State v. Trammell

78 So. 3d 205, 2011 WL 5375009
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 9, 2011
DocketNo. 46,725-KA
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 78 So. 3d 205 (State v. Trammell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Trammell, 78 So. 3d 205, 2011 WL 5375009 (La. Ct. App. 2011).

Opinions

LOLLEY, J.

1 ,This criminal appeal arises from the First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo, State of Louisiana. A jury found Lucien Jamar Trammell guilty of attempted first degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:27 and 14:30. After being convicted of this crime and pleading guilty to being a third felony habitual offender, Trammell was sentenced to 58 years at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. Trammell appeals his conviction. For the following reasons, Trammell’s conviction is affirmed; his sentence is amended to state that his sentence be served at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence; and his sentence is affirmed as amended.

Facts

On January 29, 2008, Officer John Mad-jerick of the Shreveport Police Department (“SPD”) was working as part of a burglary grant due to a recent spike in the number of burglaries in an area of Shreveport. Officer Madjerick was instructed to go into the identified area and make contact with as many people as possible, get contact information from them, and complete field interview cards including fingerprinting. The concept of the grant was to create more of a police presence in the area and deter future burglaries.

While driving on Suntan Street in his marked police vehicle, Off. Madjerick noticed Lucien Trammell walking in the middle of the street. Officer Madjerick stopped him in order to fulfill his duties associated with the burglary grant. He pulled up next to Trammell, addressed him, and told him to come to the front of the police car; Trammell did not comply. An ^altercation ensued and Off. Madjerick was shot in the face; he survived the shooting and after two surgeries is able to work again as a police officer. Trammell fled the scene but was later arrested near Houston, Texas.

Trammell was charged with attempted first degree murder and convicted by a jury of this charge. He pleaded guilty to being a third felony habitual offender and was sentenced as such to 58 years at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. Trammell now appeals his conviction.

Applicable Law

On appeal Trammell raises the issue of sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction. He argues specifically that the shooting occurred accidentally when both Off. Madjerick and himself were struggling for control of his gun; he claims the state failed to establish that he had the specific intent requisite to support his conviction. We disagree.

As stated in La. R.S. 14:27, in pertinent part:

A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

As stated in La. R.S. 14:30, in pertinent part:

A. First degree murder is the killing of a human being:
⅜ ⅜ ⅝ ⅝ ⅜ ⅜
(2) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon a fireman, peace officer, or civilian employee of the Louisiana State Police Crime Laboratory or any other forensic laboratory engaged in the performance of his lawful duties, or when the specific intent to kill or to inflict | .-¡great bodily [208]*208harm is directly related to the victim’s status as a fireman, peace officer, or civilian employee.
B. (1) For the purposes of Paragraph (A)(2) of this Section, the term “peace officer” means any peace officer, as defined in R.S. 40:2402, and includes any constable, marshal, deputy marshal, sheriff, deputy sheriff, local or state policeman, commissioned wildlife enforcement agent, federal law enforcement officer, jail or prison guard, parole officer, probation officer, judge, attorney general, assistant attorney general, attorney general’s investigator, district attorney, assistant district attorney, or district attorney’s investigator.

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Tate, 2001-1658 (La.05/20/03), 851 So.2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S.Ct. 1604, 158 L.Ed.2d 248 (2004). This standard, now legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own appre ciation of the evidence for that of the factfinder. State v. Pigford, 2005-0477 (La.02/22/06), 922 So.2d 517. The trier of fact is charged to make a credibility determination and may, within the bounds of rationality, accept or reject the testimony of any witness. State v. Casey, 1999-0023 (La.01/26/00), 775 So.2d 1022, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S.Ct. 104, 148 L.Ed.2d 62 (2000). The reviewing court may impinge on that discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental due process of law. Id.

l/The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 1994-3116 (La.10/16/95), 661 So.2d 442. A reviewing court accords great deference to a jury’s decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v. Eason, 43,788 (La.App.2d Cir.02/25/09), 3 So.3d 685, writ denied, 2009-0725 (La.12/11/09), 23 So.3d 913.

The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and circumstantial evidence. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by that evidence, must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Sutton, 436 So.2d 471 (La.1983); State v. Speed, 43,786 (La.App.2d Cir.01/14/09), 2 So.3d 582, writ denied, 2009-0372 (La.11/06/09), 21 So.3d 299.

In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence, one witness’s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Gullette, 43,032 (La.App.2d Cir.02/13/08), 975 So.2d 753.

Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the |awitnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Speed, supra.

Attempt requires both the specific intent to commit a crime and an act for the purpose of, or an “overt act,” tend[209]*209ing directly toward accomplishment of that crime. State v. Caston,

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
78 So. 3d 205, 2011 WL 5375009, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-trammell-lactapp-2011.