[Cite as State v. Thomas, 2026-Ohio-20.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. {48}L-25-00049
Appellee/Cross-appellant Trial Court No. CR0202401945
v.
Coleman D. Thomas DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant/Cross-appellee Decided: January 6, 2026
*****
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Lorrie J. Rendle, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee/cross-appellant.
Henry Schaefer, for appellant/cross-appellee.
***** MAYLE, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Coleman Thomas, appeals the February 14, 2025 judgment of the
Lucas County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to four to six years in prison. For
the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
I. Background and Facts
{¶ 2} Thomas was charged with one count of aggravated burglary in violation of
R.C. 2911.11(A)(1), a first-degree felony. {¶ 3} Thomas’s case was tried to the court. At trial, the State presented the
testimony of Toledo Police Department lieutenant Philip Cook, sergeant Jimmie Bennett,
detective Timothy Langlois, and officers Bradley Knapp and Thomas Burzynski, and
Toledo Fire Department captain Brian Gardner. Although I.H., the alleged victim, was
properly subpoenaed, she did not appear at trial.
{¶ 4} Cook testified that he is responsible for retrieving 911 calls and call records.
He presented the records of I.H.’s and I.H.’s mother’s 911 calls from the morning of June
26, 2024. According to the incident detail report related to the calls, the two 911 calls
came in at 2:09 and 2:14 a.m. The report also notes that officers were “TAKING ONE
IN CUSTODY” at 2:19 a.m., and again notes that the suspect was taken into custody at
2:26 a.m.
{¶ 5} Thomas objected to the admission of the 911 calls on the basis that the
statements in them were testimonial and neither declarant was available to be cross-
examined at trial, in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The trial court overruled his objection.
{¶ 6} In the first 911 call that the State played for the court, after I.H. identifies
herself, gives her address, and asks for someone to “please get here,” she tells the
operator that “he’s here, in my house” and explains that “he busted [her] windows . . .”
and said that he is not leaving. She also says that “he hit [her], he beat [her]” and her
“head is lumped up.” She identifies the assailant as Coleman Thomas, her children’s
father. She tells the operator that Thomas has a weapon but does not answer when the
2. operator asks if it is a gun or a knife. Throughout the call, a man and woman are yelling
in the background.
{¶ 7} In the second 911 call, the female caller asks for help to “please get here
immediately” because “a man has broke in the house . . . .” She tells the operator that
“the whole door fell down. The window out.” When the operator asks if the person who
broke in is still there, the caller responds, “he’s going back and forth.” After giving that
answer, the caller begins yelling at a man whose voice can be heard in the background of
the call, and she argues with the man for the rest of the call.
{¶ 8} Knapp was one of the officers who responded to the 911 calls from I.H.’s
apartment. When he got to the apartment, the occupants told him that the suspect had
fled. He and his partner began checking the area for the suspect for their and the victim’s
safety. They were told that a suspect was running away from the area, but they did not
chase him. Other officers eventually apprehended the suspect—Thomas—about a block
away from I.H.’s apartment.
{¶ 9} When Knapp got to the apartment, I.H. was “[h]ysterical” and in shock. He
noticed that a sliding door was “completely off the hinges and laying inward into the
apartment.” Based on where the door was laying, Knapp believed that it was “forced
from the outside to the in.” The pictures that Knapp took of I.H.’s apartment and patio
showed “property that was basically thrown about in the apartment that was laying on top
of the door” and items on the patio that Thomas had knocked over. In Knapp’s
experience, this type of property destruction usually indicates some kind of struggle.
Knapp also took a picture of a cut in the patio door screen because “there was possibly a
3. knife involved, and it appeared that the screen was cut.” Additionally, Knapp took
pictures of a contusion on I.H.’s forehead.
{¶ 10} According to information that Knapp learned from other officers, Thomas
went to the apartment because he wanted his fishing poles. The officers did not find
fishing poles inside the apartment, but they did find some in a dumpster behind a carport
outside of the apartment.
{¶ 11} On cross-examination, Knapp said that he did not look around the
apartment to see if any property belonging to a man or any mail addressed to Thomas was
there. Although Knapp had a theory about how the door ended up inside of the
apartment, he did not know how the door actually got there. Similarly, he did not know
how the items on top of the door and on the patio ended up in their locations, how the
patio screen got slashed, or when or how I.H.’s forehead was injured.
{¶ 12} Gardner testified that he responded to an assault at I.H.’s apartment.
