[Cite as State v. Trader, 2025-Ohio-2822.]
COURT OF APPEALS RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGES: STATE OF OHIO : Hon. Kevin W. Popham, P.J. : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. David M. Gormley, J. : -vs- : : Case No. 2025-CA-0001 ASHLEE TRADER : : Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Mansfield Municipal Court, Case No, 2024-CRB-73K
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: August 11, 2025
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
JODIE M. SCHUMACHER ASHLEE TRADER Prosecuting Attorney 780 E. Debby Lane BY: MICHELLE FINK Ontario, OH 44906 Assistant Prosecutor 38 South Park Street Mansfield, OH 44902 [Cite as State v. Trader, 2025-Ohio-2822.]
Popham, P.J.,
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Ashlee Trader (“Trader”) appeals her conviction and
sentence after a no contest plea in the Mansfield Municipal Court, Richland County, Ohio.
For the reasons below, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} Trader and the complainant were neighbors who became embroiled in a
property line dispute. Both parties contacted law enforcement multiple times to report
perceived encroachments. T. at 7. Officers recorded body camera footage during these
responses. Id.
{¶3} Trader allegedly installed video surveillance cameras aimed at the
complainant’s residence and subsequently posted footage online. Trader was also
alleged to have trespassed on the complainant’s property, contacted the complainant’s
employer concerning the complainant’s prior criminal history, and published disparaging
statements about the complainant and her family on various social media platforms.
{¶4} On September 1, 2023, Trader was charged with menacing by stalking, a
first-degree misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 2903.211. The case was transferred to the
Mansfield Municipal Court in January 2024.
{¶5} On November 20, 2024, the State informed the trial court that, pursuant to
pretrial discussions, it would amend the menacing by stalking charge to disorderly
conduct, a fourth-degree misdemeanor under R.C. 2917.11(A), in exchange for a no-
contest plea. T. at 3. Trader accepted the plea agreement, entered a no-contest plea,
and stipulated to a finding of guilt. Id. at 5. {¶6} The prosecutor read the complaint into the record. Id. at 5-6. The trial court
found that the charging document adequately alleged the elements of fear of physical
harm and persistence - elements sufficient to support a fourth-degree misdemeanor
charge of disorderly conduct. Id. at 6. The court accepted the plea and entered a finding
of guilt. Id.
{¶7} Prior to sentencing, the trial court heard statements from defense counsel,
the complainant, and the prosecution. A disagreement arose over whether the State had
previously indicated an intent to recommend a jail sentence. T. at 11-13. The court
acknowledged its involvement in pretrial discussions, and gave consideration to the
complainant’s statement, particularly noting that she and her family had moved from the
neighborhood at considerable cost and inconvenience. Id. at 14.
{¶8} The court then imposed sentence as follows:
[C]onsistent with previous discussions, the Court is going to, at this
point, impose a maximum fine of $250, 30 days in jail, that is suspended.
Assignments of Error
{¶9} Trader presents five assignments of error for our review,
{¶10} “WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPOSING A SUSPENDED
JAIL SENTENCE, AND MAXIMUM FINES CONTRARY TO THE AGREED-UPON PLEA
TERMS, AS DEMONSTRATED IN THE EMAIL FROM ATTORNEY MAYER ABOUT THE
PLEA DEAL (EXHIBIT C). THE PLEA AGREEMENT SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED NO
JAIL TIME, NO PROBATION, AND NO RESTITUTION; HOWEVER, THE TRIAL COURT
IMPOSED A SUSPENDED 30-DAY JAIL SENTENCE AND MAXIMUM FINES,
VIOLATING THE NEGOTIATED PLEA AGREEMENT.” {¶11} “II. WHETHER THE PROSECUTOR'S CONDITIONING OF THE PLEA
OFFER ON THE PAYMENT OF A CIVIL DEBT CONSTITUTED MISCONDUCT, AS
EVIDENCED BY EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE (EXHIBIT I-11) AND THE GRIEVANCE
FILED WITH THE OHIO SUPREME COURT DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL (EXHIBIT J-1
TO J-3). THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY LINKED A CRIMINAL PLEA TO A CIVIL
OBLIGATION, VIOLATING ETHICAL GUIDELINES AND OHIO REVISED CODE
2921.03 (COERCION). ADDITIONALLY, WHETHER THE PROSECUTOR
MISREPRESENTED THE FACTS SURROUNDING THE SERVICE OF THE
SUMMONS, AS SHOWN IN EXHIBIT B, POLICE REPORT OF HOW THE SUMMONS
WAS SERVED & EXHIBIT A, TRANSCRIPT OF THE PLEA HEARING.”
