State v. Traish

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 8, 2026
• Docket: 2025-A-0062
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Traish, 2026-Ohio-2133.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ASHTABULA COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2025-A-0062

Plaintiff-Appellee, Criminal Appeal from the - vs - Court of Common Pleas

MUHAMMAD TRAISH, Trial Court No. 2025 CR 00057 Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Decided: June 8, 2026 Judgment: Reversed and vacated

April R. Grabman, Ashtabula County Prosecutor, and Dane R. Hixon, Assistant Prosecutor, 25 West Jefferson Street, Jefferson, OH 44047 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

John T. Martin and Michael I. Marein, Marein & Bradley, L.L.C., 1300 East 9th Street, Suite 1000, Cleveland, OH 44114 (For Defendant-Appellant).

JOHN J. EKLUND, J.

{¶1} Appellant, Muhammad Traish, appeals his convictions for Trafficking in

Harmful Intoxicants and Improperly Dispensing or Distributing Nitrous Oxide following a

jury trial in the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas.

{¶2} Appellant raises five assignments of error, arguing that (1, 2) the evidence

was insufficient to sustain his two convictions; (3) his convictions are against the manifest

weight of the evidence; (4) the trial court committed plain error in admitting the contents

of a phone call and county-auditor records; and (5) he received ineffective assistance of

trial counsel. {¶3} Having reviewed the record and the applicable law, we sustain Appellant’s

first and second assignments of error. We find that the evidence was insufficient to prove

Appellant’s identity as the perpetrator of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. In

particular, the State’s evidence did not establish the requisite nexus between the

perpetrator and Appellant. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Ashtabula County

Court of Common Pleas and vacate Appellant’s convictions.

Substantive and Procedural History

{¶4} This case involves Appellant’s convictions in relation to the sale of a

“whippet” to an undercover detective at a “smoke shop” in Jefferson, Ohio.

{¶5} On October 22, 2024, Det. Perry from the Ashtabula County Sheriff’s Office

entered the Jefferson Convenient and Smoke Shop in Jefferson, Ohio, in an undercover

capacity to make a controlled purchase of nitrous oxide. Det. Perry asked the store clerk,

Nour Baninemra, if he had any “whippets” for sale. According to Det. Perry, a “whippet”

is a “small pressurized canister of nitrous oxide.” Det. Perry explained that if a person

were buying nitrous oxide for culinary purposes, that person would not refer to it as a

“whippet.” Baninemra sold Det. Perry a canister of nitrous oxide that had been located

on a shelf along with tobacco and vape products. Baninemra also gave Det. Perry a black

nozzle. According to Det. Perry, an intoxicant abuser inserts the nozzle into a balloon,

inflates the balloon with nitrous oxide, and inhales the gas. Baninemra did not ask Det.

Perry to sign a card documenting and certifying the sale of nitrous oxide. Appellant was

not present at the store during the controlled purchase.

{¶6} Meanwhile, Det. Grabman was outside monitoring Det. Perry’s controlled

purchase via a recording device. After the purchase, Det. Grabman entered the store.

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Case No. 2025-A-0062 Baninemra called his “boss” on the phone, who Det. Grabman believed was named

“Muhammad” (which is also Appellant’s first name). Det. Grabman identified himself as

law enforcement and told “Muhammad” that the store’s sale of nitrous oxide was illegal.

“Muhammad” responded that he did not know it was illegal and that he would immediately

remove the remaining items from “his stores” or from “his shelves.”

{¶7} During the course of his investigation, Det. Perry searched Appellant’s

name through the BMV imaging on his computer and retrieved the driver’s license

photograph. Det. Perry identified Appellant at trial as the person in the photograph.

{¶8} In addition, Det. Grabman ran an “auditor’s check” and determined that HT

Emory Holdings, LLC, is the owner of the building in which the store is located. Det.

Grabman also searched the secretary of state’s website and determined that a person

named “Muhammad Traish” is the “statutory agent” or “registered agent” for HT Emory

Holdings, LLC. Det. Grabman also determined that “Jefferson Convenient and Smoke

Shop” is “its own separate LLC” and that “Nour Baninemra” is its registered agent. Det.

Grabman’s understanding was that a “registered agent” is the owner of the business.

{¶9} Two days after the controlled purchase, on October 24, 2024, Det. Grabman

executed a search warrant at the store and did not find any records involving the sale of

nitrous oxide. Appellant was not present at the store during the search.

{¶10} On February 20, 2025, the Ashtabula County Grand Jury indicted Appellant

on two counts: Trafficking in Harmful Intoxicants, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C.

