State v. Tillman

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: August 6, 2025
• Docket: 24-817
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA24-817

Filed 6 August 2025

Duplin County, Nos. 20CRS050582-300, 20CRS050583-300, 20CRS050611-300

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

WILLIE MICHAEL TILLMAN, JR., Defendant.

Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 1 September 2023 by Judge

George R. Hicks, III in Superior Court, Duplin County. Heard in the Court of Appeals

18 March 2025.

Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Whitney N. Shaffer, for the State.

Ryan Legal Services, PLLC, by John E. Ryan III, for defendant-appellant.

STROUD, Judge.

Defendant appeals from a judgment entered 1 September 2023. Defendant

argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of felony

breaking or entering a motor vehicle as the State did not present sufficient evidence

Defendant intended to permanently deprive the owner of the tow strap when he took

it from the toolbox. As the evidence was sufficient to reach the jury, we conclude

there was no error. STATE V. TILLMAN

Opinion of the Court

I. Background

The State’s evidence tended to show that on 25 March 2020, Master Trooper

John Gurganus of the North Carolina State Highway Patrol responded to a call of a

vehicle in a ditch in front of Warsaw Heating and Air, a business in Warsaw, North

Carolina. When Trooper Gurganus arrived, he saw a black Chevrolet Tahoe in the

ditch and a burgundy Ford Expedition “in front of it with a tow strap hooked between

them.” Defendant was alone outside the Ford Expedition. Defendant said the Tahoe

belonged to him and the Expedition belonged to his friend; Defendant stated his

friend lived nearby and let Defendant take the Expedition to try to pull his vehicle

out of the ditch. Trooper Gurganus testified he told Defendant “with the strap that

he had, [he] was pretty confident it was not going work, and [he] told him that he was

going to have to get somebody else.” Defendant left the scene in the Expedition, got

his father, and returned to pull the Tahoe from the ditch. When Defendant returned,

Trooper Gurganus saw him park the Expedition in the parking lot at Warsaw Heating

and Air. Trooper Gurganus had another call pending and observed Defendant “was

not hurt, [and] there was not a thousand dollars worth of damage, [so] there was no

reason . . . to do a report[.]” Trooper Gurganus also did not believe Defendant to be

impaired so he “moved on.”

Curtis Boone, who was employed at Warsaw Heating and Air on the date of

this incident, testified that the Expedition did not belong to Defendant but to the

owner of Warsaw Heating and Air, Doug Brinson. Mr. Boone also testified he owned

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a 1973 GMC truck and that he left the truck in the parking lot of Warsaw Heating

and Air overnight. Upon arriving at work the morning of 25 March, Mr. Boone

noticed his GMC truck “had been moved and [the] hood was up, had been up.” Mr.

Boone kept ratchet straps and tow straps in a toolbox in the bed of the truck. Mr.

Boone testified that the ratchet straps and tow straps were missing from the toolbox.

He also noticed tire marks around the truck on the ground and “followed [the] truck

tire marks through the mud . . . all the way back where the car was in the ditch, and

that’s where the [ratchet] straps were at, broke laying on the ground.” Mr. Boone

also noticed “spin marks” “where [Defendant] tried to pull the car out.” Mr. Boone

testified that he never got the tow straps back.

Later that morning, Trooper Gurganus again responded to a call at Warsaw

Heating and Air to speak with Mr. Boone. Trooper Gurganus told Mr. Boone to file a

report in Kenansville and then went to the Warsaw Police Department to ask for help

in locating the black Tahoe he had seen earlier with Defendant. Trooper Gurganus

was notified around 10:30 a.m. by Officer Maury Camron of the Warsaw Police

Department of Defendant’s location. Trooper Gurganus approached Defendant and

began talking to him and Defendant explained why he was using the vehicles.

Defendant explained to Trooper Gurganus that “he didn’t mean any harm and that

he was just trying to get his vehicle out.”

On 7 June 2021, Defendant was indicted in file number 20 CRS 50582 for one

count of felony breaking or entering a motor vehicle for breaking into the GMC truck,

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one count of misdemeanor larceny of the tow straps that were in the GMC truck, and

one count of misdemeanor injury to personal property for damage to the ratchet

straps.1 The indictment for breaking or entering into a motor vehicle specifically

stated that Defendant “did break and enter a motor vehicle, a 1973 GMC Truck . . .

with the intent to commit larceny therein.” Trial began on 28 August 2023. At the

close of the State’s evidence, Defendant moved to dismiss all charges arguing the

State failed to present evidence of every element of every charged offense. This

motion was denied. Defendant renewed his motion at the close of all evidence. On 1

September 2023, the jury found Defendant guilty of all charges. After the jury

verdict, Defendant renewed his motions, which were denied. The trial court

consolidated the charges of felony breaking or entering of a motor vehicle,

misdemeanor larceny, and injury to real property into a single judgment. Defendant

gave oral notice of appeal in open court.

II. Analysis

Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the

breaking or entering charge based on insufficient evidence of intent to commit larceny

since the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Defendant intended to

1 Defendant was also indicted for several additional crimes in file numbers 20 CRS 50583 and 20 CRS

50611. However, the only issue Defendant raises on appeal is to the elements of breaking and/or entering a motor vehicle in file number 20 CRS 50582. Thus, our discussion will be limited to that charge.

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permanently deprive Mr. Boone of the tow straps at the time Defendant took them

from the toolbox of Mr. Boone’s 1973 GMC Truck.