{¶12} “III. WHETHER THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE TIMELY
AND COMPLETE DISCOVERY, INCLUDING BODY CAM FOOTAGE, DEPRIVED THE
DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL, AS DEMONSTRATED IN EXHIBIT H (PUBLIC
RECORDS REQUESTS AND RESPONSES), EXHIBIT A-7 (TRANSCRIPT OF PLEA
HEARING), AND EXHIBIT F-1 TO F-55 (DISCOVERY DOCUMENTS). THESE
EXHIBITS SHOW THAT CRITICAL MATERIALS WERE EITHER WITHHELD OR
PROVIDED LATE, VIOLATING THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND
PREVENTING ADEQUATE PREPARATION.”
{¶13} “IV. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO RULE ON CRITICAL
MOTIONS, INCLUDING THE MOTION TO DISMISS FOR PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT, MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE, AND MOTION TO COMPEL THE
BILL OF PARTICULARS, DEPRIVED THE DEFENDANT OF A FAIR OPPORTUNITY
TO CHALLENGE KEY ISSUES IN THE CASE, AS DEMONSTRATED IN THE PROCEDURAL RECORD AND MOTIONS FILED. THESE MOTIONS WERE NOT
ADDRESSED BY THE COURT, HINDERING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S
DEFENSE.”
{¶14} “V. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S RELIANCE ON CIVIL MATTERS,
PARTICULARLY THE VICTIM'S IMPACT STATEMENT (EXHIBIT G-1 TO G-3),
IMPROPERLY INFLUENCED THE SENTENCING DECISION. THE VICTIM'S
STATEMENT, WHICH FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON CIVIL PROPERTY ISSUES
UNRELATED TO THE CRIMINAL CHARGE, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
CONSIDERED IN SENTENCING, AS IT UNDERMINED THE FAIRNESS AND
INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS. THIS RELIANCE ON CIVIL MATTERS
WAS NOT APPROPRIATE UNDER STATE V. BROWN, 65 OHIO ST.3D 649 (1992)
[sic.], WHICH HELD THAT SUCH ISSUES SHOULD NOT INFLUENCE CRIMINAL
SENTENCING.”
Pro se appellants
{¶15} We understand that Trader has filed this appeal pro se. Nevertheless, “like
members of the bar, pro se litigants are required to comply with rules of practice and
procedure.” Hardy v. Belmont Correctional Inst., 2006-Ohio-3316, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.). See
also State v. Hall, 2008-Ohio-2128, ¶ 11 (11th Dist.). We also understand that “an
appellate court will ordinarily indulge a pro se litigant where there is some semblance of
compliance with the appellate rules.” State v. Richard, 2005-Ohio-6494, ¶ 4 (8th Dist.)
(internal quotation omitted); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972) (pleadings
prepared by prisoners who do not have access to counsel should be liberally construed);
McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (same); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988) (some procedural rules must give way because of the unique circumstance of
incarceration). See also State v. Harris, 2024-Ohio-2993, ¶¶ 9 - 10 (5th Dist.).
{¶16} Although in a pro se action this Court allows latitude to the unrepresented
defendant in the presentation of her case, this Court is not required to totally disregard
rules of procedure. See, Wellington v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2008-Ohio-554, ¶
18. (A substantial disregard for the rules cannot be tolerated).
