State v. Tomberlin

District Court of Appeal of Florida

State v. Tomberlin

160 So. 3d 166, 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 5071, 2015 WL 1546255

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedApril 8, 2015

DocketNo. 1D13-4648

StatusPublished

This text of 160 So. 3d 166 (State v. Tomberlin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Tomberlin, 160 So. 3d 166, 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 5071, 2015 WL 1546255 (Fla. Ct. App. 2015).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The State appeals an order granting Appellee’s motion for discharge based on the State’s failure to bring Appellee to trial within 15 days after expiration of the 175-day speedy trial period. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(a), (p). The State argues, and Appellee concedes, that the trial court erred when, in calculating the speedy trial period, it included the date of Appellee’s arrest. See State v. Naveira, 768 So.2d 1254, 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (“[T]he date of arrest is excluded in the 175-day calculation of time, despite that the calculation commences from the date of arrest.”). Accordingly, we reverse the order granting Appellee’s motion for discharge.¹

REVERSED.

MARSTILLER, SWANSON and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.

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PER CURIAM.

The State appeals an order granting Appellee’s motion for discharge based on the State’s failure to bring Appellee to trial within 15 days after expiration of the 175-day speedy trial period. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(a), (p). The State argues, and Appellee concedes, that the trial court erred when, in calculating the speedy trial period, it included the date of Appellee’s arrest. See State v. Naveira, 768 So.2d 1254, 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (“[T]he date of arrest is excluded in the 175-day calculation of time, despite that the calculation commences from the date of arrest.”). Accordingly, we reverse the order granting Appellee’s motion for discharge.¹

REVERSED.

MARSTILLER, SWANSON and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

160 So. 3d 166, 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 5071, 2015 WL 1546255, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-tomberlin-fladistctapp-2015.

Opinion

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