According to the incident report from the run, I.H.’s chief complaint was an assault with
bodily force that caused a head injury. Specifically, I.H. had a bump on her forehead that
the EMTs treated with an ice pack to reduce the swelling. I.H. was upset and “[l]ooked
like she had been in an altercation.” I.H. declined Gardner’s offer to take her to the
hospital.
{¶ 13} On cross, Gardner testified that he did not see any bruising on I.H., but
“she was a darker complected woman. It is tough to tell in that short of a time span.” He
did not know if the existence of swelling on I.H.’s forehead was later confirmed by a
doctor.
4. {¶ 14} Burzynski testified that he was one of the officers who responded to I.H.’s
and I.H.’s mother’s 911 calls. He arrived at I.H.’s apartment around 2:00 a.m. After
getting a description of Thomas and learning which direction he ran, Burzynski searched
for him but ultimately did not find him.
{¶ 15} Once Thomas was in custody, Burzynski went back to I.H.’s apartment.
I.H. was “hysterical, kind of yelling and screaming.” He saw an injury on I.H.’s
forehead. She was holding an ice pack on her forehead and kept her head down. Inside
the apartment, he saw “[t]he sliding glass door on the floor and stuff strewn about the
apartment.”
{¶ 16} On cross, Burzynski testified that he was unsure whether one of the
pictures pulled from his body camera video showed a duffle bag on the floor. There
appeared to be shoes in one of the photos. Other than I.H.’s statement that the door was
“kicked in,” Burzynski had no way of knowing whether the door ended up on the floor
accidentally or intentionally.
{¶ 17} Burzynski looked through the whole apartment but did not look for male
clothing, duffle bags, mail addressed to Thomas, or anything else that would indicate that
Thomas lived at the apartment.
{¶ 18} Bennett also responded to I.H.’s apartment the night of the incident. As a
sergeant, he does not usually respond to domestic violence incidents but he decided to
respond to this one “based off the [911] call text saying that the [suspect] had a knife, and
that there was screaming going on in the background.”
5. {¶ 19} After going to the apartment and talking to I.H., Bennett and two other
crews began looking for Thomas. One of the other crews saw Thomas and tried to
apprehend him, but he fled from them. Bennett saw Thomas fleeing from the other crew,
chased him, and took him into custody. Thomas was initially “a little hesitant” when
Bennett tried to apprehend him, but he complied “after a few orders of [Bennett] telling
him to get on the ground . . . .” Thomas was “very agitated” when Bennett took him into
custody. He told Bennett that he was at the apartment to get his fishing poles. There
were fishing poles found outside at the apartment complex.
{¶ 20} On cross, Bennett testified that Thomas did not have a knife on him when
Bennett arrested him, and Bennett did not find a knife anywhere near Thomas.
{¶ 21} Thomas was “[f]airly” compliant when Bennett caught up to him. He was
attempting to jump a fence, but he stopped when Bennett got his taser out.
{¶ 22} When Bennett was inside the apartment, he did not look for a knife. He did
not see any items belonging to a male.
{¶ 23} Langlois, the detective assigned to this case, testified that he got to I.H.’s
apartment about an hour after I.H.’s and I.H.’s mother’s 911 calls. He noticed that her
“door was inside the apartment” and that there were “a couple things knocked off, but
there was no other damage [he] saw.”
{¶ 24} Langlois personally delivered a subpoena for trial to I.H. the week before
trial. In his experience, it was sometimes difficult to get witness cooperation in domestic
violence cases because of fear.
6. {¶ 25} Langlois interviewed Thomas as part of his investigation. In his interview,
Thomas told Langlois that he lives in Detroit and stays with his brother on Rogan Way
when he is in Toledo to visit his children. He explained that he and I.H. “got into it all
the way from” I.H.’s sister’s house near Rogan Way to I.H.’s apartment. I.H. left him
and made him walk. He went to I.H.’s apartment to “get [his] shit.” As he was trying to
leave, they “got into a scuffle” because she was mad that he wanted to go back to Detroit.
He also explained that I.H.’s patio door came off very easily. Beyond that, Thomas said,
“I’m not going to say what happened, bro, because I’m not about to incriminate my wife .
. . we got into it, bro. We got into it. That’s all I’m going to say. She did what she did. I
did what I did, bro.”