{¶17} This Court does not have discretion and must disregard facts, arguments,
or evidence presented in the appellate brief when those facts, arguments, or evidence
were not presented to the trial court. In State v. Hooks, 92 Ohio St.3d 83 (2001), the
Supreme Court of Ohio noted, “a reviewing court cannot add matter to the record before
it that was not a part of the trial court's proceedings, and then decide the appeal on the
basis of the new matter. See, State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 (1978).” It is also a
longstanding rule “that the record cannot be enlarged by factual assertions in the brief.”
Dissolution of Doty v. Doty, 1980 WL 350992 (4th Dist., Feb. 28, 1980), citing Scioto Bank
v. Columbus Union Stock Yards, 120 Ohio App. 55, 59 (10th Dist. 1963). New material
and factual assertions contained in any brief in this Court may not be considered. See
North v. Beightler, 2006-Ohio-6515, ¶ 7, quoting Dzina v. Celebrezze, 2006-Ohio-1195,
¶ 16.
{¶18} Therefore, we have disregarded facts in the parties’ briefs, and exhibits
attached to those briefs, that are outside of the trial court record. State v. Stevens, 2023-
Ohio-2736, ¶ 16 (5th Dist.). The Mootness Doctrine
{¶19} Mootness is a jurisdictional question because courts are tasked with
deciding adversarial legal cases and issuing judgments that can be carried into effect.
Cyran v. Cyran, 2018-Ohio-24, ¶ 9, citing Fortner v. Thomas, 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 14 (1970).
See also United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113, 116 (1920); North Carolina v.
Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). Under the mootness doctrine, courts will not decide
cases in which there is no longer an actual legal controversy between the parties. In re
A.G., 2014-Ohio-2597, ¶ 37. Because mootness is jurisdictional, a court must address it
even if the parties do not raise the issue. Rice, 404 U.S. at 246. Here, the State contends
that this appeal is moot because Trader voluntarily completed the sentence imposed by
the trial court.
{¶20} As the Supreme Court of Ohio has noted, “an event that causes a case to
be moot may be proved by extrinsic evidence outside the record.” State ex rel. Nelson v.
Russo, 89 Ohio St.3d 227, 228 (2000), quoting Pewitt v. Lorain Correctional Inst., 64 Ohio
St.3d 470, 472 (1992). Accord, Miner v. Witt, 82 Ohio St. 237, 239 (1910). See also
State v. Lawless, 2018-Ohio-1471, ¶ 18 (5th Dist.); State v. Williams, 2020-Ohio-77, ¶ 15
(5th Dist.).
{¶21} Although there are exceptions to the mootness doctrine, none apply in this
case. See, e.g., In re Suspension of Huffer from Circleville High School, 47 Ohio St.3d
12 (1989), paragraph one of the syllabus (noting the two exceptions to the mootness
doctrine are when “the issues are capable of repetition, yet evading review” or the case
“involves a matter of public or great general interest”). {¶22} With respect to mootness in misdemeanor cases, the Supreme Court of
Ohio has held,
The completion of a sentence is not voluntary and will not make an
appeal moot if the circumstances surrounding it demonstrate that the
appellant neither acquiesced in the judgment nor abandoned the right to
appellate review, that the appellant has a substantial stake in the judgment
of conviction, and that there is subject matter for the appellate court to
decide.
Cleveland Hts. v. Lewis, 129 Ohio St.3d 389, 390 (2011), paragraph one of the syllabus.
In Cleveland Hts., the Court specifically held that,
The expiration of an inactive period of probation during the pendency
of an appeal does not render the appeal moot because the misdemeanant
failed to file a motion for stay in the appellate court where the misdemeanant
unsuccessfully sought a stay of execution from the trial court to prevent an
intended appeal from being declared moot and subsequently filed a notice
of appeal to challenge the conviction.
