sentenced Turner consistent with the parties’ agreement.74 “There
was no discovery, or no new information, that Counsel received near, at the time of,
or after Mr. Turner entered the plea regarding Mr. Thompson. Mr. Turner entered
71 Aff. Trial Counsel ¶ 3. 72 Id. ¶ 4. 73 Plea Agreement. 74 Trial Counsel thoroughly investigated Turner’s “mental health concerns.” Aff. Trial Counsel ¶ 8. While Counsel was satisfied Turner was competent to stand trial, his “mental health evaluation was used for mitigation.” Id. And “[t]he Court expressly referenced this mitigation when following the joint plea agreement between the State and Mr. Turner.” Id. 12 the plea with full awareness of all discovery and the plea agreement his co-defendant
accepted.”75
Turner contends that, after his plea and sentencing, his attorney told his
parents “that she did not want to go to trial due to co-defendant Meziah Thompson’s
agreement to testify against defendant.”76 To be sure, on December 23, 2024, Turner
informed the Court of his satisfaction with counsel’s representation of him and that
his lawyer fully advised him of his rights.77 “Counsel was prepared to proceed to
trial, and litigated all issues believed to be with merit, prior to trial.”78 Trial Counsel
did not seek to avoid trial; to the contrary, she diligently prepared for trial while
simultaneously developing a mitigation case. And, of course, it was Turner’s
decision alone to plead guilty.79 Trial Counsel’s performance was professionally
reasonable.
To the extent Turner argues that Thompson entered into an agreement with the
State to testify against him in violation of their—Turner and Thompson’s—joint
75 Aff. Trial Counsel ¶ 5. 76 Def. Mem. at 8. 77 Plea Agreement. 78 Aff. Trial Counsel ¶ 9. 79 Taylor v. State, 28 A.3d 399, 406 (Del. 2011). (“A criminal defendant has ‘ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal.’” (quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983))). 13 defense agreement, that claim plainly lacks merit.80 Thompson’s plea agreement did
not call for Thompson to testify against Turner,81 nor was there a “joint defense.”82
Thompson “was not cooperating with the State, did not have an agreement with the
State to testify, did not give information to the State (for a lower plea offer or
otherwise), and was not acting as an agent for the State.”83
Turner alleges his Trial Counsel failed to show him an offer made by the
State.84 But there is no evidence that Trial Counsel failed to convey any plea or other
pertinent information to Turner. To the contrary, Trial Counsel met with Turner at
least fourteen times, reviewed Thompson’s plea with him on multiple occasions,
prepared a mitigation case, and negotiated a favorable resolution on Turner’s
behalf. 85 The record amply demonstrates Trial Counsel provided professionally
80 Within this claim, Turner asks the Court to order the State turn over all communications with Thompson and his Counsel, including notes and times of communications. Def. Addendum at 7. While there is no specific right to discovery under Rule 61, this Court, possesses “inherent authority . . . to grant particularized discovery for good cause shown.” Cabrera v. State, 173 A.3d 1012, 1033 (Del. 2017) (internal citations omitted). There is no evidence that the State failed to provide any information it was legally obligated to provide Turner. Thus, in the absence of a showing of good cause, the Court declines to order the State to provide any additional information to Turner. 81 State’s Resp. at 6. 82 Id. at 7. 83 Id. at 9. 84 Def. Mem. at 12. 85 See generally, Aff. Trial Counsel. 14 reasonable assistance. Turner “entered the plea with full awareness of all
discovery.”86
Turner’s assertion that he suffered a violation of an agreed-upon “joint
defense” with Thompson, too, lacks merit. In a criminal case it is common for
defendants to be indicted and tried together. 87 But, joinder for trial presents no
mutuality of defense. 88 For this reason, dual representation is strongly
discouraged.89 Where defenses diverge to become mutually antagonistic, individual
defendant’s trials are often severed.90 Of course, the State may not deploy an agent
to infringe upon a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel;91 but that did not