2925.32(A)(1) and (D)(1) (count 1), and Improper Dispensing or Distributing Nitrous

Oxide, a fourth-degree misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 2925.32(B)(4)(a) and (D)(2)

(count 2).

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Case No. 2025-A-0062 {¶11} On March 7, 2025, Appellant appeared for arraignment with counsel and

entered not-guilty pleas.

{¶12} On June 12, 2025, the Ashtabula County Grand Jury re-indicted Appellant

on two counts, with the only difference between the two indictments being that Appellant

was subsequently charged in count 1 with violating R.C. 2925.32(B)(1) instead of (A)(1).

{¶13} On July 3, 2025, Appellant appeared for arraignment with counsel on the

re-indictment and entered not-guilty pleas.

{¶14} On September 30, 2025, the matter was trial to a jury. The State presented

testimony from Det. Perry and Det. Grabman. As exhibits, the State submitted video

footage from the controlled purchase and photographs of the nitrous oxide canister, the

black nozzle, and the frontage of the store. The State then rested.

{¶15} Appellant moved for acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A). At a sidebar, the

parties engaged in a discussion with the trial court. The State indicated that it would

request a jury instruction on Complicity. Over Appellant’s objection, the trial court

permitted the State to reopen its case-in-chief to present additional testimony from Det.

Grabman regarding his execution of the search warrant. The State against rested.

{¶16} Over Appellant’s objection, the trial court granted the State’s request to

instruct the jury on Complicity for both counts.

{¶17} Appellant rested without presenting testimony or exhibits and renewed his

Crim.R. 29(A) motion for acquittal, which the trial court denied.

{¶18} The next day, on October 1, 2025, the jury found Appellant guilty on both

counts.

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Case No. 2025-A-0062 {¶19} On October 14, 2025, Appellant filed a written Crim.R. 29(C) motion for

acquittal, which he supplemented on October 27, 2025. On October 28, 2025, the State

filed a response in opposition.

{¶20} On October 30, 2025, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. After

hearing argument from counsel, the trial court denied Appellant’s Crim.R. 29(C) motion

for acquittal. The court sentenced Appellant to two years of community control, fines of

$2,500 on count 1 and $250 on count 2, and costs.

{¶21} On October 31, 2025, the trial court filed the sentencing entry.

{¶22} On November 12, 2025, Appellant timely appealed. On the same date,

Appellant also filed a motion in the trial court to stay execution of his sentence. On

November 13, 2025, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion for a stay.

{¶23} Appellant raises five assignments of error.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

{¶24} We review Appellant’s first and second assignments of error together.

{¶25} Appellant’s first assignment of error states: “THE EVIDENCE WAS

INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION IN COUNT ONE–TRAFFICKING IN

HARMFUL INTOXICANTS.”

{¶26} Appellant’s second assignment of error states: “THE EVIDENCE WAS

INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION IN COUNT TWO–IMPROPERLY

DISPENSING OR DISTRIBUTING NITROUS OXIDE.”

{¶27} Appellant’s first and second assignments of error challenge the sufficiency

of the evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdicts.

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Case No. 2025-A-0062 {¶28} “‘“Sufficiency” is a term of art meaning that legal standard which is applied

to determine whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally

sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law.’” State v. Thompkins, 1997-Ohio-

52, ¶ 23, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). “In essence, sufficiency is a test

of adequacy.” Id. “Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a

question of law.” Id. “[A] conviction based on legally insufficient evidence constitutes a

denial of due process.” Id.

{¶29} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to

determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991),

paragraph two of the syllabus. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence

in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “The verdict will

not be disturbed unless the appellate court finds that reasonable minds could not reach

the conclusion reached by the trier-of-fact.” State v. Dennis, 1997-Ohio-372, ¶ 51.

“[W]hen conducting a sufficiency of the evidence analysis, this [C]ourt is to look at the

actual evidence admitted at trial, both admissible and inadmissible.” State v. Rose, 2015-

Ohio-2607, ¶ 34 (11th Dist.).

{¶30} In count 1, Appellant was found guilty of Trafficking in Harmful Intoxicants

in violation of R.C. 2925.32(B)(1), which provides, “No person shall knowingly dispense

or distribute nitrous oxide to a person age twenty-one or older if the person who dispenses

or distributes it knows or has reason to believe the nitrous oxide will be used in violation

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Case No. 2025-A-0062 of section 2925.31 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 2925.31(A), in turn, provides, “Except for

lawful research, clinical, medical, dental, or veterinary purposes, no person, with purpose

to induce intoxication or similar physiological effects, shall obtain, possess, or use a

harmful intoxicant.”