Id. at paragraph 2 of the syllabus. Trader received a suspended 30-day jail sentence, but
she did not seek a stay on the payment of the imposed fine in either the trial court or this
Court; rather, she voluntarily paid the fine in full before she filed a notice of appeal. {¶23} However, even when a defendant has voluntarily completed the sentence,
the case is not moot if a collateral disability results. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 54-
55 (1968); State v. Wilson, 41 Ohio St.2d 236, 238 (1975). But see State v. Berndt, 29
Ohio St.3d 3, 4 (1987) (Enhanced penalty on subsequent conviction for the same crime
is not a collateral disability). Trader has pointed to no evidence from which it could be
inferred that she would suffer a collateral disability or loss of civil rights from the
conviction.
{¶24} Because Trader voluntarily completed her sentence – vis-à-vis paid the fine
and did not seek a stay from the trial court or this Court, and there is no indication of a
resulting collateral disability or loss of civil rights from the conviction, the appeal is moot.
Plain Error
{¶25} Even if we found the appeal were not moot, Trader’s arguments would still
fail.
{¶26} Normally, an appellate court need not consider error that was not called to
the attention of the trial court at a time when the error could have been avoided or
corrected by the trial court. State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 117 (1977). Accordingly,
a claim of error in such a situation is usually deemed to be forfeited absent plain error.
However, plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although not
brought to the attention of the trial court. Crim.R. 52(B). Trader did not object during the
plea hearing or raise any of the issues now presented in this Court. Nor has she claimed
plain error on appeal. Because she does not claim plain error on appeal, we need not
consider it. See, State v. Quarterman, 2014-Ohio-4034, ¶ 17-20 (appellate court need
not consider plain error where appellant fails to timely raise plain-error claim); State v. Gavin, 2015-Ohio-2996, ¶ 25 (4th Dist.), citing Wright v. Ohio Dept. of Jobs & Family
Servs., 2013-Ohio-2260, ¶ 22 (9th Dist.) (when a claim is forfeited on appeal and the
appellant does not raise plain error, the appellate court will not create an argument on his
behalf); State v. McCreary, 2022-Ohio-2899. ¶ 65 (5th Dist.); State v. Carbaugh, 2023-
Ohio-1269, ¶ 67 (5th Dist.); State v. Fitts, 2020-Ohio-1154, ¶ 21 (6th Dist.); Simon v.
Larreategui, 2022-Ohio-1881, ¶ 41 (2d Dist.).
{¶27} Nevertheless, even if we were to consider Trader’s claims under plain error
review, they would not succeed.
{¶28} Crim.R. 52 grants appellate courts limited authority to correct trial errors.
Crim.R. 52(A) applies to preserved errors and allows reversal only if the error affected
substantial rights. Crim.R. 52(B) governs unpreserved errors and permits reversal only if
the error was plain and affected substantial rights. The critical distinction is the burden of
proof: under plain-error review, the burden is on the defendant; under harmless-error
review, the State bears the burden. State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-3051, ¶¶ 17-18. See also
State v. Bond, 2022-Ohio-4150, ¶ 7.
{¶29} To establish plain error under Crim.R. 52(B), a defendant must show: (1) an
error occurred; (2) the error was obvious; and (3) the error affected the outcome of the
proceeding. State v. McAlpin, 2022-Ohio-1567, ¶ 66, quoting State v. Rogers, 2015-Ohio-
2459, ¶ 22; accord State v. Bailey, 2022-Ohio-4407, ¶ 8. All three elements must be met.
Bailey, ¶ 9, citing State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 (2002).
{¶30} To show that the error affected substantial rights, the appellant must
demonstrate a reasonable probability that it prejudiced the outcome - this mirrors the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Rogers, ¶ 22, citing United States
v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81–83 (2004). See Bond, ¶ 22.
{¶31} Even where the elements of plain error are satisfied, an appellate court is
not required to correct the error. Rogers, ¶ 23; State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 120
(2004). See also State v. Newlon, 2024-Ohio-3433 (5th Dist.); State v. Wycinski, 2024-
Ohio-5203, ¶¶ 21-23 (5th Dist.). Correction of plain error is reserved for exceptional cases
to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. Bailey, ¶ 8, citing State v. Long, 53 Ohio
St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus.