occur here. 92 Thompson and Turner were free to independently negotiate plea
86 Id. ¶ 5 (cleaned up). 87 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 8(b); State v. Phillips, 2015 WL 5332388, at *9 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2015) (citing Jenkins v. State, 230 A.2d 262, 272 (Del. 1967). 88 See Phillips v. State, 154 A.3d 1146, 1157 (Joinder can exist where there is a “presence of hostility between a defendant and his codefendant or ‘mere inconsistencies in defenses or trial strategies.’” (quoting Outten v. State, 650 A.2d 1291, 1298 (Del. 1994)). 89 State v. Morris, 1978 WL 183774, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. June 29. 1978) (“Dual representation must be approached with caution by the lawyer and the Court.”); Lewis v. State, 757 A.2d 709, 712 (2000) (“The Comment to Rule 1.7 [of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct] states ‘[t]he potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant.’”). 90 Phillips, 2015 WL 5332388, at *10. 91 State v. Robinson, 209 A.3d 25, 47-48 (2019). 92 State’s Resp. at 9. 15 resolutions, and they did. There is no evidence Thompson encroached upon Turner’s
right to counsel to leverage a better deal on his—Thompson’s—behalf. And, to an
objective observer, each defendant’s plea reflects an attribution of responsibility
commensurate with the role of each actor. While the facts linked Thompson and
Turner as conspirators, evidence revealed Turner to be the individual who chased
down and shot the victim.93
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – “Critical Pretrial Motions”
Turner pled guilty.94 A judge of this Court accepted his plea after a thorough
colloquy.95 By pleading guilty, Turner waived any alleged errors occurring before
the entry of his plea. 96 In any event, Turner has failed to demonstrate deficient
performance or prejudice resulting from Trial Counsel’s representation.
a. Suppression Motions
Turner contends that his Trial Counsel “was in violation [of] the Due Process
Clause when she failed to raise fundamental objections during critical pretrial
stages.”97 According to Turner, Trial Counsel failed to “raise suppression to their
93 Aff. ¶ 12. 94 Plea Agreement. 95 Id. 96 Dollard v. State, 2020 WL 2393353, at *2 (Del. May 11, 2020) (citing Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 2003)). 97 Def. Mem. at 4. 16 fullest potential”98 by seeking to exclude “falsely included surveillance information
within the warrant/probable cause,” 99 the firearm found by police, 100 and certain
items seized during the search of an apartment and a cell phone.101
Turner largely ignores the fact that Trial Counsel sought to suppress evidence
obtained in the search of an apartment102 and evidence obtained from an iPhone.103
The Court heard argument on these motions on November 15, 2024, and took them
under advisement. 104 Following argument, the State agreed not to use evidence
found on the iPhone in its case-in-chief.105 Turner’s subsequent guilty plea rendered
the motions moot.106
Trial Counsel explained she did not file a motion to suppress the surveillance
footage because Turner lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy when walking
along the public roads captured in the surveillance footage.107 Further, she did not
98 Id. at 14. 99 Id. 100 Id. 101 Id. 102 D.I. 13. 103 D.I. 14. 104 D.I. 33. 105 D.I. 37. 106 D.I. 39; Aff. Trial Counsel ¶ 6. 107 Aff. Trial Counsel ¶ 6. 17 file a motion to suppress the firearm because the weapon was found abandoned in
the rear yard of 823 West 6th Street.108
i. Surveillance Footage
Turner alleges that his Trial Counsel should have suppressed surveillance
footage capturing him in the area of the shooting.109 The Fourth Amendment affords
citizens a reasonable expectation of privacy.110 “It is well-established that what a
person knowingly exposes to the public is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.”111 Turner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movement in
public areas and, thus, no Fourth Amendment protections as they relate to the
surveillance footage. Trial Counsel’s decision to forego a challenge to the
admissibility of the surveillance video was professionally reasonable.
