State v. . Todd

Supreme Court of North Carolina

State v. . Todd

30 S.E.2d 157, 224 N.C. 358, 1944 N.C. LEXIS 363

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedMay 24, 1944

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 30 S.E.2d 157 (State v. . Todd) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. . Todd, 30 S.E.2d 157, 224 N.C. 358, 1944 N.C. LEXIS 363 (N.C. 1944).

Pincite

Opinion

DeviN, J.

The defendant’s only assignment of error is to the following portion'of the judge’s charge to the jury: “When an intentional killing is admitted or established, the law presumes malice from the use of a deadly weapon and the defendant would -be guilty of murder in the second degree unless he can satisfy the jury of the truth of the facts, not beyond a reasonable doubt nor by the greater weight of the evidence but simply satisfy the jury of facts which justify his act or mitigate it to manslaughter and the burden is on the accused in such case to establish such facts to the satisfaction of the jury unless they arise out of the evidence against him.”

This statement of a principle of law appropriate to the definition of murder in the second degree was amplified and pointed to the facts in evidence in this case by the following instruction: “If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt or if you find from the admissions of the prisoner that he shot and killed the deceased, James L. Faison, on the 25th day of October, 1943; that he killed him intention *359 ally and that he killed him with a deadly weapon, then the prisoner is guilty of murder in the second degree and if you so. find it will be your duty to render a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree against the defendant, unless he has established, not beyond a reasonable doubt nor by the greater weight of the evidence, but simply to the satisfaction of the jury from the evidence he has offered or from the evidence offered against him, the legal provocation which will take from the crime the element of malice, presumed from killing with a deadly weapon, and thus reduce it to manslaughter, or which will excuse it altogether on the grounds of self-defense.”

The charge of the court was in accord with well settled principles of law, and the exception thereto cannot be sustained. S. v. Quick, 150 N. C., 820, 64 S. E., 163; S. v. Sheek, 219 N. C., 811, 15 S. E. (2d), 282; S. v. Beachum, 220 N. C., 531, 17 S. E. (2d), 674; S. v. Prince, 223 N. C., 392.

In the trial we find

No error..

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DeviN, J.

The defendant’s only assignment of error is to the following portion'of the judge’s charge to the jury: “When an intentional killing is admitted or established, the law presumes malice from the use of a deadly weapon and the defendant would -be guilty of murder in the second degree unless he can satisfy the jury of the truth of the facts, not beyond a reasonable doubt nor by the greater weight of the evidence but simply satisfy the jury of facts which justify his act or mitigate it to manslaughter and the burden is on the accused in such case to establish such facts to the satisfaction of the jury unless they arise out of the evidence against him.”

This statement of a principle of law appropriate to the definition of murder in the second degree was amplified and pointed to the facts in evidence in this case by the following instruction: “If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt or if you find from the admissions of the prisoner that he shot and killed the deceased, James L. Faison, on the 25th day of October, 1943; that he killed him intention *359 ally and that he killed him with a deadly weapon, then the prisoner is guilty of murder in the second degree and if you so. find it will be your duty to render a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree against the defendant, unless he has established, not beyond a reasonable doubt nor by the greater weight of the evidence, but simply to the satisfaction of the jury from the evidence he has offered or from the evidence offered against him, the legal provocation which will take from the crime the element of malice, presumed from killing with a deadly weapon, and thus reduce it to manslaughter, or which will excuse it altogether on the grounds of self-defense.”

The charge of the court was in accord with well settled principles of law, and the exception thereto cannot be sustained. S. v. Quick, 150 N. C., 820, 64 S. E., 163; S. v. Sheek, 219 N. C., 811, 15 S. E. (2d), 282; S. v. Beachum, 220 N. C., 531, 17 S. E. (2d), 674; S. v. Prince, 223 N. C., 392.

In the trial we find

No error..

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Bluebook (online)

30 S.E.2d 157, 224 N.C. 358, 1944 N.C. LEXIS 363, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-todd-nc-1944.

Opinion

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