I.
{¶32} In her first assignment of error, Trader maintains the trial court erred by
imposing a suspended jail sentence and maximum fines, contrary to the agreed upon
plea terms. Trader cites documents that are not part of the trial court record to support
her contention.
Breach of a Plea Agreement
{¶33} In this case, the record does not include a written Crim.R. 11(E) or (F) plea
agreement signed by Trader, her attorney, and the assistant prosecuting attorney.
Instead, the terms of the plea negotiations were discussed during the change-of-plea
hearing. Defense counsel stated that their understanding of the plea negotiations was
that Trader would enter a no contest plea, and the charge would be reduced to a fourth-
degree misdemeanor disorderly conduct. T. at 3.
{¶34} At the hearing, Trader requested that the court impose a sentence
consisting solely of the maximum fine and court costs. T. at 8. In support of this request,
Trader indicated that she was employed full-time, earning approximately $1,000 per week. T. at 9. The following exchange then occurred between defense counsel and the
trial court:
MR. MAYER: She can pay a max fine, Judge.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. MAYER: I did explain to her that, ah, there was a discussion that
a max fine would be appropriate in this case. She is gainfully employed, and
she can pay, and I think she intends to pay today.
THE COURT: Okay. Certainly, if she was unemployed, the Court
would consider much less than a max fine, but from the sound of things,
you are, at this time, gainfully employed.
T. at 9 (emphasis added).
{¶35} The prosecuting attorney disagreed with the defense recommendation and
instead asked the court to impose a jail sentence. Id. at 11. Ultimately, the trial court
imposed the maximum fine and a 30-day jail sentence; however, the jail sentence was
unconditionally suspended.
{¶36} Both the state and Trader agreed that the original charges would be
reduced, and that Trader would enter a plea of no contest instead of a guilty plea. The
record reflects that each party presented a non-binding sentencing recommendation to
the trial court. Even assuming the state agreed to recommend that Trader not receive a
jail sentence, such a recommendation does not bind the trial court or preclude it from
imposing jail time.
{¶37} It is well established that a defendant has no right to be offered a plea deal,
nor any right to have the court accept one. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 149 (2012). The decision whether to accept a
plea agreement and the ultimate sentence imposed rests squarely within the trial court’s
discretion. State v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, Aerie No. 1224, 2018-Ohio-548, ¶ 6; State
ex rel. Duran v. Kelsey, 2005-Ohio-3674, ¶ 6, quoting State v. Buchanan, 2003-Ohio-
4772, ¶ 13 (5th Dist.), quoting State v. Pettiford, 2002-Ohio-1914 (12th Dist.). Crim.R. 11
does not anticipate that punishment will be the result of a successful plea bargain because
sentencing is determined expressly either by statute or rests within the sound discretion
of the trial court. State v. Mathews, 8 Ohio App.3d 145, 146, (10th Dist. 1982); State v.
Summers, 2024-Ohio-5200, ¶ 34 (5th Dist.).
{¶38} There is no evidence in the record indicating that the trial judge promised
Trader any specific sentence. To be sure, Trader received the sentence she requested:
the maximum fine, with no community control sanctions and no actual jail time imposed.
The 30-day jail term was unconditionally suspended.
{¶39} The trial court’s reasoning reflects a sentence based on the evidence and
representations made during the hearing. Its decision was not arbitrary, legally
erroneous, or unjust. Nor did it produce a result inconsistent with reason or the record.
Accordingly, we find no manifest injustice. The trial court’s imposition of the maximum
fine and an unconditionally suspended 30-day jail sentence does not warrant reversal.
{¶40} Trader’s first assignment of error is overruled.
II.
