State v. Townsend
This text of 784 P.2d 881 (State v. Townsend) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
OPINION OF THE COURT BY
In a bench trial, the family court of the second circuit convicted defendant-appellant Floid Townsend (Defendant) of the offense of Abuse of a Household Member in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 709-906(1) (1985). Defendant contends that the family court prejudicially erred in precluding a witness from testifying on his behalf because of Defendant’s discovery violation. Concluding that the family court’s discovery sanction had no legal basis, we vacate the judgment of conviction and remand the case for a new trial.
[561]*561I.
On September 20, 1988, the State of Hawaii (State) filed a complaint, charging that Defendant physically abused a household member, Joanna Jeronimo (Jeronimo), on June 3, 1988. On September 30, 1988, Defendant filed a “Written Request for Disclosure,” pursuant to Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 16(b).1 The State reciprocated by filing a “Written Request for Disclosure,” on January 23, 1989, pursuant to HRPP Rules 12.12 [562]*562and 16(c).3 The case file does not indicate whether the State and Defendant responded to each other’s written requests.
The trial commenced and was completed on May 25, 1989. Jeronimo testified that, on the day in question, Defendant asked to use her credit card. Her refusal precipitated an argument. Defendant grabbed a bag that was wrapped around Jeronimo’s arm and then shoved and slammed her against the wall. The physical altercation resulted in injuries to Jeronimo.
On cross-examination, Jeronimo testified that Defendant also struck her with his fist during the altercation. Defense counsel then asked Jeronimo whether she had a conversation with a Bill Christian (Christian), after Defendant had been charged with the offense, in which she told Christian that Defendant had never struck her. Jeronimo answered “no.”
During the presentation of his case, Defendant sought to call Christian as a “rebuttal” witness to testify about Jeronimo’s prior inconsistent statement. The State objected on the ground that Defendant had not disclosed Christian’s name and address as requested in its January 23, 1989 written request. The family court sustained the State’s objection and precluded Christian from testifying in the case.
[563]*563At the conclusion of the trial, the court adjudged Defendant guilty, stating that it found “that Mr. Townsend’s testimony is not credible. The testimony of Ms. Jeronimo is credible.” Transcript at 40.
II.
The provisions of HRPP Rule 16, which are pertinent in this case, are subsections (a), (d), and (e)(8)(i) which provide as follows:
(a) Applicability. Subject to subsection (d) of this rule, discovery under this rule may be obtained in and is limited to cases .in which the defendant is charged with a felony, and may commence upon the filing in circuit court of an indictment or a complaint.
* * Hi
(d) Discretionary Disclosure. Upon a showing of materiality and if the request is reasonable, the court in its discretion may require disclosure as provided for in this Rule 16 in cases other than those in which the defendant is charged with a felony, but not in cases involving violations.
(e) Regulation of Discovery.
* * *
(8) Sanctions.
(i) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule or an order issued pursuant thereto, the court may order such party to permit the discovery, grant a continuance, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
Based on the foregoing provisions, in a case involving a felony, Rule 16 discovery is automatically available to the parties as a matter of right. However, the parties in a misdemeanor case may resort to discovery only by grace of the court’s discretion, upon a showing of materiality and reasonableness.
The offense of abuse of a household member is a misdemeanor. HRS § 709-906(5) (1985). Consequently, if the State desired the disclosure of the names and addresses of the persons Defendant [564]*564intended to call as witnesses, the State had to serve and File a motion for an order requiring such disclosure under HRPP Rule 16(d). Absent such an order, the family court had no basis for the preclusion of Christian as a witness in the case, since the court may impose sanctions under HRPP Rule 16(e)(8) only for noncompliance with provisions of Rule 16 or an order issued thereunder. In this misdemeanor case, the State did not obtain an order from the family court requiring Defendant to disclose the information the State desired. Therefore, the record does not show that Defendant failed to comply with HRPP Rule 16 or any order issued pursuant thereto. Under such circumstances, the family court reversibly erred in imposing the sanction of precluding Christian from testifying on Defendant’s behalf.
The State, however, argues that the family court’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree. Here, the guilt or innocence of Defendant hinged on whether the family court believed Jeronimo or Defendant. In our view, precluding Christian’s testimony which sought to impeach Jeronimo’s credibility was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Judgment of conviction vacated and case remanded for a new trial.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
784 P.2d 881, 7 Haw. App. 560, 1989 Haw. App. LEXIS 24, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-townsend-hawapp-1989.