State v. Toby Glenn Weatherly

371 P.3d 815, 160 Idaho 302, 2016 WL 1454342, 2016 Ida. App. LEXIS 47
CourtIdaho Court of Appeals
DecidedApril 14, 2016
Docket42777
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 371 P.3d 815 (State v. Toby Glenn Weatherly) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Idaho Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Toby Glenn Weatherly, 371 P.3d 815, 160 Idaho 302, 2016 WL 1454342, 2016 Ida. App. LEXIS 47 (Idaho Ct. App. 2016).

Opinion

HUSKEY, Judge.

Toby Glenn Weatherly appeals from his judgment of conviction, arguing that his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Idaho Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated when a jury found him guilty of grand theft and criminal possession of a financial transaction card.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The State charged Weatherly with one count of grand theft and one count of criminal possession of a financial transaction card, with a sentencing enhancement alleging Weatherly was a persistent violator of the law. A jury found Weatherly guilty of both counts and that Weatherly had two prior felonies. For each count, the district court imposed a five-year sentence, with one year determinate, to be served concurrently. Weatherly timely appeals from the judgment of conviction.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether a defendant’s prosecution complies with the constitutional protection against being placed in jeopardy twice is a question of law over which we exercise free review. State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 63, 14 P.3d 378, 383 (Ct.App.2000). The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” The clause affords a defendant three basic protections. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and multiple criminal punishments for the same offense. Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229, 114 S.Ct. 783, 788-89, 127 L.Ed.2d 47, 56 (1994); State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 622, 38 P.3d 1275, 1278 (Ct.App.2001).

III.

ANALYSIS

Weatherly argues that his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Idaho and United States Constitutions were violated because possession of a financial transaction card is a lesser included offense of grand theft. Weatherly did not raise the issue of double jeopardy below.

Generally, issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time on appeal. State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). Idaho decisional law, however, has long allowed appellate courts to consider a claim of error to which no objection was made below if the issue presented rises to the level of fundamental error. See State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007); State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 251, 486 P.2d 260, 262 (1971). In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court abandoned the definitions it had previously utilized to describe what may constitute fundamental error. The Perry Court held that an appellate court should reverse an unobjected-to error when the defendant persuades the court that the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) is clear or obvious without the need for reference to any additional information not contained in the appellate record; and (3) affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. Id. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.

There are two theories under which a particular offense may be determined to be a lesser included offense of a charged offense: the statutory theory and the pleading theory. See State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 527-529, 261 P.3d 519, 521-523 (2011). We hold that Weatherly has failed to persuade the Court that the alleged error violates an unwaived constitutional right because possession of a financial transaction card is not a lesser included offense of grand theft under either the statutory theory or the pleading theory.

*305 A. Possession of a Financial Transaction Card Is Not a Lesser Included Offense of Grand Theft Under the Statutory Theory

Under the statutory theory, “one offense is not considered a lesser included of another unless it is necessarily so under the statutory definition of the crime.” State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 433, 614 P.2d 970, 973 (1980). The test originated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). “An offense will be deemed to be a lesser included offense of another, greater offense, if all the elements required to sustain a conviction of the lesser included offense are included within the elements needed to sustain a conviction of the greater offense.” State v. McCormick, 100 Idaho 111, 114, 594 P.2d 149, 152 (1979).

A person commits grand theft when he (1) knowingly takes or exercises unauthorized control over, or makes an unauthorized transfer of an interest in (2) a financial transaction card (3) of another person, (4) with the intent of depriving the owner thereof. I.C. §§ 18-2403(3), 18-2407(l)(b)(3). A person commits criminal possession of a financial transaction card when he (1) acquires (2) a financial transaction card (3) without the consent of a card holder or the issuer (4) with the intent to defraud. I.C. § 18-3125(1). As illustrated below, the intent element of each crime is different.

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To prove grand theft, the State must prove the defendant intended to deprive the owner of a financial transaction card. To prove criminal possession of a financial transaction card, the State must prove the defendant intended to defraud. The intent to defraud is not limited to the owner and could apply to the owner, the issuer of the card, or the subsequent merchant or entity from whom the card was redeemed. Therefore, because each crime requires a different intent element, possession of a financial transaction card is not a lesser included offense of grand theft under the statutory theory.

B. Possession of a Financial Transaction Card Is Not a Lesser Included Offense of Grand Theft Under the Pleading Theory

Under the pleading theory adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court, a lesser included offense is one “alleged in the information as a means or element of the commission of the higher offense.” State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 837, 841, 291 P.3d 1036, 1040 (2013), citing Thompson, 101 Idaho at 434, 614 P.2d at 974. The pleading theory does not look at evidence adduced at trial, only the language of the charging document. See McKinney, 153 Idaho at 841, 291 P.3d at 1040.

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Bluebook (online)
371 P.3d 815, 160 Idaho 302, 2016 WL 1454342, 2016 Ida. App. LEXIS 47, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-toby-glenn-weatherly-idahoctapp-2016.