{¶31} In count 2, Appellant was found guilty of Improper Dispensing or Distributing

Nitrous Oxide, a fourth-degree misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 2925.32(B)(4)(a), which

provides, “No person who dispenses or distributes nitrous oxide in cartridges shall fail to

comply with . . . [t]he record-keeping requirements established under division (F) of this

section.” R.C. 2925.32(F), in turn, requires “a person who dispenses or distributes nitrous

oxide” to “record each transaction . . . on a separate card”; to “require the purchaser to

sign the card and provide a complete residence address”; and to “sign and date the card.”

The person is also required to “retain the card . . . for one year from the date of the

transaction” and to

maintain the cards at the person’s business address and make them available during normal business hours for inspection and copying by officers or employees of the state board of pharmacy or of other law enforcement agencies of this state or the United States that are authorized to investigate violations of Chapter 2925., 3719., or 4729. of the Revised Code or the federal drug abuse control laws.

{¶32} R.C. 2923.03, the Complicity statute, provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o

person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall

. . . (1) [s]olicit or procure another to commit the offense; [or] (2) [a]id or abet another in

committing the offense . . . .” R.C. 2923.03(A)(1) and (2). “Whoever violates [R.C.

2923.03] is guilty of complicity in the commission of an offense, and shall be prosecuted

and punished as if he were a principal offender.” R.C. 2923.03(F). “A charge of complicity

may be stated in terms of [R.C. 2923.03], or in terms of the principal offense.” Id.

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Case No. 2025-A-0062 {¶33} Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that (1) he was

involved in store operations; (2) he was complicit in the commission of the charged

offenses; or (3) he had reason to believe that Det. Perry purchased the nitrous oxide for

use as an intoxicant. We find Appellant’s first argument to be dispositive.

{¶34} In addition to each element of a charged offense, the State must prove the

identity of the defendant as the perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Goldner,

2024-Ohio-1854, ¶ 40 (11th Dist.); State v. Sandercock, 2018-Ohio-2448, ¶ 12 (11th

Dist.). See State v. Cook, 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 526 (1992). Identity may be proven by

circumstantial evidence. Goldner at ¶ 40. “Circumstantial evidence is . . . ‘[t]estimony not

based on actual personal knowledge or observation of the facts in controversy, but of

other facts from which deductions are drawn, showing indirectly the facts sought to be

proved.’” State v. Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d 147, 150 (1988), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary

(5th Ed. 1979). “[W]hen circumstantial evidence forms the basis of a conviction, that

evidence must prove collateral facts and circumstances, from which the existence of a

primary fact may be rationally inferred according to common experience.” State v.

Windle, 2011-Ohio-4171, ¶ 34 (11th Dist.). “Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence

inherently possess the same probative value . . . .” Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d at paragraph

one of the syllabus.

{¶35} However, this Court and others have held that “‘merely establishing that the

defendant’s name is the same as that of the alleged offender is insufficient to prove

identity.’” (Emphasis in original.) Sandercock at ¶ 13, quoting State v. Bailey, 2017-Ohio-

2679, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.). See also State v. Lauer, 2023-Ohio-1076, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.); State v.

McCallister, 2019-Ohio-744, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.); State v. Gray, 2010-Ohio-2530, ¶ 7 (7th

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Case No. 2025-A-0062 Dist.); State v. Hatfield, 2004-Ohio-6450, ¶ 16 (10th Dist.); State v. O’Neil, 107 Ohio

App.3d 557, 561 (6th Dist. 1995). In addition, “[a] conviction . . . may not be premised

upon the ‘stacking of inferences.’” State v. Payne, 2014-Ohio-4304, ¶ 23 (11th Dist.). In

other words, “[w]hen an inference, which forms the basis of a conviction, is drawn solely

from another inference and that inference is not supported by any additional facts or

inferences drawn from other established facts, the conviction is improper.” Id. Accord

State v. Armstrong, 2016-Ohio-7841, ¶ 23 (11th Dist.).

{¶36} For instance, in Sandercock, 2018-Ohio-2448 (11th Dist.), we vacated the

appellant’s conviction for Failure to Appear because the State failed to submit evidence

that the Dale Sandercock who was indicted and standing trial was the Dale Sandercock

who was discussed during the State’s case-in-chief. Id. at ¶ 15. The State’s only witness,

who was Dale Sandercock’s former counsel, “was never asked to identify the man

standing trial as his former client.” Id. at ¶ 16. The State presented “circumstantial

evidence that the person who did not appear at the October hearing was named Dale

Sandercock (by virtue of the case caption and the fact that a prosecution was taking

place).” Id. We found that “[a]part from having the same name, however, there was no

direct or circumstantial evidence that the man standing trial was that person.” Id. We

further found that “in order to conclude the Dale Sandercock standing trial was the Dale

Sandercock referred to in the [S]tate’s case-in-chief, required the jury to assume identity,”

which constituted an improper stacking of inferences. Id. at ¶ 23.