ii. Abandonment
Next, Turner contends that Trial Counsel should have suppressed the firearm
found by police when they canvassed the area where the shooting occurred. 112
108 Id.; Aff. ¶ 11. 109 See Def. Mem. at 14. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (J. Harlan concurring); Garnett v. State, 110
308 A.3d 625, 641 (Del. 2023). 111 State v. King, 2021 WL 211150, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 21, 2021) (cleaned up) (quoting Kowalski v. Scott, 2005 WL 703757, at *1 (3d. Cir. Mar. 29, 2005) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 351)). 112 Def. Mem. at 14-15. 18 “Property discarded by a suspect who refuses to submit to an officer’s authority and
flees is deemed abandoned. There is no legal basis under the Fourth Amendment to
suppress that abandoned property.” 113 Here, Turner refused to submit to officer
authority, fled the scene of the shooting, and discarded the weapon, abandoning it
and forfeiting any Fourth Amendment protections he otherwise possessed in the
weapon. Trial Counsel’s decision not to challenge the recovery of the abandoned
firearm was professionally reasonable.
“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance is highly deferential.”114 “Courts
must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range
of professional assistance,” and the burden falls on the defendant to rebut this “strong
presumption.”115 Turner, through his unsubstantiated allegations, fails to meet this
burden. Trial Counsel’s informed decision not to seek suppression of legitimately,
and Constitutionally, acquired evidence was professionally reasonable.
b. Timeliness
Turner contends his Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel
because of “gross motions of continuances, that violated defendant’s indictment
113 Jackson v. State, 990 A.2d 1281, 1289 (Del. 2009) (citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991)); see King, 2021 WL 211150, at *6. 114 Cooke v. State, 338 A.3d 418, 455 (Del. 2025) (cleaned up). 115 Id. 19 challenges, and his counsel[ ] [failed] to request for a speedy trial.”116 Turner alleges
his counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel when she did not object to the
State’s failure to indict him within forty-five days of his arrest117 and to multiple trial
continuances.118
In fact, Trial Counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Indictment on
January 9, 2024,119 but that motion was deemed moot on January 29, 2024, because
the State had indicted the case.120 Ninety days elapsed between Turner’s October
18, 2023 arrest 121 and his January 15, 2024 indictment; 122 this “delay” does not
amount to a speedy trial violation.123 Turner’s case proceeded to trial with alacrity
despite continuances to allow, in part, development of Turner’s mitigation case. And
Trial Counsel was prepared for trial.124 Turner chose to plead guilty. Turner’s claim
116 Def. Mem. at 11. 117 Id. at 12. 118 Id. 119 D.I. 4. 120 D.I. 19; Aff. Trial Counsel ¶ 7. 121 D.I. 1. 122 D.I. 5. 123 State v. Moore, 2024 WL 2292230, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. May 21, 2024) (The Court found that a delay between arrest and indictment of 91 days was not a violation of a defendant’s speedy trial rights.). 124 Aff. Trial Counsel ¶ 9. 20 that Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel because she failed to
address speedy trial issues is without merit.
CONCLUSION
Trial Counsel provided Turner constitutionally effective assistance of counsel.
Trial Counsel met with Turner on multiple occasions to guide him through the trial
process, discuss materials provided by the State, and assess Thompson’s plea. These
meetings culminated in Turner’s knowing, intelligent, and voluntary election to
plead guilty. Trial Counsel’s diligent preparation of mitigation material prompted
the State to join Turner in recommending the minimum sentence required by law, a
sentence the Court imposed. The record evidences Turner’s awareness and
understanding of Thompson’s plea. And, while Turner’s plea forestalls any
challenges to the events that preceded it, Trial Counsel professionally considered
and lodged appropriate evidentiary challenges and chose not to pursue legal
arguments unsupported by extant law. Trial Counsel was not ineffective, and Turner
suffered no prejudice. Turner’s Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________ Sean P. Lugg, Judge