Whether the State presented substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense is a question of law; therefore, we review the denial of a motion to dismiss de novo. The question for a court on a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of [the] defendant’s being the perpetrator of such offense. If so, the motion is properly denied. Substantial evidence is the same as more than a scintilla of evidence.

State v. Tucker, 380 N.C. 234, 236-37, 867 S.E.2d 924, 927 (2022) (citations and

quotation marks omitted). Further, while “[s]ubstantial evidence is the same as more

than a scintilla of evidence[,]” “the trial court should be concerned only about whether

the evidence is sufficient for jury consideration, not about the weight of the evidence.”

Id. at 237, 867 S.E.2d at 927. All evidence must be reviewed in the light most

favorable to the State, “giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” Id.

“Contradictions and discrepancies are for the jury to resolve and do not warrant

dismissal.” State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980).

The elements of breaking or entering a motor vehicle under North Carolina

General Statute Section 14-56 are: “(1) . . . a breaking or entering by the defendant;

(2) without consent; (3) into a motor vehicle; (4) containing goods, wares, freight, or

anything of value; and (5) with the intent to commit any felony or larceny therein.”

State v. Jackson, 162 N.C. App. 695, 698, 592 S.E.2d 575, 577 (2004) (emphasis

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omitted); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-56 (2023). “The essential elements of larceny

are that the defendant (1) took the property of another; (2) carried it away; (3) without

the owner’s consent; and (4) with the intent to deprive the owner of his property

permanently.” State v. Campbell, 373 N.C. 216, 221, 835 S.E.2d 844, 848 (2019); see

also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-72 (2023).

“Intent is a mental attitude seldom provable by direct evidence. It must

ordinarily be proved by circumstances from which it may be inferred.” State v. Chillo,

208 N.C. App. 541, 546, 705 S.E.2d 394, 398 (2010) (citation omitted). Intent to

commit a larceny “may be inferred by demonstrating that [the] defendant did not

intend to return the property and was indifferent as to whether the owner ever

recovered the property.” State v. Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. 446, 473, 573 S.E.2d 870, 889

(2002) (citations omitted). This Court has held that a defendant’s intent to

permanently deprive an owner of property may properly be inferred from the

surrounding circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 75 N.C. App. 294, 297-98, 330

S.E.2d 668, 670 (1985) (concluding that abandonment of a stolen vehicle was properly

inferred to be evidence of the defendant’s intent to permanently deprive the owner of

the vehicle); see also Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. at 473, 573 S.E.2d at 889 (inferring intent

where the defendant abandoned the vehicle near the crime scene).

Here, Defendant argues there is insufficient evidence to establish intent at the

time of his breaking and entering as he only “intended to temporarily use the straps”

and “despite his best intentions did not return the straps[.]” Trooper Gurganus stated

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that Defendant “said he did not mean any harm and that he was just trying to get his

vehicle out” from the ditch. Even considering Defendant’s self-serving statement to

Trooper Gurganus that he intended to return the straps, the trial court was required

to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State with every reasonable

inference drawn in the State’s favor. See Smith, 300 N.C. at 78-79, 265 S.E.2d at 169.

And this Court may not weigh the credibility of witnesses or weigh the evidence; the

jury has that role. See id.

Defendant relies on State v. Kirkpatrick, 34 N.C. App. 452, 238 S.E.2d 615

(1977), which states “the intent at the time of the breaking or entering must be

established by the evidence to convict a defendant of felony breaking or entering.” Id.

at 455, 238 S.E2d at 618. In Kirkpatrick, three defendants entered a garage, left, and

drove their vehicle out of view of the garage; two defendants then reentered the

garage to remove a C.B. radio from the victim’s automobile. See id. This Court

concluded that the “State’s evidence would justify the jury’s finding[,]” of felony

breaking or entering of a motor vehicle in that the defendant entered the victim’s

garage for 30 seconds, tried to remove the C.B. radio from the automobile leaving his

fingerprint on the dashboard, returned to the defendant’s car and drove it while two

defendants returned to the garage where they successfully removed the C.B. radio.

Id. While Kirkpatrick is factually distinguishable from the present case, the same

reasoning applies here. Based on Defendant’s actions, the jury could infer

Defendant’s intent.

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Here, the State’s evidence showed Defendant went to Warsaw Heating and Air

and took the tow straps and ratchet straps from the GMC pickup truck belonging to

Mr. Boone. Defendant used the tow straps to retrieve his vehicle from the ditch but

did not return them; this tends to show that Defendant intended to deprive the owner

of any further use of the tow straps. Defendant claimed he had intended to return

the tow straps after Trooper Gurganus went to investigate the missing items, hours

after the initial interaction when the Tahoe was in the ditch. The evidence, viewed

in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient for the jury to infer that

Defendant had the intent to permanently deprive Mr. Boone of the tow straps at the

time he committed the breaking or entering of the vehicle. See State v. Barts, 316

N.C. 666, 690, 343 S.E.2d 828, 843-44 (1986) (explaining that “the intent to

permanently deprive an owner of his property could be inferred where there was no

evidence that the defendant ever intended to return the property, but instead showed

a complete lack of concern as to whether the owner ever recovered the property”

(citation omitted)). This argument is without merit.

III. Conclusion

We conclude the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to

dismiss based on insufficiency of the evidence.

NO ERROR.

Judges ZACHARY and COLLINS concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

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