{¶37} Similarly, in Bailey, the Second District vacated the appellant’s conviction

because the State failed to prove her identity as the perpetrator. Lavetta Bailey was

charged and found guilty of assault after a jury trial. Id. at ¶ 1. The State’s evidence

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Case No. 2025-A-0062 established that emergency medical personnel responded to a fight at a bar where they

found, inter alia, a belligerent, yet visibly injured woman. Id. at ¶ 3. They were able to

transport the woman into their ambulance and, upon arrival at the hospital, the woman

struck one of the individuals in the head with a closed fist. Id. at ¶ 4-5. At trial, neither

the emergency personnel nor a responding officer could identify the appellant as the

perpetrator of the assault. Id. at ¶ 8-11.

{¶38} Here, Appellant was not physically present at the store during the controlled

purchase or its subsequent search. As stated, Det. Grabman testified that Baninemra,

the store clerk, called his “boss” on the phone, and Det. Grabman believed the boss’s

name was “Muhammad.” “Muhammad” told Det. Grabman that he would immediately

remove the remaining items from “his stores” or from “his shelves.” The State presented

the following circumstantial evidence to purportedly establish Appellant’s identity as

“Muhammad” from the phone call:

• Det. Perry testified that during the course of his investigation, he searched Appellant’s name through the BMV imaging on his computer and retrieved the driver’s license photograph. Det. Perry identified Appellant in the courtroom as the person in that photograph.

• Det. Grabman testified that HT Emory Holdings, LLC, is the owner of the building in which the store is located and that “Muhammad Traish” is HT Emory Holdings, LLC’s “statutory agent” or “registered agent.”

• Det. Grabman also testified that “Jefferson Convenient and Smoke Shop” is “its own separate LLC” and that “Nour Baninemra” is its registered agent.

• Det. Grabman further testified to his understanding that the statutory or registered agent of a business is its owner.1

1. Ohio law requires an LLC to “maintain continuously in this state an agent for service of process on the company.” R.C. 1706.09(A). Contrary to Det. Grabman’s understanding, an LLC’s agent is not required to be an owner. See R.C. 1706.09(A)(1)-(2). Even if we accepted Det. Grabman’s misunderstanding as true,

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Case No. 2025-A-0062 {¶39} Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the State, as required, it

failed to establish that Appellant was “Muhammad” from the phone call or “Muhammad

Traish” from the business/property records. While Det. Perry’s testimony and in-court

identification established that Appellant’s name is Muhammad Traish, Det. Perry did not

explain why he obtained Appellant’s driver’s-license photograph during his investigation.

For instance, there was no testimony that “Muhammad” from the phone call provided his

last name (much less that it was “Traish”) or that Appellant shared any characteristics

with either individual other than the same name. Therefore, as in Sandercock, 2018-

Ohio-2448 (11th Dist.), the State’s evidence failed to establish “the requisite nexus”

between the perpetrator and the person on trial. Id. at ¶ 22. To the extent the jury

assumed Appellant’s identity as the perpetrator, it constituted an improper stacking of

inferences. See id. at ¶ 23.

{¶40} Based upon the evidence presented by the State, reasonable minds could

not have concluded that Appellant was the perpetrator of the offenses. Therefore, the

State failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain Appellant’s convictions.

{¶41} Accordingly, Appellant’s first and second assignments of error are

sustained. The trial court’s judgment is reversed, and Appellant’s convictions are

vacated.

{¶42} Because we have vacated Appellant’s convictions, his third through fifth

assignments of error are overruled as moot. See Sandercock at ¶ 29.

however, this would not mean that “Muhammad Traish” owns the store; rather, it would mean that “Nour Baninemra” owns the store, while “Muhammad Traish” owns the building.

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Case No. 2025-A-0062 {¶43} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of

Common Pleas is reversed, and Appellant’s convictions are vacated.

MATT LYNCH, P.J.,

SCOTT LYNCH, J.,

concur.

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Case No. 2025-A-0062 JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, it is the judgment and order of

this Court that the judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas is reversed,

and Appellant’s convictions are vacated.

Costs to be taxed against Appellee.

JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND

PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH, concurs

JUDGE SCOTT LYNCH, concurs

THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.

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Case No. 2025-A-0062