{¶41} In her second assignment of error, Trader first contends that the prosecutor
engaged in misconduct by conditioning the plea offer on the payment of a civil debt. Payment of Civil Debt
{¶42} As a threshold matter, this Court is bound by the record before the trial court
and cannot consider facts, arguments, or evidence that were not presented below. Any
new factual claims presented for the first time on appeal, even if included in a brief, are
not properly before this Court and will not be considered. State v. Hooks, 92 Ohio St.3d
83, 84 (2001), citing State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 (1978).
{¶43} Nothing in the record supports Trader’s claim that the plea agreement was
conditioned on any payment to the complainant. Neither the prosecution nor the defense
mentioned restitution or civil payment at the plea hearing, and the trial court did not
impose restitution as part of Trader’s sentence. There is no indication in the record that
Trader paid the complainant any money in exchange for a reduction in charges.
{¶44} Trader bears the burden of demonstrating plain error, specifically, that an
error occurred, that the error was obvious, and that there is “a reasonable probability that
the error resulted in prejudice,” meaning it affected her decision to enter the plea, or the
fairness of the proceedings. State v. McAlpin, 2022-Ohio-1567, ¶ 66, quoting State v.
Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 22. Trader has not met that burden. We find no manifest
injustice as a result of the plea negotiations.
Prosecutorial Misconduct
{¶45} Trader next argues that the prosecutor misrepresented the facts at the plea
hearing by reciting the factual basis for the original charge of menacing by stalking rather
than the amended charge of disorderly conduct. She contends this amounted to an
inflammatory and misleading narrative that undermined the fairness of her plea. She also claims the prosecutor misstated her behavior during service of the summons, further
distorting the factual record presented at the hearing.
{¶46} The transcript reflects that the prosecutor read the contents of the complaint
into the record. T. at 5-6. The trial court found that the complaint sufficiently alleged the
essential elements to support a fourth-degree misdemeanor charge of disorderly conduct,
including fear of physical harm and persistence. Id. at 6. Based on that determination,
the court accepted the no contest plea and entered a finding of guilt. Notably, Trader
raised no objection at the hearing to the prosecutor’s statements and did not indicate any
confusion or disagreement with the factual basis offered in support of the amended
charge.
{¶47} Moreover, the trial judge was already familiar with the original complaint and
the nature of the allegations against Trader. Trader does not explain how the prosecutor’s
recitation of the original facts, already known to the court, rendered her plea involuntary
or otherwise unfair. She likewise fails to specify how the prosecutor’s remarks concerning
the service of the summons had any bearing on the sentence imposed, which matched
the terms of her plea bargain.
{¶48} Once again, Trader has not demonstrated that an error occurred, that it was
plain, or that it prejudiced her in a manner affecting her decision to plead. McAlpin, 2022-
Ohio-1567, ¶ 66; Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 22.
{¶49} We find no manifest injustice occurred as a result of the prosecutor’s
statements relating to the facts of the complaint, or what was said by Trader during the
service of summons.
{¶50} Trader’s second assignment of error is overruled. III.
{¶51} In her third assignment of error, Trader contends that the State failed to
provide timely and complete discovery, including body camera footage. She argues that
this alleged failure deprived her of a meaningful opportunity to prepare for trial or to
engage in informed plea negotiations. We find this argument unpersuasive.
{¶52} At the change of plea hearing, defense counsel informed the court that all
discovery, including the most recent body camera footage, had been received and
reviewed with Trader. Counsel stated:
[W]e’ve reviewed all the body cam. We have received all that’s been
in discovery in this case as of Monday, I had a chance to review all of them
with my client including the most recently provided videos, Ashlee [the
appellant] could confirm that. And I think that this is what amounts to a very
reasonable resolution in an otherwise very difficult case for all parties
involved.
T. at 7.
{¶53} Trader did not object to these representations. Nor did she request a
continuance to allow additional time to prepare for trial or further consider the plea offer.
On this record, there is no indication that the alleged discovery issue affected the
voluntariness of her plea or the fairness of the proceedings.
