State v. Tomlin

2026 Ohio 439

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 11, 2026
• Docket: 25CA000008
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Tomlin, 2026-Ohio-439.]

COURT OF APPEALS KNOX COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO Case No. 25CA000008

Plaintiff – Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Knox County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 25CR02-0022

TARA TOMLIN Judgment: Affirmed

Defendant – Appellant Date of Judgment Entry:February 11, 2026

BEFORE: CRAIG R. BALDWIN, P.J., KEVIN POPHAM, J, DAVID M. GORMLEY, J; Appellate Judges

APPEARANCES: CHARLES MCCONVILLE, NICOLE E. DERR, for Plaintiff-Appellee; TODD BARSTOW, for Defendant-Appellant

OPINION

Popham, J.,

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Tara Tomlin appeals from her conviction and sentence

following a negotiated guilty plea entered in the Knox County Court of Common Pleas.

She contends that her plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered

because the trial court failed to advise her that a guilty plea constitutes a complete

admission of guilt and that the court could proceed immediately to judgment and

sentencing. For the reasons below, we disagree.

Facts and Procedural History {¶2} On February 2, 2025, Tomlin was a passenger in a vehicle stopped by the

Mount Vernon Police Department. After a K-9 alerted to the presence of narcotics, officers

searched the vehicle and discovered drug paraphernalia. Tomlin was arrested and, during

booking, admitted that she was carrying methamphetamine on her person.

{¶3} The substance weighed approximately 18 grams—more than five times the

statutory bulk amount. Plea T. at 10.

{¶4} On February 10, 2025, a Knox County grand jury indicted Tomlin on one

count of Aggravated Possession of Drugs (methamphetamine), in an amount greater than

or equal to five grams but less than fifty grams, a felony of the second degree, in violation

of R.C. 2925.11(A).

{¶5} On May 29, 2025, Tomlin executed a written Crim.R. 11 plea form

identifying the charge, the rights waived, the maximum penalties, and the terms of the

negotiated plea. The trial court conducted a plea hearing that same day, accepted

Tomlin’s guilty plea, and ordered a presentence investigation. Plea T. at 12.

{¶6} Following review of the PSI and statements from the parties, on July 10,

2025, the trial court sentenced Tomlin to an indefinite prison term with a minimum of six

years and a potential maximum of nine years.

Assignment of Error

{¶7} “I. APPELLANT DID NOT KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY, AND

VOLUNTARILY ENTER HER GUILTY PLEA.”

Standard of Review and Governing Law

{¶8} Criminal Rule 11 requires that a guilty plea be entered knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily. Strict compliance is required with respect to the constitutional rights enumerated in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), while substantial compliance suffices for

nonconstitutional advisements under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b).

State v. Veney, 2008-Ohio-5200, ¶¶ 19, 31; State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990).

{¶9} A guilty plea constitutes a complete admission of guilt. Crim.R. 11(B)(1).

Advisement of this consequence is nonconstitutional and reviewed under a substantial-

compliance standard. State v. Griggs, 2004-Ohio-4415, ¶¶ 11-12.

{¶10} When substantial compliance applies, the defendant must demonstrate

prejudice—that but for the alleged error, the plea would not have been entered. Nero at

108; Veney at ¶ 15. We review compliance with Crim.R. 11 de novo.

Nero at 108-109.

Analysis

{¶11} The record reflects that Tomlin’s guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily entered.

{¶12} Tomlin executed a written plea form, signed by both Tomlin and her

counsel, which detailed the charge, the maximum penalties, and the constitutional rights

she agreed to waive. A written waiver of rights is presumed valid. State v. Clark, 38 Ohio

St.3d 252, 261 (1988).

{¶13} At the plea hearing, the trial court thoroughly advised Tomlin of her right to

a jury trial, the right to confront witnesses, the privilege against self-incrimination, the

state’s burden of proof, and her right to compulsory process. Plea T. at 8-9. Tomlin

affirmed that she understood these rights, the nature of the charge, and the penalties she

faced. Id. at 5-9. {¶14} Tomlin further confirmed that she was satisfied with counsel, had reviewed

the plea agreement, and admitted the factual basis for the offense. Id. at 10-11. She

expressly admitted guilt to Aggravated Possession of Drugs, a felony of the second

degree. Id. at 11.

{¶15} Even assuming the trial court did not expressly state that a guilty plea is a

“complete admission of guilt,” Tomlin cannot establish prejudice. She admitted guilt on

the record and did not assert innocence. Under these circumstances, she is presumed to

have understood the effect of her plea. Griggs, 2004-Ohio-4415 at ¶ 19.

{¶16} Nor was Tomlin prejudiced by any failure to advise that the court could

proceed immediately to judgment and sentencing. Sentencing was deferred pending a

presentence investigation, and Tomlin was sentenced more than a month later. Nothing

in the record suggests that this advisement would have altered her decision to plead

guilty. See State v. Woods, 2006-Ohio-2325, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.).

{¶17} Viewed as a whole, the plea colloquy reflects careful adherence to Crim.R.

11 and establishes that Tomlin entered her plea with full awareness of its consequences.

Conclusion

{¶18} The record demonstrates that Tomlin’s guilty plea was entered knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily. She has failed to show prejudice arising from any alleged

omission in the plea colloquy.

{¶19} Tomlin’s sole assignment of error is overruled. For the reasons stated in our Opinion, the judgment of the Knox County Court of

Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs to Appellant, Tara Tomlin.

By: Popham, J.

Baldwin, P.J. and

Gormley, J., concur