{¶ 26} Of the things that Thomas said in his interview, Langlois found it
significant that he admitted that he did not live at I.H.’s apartment. He also noted that
Thomas said, “I did what I did, and she did what she did.” The fishing poles that Thomas
talked about were found behind some dumpsters about 100 to 150 yards away from the
apartment.
{¶ 27} On cross-examination, Langlois testified that Thomas said that he brought
the fishing poles down from Detroit in a U-Haul.
{¶ 28} Langlois never considered that Thomas might have been invited into I.H.’s
{¶ 29} After Langlois’s testimony, the State rested.
{¶ 30} Thomas moved for acquittal under Crim.R. 29 because there was no direct
evidence that Thomas was in I.H.’s apartment. Beyond that, Thomas told Langlois in his
7. interview that he stays at the apartment sometimes, and there was no evidence of his
permission to be in the apartment being revoked. Additionally, he claimed that it was
clear from the evidence that Thomas went to I.H.’s apartment to reclaim his property, not
with the intent to cause harm or commit a crime. In response, the State pointed to I.H.’s
911 call, in which she named Thomas and told the operator that he busted her window, he
beat her, and she was scared. It also noted that her door was pushed in from the outside.
The trial court denied Thomas’s motion.
{¶ 31} Thomas did not present any evidence.
{¶ 32} The court found Thomas guilty of aggravated burglary. It sentenced him to
four to six years in prison. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court told Thomas that he
would be subject to a mandatory term of postrelease control of two to five years upon his
release from prison and the consequences of violating postrelease control.
{¶ 33} In its sentencing entry, regarding postrelease control, the trial court stated,
Defendant notified of post-release control as follows: Felony Sex Offense: 5 years mandatory; F-1: 2-5 years mandatory; F-2: 18 months-3 years mandatory; F-3 (offense of violence, R.C. 2901.01(A)(9)): 1-3 years mandatory; F-3 (other): up to 2 years discretionary; F-4: up to 2 years discretionary; F-5: up to 2 years discretionary. Defendant further notified that if post-release control conditions are violated, the adult parole authority or parole board may impose a more restrictive or longer control sanction or return Defendant to prison for up to nine months for each violation, up to a maximum of 50% of the minimum stated term originally imposed. Defendant further notified that if the violation is a new felony conviction, Defendant may be both returned to prison for the greater of one year or the time remaining on post-release control, plus receive a prison term for the new felony (-ies).
8. {¶ 34} Thomas now appeals, raising two assignments of error:
I. The trial court erred in admitting the 911 calls (State’s Exhibit 1) containing out-of-court statements by the alleged victim, I.H., and her mother, in violation of the Defendant-Appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him, as the statements were testimonial under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and the declarants were unavailable for cross-examination.
II. The trial court’s finding of guilt for aggravated burglary under R.C. 2911.11(A)(1) was against the manifest weight of the evidence, as the greater weight of credible evidence does not support the conclusion that Coleman Thomas trespassed into the apartment with the intent to commit a criminal offense and inflicted physical harm.
{¶ 35} Additionally, the State filed a cross-appeal relating to Thomas’s sentence:
Although at sentencing the trial court properly notified Appellant/Cross-Appellee Coleman Thomas that his conviction for aggravated burglary, a felony of the first degree, included a mandatory term of post-release control (“PRC”) of 2 to 5 years, the February 11, 2025, sentencing entry (e-filed February 14, 2025) only listed the possible ranges of PRC terms associated with the various felony degree levels. As such, the State submits that the trial court did not properly notify Thomas of the term and nature of PRC in this case. Remand with instructions to issue a nunc pro tunc entry is therefore necessary to address this limited issue.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Admission of the 911 calls did not violate Thomas’s right to confront witnesses.
{¶ 36} In his first assignment of error, Thomas argues that the trial court violated
his right to confront the witnesses against him by admitting the 911 calls by I.H. and her
mother. He contends that the statements in the calls were testimonial because they
described past events and served to document evidence for prosecution instead of
addressing an immediate threat. Further, he claims that the statements were inadmissible
because I.H. and her mother were unavailable to testify at trial and he did not have a prior
opportunity to cross-examine them about their statements. He also contends that the trial 9. court’s error was not harmless, and that the State’s reliance on hearsay exceptions for the
admissibility of the statements does not cure a Confrontation Clause violation.
{¶ 37} The State responds that the statements in the 911 calls are not testimonial
because they were made before Thomas was apprehended and while he was still in the
apartment posing a threat to the apartment’s occupants. It also argues that the statements
fall within the present sense impression and excited utterance hearsay exceptions in
Evid.R. 803(1) and (2), so the trial court properly admitted them.
