[Cite as State v. Trivett, 2016-Ohio-8204.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF MEDINA )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 15CA0041-M
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE MELANIE TRIVETT COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO Appellant CASE No. 14CR0285
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: December 19, 2016
CARR, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Melanie Trivett, appeals her conviction for endangering children. This
Court reverses.
I.
{¶2} Melanie Trivett’s three-year-old son ingested Wellbutrin, a prescription drug that
had been prescribed to treat Trivett’s symptoms of depression. Ten days later, two detectives
from the Medina Police Department came to Trivett’s apartment, told her that they needed to
question her about the incident, and escorted her to the police station. The detectives told Trivett
that they could only do the interview at the police station, and when Trivett stated that she would
drive her own vehicle, the detectives refused. They interviewed her for approximately two hours
and, when the interview ended, asked her to complete a written statement. Trivett asked whether
she could leave, complete the written statement, and return. The detectives told her that she
could not. 2
{¶3} Trivett was charged with felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1),
endangering children in violation of R.C. 2919.22(A), and tampering with evidence in violation
of R.C. 2921.12(A)(2). Trivett moved to suppress all of the statements that she made during her
interview and the written statement that she made after the conclusion of the interview, arguing
that the police did not inform her of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444
(1966). The trial court concluded that Trivett was not in custody for purposes of Miranda and
denied the motion. The case proceeded to trial, and a jury found Trivett guilty of endangering
children. The trial court sentenced her to three years of community control, and Trivett
appealed.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND DENIED THE APPELLANT THE PROTECTIONS AFFORDED BY THE FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WHEN IT OVERRULED HER MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS[.]
{¶4} Trivett’s first assignment of error is that the trial court erred when it overruled her
motion to suppress. We agree.
{¶5} An appellate court’s review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress
presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-
5372, ¶ 8. The trial court acts as the trier of fact during a suppression hearing and is best
equipped to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and resolve questions of fact. Id.; State v.
Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521, 548 (2nd Dist.1996), quoting State v. Venham, 96 Ohio App.3d
649, 653 (4th Dist.1994). Consequently, this Court accepts a trial court’s findings of fact if
supported by competent, credible evidence. Burnside at ¶ 8. Once we have determined that the
trial court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, we consider the trial court’s legal 3
conclusions de novo. In other words, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact as true, and
“must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court,
whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio
App.3d 706, 710 (4th Dist.1997).
{¶6} The trial court found that two detectives came to Trivett’s apartment and told her
that they needed to speak with her about the incident. The trial court noted that Trivett expressed
her desire to drive herself to the police station, but that the detectives insisted that she ride with
them. According to the trial court’s findings of fact, the detectives walked her from the
apartment with one walking ahead and one walking behind her and, when they reached an
unmarked police car, one detective sat in the back with Trivett. The trial court observed that the
front seat was not separated from the backseat by a cage, but that the car’s child safety locks
prevented backseat passengers from opening the doors from within. The trial court found that
once at the police station, the officers walked Trivett to a small interview room, where they
interviewed her for over two hours.
{¶7} The trial court’s findings of fact are supported by the record as far as they go, but
because they are incomplete, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s findings of facts as a
whole are supported by competent, credible evidence. Specifically, the record offers further
detail about the detectives’ interaction with Trivett after they arrived at the police station that
bears on the question of whether she was in custody. These facts include, but are not limited to,
the following. According to the officers’ testimony, they walked Trivett through the police
station in the same configuration in which they had left her apartment – one officer in front of
her, and one following close behind. The testimony confirms that they walked her through the
police station to the basement and, ultimately, to a small interview room that was as far from the 4
building exit as it was possible to be. The video recording of the interview demonstrates that
once in the interview room, the officers directed Trivett to a seat in the corner opposite the door,
while they sat in chairs that physically blocked her egress. Trivett did not leave the room during
the duration of the interview. At the interview’s conclusion, one detective presented her with a
release related to all of her children’s’ medical records and told her to sign it. Trivett became
visibly upset. In this immediate context, the same detective then told her that they needed her to
complete a written statement. When Trivett asked if she could take the statement home to
complete, the detective told her that it had to be completed at that time and at the police station.
{¶8} This is not to say a trial court errs on every occasion in which facts present in the
record are omitted from findings of fact in a decision ruling on a motion to suppress. In this
case, however, multiple facts necessary to a determination of the question of whether Trivett was
in custody were omitted from the trial court’s decision. The trial court made no determination
regarding these facts and, consequently, we cannot determine the extent to which they were
considered. Under these unique circumstances, we conclude that the trial court’s findings of fact
as a whole are not supported by competent, credible evidence.
{¶9} Having concluded that the trial court’s findings of fact are incomplete, we must
also conclude that the trial court erred by denying Trivett’s motion to suppress for that reason.
See State v. Lindow, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27417, 2016-Ohio-913, ¶ 12; State v. Hendrix, 9th
Dist. Summit Nos. 26648, 26649, 2013-Ohio-2430, ¶ 14. Trivett’s first assignment of error is
sustained on this basis, and we must reverse and remand this matter to the trial court to address
the motion to suppress in light of our conclusion in the first instance. We do so without
considering Trivett’s legal argument regarding whether the facts demonstrate that she was in
custody for purposes of Miranda. 5
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[Cite as State v. Trivett, 2016-Ohio-8204.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF MEDINA )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 15CA0041-M
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE MELANIE TRIVETT COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO Appellant CASE No. 14CR0285
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: December 19, 2016
CARR, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Melanie Trivett, appeals her conviction for endangering children. This
Court reverses.