{¶54} Trader has not met her burden to show plain error occurred, that the error
was obvious, and that there is a reasonable probability that the error affected her decision
to enter a plea, or the fairness of the proceedings. We find no manifest injustice that
would warrant reversal. {¶55} Trader’s third assignment of error is overruled.
IV.
{¶56} In her fourth assignment of error, Trader contends that the trial court erred
by failing to rule on several critical motions, including a motion to dismiss for prosecutorial
misconduct, a motion to suppress evidence, and a motion to compel a bill of particulars.
She argues that the failure to address these motions deprived her of a fair hearing.
{¶57} On November 6, 2024, while represented by counsel, Trader filed the
following motions pro se: a motion to compel a bill of particulars (Docket Entry No. 11), a
motion to dismiss for prosecutorial misconduct (Docket Entry No. 12), and a motion to
suppress evidence (Docket Entry No. 13). Trader subsequently entered a negotiated
plea on November 20, 2024.
Hybrid Representation Is Not Permitted
{¶58} Although a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to waive counsel
and represent herself, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), there is no
corresponding right to hybrid representation, where a defendant is represented by
counsel and simultaneously acts as her own attorney. State v. Keenan, 81 Ohio St.3d
133, 138 (1998), citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984); State v. Ferguson,
2006-Ohio-1502, ¶ 97. Accordingly, a trial court is not required to entertain pro se motions
filed by a defendant who is represented by counsel. See State v. Williams, 2012-Ohio-
3417, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.); State v. Castagnola, 2018-Ohio-1604, ¶ 14 (9th Dist.); Storks v.
Sheldon, 2013 WL 3992592, at *35 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2013); State v. Lamb, 2018-Ohio-
1405, ¶ 56 (4th Dist.); State v. Davis, 2006-Ohio-5039, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.); State v. Greenleaf, 2006-Ohio-4317, ¶ 70 (11th Dist.); State v. Brown, 2017-Ohio-7704, ¶ 21 (7th
Dist.).
{¶59} Because Trader was represented by counsel at the time she filed the
motions at issue, the trial court was under no obligation to consider or rule on them.
Trader has not shown that the trial court’s inaction constituted error, plain or otherwise.
{¶60} Trader’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
V.
{¶61} In her fifth assignment of error, Trader argues that the trial court improperly
relied on civil matters, including the complainant’s victim impact statement, when
determining her sentence.
{¶62} The purpose of a victim impact statement is to inform the sentencing
authority of the actual harm suffered by the victim and the victim’s family as a result of the
offense. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 821 (1991); State v. Fautenberry, 72
Ohio St.3d 435, 439 (1995). See also R.C. 2947.051(B). Under R.C. 2947.051(A), victim
impact statements are required in all cases where a defendant is convicted of or pleads
guilty to a victim-involved felony.
{¶63} For misdemeanor offenses, R.C. 2929.22(D)(1) directs the sentencing court
to consider all relevant oral or written statements made by the victim, the victim’s
representative, or attorney (if applicable), the defendant, defense counsel, and the
prosecuting authority.
{¶64} We find that Trader’s claim lacks merit. She expressly agreed during the
proceedings that the maximum fine was an appropriate resolution of the case. The trial
court did not impose community control sanctions under R.C. 2929.25, nor did it order restitution pursuant to R.C. 2929.28(A). The court also unconditionally suspended her
thirty-day jail sentence. Further, the trial court indicated that if Trader were unemployed,
the court would consider much less than a maximum fine. In short, Trader received the
sentence she bargained for, regardless of the complainant’s statements at sentencing.
{¶65} Once again, Trader has not demonstrated that an error occurred, that it was
plain, or that it prejudiced her in a manner affecting her decision to plead, or the fairness
of the proceedings. McAlpin, 2022-Ohio-1567, ¶ 66; Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 22. We
find no manifest injustice occurred as a result of the trial court considering the
complainant’s victim impact statement.
{¶66} Trader’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶67} The judgment of the Mansfield Municipal Court, Richland County, Ohio is
affirmed.
By Popham, P.J.,
Baldwin, J., and
Gormley, J., concur