{¶ 38} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in
relevant part, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
be confronted with the witnesses against him.” In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
53-54 (2004), the United States Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause bars
“admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless [she]
was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.” “[T]he proper analysis for determining whether out-of-court statements
violate the Confrontation Clause is . . . whether they are testimonial in nature.” Toledo v.
Sailes, 2008-Ohio-6400, ¶ 13 (6th Dist.), citing Crawford at 61. We conduct a de novo
review of evidentiary rulings that implicate the Confrontation Clause. State v. McKelton,
2016-Ohio-5735, ¶ 97.
{¶ 39} Whether the admission of a recording as evidence at trial violates the
Confrontation Clause depends on whether the recorded statements are testimonial or not.
State v. McMillion, 2025-Ohio-5304, ¶ 19 (6th Dist.). That is, the admission of a
recording containing testimonial statements without the opportunity for cross-
10. examination violates the Confrontation Clause; the admission of nontestimonial
statements does not. Id. Statements are testimonial if the witness made them with the
reasonable belief that they will be used at a trial. In re D.K., 2009-Ohio-6347, ¶ 20 (6th
Dist.). Statements are nontestimonial if the witness made them to enable the police to
assist during an ongoing emergency. State v. Williams, 2013-Ohio-726, ¶ 6 (6th Dist.).
To determine whether a statement is testimonial or nontestimonial, we use the “primary
purpose” test, which provides:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.
State v. Costilla, 2024-Ohio-3221, ¶ 30 (6th Dist.).
{¶ 40} Therefore, whether statements are testimonial or nontestimonial depends on
whether they were made to seek assistance during an ongoing emergency. Whether an
emergency exists and is ongoing “‘is a highly context-dependent inquiry.’” State v.
Stevenson, 2023-Ohio-4853, ¶ 62 (6th Dist.), quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344,
363 (2011). When deciding whether evidence is testimonial or not, a court must consider
“‘the statements and actions of both the declarant and interrogators . . . .’” State v. Jones,
2012-Ohio-5677, ¶ 155, quoting Bryant at 367. Generally, “[a] 911 call to report an
ongoing emergency, with statements made contemporaneously with the emergency to
request police assistance, are not testimonial statements for Sixth Amendment purposes.”
11. Costilla at ¶ 35; State v. Wilcox, 2024-Ohio-5719, ¶ 12 (lead opinion), citing Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 818, 827-828 (2006).
{¶ 41} In this case, it is apparent that the 911 calls were made for the purpose of
seeking help during an ongoing emergency. In her call, I.H. explained that Thomas
“busted [her] windows,” was in her house, had a weapon, had hit her and beaten her, and
would not leave. She requested that someone “please get here.” There is a man yelling
in the background of the entire call. Similarly, in the second call, the caller tells the
operator that a man has broken into the house, the door fell down and the window is out,
and the man is “going back and forth.” She asked for help to “please get here
immediately.” The caller spends a portion of the call yelling at a man whose voice is
heard in the background. These facts show (1) an emergency—a man breaking into the
apartment, possibly with a weapon; (2) that the emergency was ongoing—the man was
still in the apartment; and (3) that the 911 calls were made to obtain police assistance.
Thus, the primary purpose of the statements in the 911 calls was to seek help during an
emergency, so the statements were not testimonial. Costilla at ¶ 35. Because the
statements were not testimonial, the trial court did not err by admitting the 911 calls.
Therefore, Thomas’s first assignment of error is not well-taken.
B. Thomas’s conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 42} In his second assignment of error, Thomas argues that his conviction is
against the manifest weight of the evidence because the State failed to present credible
evidence supporting every element of the offense. He contends that the trial court’s
reliance on circumstantial evidence and dismissal of evidence showing that he had
12. permission to be in the apartment created a manifest miscarriage of justice. The State
responds that Thomas’s conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence because it
established the elements of aggravated burglary beyond a reasonable doubt.
{¶ 43} When we review a claim that a verdict is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, we weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of
the witnesses, and determine whether the trial court clearly lost its way in resolving
evidentiary conflicts so as to create such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d
380, 387 (1997). We do not view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution. “Instead, we sit as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and scrutinize ‘the factfinder’s
resolution of the conflicting testimony.’” State v. Robinson, 2012-Ohio-6068, ¶ 15 (6th
Dist.), quoting id. at 387. Reversal on manifest weight grounds is reserved for “‘the
exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’”
Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).