I.
{¶2} Melanie Trivett’s three-year-old son ingested Wellbutrin, a prescription drug that
had been prescribed to treat Trivett’s symptoms of depression. Ten days later, two detectives
from the Medina Police Department came to Trivett’s apartment, told her that they needed to
question her about the incident, and escorted her to the police station. The detectives told Trivett
that they could only do the interview at the police station, and when Trivett stated that she would
drive her own vehicle, the detectives refused. They interviewed her for approximately two hours
and, when the interview ended, asked her to complete a written statement. Trivett asked whether
she could leave, complete the written statement, and return. The detectives told her that she
could not. 2
{¶3} Trivett was charged with felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1),
endangering children in violation of R.C. 2919.22(A), and tampering with evidence in violation
of R.C. 2921.12(A)(2). Trivett moved to suppress all of the statements that she made during her
interview and the written statement that she made after the conclusion of the interview, arguing
that the police did not inform her of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444
(1966). The trial court concluded that Trivett was not in custody for purposes of Miranda and
denied the motion. The case proceeded to trial, and a jury found Trivett guilty of endangering
children. The trial court sentenced her to three years of community control, and Trivett
appealed.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND DENIED THE APPELLANT THE PROTECTIONS AFFORDED BY THE FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WHEN IT OVERRULED HER MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS[.]
{¶4} Trivett’s first assignment of error is that the trial court erred when it overruled her
motion to suppress. We agree.
{¶5} An appellate court’s review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress
presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-
5372, ¶ 8. The trial court acts as the trier of fact during a suppression hearing and is best
equipped to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and resolve questions of fact. Id.; State v.
Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521, 548 (2nd Dist.1996), quoting State v. Venham, 96 Ohio App.3d
649, 653 (4th Dist.1994). Consequently, this Court accepts a trial court’s findings of fact if
supported by competent, credible evidence. Burnside at ¶ 8. Once we have determined that the
trial court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, we consider the trial court’s legal 3
conclusions de novo. In other words, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact as true, and
“must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court,
whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio
App.3d 706, 710 (4th Dist.1997).
{¶6} The trial court found that two detectives came to Trivett’s apartment and told her
that they needed to speak with her about the incident. The trial court noted that Trivett expressed
her desire to drive herself to the police station, but that the detectives insisted that she ride with
them. According to the trial court’s findings of fact, the detectives walked her from the
apartment with one walking ahead and one walking behind her and, when they reached an
unmarked police car, one detective sat in the back with Trivett. The trial court observed that the
front seat was not separated from the backseat by a cage, but that the car’s child safety locks
prevented backseat passengers from opening the doors from within. The trial court found that
once at the police station, the officers walked Trivett to a small interview room, where they
interviewed her for over two hours.
{¶7} The trial court’s findings of fact are supported by the record as far as they go, but
because they are incomplete, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s findings of facts as a
whole are supported by competent, credible evidence. Specifically, the record offers further
detail about the detectives’ interaction with Trivett after they arrived at the police station that
bears on the question of whether she was in custody. These facts include, but are not limited to,
the following. According to the officers’ testimony, they walked Trivett through the police
station in the same configuration in which they had left her apartment – one officer in front of
her, and one following close behind. The testimony confirms that they walked her through the
police station to the basement and, ultimately, to a small interview room that was as far from the 4
building exit as it was possible to be. The video recording of the interview demonstrates that
once in the interview room, the officers directed Trivett to a seat in the corner opposite the door,
while they sat in chairs that physically blocked her egress. Trivett did not leave the room during
the duration of the interview. At the interview’s conclusion, one detective presented her with a
release related to all of her children’s’ medical records and told her to sign it. Trivett became
visibly upset. In this immediate context, the same detective then told her that they needed her to
complete a written statement. When Trivett asked if she could take the statement home to
complete, the detective told her that it had to be completed at that time and at the police station.
{¶8} This is not to say a trial court errs on every occasion in which facts present in the
record are omitted from findings of fact in a decision ruling on a motion to suppress. In this
case, however, multiple facts necessary to a determination of the question of whether Trivett was
in custody were omitted from the trial court’s decision. The trial court made no determination
regarding these facts and, consequently, we cannot determine the extent to which they were
considered. Under these unique circumstances, we conclude that the trial court’s findings of fact
as a whole are not supported by competent, credible evidence.
{¶9} Having concluded that the trial court’s findings of fact are incomplete, we must
also conclude that the trial court erred by denying Trivett’s motion to suppress for that reason.
See State v. Lindow, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27417, 2016-Ohio-913, ¶ 12; State v. Hendrix, 9th
Dist. Summit Nos. 26648, 26649, 2013-Ohio-2430, ¶ 14. Trivett’s first assignment of error is
sustained on this basis, and we must reverse and remand this matter to the trial court to address
the motion to suppress in light of our conclusion in the first instance. We do so without
considering Trivett’s legal argument regarding whether the facts demonstrate that she was in
custody for purposes of Miranda. 5
{¶10} Trivett’s first assignment of error is sustained.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT BELOW WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND VIOLATED [TRIVETT’S] RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT BELOW WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶11} In light of our resolution of Trivett’s first assignment of error, her second and
third assignments of error are premature.
III.
{¶12} Trivett’s first assignment of error is sustained. Her second and third assignments
of error are premature. The judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas is reversed,
and this matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 6
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellee.
DONNA J. CARR FOR THE COURT
MOORE, J. SCHAFER, J. CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
ROBERT A. DIXON, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DEAN HOLMAN, Prosecuting Attorney, and MATTHEW A. KERN, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.