{¶ 44} Although we consider the credibility of witnesses under a manifest-weight
standard, we must, nonetheless, extend special deference to the trial court’s credibility
determinations, given that it is the court that has the benefit of seeing the witnesses
testify, observing their facial expressions and body language, hearing their voice
inflections, and discerning qualities such as hesitancy, equivocation, and candor. State v.
Fell, 2012-Ohio-616, ¶ 14 (6th Dist.).
{¶ 45} Thomas was convicted of aggravated burglary in violation of R.C.
2911.11(A)(1), which provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o person, by force, stealth, or
13. deception, shall trespass in an occupied structure . . . when another person other than an
accomplice of the offender is present, with purpose to commit in the structure . . . any
criminal offense, if . . . [t]he offender inflicts, or attempts or threatens to inflict physical
harm on another[.]”
{¶ 46} Thomas challenges the weight of the evidence related to the trespass,
purpose to commit a criminal offense, and physical harm elements of aggravated
burglary, as well as the overall strength and quality of the State’s evidence.
{¶ 47} “Trespass,” occurs when a defendant, without privilege to do so, knowingly
enters or remains on the land or premises of another. R.C. 2911.21(A)(1). A person acts
“knowingly,” regardless of his purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will probably
cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. R.C. 2901.22(B). A person
has knowledge of circumstances when he is aware that such circumstances probably
exist. Id. If a defendant’s presence at the property is initially lawful, a trespass may
nonetheless occur if the defendant’s privilege is revoked or terminated. State v.
Roberson, 2017-Ohio-4339, ¶ 49 (6th Dist.). A defendant’s privilege is revoked when he
commits a criminal offense inside the home. Id.
{¶ 48} Here, the evidence—in the form of I.H.’s and I.H.’s mother’s 911 calls—
showed that Thomas was in or remained in I.H.’s apartment without privilege to be there.
The fact that Thomas “busted [her] windows” and “the whole door fell down” as he
entered the apartment indicates that he was not entering the home with permission. See
State v. Lewis, 2024-Ohio-607, ¶ 48 (6th Dist.) (breaking a window to enter an apartment
at night is evidence of lack of permission). Even assuming that Thomas initially had
14. permission to be in the apartment, his permission was revoked as soon as he began
assaulting I.H., as evidenced by her report to the 911 operator that “he hit [her], he beat
[her]” and her “head is lumped up.” Thomas was in the apartment during the 911 calls,
which were made after he had assaulted I.H., so—at the very least—he remained in the
apartment after his privilege to be there was revoked by his assault on I.H.
{¶ 49} To prove the defendant had a “purpose to commit a criminal offense,” the
State must show that the defendant invaded the building specifically to commit a crime or
formed the intent to commit a crime during the course of a trespass. State v. Fontes, 87
Ohio St.3d 527 (2000), syllabus. A defendant has purpose in two scenarios: (1) when it
is his specific intention to cause a certain result; and (2) when the offense prohibits
certain conduct, it is the defendant’s specific intention to engage in that conduct,
regardless of what he intends to accomplish. R.C. 2901.22(A). Intent can rarely be
proven by direct evidence, but it can be inferred from the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case. State v. Teamer, 82 Ohio St.3d 490, 492 (1998).
{¶ 50} The facts and circumstances surrounding the break-in show that Thomas
formed the intent to assault I.H. during the course of trespassing in her apartment. A
person commits assault when they knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to
another. R.C. 2903.13(A). While Thomas was in I.H.’s apartment without privilege to
be there, he “hit” and “beat” I.H. It is reasonable to infer from Thomas’s demeanor
during his interview and his admission to Langlois that he and I.H. had been arguing that
evening that he was angry with her and, from that, it is also reasonable to infer that
Thomas specifically intended to cause I.H. physical harm while he was in her apartment.
15. {¶ 51} “Physical harm” includes “any injury, illness, or other physiological
impairment, regardless of its gravity or duration.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(3). Swelling and
bumps are physical harm. See City of Toledo v. Manning, 2019-Ohio-3405, ¶ 35 (6th
Dist.); State v. Hopkins, 2019-Ohio-522, ¶ 11 (5th Dist.). The evidence supports a
finding that Thomas caused I.H. physical harm. I.H. reported to the 911 operator that
Thomas beat her, and the responding officers and EMT testified to seeing a contusion,
bump, and swelling on I.H.’s forehead. The testimony of one witness, if believed, is
enough to support a conviction. State v. Sherman, 2024-Ohio-5354, ¶ 172 (6th Dist.).
The trial court clearly believed I.H.’s report that Thomas caused the injury to her
forehead and the first responders’ reports of seeing an injury, and we must defer to the
trial court’s credibility findings.
{¶ 52} In sum, after carefully reviewing the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses and weighing the testimony, we are not convinced that this is an exceptional
case in which the evidence weighs heavily against a conviction. The trial court did not
lose its way by convicting Thomas of aggravated burglary. Therefore, Thomas’s
conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and his second assignment
of error is not well-taken.
C. The sentencing entry fails to properly notify Thomas of postrelease control.
{¶ 53} In its cross-assignment of error, the State argues that the trial court failed to
properly notify Thomas of the term of postrelease control he is facing when he finishes
his prison term because the trial court’s sentencing entry lists the ranges of possible
postrelease control terms associated with different levels of felonies, as opposed to
16. stating that Thomas is subject to a mandatory term of two to five years of postrelease
control for his first-degree felony conviction. Because the court told Thomas of the
proper postrelease control term at his sentencing hearing, the State contends that the
court’s error can be corrected with a nunc pro tunc entry. Thomas responds that the trial
court’s sentencing entry included the proper postrelease control term for a first-degree
felony, so any error in including extra information is harmless. He also argues that the
State waived its right to challenge the postrelease control notification by failing to raise it
at or after the sentencing hearing, and any error does not rise to the level of plain error.
{¶ 54} As an initial matter, we do not find that the State forfeited its right to raise
the issue of postrelease control notification. The trial court properly notified Thomas of
postrelease control at the sentencing hearing, so the State would not have known of any
notification issues at that time. Nor would it have known of any issues with the
sentencing entry before the court finalized and issued it. Additionally, “[a]n attack on a
trial court’s imposition of postrelease control in a sentence must be brought on direct
appeal or it will be barred by res judicata. . . . This holding applies to the State as well as
the defendant.” State v. Bates, 2022-Ohio-475, ¶ 32. In short, the State followed the
proper procedure by filing its cross-appeal.
{¶ 55} Turning to the postrelease control notification in Thomas’s sentencing
entry, we find that the trial court erred by failing to notify Thomas of the term of
postrelease control that it imposed at the sentencing hearing. When a trial court imposes
a prison term on a defendant, it is required to notify the defendant at the sentencing
hearing about postrelease control and is required to incorporate that notice into its
17. sentencing judgment entry. State v. Jordan, 2004-Ohio-6085, ¶ 17. The notice the court
incorporates into its sentencing entry must reflect the notice that it gave the defendant at
the sentencing hearing. State v. Qualls, 2012-Ohio-1111, ¶ 19. When a defendant is
notified about postrelease control at the sentencing hearing, but that notification is not
properly reflected in the sentencing entry, the omission can be corrected with a nunc pro
tunc entry. Id. at ¶ 24.
{¶ 56} Here, the trial court correctly told Thomas at his sentencing hearing that he
will be subject to a mandatory two-to-five-year term of postrelease control upon his
release from prison. The sentencing entry, which lists all possible terms of postrelease
control, does not reflect the notice that the court gave Thomas at the sentencing hearing.
Moreover, we have previously determined that this type of postrelease control
notification in the sentencing entry is clearly and convincingly contrary to law. State v.
Whitney, 2025-Ohio-4978, ¶ 20 (6th Dist.). Because the trial court did not properly
notify Thomas of postrelease control in the sentencing entry, we must reverse and remand
this case for the limited purpose of entering a nunc pro tunc entry that includes only the
postrelease control term applicable to Thomas. Therefore, we find that the State’s cross-
assignment of error is well-taken.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 57} For the foregoing reasons, the February 14, 2025 judgment of the Lucas
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for
the limited purpose of entering a nunc pro tunc judgment entry that includes only the
18. term of postrelease control applicable to Thomas. Thomas is ordered to pay the costs of
this appeal under App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed, in part, reversed, in part, and remanded.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J. Osowik, P.J. ____________________________ JUDGE Christine E. Mayle, J. ____________________________ Charles E. Sulek, J. JUDGE CONCUR. ____________________________ JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
19.